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The Enforcement of International Law
Through Municipal Law in the
United States
PHILIP QUINCY WRIGHT, Ph.D.

PREFACE
The theory of international law upon which this study is
based may be briefly summarized in a few statements. With
the present system of world organization, effective enforcement
of law is only possible through action by state administrative
and judicial organs. International law, therefore, can not be
effectively enforced except over persons subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state. We may therefore conclude that international
law can be effectively enforced only in so far as it prescribes,
conduct for persons and subordinate agencies of government.
The essential feature of international law is not that it lays
down rules of conduct for states, but that it holds states respon-
sible for the conduct of persons. International law, therefore,
should be regarded as the law binding the members, both persons
and states, of a "supra-national" state or a "community of na-
tions", the enforcement of which is delegated to the organs of
the states composing it. The German Constitution, with its
system of imperial law, binding on individuals but enforced
largely through the administrative officers and courts of the
component states, furnishes an illustration of such a system.
The recognition of this fact, that international law reaches
down to individuals, is, therefore, important. International law
can become effective through state enforcement in proportion as
it lays down obligations for persons, rather than for states. Much
of it now consists of rules prescribed for persons and officers of
government and the greater part of it can be described in terms
of such rules because the state can only act through human
agencies. When we say that a state is obliged to do or abstain
from doing certain acts, we can only mean that its chief executive
officer, or its legislature, or its courts are bound to observe cer-
tain rules, which, by proper constitutional checks, it is possible
for municipal law to enforce.
With this conception, that international law prescribes
rules of conduct for persons and public officers and imposes
obligations upon states, to enforce them, we shall consider the
rules of municipal law enforced in the United States in pur-
suance of this international obligation.
The distinction between a legal and a political method of
5
enforcement has been kept in mind. Where action is left to the
discretion of military, naval or executive officers or legislative
bodies as cases arise, the rule is not considered one of municipal
law. The term is only applied to the rules laid down as per-
manent and enforceable by governmental authority according to
an established procedure, either judicial or administrative.
The title to be given this study caused the author much
perplexity, and doubtless the one finally decided upon is open
to criticism. Mr. A. V. Dicey entitled his book on private
international law, "A Digest of the Law of England with
reference to the Conflict of Law." Perhaps this thesis could be
entitled "A Digest of the Law of the United States with reference
to International Law." Such a title, however, would imply a
more or less exhaustive treatment of the subject. The present
work does not pretend to digest the whole of the law of the
United States relating to the enforcement of international obli-
gations. It is intended merely to suggest a field which the writer
believes will bear further exploration. The title first considered
was "The Extent to which International Law is Incorporated
into the Law of the United States." Such a title would have
excluded consideration of the rules which we have designated
as laws supplementary to international law. These are municipal
law enforcing international obligations but are not rules of
international law incorporated into municipal law. The title
finally settled upon is certainly inclusive enough and indicates
that discussion is limited to the rules of international law
enforced as law in the United States, excluding those enforced by
executive authorities as
"political questions."
The general subject of the relationship of international to
municipal law has not been extensively considered in any English
treatise. Holland's excellent article on "International Law and
Acts of Parliament" published in his "Studies on International
Law" is a brief but valuable contribution. Professors J. B.
Scott and W. W. Willoughby in articles in the American Journal
of International Law, Westlake in an article entitled, "Is Inter-
national Law a part of the Law of England?" published in the
Law Quarterly Review, and Lawrence in his "Essays on some
disputed Questions of International Law" have discussed the
nature of international law and its relation to municipal law,
especially to the judiciary. Since this work was completed an
excellent discussion of ' ' The Relation of International Law to the
Law of England and of the United States of America" by
C. M. Picciotto has been published. This writer deals especially
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with the relative legal force of statutes, executive orders, treaties
and customary international law in the courts of England and
the United States. Walker in his ' ' Science of International Law '
',
"Westlake in his "Principles" as well as in his more recent work
on "International Law", and A. H. Snow in several articles in
the American Journal of International Law have emphasized the
idea that international law is law governing individuals
regarded as members of a society of nations, rather than law
simply between nations, as the name suggests. The last writer in
fact suggests the term "supra or super national" as a more
appropriate term.
Writers on jurisprudence have sometimes considered the sub-
ject but usually very briefly. With Austin's example before
them, they have excluded international law from the scope of
their subject. Gray's "Nature and Sources of the Law" and
Stephen's "History of the Criminal Law of England" contain
particularly lucid expositions from this standpoint.
The most important contributions to the subject are in Ger-
man. H. Triepel in his "Volkerrecht und Landesrecht" con-
siders the nature, sources and relationship of international and
municipal law. W. Kaufmann, in "Die Eeehtskraft des Inter-
nationalen Rechtes und das Verhaltnisse des Staats Organs zu
demselben" covers somewhat the same ground, but emphasizes
particularly the legal authority of international law and treaties
as immediate sources of municipal law.
In the present work, the writer has attempted to discover
the actual situation in the United States, with only incidental
reference to the theoretical relationship of the two branches of
jurisprudence. Primary reference has therefore been made to
the treaties, statutes, executive orders and court decisions of the
United States. Had it not been for the orderly arrangement of
much of this material in Moore's "Digest of International Law",
a monumental contribution to the science, the work would have
been practically impossible. Moore's International Arbitrations
have also been used, as have the collections of cases by Freeman
Snow, J. B. Scott, Pitt Cobbett, and Norman Bentwich. Much
use has also been made of the annual publications of the Naval
War College, in which numerous points of prize law have been
exhaustively discussed with especial reference to the practice
of the United States. Professor C. G. Fenwick's recent work on
the Neutrality laws of the United States has been constantly
referred to in dealing with that subject. Tucker and Blood's
edition of the Penal Code of 1910, Davis's edition of the Military
Laws and Rowland's Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates
General, all exhaustively annotated, have also been of assistance.
The standard treatises on international law, of which those by
Professors G. G. Wilson and Amos S. Hershey are particularly
rich in references illustrative of American practice, have, of
course, been examined.
The work has been carried through under the guidance of
Professors J. W. Garner and Walter Fairleigh Dodd, to both of
whom the author wishes to make grateful acknowledgement for
many suggestions and much helpful criticism.
Champaign, Illinois,
January, 1916.
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INTRODUCTION
POSSIBILITY OP EXPOBCIXG INTERNATIONAL BY MUNICIPAL LAW
It is the purpose of this thesis to discover how and to what
extent international law is enforced by municipal law in the
United States. For an adequate treatment of the subject a more
or less definite meaning must be attached to the terms municipal
law and international law. This is all the more necessary be-
cause, with a common view of these two branches of jurispru-
dence, our inquiry would be not only fruitless but impossible.
Thus there is a common opinion which limits the connotation
of international law to relationships between states regarded as
independent political communities, exclusively.1 With this view
the state is regarded as a unit, an organism whose control is con-
centrated in a single will designated by the term sovereignty.
It is with sovereigns alone that international law has to do.
Municipal law on the other hand is held to be law within the
state. The sovereign enforces it but can not be bound by it. As
well say that a dynamo can drive the engine which moves it, as to
say the sovereign power can be controlled by the municipal law
1See Bentham, "With regard to the political equality of the persons
whose conduct is the object of the law. They may, on any given occasion,
be considered either as members of the same state, or members of different
states. In the first case the law may be referred to die head of internal ;
in the second case to that of international jurisprudence. Xow as to any
transactions which may take place between individuals who are subjects
of different states: those are regulated by the internal laws and decided
upon by the internal tribunals of the one or the other of these states, the
case is the same where the sovereign of die one has any immediate trans-
action with a private member of die odier. * * * There remains. den
die mutual transactions between sovereigns as such, for die subject of tisat
branch of jurisprudence which may be properly and exclusively termed
international law." Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation.
Works, Bowring. EdL, 3:149. See also Travers Twiss. Law of Nations
considered as Independent Political Communities, Oxford, 1884, p. 2; T. E.
Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, ndt ed, X. Y, 1910, pp. 385-
389, 402.
II
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it makes and enforces. 2 How then can municipal law enforce
international law ? Clearly with this conception of international
law it can not.
Although this theory of international law is often enunci-
ated, it is never adhered to in discussions of the subject with the
meaning just outlined. All writers on international law discuss
rights and duties of ambassadors and consuls, of armed forces,
of aliens, of neutral vessels in time of naval war, etc. Inter-
national law as well as municipal law contains rules relating to
the conduct of persons. Were such rules omitted from the sub-
ject, international law would be reduced to a few precepts telling
when a state may make war, how far it may exercise jurisdiction,
and how and when it may acquire territory, some of which on
investigation would be found to be rules of policy rather than
of law.
International law is not to be distinguished from municipal
law by the assertion that the former relates to the conduct of
states, the latter to the conduct of individuals within the state.
Not state conduct, but state responsibility is the criterion of
international law. International law prescribes rules of conduct
which the individual must observe, but if he fails to observe them
it pays no attention to the individual but declares that the state
of which he is a member is responsible and liable. All rules, for
the breach of which states will be held liable, are rules of inter-
national law.
Thus international law and municipal law are not mutually
exclusive. The same rules may be prescribed by both. Both
international law and the municipal law of the United States say
2Cf. Justice Holmes, a "A sovereign is exempt from suit not because
of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and prac-
tical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends," Kawananako vs. Polyblank,
205 U. S. 349, 353, (1907), citing Hobbes, Leviathan, ch.226, 2; Bodin, Re-
publique, I, ch.8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestrate, c3;
Baldwin, De Leg. et Const., Digna Vox, 2nd ed., 1496, fol, 51 b, ed. 1539,
fol. 61. See also American Banana Co. vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S.
347; John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th ed., London, 1911, 2
vols., 1 1263, 278 ; J. C. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, N. Y.,
1909. PP. 77-8i; T. E. Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, nth ed.,
N. Y., 1910, pp. 53, 365; J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed., London,
1907, P- no, 475-481; J. C. Calhoun, Disquisition on government, Works,
vol. 6, Columbus, 1851, 15146; J. W. Burgess, Political Science and Com-
parative Constitutional Law, Boston, 1902, 2 vol., i ;53.
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that inhabitants of the United States shall not "set on foot
military expeditions" when the country is neutral, and that
naval forces shall not interfere with neutral commerce in time
of war except for breach of blockade, carriage of contraband or
similar cause. Municipal law, however, holds the individual
criminally liable for setting on foot a military expedition
3 and
the naval officer liable in damages for making a seizure without
probable cause,
4
while international law in both cases requires
the United States to make reparation to the injured states if
these acts occur.5 We believe therefore that it is possible for
municipal law to enforce at least a part of international law so
far as the obligations of that state are concerned.
RELATIONSHIP OP INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW
International law consists of rules prescribing the conduct
of persons, agencies of government and states, for breaches of
which states are held liable.8 This definition is undoubtedly
3Act Apr. 20, 1818, Rev. Stat., sec. 5286.
4Little vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 176, (1804) ; The Thompson, 3 Wall.,
155 ; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170. See Moore's Digest, 7 ; 593-598.
'Hague Conventions, 1907, v;art. 4; Declaration of London, 1909,
art. 64.
6A number of different points of emphasis are made in definitions of
international law. All agree that it consists of "rules of conduct regulating
the intercourse of states" (Halleck, Int. Law, 3rd ed., 1546). Many
however enlarge this definition in its most limited sense, by emphasizing
the fact that international law may prescribe conduct for persons, (Her-
shey, Int. Law, p. r ; Westlake, Int. Law i, p. i ; Principles p. i ; Bonfils,
Droit Int, pp. 2, 79). Walker, (Science, p. 44) emphasizing this idea, says,
"International laws are rules of conduct observed by men toward each
other as members of different states though members of the same inter-
national circle." Most writers, however, restrict the connotation of the
term by requiring that the rules conform to some standard of objectivity.
"Actual observance" is frequently considered enough (Bonfils, p. i; Wal-
ker, Science, p. 44). Lawrence (p. i) and Bonfils (p. 2) require that the
rules "determine conduct", Westlake (Prin. p. i) that they "govern the
relations of states", Hershey (p. i) that they be "binding upon the mem-
bers of the international community". Exactly how any of these standards
can distinguish international law from international morality, it is difficult
to see. They are so vague as to be almost meaningless. Hall's insistence
that nations must "have consented to be bound" (p. 5) is more definite,
while Holland (Studies, p. 194) is even more concrete when he says,
"the law of nations * * is the public opinion of the governments of
the civilized world with reference to the rights which any state would be
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exceedingly vague. It is often difficult to tell whether a state
will be held liable for the infraction of a particular rule or not.
Often if weak it will, if strong it will not. There is no authori-
tative tribunal for defining rules of international law and saying
for this act of a person or of an officer the state is responsible,
for this it is not. The only test is that of actual practice. Where
responsibility is habitually acknowledged or, in other words,
where the consensus of opinion among nations recognizes that
responsibility exists, the rule is one of international law.
Even more vague than the scope of international law is its
sanction. The enforcement of the liability of states is not insured
by any legal procedure. Such pressure as the inertia of habit,
public opinion, commercial or military reprisal, threats of war,
etc.,
7 alone compels states to observe international law, to enforce
its observance among their subjects and, within their territory,
justified in vindicating for itself by a resort to arms." Some writers
emphasize the idea that international law is not real law. Holland calls
it "public opinion", (Studies, p. 194), Austin, "international public moral-
ity" (i; 173, 226), Stephen (History of Crim. Law, 2525) and Gray
(Nature and Sources of the Law p. 125) convey a similar idea. It seems
to us that such assertions are inappropriate in a definition of international
law. Usage has applied the term so consistently that it would seem more
proper to enlarge the definition of law so as to include international
law. However, such definition may serve the useful purpose of indi-
cating that the sanction of international law is different from that of
municipal law, which is the significance given by these writers to the term
"law". Our definition is doubtless as open to the criticism of vagueness
as any. We make no immediate limitation according to the character of
the parties obligated. Any rule of conduct is a rule of international law,
if states are held liable. This connotative limitation under present con-
ditions implies an exclusion of rules relating to parties of a certain
character, for instance those defining relationships between persons of
the same state or persons and their own government, because such matters
being entirely internal, other states have no interest in exacting a lia-
bility. There have, however, been attempts to include res interna in
international law, for example the principle of legitimacy by the Quad-
ruple Alliance of 1815. If state liability were actually recognized, in such
matters, they would become rules of international law. By the phrase
"are held liable" we mean to assume an inductive and objective standard,
requiring actual practice for the proof of this condition, and also a sub-
jective standard similar to Holland's that opinion must recognize a resort
to force as justifiable in enforcing this liability, a condition which is of
course incapable of more than very indefinite verification.
7See Elihu Root, "The sanctions of International Law", Am. Jour.
Int. Law, 2:451 (1908).
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to acknowledge their liability and to make adequate reparation
for infractions of its precepts.
But although it is difficult to tell what rules are within the
field of international law and what sanctions enforce the liability
of states, it is easy to state definitely many of the rules them-
selves and to show how they are actually enforced. This state-
ment appears self-contradictory, yet there are many rules
relating to diplomatic intercourse, condemnation of prizes, etc.,
which are capable of being stated in definite terms and are
enforced by definite legal methods. They are also rules of inter-
national law; at least states have habitually acknowledged
responsibility for their infraction.
For the definite statement and legal enforcement of interna-
tional law we look to the municipal law of states. Municipal law
consists of all general rules which the state enforces.8 The most
common agents of enforcement are judicial tribunals, but a rule
enforced by an authoritative executive or administrative pro-
8Writers on general jurisprudence commonly give a similar definition
to the term "law". Gray (Nature and Sources of the Law, p. 82) says,
"the law of the state * * is composed of the rules which the courts
* *
lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties."
Salmond (Jurisprudence p. 9) says, "The law is the body of principles
recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice".
Both of these definitions recognize state enforceability as the most
important feature of municipal law. Austin's conception (Lectures orr
Jurisprudence, i ;yg, 88) was essentially the same although he emphasized
the fact that the state "commanded" law rather than that it enforced it,
thus being forced to the awkward explanation that "what the sovereign
permits he commands" (25510) to explain judge-made law. Maine's
criticism (Early Hist, of Inst., pp. 3/7-387) that customary law is neither
commanded nor enforced by the sovereign and can not be altered by him,
seems to confuse the titular with the real sovereign. If customary law
is applied in the village tribunals it is being enforced by the "sovereign"
in the sense of political science even though Runjeet Singh, the titular
sovereign, does not enforce it and can not alter it. Walker (Science of
Int. Law, p. 44) attempts to parallel his definition of municipal with that
of international law and says "municipal laws are rules of conduct ob-
served by men or by men recognized as binding toward each other as
members of the same state". He does not recognize positive state enforce-
ability as necessary and he also limits the connotation of the term to rules
between members of the same state. We disagree with him in both of"
these points. We intend to include as municipal law all rules of conduct
binding either citizens or aliens, enforced by the state, either through a
central or local authority, so long as this authority is recognized as
legitimate.
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cedure is no less municipal law. The rules of international law,
so far as they lay down rights and duties of persons and officers,
may be enforced by municipal law either directly through the
application of international law by the court and executive
officials or indirectly through the coercion of persons and officers
in a manner not immediately prescribed by international law but
calculated to cause an observance of the international duty.
It is true that they may not be. A state has entire control
of its own municipal law and whether or not it chooses to enforce
rules of international law, depends upon the force of the inter-
national sanctions pressing upon it. 9 But if it does enforce them,
it thereby enforces its own duties under international law, and
in so far as this enforcement is effective and complete it escapes
liability under international law. It also gives legal definition
and sanction to these rules.
It is thus an obligation, imposed by international law itself
upon states, to enforce that part of international law relating
to the conduct of persons within their jurisdiction, through their
municipal jurisprudence.10 It is for states to supply the lack of
a world administration for the execution of international law.
9See W. W. Willoughby, The Legal Nature of Int. Law, Am. Jour.
Int. Law, 8;357, in answer to an article of the same title by J. B. Scott, Am.
Jour. Int. Law, i ;83i. Also Westlake, Is Int. Law part of the Law of
England?, Law Quar. Rev., 22; 14-26; Holland, Studies in Int. Law,
P- 195.
10See judicial decisions on this subject, Res Publica vs. DeLong-
champs, i Dall. in; Talbot vs. Seamens, I Cranch i, 37 (1801) ; Thirty
Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191 ; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170,
Scott 17; Hilton vs. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S.
677, Scott, 19. In Murray vs. the Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, the court said
that municipal law ought to be interpreted in harmony with international
law if possible. English cases Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, Scott, 6;
Heathfield vs. Chilton, 4 Burr. 2015, Scott 189; Le Louis, 2 Dods. 239,
Scott 352; Emperor of Austria vs. Day, 2 Giff. 628; In the Recovery, 6
Rob. 348, the court even went so far as to assert that prize courts must
apply international law in opposition to municipal statutes. This view was
not maintained in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. vs. Rex, L. R.
1905, 2 K. B. 391, Bentwich I, which held that an act of state prevented
the application of conflicting rules of international law. Regina vs. Keyn,
L. R. 2 Ex. 63, Bentwich, 6, held that international law could not operate
to increase jurisdiction ; and Mortensen vs. Peters, 14 Scot. L. T. R. 227
(1906), Bentwich 12, applied a statute extending jurisdiction beyond the
limits permitted by international law. See discussion of prize cases on this
point, Holland Studies, pp. 193-199.
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As state courts of the United States enforce the federal consti-
tion, laws and treaties, so it is the duty of independent govern-
ments to see that their courts enforce international law and that
their executive authorities execute it.
It must not be overlooked that there are rules of interna-
tional law which are incapable of enforcement as municipal law.
Those which prescribe rules of conduct which the state considered
as a unit must do or refrain from are directed solely to the sov-
erign power in the government. The commencement of war, the
recognition of foreign states and governments, the submission of
questions to arbitration, the acquisition of territory, the extension
of jurisdiction are of this character. They are political questions
and beyond the power of municipal law to control. The observ-
ance of such rules is in the hands of discretionary officers. In
the United States congress and the president are responsible
for the observance of such rules by the United States and they
can not be coerced by municipal regulations. It is true that in
these matters the political organs of the government act accord-
ing to legal precedents as well as dictates of pure policy. But
their action in either case is beyond the scope of municipal law
and of our subject.
We are concerned with the rules of international law
enforced directly as law in the United States and those enforced
indirectly by the enforcement of laws supplementary to inter-
national law. The precedents and procedure followed by polit-
ical organs of government in settling these political questions will
not, therefore, be considered.
CLASSIFICATION
The doctrine of responsibility of states, which is the essence
of international law, presents two possible methods of viewing
the matter. We may consider the rule itself of primary import-
ance; and thus private persons, ambassadors, consuls, military
forces, naval forces, etc., as well as states would be subjects
of international law for whom different rights and obligations
are prescribed. On the other hand we may consider the liability
or enforcement of the rule as of primary importance ; and states,
which are alone responsible, as the only subjects of international
law. We should then describe the rights and duties of states,
with reference to these various classes of officers and persons,
considering them as objects of international law.
The latter is the course commonly pursued. States are said
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to be the only subjects of international law. Persons and public
officers as well as territory and other kinds of property are its
objects. 11
In our own opinion there is much to be said for the first view.
There is a tendency for international law to impose a direct re-
sponsibility upon persons and officers
12 and if it is ever to be law
in the Austinian sense of the term, this view will have to be re-
cognized. The possibility of an effective law binding states as
such was exhaustively discussed in the federal convention of
1787,
13 and the impossibility of enforcing such a law by ordinary
lagal processes was demonstrated prior to the civil war. Even
corporations when of considerable magnitude have proved sur-
prisingly difficult things to control by law. A corporation or a
state can neither be brought to court, nor put in jail. Law can
never act upon it more than imperfectly.
As it is, however, the responsibility of states is the predomi-
nant feature of international law, and we will adhere to the us-
ual custom of classifying the branches of that subject according
to the rights and duties of states.
It is possible to discuss any body of law in terms of either
rights or duties ; either privileges or obligations ; either liberties
or restrictions. Every right implies a duty on the part of others
11 See Lawrence, Int. Law, p. 73, "Probably it is best to say with
Oppenheim (Int. Law, i ; 344) that persons, like territory, are objects of
International law, and reserve the term subjects for those artificial persons
who are either sovereign states or communities closely akin to them
through the possession of some of the distinguishing marks of statehood."
12
See, for instance, Hague Conventions 1907, in which occur such
expressions as "Every prisoner of war is bound to give, etc." (IV, Art.
9) "a belligerent war ship may not prolong its stay, etc." (XIII, Arts.
14, 16, 18, 19, 20).
"See James Madison, The Journal of the Debates in the Convention
which framed the Constitution of the United States, Gaillard Hunt, ed.,
N. Y., 1908, 2 vol., also in Madison, Works, Hunt, ed., vol. 3; Elliot,
Debates, vol. 5; Farrand, The records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
New Haven, 1911, Remarks by Madison, May 31, Wilson, June 25, King,
July 14. Strong, July 14, says, "The practicability of making laws with
coercive sanction for the states as political bodies had been exploded in
all hands". See also Madison letter to Jefferson, Works, 1:344: The
Federalist, Nos. 15, 16, 21, P. L. Ford, ed., pp. 87, 90, 91, 97, 123. A. C.
McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, Am. Nation Sen,
vol. TO. pp. 242, 245. The constitution of the German Empire does pro-
vide for the legal coercion of states through a process known as "Federal
Execution", but the law of the empire acts directly on individuals.
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to expect its observance. Treatises on international law, as on
all other departments of law, commonly treat parts of the sub-
ject by describing duties, other parts by describing rights. In
fields where liberty of action is the rule and restriction the ex-
ception, convenience dictates a treatment from the standpoint of
duties, while when the reverse is true, when restriction is the rule
and liberty of action the exception, a treatment from the stand-
point of rights is most conservative of space.
For our purposes, however, a classification based exclusively
on duties is necessary. Our purpose is to discover what obliga-
tions of international law are enforced by municipal law. We
will therefore attempt to cover the whole field of international
law from the viewpoint of duties. We will not consider the
rights of the United States as such, but only in so far as they
imply a duty to respect equivalent rights of other states.
Looking at international law as imposing obligations upon
states, some of these 'obligations require action or abstention on
the part of the government, while others require the state to en-
force action or abstention on the part of its citizens or public of-
ficers. Duties of the first character are considered under four
heads, abstention, acquiescence, vindication and reparation,
those of the second under the head prevention.
The international obligations of a state differ somewhat ac-
cording to differences in status caused by the advent of wars.
Four general divisions are thus suggested obligations in time of
peace, obligations as a neutral, obligations as a belligerent toward
neutrals and obligations as a belligerent toward enemies.
The questions relating to the transition from war to peace,
peace to neutrality, etc., as well as to the advent of new states,
involve the subject of recognition. This is a political question.
Municipal law does not lay down rules saying when states shall
be recognized, when belligerency and insurgency exist, and when
they cease. In these matters the municipal law of the United
States follows the political departments of the government as
has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts. 14 It adjusts itself to
the new status and recognizes the new condition.
"Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808) ; Consul of Spain vs. the
Conception, Fed. Cas. 3137 (1819) ; Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 324
(1818) ; U. S. vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610 (1818) ; The Divina Pastora, 4
Wheat. 52; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307; Keene vs. McDonough, 8
Pet. 308; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet. 511 ; Williams vs. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet.
415 (1839) ; Rennet vs. Chambers, 14 How. 38 (1852) ; The Prize Cases,
2 Black 635; U. S. vs. Yorba, i Wall. 412; U. S. vs. Lynde, 11 Wall. 632;
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These matters are therefore beyond the scope of our subject.
We will take the conditions of peace, war and neutrality for
granted and discuss the municipal measures for enforcing na-
tional duties in each of these conditions, classifying such duties
under the five heads, abstention, acquiescence, prevention, vindi-
cation and reparation.
The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408 (1885) ; Jones vs. U. S. 137 U. S.
202 (1890) ; The Three Friends, 166 U. S. i (1896) ; Underhill vs. Her-
nandez, 168 U. S. 250; Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938 (1913).
English cases The Pelican, Edw. Adm. Appdx. D., Taylor vs. Barkley,
2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria vs. Day, 2 Giff 628; Republic of Peru vs.
Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch D. 489, 497; Republic of Peru vs. Dreyfus,
38 Ch. D. 348, 356, 359-
PART I. OBLIGATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY
The obligations imposed upon states in time of peace are in
general derived from one fundamental conception, which may be
summarized as the principle of territorial independence or ter-
ritorial sovereignty.
Modern international law was impossible until the idea that
government and jurisdiction are inseparable from territory had
received recognition. It is true that these propositions are not
universally held now. The principle that jurisdiction extends by
race or nationality and by the nature of the act rather than by
territory is still asserted and acted upon in claims of jurisdic-
tion over citizens abroad and over any one committing offenses
against the state or its citizens. It is, however, believed that
these claims are to be regarded as exceptions to the general rule
of territorial jurisdiction. The triumph of the theory of territo-
riality in jurisdiction and government is assured by the fact that
power of coercion, physical force, is the foundation of both of
them, and effective coercion is by the nature of things exclusive
within one territory. We will therefore regard the following
propositions as the norms of the law of peace: (1) A state occu-
pies a definite portion of territory. (2) Within that territory
it may organize itself, dispose of its land, resources and wealth,
and control the conduct of the inhabitants with perfect freedom.
This may be stated by saying that within its territory it has un-
limited powers of government, property and jurisdiction. (3)
Outside of that territory its power ceases.1
1On the theory and necessity of territorial sovereignty see J. W.
Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, Boston,
1898, i',52; Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 8th ed.,
Boston, 1883, pp. 8-9, 21-24; J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence; 2nd ed.,
London, 1907; p. 99; Justice O. W. Holmes, in American Banana Co.
vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909) ; W. E. Hall, International Law,
4th ed., London, 1895, pp. 20-21, 45-46. J. E. Feraud-Giraud, Etats et
Souverains devant les tribunaux etrangers, Paris, 1895, i ;3i-36 discusses the
necessary exemption of states from foreign jurisdiction.
21
22 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [22
These conditions are in fact imaginary. They could in com-
pleteness be realized only if all states were as isolated as the
planets. This not being true, they are subject to numerous ex-
ceptions, necessitated by the inevitable peaceful intercourse of
states and their subjects, and the necessary concurrent extension
of authority by all states over the high seas, which are within the
territory of no state, and which by physical facts can not be so
appropriated. States better than human individuals accord
with Herbert Spencer's theory of liberty,
2 but even in their case
we must modify this absolute right of liberty by the proviso that
a like liberty be accorded to others.
It is the determination of these exceptions to the ideal con-
dition of absolute territorial independence which forms the body
of the law of peace. Were there ho exceptions, obviously there
would be no more need for law regulating relations between
states than there is for law regulating relations between the
inhabitants of the earth and the inhabitants of Mars. Consisting
of rules governing exceptions to the general rule, the law is ordi-
narily expressed in terms of rights. Thus we speak of the state 's
right to a limited jurisdiction over its subjects abroad, and over
its merchant vessels on the high seas, and its exclusive right of
jurisdiction over its ambassadors, public vessels and armed
forces abroad. We propose, however, to look at the matter from
the reverse side of duties. We are not interested in the laws of
the United States providing for the exercise of rights as such;
but as they indicate the limits of these rights, and imply an ob-
ligation of the United States not to exceed them.
The obligations of states under international law may be
classified under five heads: (1) abstention, (2) acquiescence,
(3) prevention, (4) vindication, (5) reparation. A state is un-
der the obligation to abstain, with a few exceptions, from the ex-
ercise of authority outside of its territory, to acquiesce in the ex-
ercise, within its territory, of authority by foreign states in a
few cases, to prevent its citizens and public officers from doing
acts injurious to foreign states and their subjects, to vindicate its
sovereignty and position in the family of nations by treating vio-
lations of international law by foreign persons or officers in a
manner prescribed by international law, and to make reparation
for breaches of international law by its citizens or public officers.
2Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, together with Man versus the State,
New York, 1910, p. 36.
CHAPTER II. OBLIGATIONS OF ABSTENTION
INTRODUCTORY
The obligations of abstention are derived from the funda-
mental principles of international law. The state is bound to
abstain from the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction over
acts or persons in any but its own territory, with a few excep-
tions. These duties relate primarily to the conduct of the gov-
ernment. If the government chooses to ignore them by sovereign
acts such as intervention or conquest, municipal law can have no
restraining effect. Statutes, treaties, and court decisions, have,
however, expressed legal limitations upon the extension of power
outside of the territory, and, until changed by a sovereign act, are
laws enforcing the duty of abstention as against the government.
By their mere statement as law, these limitations tend to be ob-
served by the sovereign power, and, of course, may be enforced
by coercive measures as against inferior officers of government.
The obligations of abstention may be considered under the
three heads, (1) acquisition of territory, (2) use of force against
foreign states or their subjects, (3) exercise of jurisdiction out-
side of the territorial limits.
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY
(1) The right to acquire unoccupied territory or territory
occupied only by savages is generally recognized by international
law and has been affirmed by the law of the United States. In
the Declaration of the Berlin congress of 1885 it was provided
that territory in Africa should only be acquired with effective
title after notification and actual occupation. The United States
signed this declaration, but as it was not submitted to the senate
for ratification it is not a binding treaty. 1 The claims of the In-
dians to territory has been held to be no bar to the rights of ac-
quisition by ciyilized nations through discovery and occupation,
in a number of cases.- The acquisition of unoccupied guano
islands by action of citizens of the United States was provided
1See Moore's Digest i -,267.
2Johnson vs. Mclntosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823); Martin vs. Waddell,
16 Pet. 367; Mortimer vs. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. S. 89 (1889) ;
Ketchum vs. Buckley, 99 U. S. 188.
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for by statute in 1856,
3 under conditions designed to prevent
such acquisition of islands already under the sovereignty of for-
eign states, but the fact that another government had formerly
occupied an island and subsequently abandoned it was held no
bar to its acquisition under this act.*
(2) The acquisition of land by accretion, or the gradual and
imperceptible building up of territory by rivers or ocean tides
has been upheld as conferring legitimate title by the United
States courts in the case of private owners and states of the
union,
5 a view which implies an acquisition of sovereignty over
such accretions by the United States. This method of acquisi-
tion was supported in an English case which acknowledged the
sovereignty of the United States over mud islands formed near
the mouth of the Mississippi.6
(3) Prescription has been held to confer good title to ter-
ritory claimed by states, 7 and by individuals as against the gov-
ernment.8 It has also been impliedly recognized as founding
good title in various boundary treaties of the United States.9
(4) The acquisition of land by conquest was denounced in
resolutions proposed at the International American congress in
Washington, 1889-1890, which stated "that the principle of con-
quest shall not, during the continuance of this treaty of arbitra-
tion, be recognized as admissable under American Public Law. ' '10
The United States acceded to the resolution, but as the plan of
8Act. Aug. 5, 1856, Rev. Stat. 55/O-55/8.
*Jones vs. U. S. 137 U. S. 202, 220, (1890). See Moore's Digest,
I :299, 556-580.
5Ocean City Association vs. Schwer, 46 Atl. Rep. 690, (X. Y. 1900) ;
Mulry vs. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424 ; Wallace vs. Driver, 61 Ark. 429 ; Jeffries
vs. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S. 178, 191, (1890) ; St. Louis vs.
Rutz, 138 U. S. 226, (1891) ; Nebraska vs. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 368, (1892).
8The Anna, 5 Rob. 373. (1805). See Moore's Digest, i ;2O9-273.
7Rhode Island, vs. Mass., 4 How. 591, 639, (1846) ; Handly's Lessee
vs. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 378, (1820) ; Indiana vs. Ky., 136 U. S. 479, (1890) ;
159 U. S. 275, (1895) ; 163 U. S. 520, (1897), 167 U. S. 270.
8U. S. vs. Chavez, 175 U. S. 509, 522, (1899) ; Peabody vs. U. S. 175
U. S. 546; Chavez vs. U. S. 175 U. S. 552.
Treaty with Great Britain, 1818, art. 3, Malloy p. 632; 1827, art. i.
p. 644. See also treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela, 1897,
adopted as a basis of the boundary arbitration demanded by the United
States, Art. 4 affirmed that fifty years prescription gave good title. See
Moore's Digest, 1 1293.
10See Moore's Digest, 1 1292 : 7 5318.
25] IN TIME OF PEACE 25
arbitration upon which it was contingent did not become effect-
ive, the resolution did not become law. The courts have held that
under the constitution congress has no power to declare wars for
conquest and the president to wage them for that purpose, hence
the United States can not acquire new territory by conquest.11
Territory under military government or occupation is, therefore,
not territory of the United States for purposes of internal admin-
istration. This interpretation of constitutional law is, however,
no guarantee against the seizure of foreign territory by conquest,
for the courts will recognize a forced cession or sale of territory
concluded by treaty and they have specifically held that acquisi-
tion by conquest is proper by international law, even though pro-
hibited by the law of the United States.12
(5) Acquisition of territory by treaty, whether from forced
cession, desire of the population, or purchase has been upheld as
inherent in the treaty making power of the government,13 and
has been the usual means by which the United States has ac-
quired territory. 1*
The law of the United States thus permits of acquisitions of
territory by occupation, accretion, prescription, and treaty,
while it requires the government to abstain from acquiring land
by conquest. The question is, however, a political rather than a
legal question, and so the courts have held.15 If the political de-
partment of government indicates by suitable evidence that it re-
gards new territory as acquired, the courts will follow it. The
duty to abstain from acquiring land occupied by other states is,
therefore, one left to the discretion of the political department
"Flemming vs. Page, 9 How. 603, (1849). Contra see Am. Ins. Co.,
vs. Canter, i Pet. 511, (1828). See Self-Denying Ordinance in reference
to Cuba. Apr. 20, 1898. 30 stat. 739 sec. 4.
12On thus subject see Flemming vs. Page 9, How. 603, (1849) ; U. S.
vs. Hayward, 2 Gall. 485 ; U. S. vs. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246 ; Moore's Digest,
1:290: 7:257-265, 315. Neely vs. Henkel 180 U. S. 109, 119-170 (1900)
Moore's Digest 1 5535.
"See Chief Justice Marshall, in Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, i Pet. 511,
(1828).
"Treaties with France 1803, Malloy p. 508, ceding La.; Spain 1819,
p. 1651, ceding Fla. ; Mexico, 1848, p. 1107, 1853, p. 1121, ceding south-
western territory; Russia, 1867, p. 1521, ceding Alaska, Spain, 1898, p. 1690,
ceding Philippines and Porto Rico, Panama, 1903, p. 1351, granting Canal
Zone. See also Joint Resolutions of Congress, Mch. I, 1845, 5 stat. 797;
Dec. 29, 1845, 9 stat. 108, admitting Texas to the Union, and July 7, 1898,
incorporating Hawaii.
"Jones vs. U. S., 137 U. S. 202, (1890) ; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.
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of the government, and is beyond the power of municipal law to
control.
USE OF FORCE AGAINST FOREIGN STATES OR THEIR SUBJECTS
The use of force may be resorted to (1) against a foreign
state itself, as in intervention, war or general reprisals; (2)
against subjects of a foreign state by way of special reprisals, or
(3) against foreigners for breaches of municipal law. The use
of force against aliens within the territorial jurisdiction in the
usual process of enforcing municipal law may unquestionably
be exercised, and gives rise to no duty of abstention. The law of
peace, however, requires a government to abstain from using
force against foreign states or their subjects outside of its ter-
ritory.
Such a use of force against the foreign state or within its
territory is known as intervention. In treaties with Cuba and
Panama the United States has been specifically given the right
to intervene. 10
(1) The Hague convention relating to the pacific settlement
of international disputes, which recommends mediation, commis-
sions of inquiry and arbitration in cases of disagreement, 17 as
well as numerous individual arbitration treaties,
18
recognizes the
duty to abstain from the use of force against foreign states. An-
other of the Hague conventions19 requires the United States to
abstain from the use of armed force for the collection of contract
debts. These treaties have been ratified and are law in the United
States, but they are addressed to the political department of the
government. The courts in applying the law will recognize sov-
ereign acts of force even when prohibited by treaty. No power
of municipal law can compel resort to arbitration or prohibit in-
tervention or a resort to arms, but the definite statement in
treaties of an obligation to abstain from the use of armed forces
"Treaty with Cuba, 1903, Malloy, p. 362, permits intervention to
preserve independence, and with Panama, 1903, art. 23, p. 1356, to protect
the canal.
17Hague conventions, 1899, i ; 1907, i.
18There are two kinds of individual arbitration treaties ; special, re-
lating to the arbitration of specified claims alone, as the treaty of Wash-
ington with Great Britain, of 1871 ; and general, requiring arbitration of
all questions of a certain class. Conventions of the latter class were con-
cluded with a large number of powers in 1908 to last for five years,
recourse to the Hague court being provided for.
19Hague conventions, 1907, ii.
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undoubtedly, in itself, offers a sanction to the observance of this
duty by the political authorities of government. The constitu-
tional provision giving congress alone power to declare war ap-
pears also to prevent a hasty resort to arms. Experience has,
however, demonstrated that the executive can create a situation
from which congress can not recede.20 The use of force in cases
not amounting to war, such as naval demonstration, or the em-
ployment of armed forces to protect embassies in time of insur-
rection, has generally been authorized by congress. Such action
is not, however, required by law. A number of cases have oc-
curred, notably the Boxer uprising in China, when armed force
was used without express authorization, and its use subsequently
ratified by congress. 21
The use of force on foreign territory to suppress marauders
and pirates and prevent maltreatment of citizens has been justi-
fied on the grounds of self defense. Thus Jackson's invasion of
Florida in 1819, and various invasions of Mexican territory in
pursuit of marauding Indians; the occupation of Amelia island
by United States forces in 1817 to suppress a nest of pirates ; the
landing of troops in Vera Cruz, Mexico, 1914, and Peking, China,
1899
;
and the bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua in 1854 to
protect American citizens were justified by the political depart-
ment of the United States government on this basis. Great Bri-
tain in the same manner attempted to justify the seizure in Amer-
ican waters and destruction of the Caroline, in 1837, against the
vigorous protest of the United States. 22
The determination of circumstances warranting intervention
in self defense is in any case a political question and forms an
exception to the general rule of international law that the state
must abstain from the use of force on foreign territory. This
general rule of abstention is recognized and enforced by United
States law. In the Navy Regulations, the use of force in territo-
rial waters and landing of armed troops, without express permis-
sion of the local authorties, is forbidden. Military law also re-
quires strict respect for foreign territory.
23
. Instructions of the
20As in the Mexican war.
21 See Moore's Digest, 7;io9-ii8, Navy regulations, 1913, sec. 1647.
22For discussion of these and other cases relating to self defense as a
justification for the violation of foreign territory, see Moore's Digest,
2
-,400-425.
23Navy Regulations, 1913, Sec. 1645-1648. Army Regulations, 1913,
Sec. 89, ch. 3, Dig. op. judge Ad. Gen. 1912, p. 90. Moore's Digest, 2:364.
For similar duties in time of war toward neutrals, see infra, p. 212 et seq.
28 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [28
Department of State further aid in the performance of this duty.
In 1887 instructions to a Charge d 'affaire in Peru said,
' '
It is al-
ways expected that the agents of the department abroad will ex-
ercise extreme caution in summoning war vessels to their aid at
critical junctures, especially if there be no practical purpose to
be subserved by their presence."24 The courts have affirmed this
view in dicta. Where a seizure under the non-intercourse act
was made in foreign territorial waters the court said, "it is cer-
tainly an offense against the power which must be adjudicated
between the two governments," 25 and where a naval officer en-
tered foreign territory to recover piratically seized property of
American citizens it held26 that he acted beyond his right, but
in both of these cases the foreign government's claim was held to
be subject to diplomatic settlement only. Municipal law could
offer no relief. Where special permission to pursue marauders on
foreign territory or to preserve order is given by treaty, as is the
case in several Mexican agreements and treaties with Cuba and
Panama, no duty of abstention is involved.27
In the present state of the law the enforcement of the duty
to abstain from intervention and the use of force on foreign ter-
ritory belongs primarily to the executive through its control of
military and naval forces and diplomatic officers, as well as of
the general conduct of foreign relations. Judicial authorities
may add their sanction by the enforcement of the usual princi-
ples of administrative and military law. Violations of the inter-
national obligation, specifically authorized by the political de-
partments of government, are, however, beyond the power of mu-
nicipal law to control.
(2) Reprisals may be divided into four classes : public and
private general reprisals, public and private special reprisals.
General reprisal is the right to seize any property of a foreign
2*Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Neal, Charge, Nov. 16, 1887;
see Moore's Digest 75109. See also Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 113.
"Ship Richmond vs. U. S., 9 Cranch 102, 104, (1815) See also the
Itata 1892, Moore, Int. Arb. pp. 3067-3071.
26Davisson vs. Sealskins, 2 Paine 324. See also Nelson, Att. Gen.,
4 op, 285 (1843); Black, Att. Gen. 9 op. 286, (1859); Moore's Digest,
i 5362-365.
"Protocols with Mexico, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1890, 1892, 1896, Mal-
loy pp. 1144-1177. Most of them were to be in force one year, but that of
1896 specified that it should last until Kid's band of Indians be extermin-
ated or pacified. See also treaty with Cuba, 1903, p. 362; Panama, 1903,
art 23, p. 1356; Nicaragua, 1867, art. 15-17, p. 1285.
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state or its citizens on the sea, and is equivalent to a state of war,
although in the trouble with France in 1798-1799 general repri-
sals were authorized by congress28 without an express declara-
tion of war. The courts, however, held that war actually ex-
isted. 29 By the abolition of privateering, private general repri-
sals are no longer permitted. Public general reprisals are still
resorted to but are considered in the chapters devoted to obliga-
tions in time of war.
By private special reprisals, persons wronged by a foreign
state were formerly permitted by commission of their sovereign
to indemnify themselves by seizing property belonging to any
subject of that state on the high seas in time of peace. This prac-
tice would amount to an aggravated form of privateering and
would now be regarded as little short of piracy. The legitimacy
of the practice seems to be admitted by the constitutional pro-
vision giving congress power to grant letters of marque and repri-
sal, though it was denied by Attorney General Randolph in an
opinion in 1793. At present the practice is undoubtedly obso-
lete.30 The only question therefore which concerns us here is
that of public special reprisals. Under this right the seizure of
vessels on the high seas or in the jurisdiction of their own state
through such institutions as pacific blockade is generally consid-
ered legitimate by writers on international law. As the United
States has not resorted to reprisals in time of peace, except in the
case of France in 1799 which the courts regarded as war, the
courts have had no opportunity to pass upon the legitimacy of
seizures by way of reprisal, but they would undoubtedly be
bound by any act of the political department of the government
in this respect. The power to make war would probably be held
to include a power to resort to lesser acts of violence.
(3) The duty to abstain from the use of force outside of the
territory of the United States against foreign vessels guilty of
infractions of local law, has not been universally maintained by
the law of the United States. An act of 179731 still in force au-
thorizes revenue officers to board foreign vessels four leagues
from the coast
;
and in Church vs. Hubbart32 Chief Justice Mar-
28May 28, 1798, I stat. 361; July 9, 1798, I stat. 578; Mch. 3, 1799,
I stat. 743.
29Bas. vs. Tingey, 4 Dall. 37, (1800); Talbot vs. Seaman, I Cranch
I, 282, (1801) ; Moore's Digest, 7;i55-i53-
30Randolph, Att. Gen. i op. 30, see Moore's Digest, 75119.
31Act. Mch. 2, 1797, Sec. 27, rev. stat. 2760; Moore's Digest, 1:725.
32Church vs. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187; Scott, 343.
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shall upheld the right to make seizures on the high sea for
breaches of municipal regulations in a case involving such a seiz-
ure by Brazil; but, a few years later, in Rose vs. Himely,
33
changed his mind, and denied the validity of such seizures. The
embargo and non-intercourse acts of the early nineteenth century
did not permit the seizure of foreign vessels outside of territo-
rial jurisdiction. The rule laid down by Lord Stowell in Le
Louis,
34 that visit, search and seizure of foreign vessels beyond
territorial jurisdiction is not permitted in time of peace, was
followed by Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 35 and ap-
pears to be the usual law of the United States. Exceptions to
this statement are found in the provisions of treaties authorizing
the seizure in restricted zones of slave traders flying foreign flags,
and the universally acknowledged right of seizing pirate vessels.
These subjects will be discussed in considering the exercise of
jurisdiction over the high seas. Cases have affirmed that unequiv-
ocal acts of the sovereign authorizing seizures beyond the three
mile limit would be obligatory, though such acts should if possi-
ble be interpreted to accord with international law.36 Neverthe-
less, in the Alaskan seal fishery dispute of 1886 British sealing
vessels were seized sixty miles from shore and their seizure justi-
fied by courts under a statute which by no means unequivocally
authorized such acts. 37 The attitude taken by the courts, how-
ever, was that the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ex-
tended one hundred Italian miles from the shore
;
the question
will therefore be adverted to in considering the extent of
jurisdiction.
While the duty to abstain from the use of force against for-
eign vessels on the high seas in time of peace is primarily to be
controlled by executive authority, yet by the rule requiring legal
33Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, (1808), see also Hudson vs. Guies-
tier, 6 Cranch 281, (1810) ; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, (1824). In the
Itata, 1892, Moore's Int. Arb., p. 3067-3071, the U. S. was held liable in
damages for a seizure in Chilean waters, see Scott, cases note p. 344.
Similar view was held by the U. S. supreme court in the Ship Richmond
vs. U. S. 9 Cranch 102, 104 (1815). Moore's Digest, 2:364.
34Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, (1817).
35
TheAntelope, 10 Wheat. 66, (1825).
"Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, (1804), which held
that the non-intercourse act should not be interpreted as authorizing the
seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas or prohibiting the sale of
national vessels to foreign countries.
"See Moore's Digest, I ;895.
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adjudication of all seizures courts may add their sanction to the
enforcement of this duty.
EXERCISE OP EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The final duty of abstention requires a state to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction beyond its territory, with a few excep-
tions. For convenience we may consider the matter under the
four heads: (1) extent of territory, (2) jurisdiction over the
high seas, (3) jurisdiction diver acts committed in foreign
countries and (4) jurisdiction over suits against foreign states.
(1) Where the territory of the United States is adjacent
to that of foreign states, the boundary has in most cases been
defined by treaties which are binding upon the courts in assum-
ing jurisdiction of cases.38 In the absence of treaty stipulations
river boundaries have been held to exist in the middle of the
main current.39 In the case of international rivers, however,
a number of treaties have provided that the jurisdiction is sub-
ject to the right of free navigation by vessels of all nations,40
and the courts have maintained this position, holding that a
foreign vessel could not be seized for violation of local laws
while passing through American waters of an international river,
en route to a foreign port.
41 The same freedom of navigation is
permitted upon the Great Lakes by treaties with Great Britain.42
The extent of territorial jurisdiction on the sea for exclusive
fishing privileges was fixed at the three mile limit in the treaty
38Cushing Att. Gen. 8 op., 175; U. S. vs. Texas, 162 U. S. i, (1896).
39Handly vs. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374; Ala. vs. Ga., 25 How. 505; Iowa
vs. 111., 147 U. S. i, (1893). Moore's Digest, 1:615-621.
40See Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, Art. 8, p. 589. Art. 3, Malloy,
p. 643; 1846, Art. 2, p. 657; 1854-1866, Art. 4, p. 671, Art. 26, p. 711 decree-
ing free navigation in the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, St. John, Yukon,
Stikine, and Porcupine. With Mexico, 1848, Art. 6, 7, p. uu; 1853, Art.
4, p. 1123, decreeing free navigation in the Colorado, Gila, and Bravo.
In a treaty with Bolivia in 1850, Art. 26, p. 122, it is stated that "in
accordance with fixed principles of international law, Bolivia regards the
rivers Amazon and La Plata * * opened by nature for the commerce
of all nations" and in that with Argentine Republic of 1853, Art. 6, p. 19,
the Parana and Uruguay are declared free to commerce even in time oi
war, with the exception of contraband.
41The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, (1824).
42Treaty with Great Britain, 1871, art. 28+ 30, Malloy, p. 711; 1842;
art. 2, p. 652; 1854-1866, art. 4, p. 671.
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of 1818 with Great Britain.43 In treaties with Mexico, however,
the boundary between the two countries was stated to begin
three marine leagues or nine miles from land in the Gulf of
Mexico,44 and an act of 179745 still in force authorizes revenue
officers to board foreign vessels four leagues from shore. The
whole of bays with headlands two leagues apart or even more
have been held by statute, official opinions and judicial decisions
to be entirely within territorial jurisdiction.46
By an act of 186847 the killing of fur seal
' '
within the limits
of Alaskan Territory or in the waters thereof" was prohibited.
Vessels engaged in such business were declared forfeitable and
their officers and crew liable to criminal punishment. In 1886
the United States District court of Alaska48 held a number of
seizures of British vessels by revenue cutters, sixty miles from
shore, valid under this statute. It reached this decision by
applying the meaning of Alaskan territorial waters given in a
Russian Ukase of 1821, which it held was the meaning adopted
by the political department of the United States government.
This Ukase had declared the territorial jurisdiction of Russia
to extend one hundred Italian miles from the shore, and the
United States claimed to have purchased this jurisdiction with
the territory in 1867. The vessels were condemned and the
officers held liable to criminal punishment. Upon Great
Britain's protest the vessels and men were released and orders
sent to Alaska to discontinue pending proceedings. Neverthe-
less in 1887 and 1889 other vessels were condemned by the same
court. The act of 1868 was amended in 1889,49 the country's
jurisdiction being extended "to all the dominions of the United
States in Behring Sea". In an arbitration of the question in
*3Treaty with Great Britain, 1818, art i, Malloy, p. 631.
*4Treaty with Mexico, 1848, art. 5, Malloy, p. 1109; 1853, art. i,
p. 1122.
45Act. Mch. 2, 1797, sec. 27; rev. stat. 2760, See Moore's Digest, 1 5725.
46For Delaware Bay, see Randolph, Att. Gen., i op. 321, Moore's
Digest, i;735; Chesapeake Bay, Stetson vs. U. S., Moore, Int. Arb., 4;
4337-4341 ; Moore's Digest, i : 741 ; Buzzard's Bay, Public Acts Mass.,
ch. i, sec. 12, (1890) ; Commonwealth vs. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230,
(1890), affirmed Manchester vs. Mass., 139 U. S. 240.
47Act June 27, 1868, Rev. Stat. 1856.
48See U. S. vs. La Ninfa, 49 Fed. Rep. 575, (1891); U. S. vs. the
James G. Swan, 20 Fed. Rep. 108; U. S. vs. The Alexander, 60 Fed.
Rep. 914.
"Act. Mch. 2, 1899, 25 Stat. 1009.
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1892 the United States' claim of jurisdiction was denied; thus
"the dominions of the United States in Behring Sea" were
held in subsequent cases to extend only to the three mile limit.
50
It is evident that the attitude taken by the United States
on the limits of territorial jurisdiction has been by no means
uniform. The courts have held that the determination of the
matter either as to boundary or jurisdiction over the sea is a
political question, and that they are bound to follow the view
of the political department of the government. 51 Nevertheless
the interpretation of political acts bearing on these points often
involves questions of legal definition, and the courts undoubtedly
may exercise an effective authority in enforcing the country's
duty of abstaining from the exercise of jurisdiction outside of its
territory, by refusing to take cognizance of cases, where, accord-
ing to international law, or national acts interpreted according
to international law, the national jurisdiction does not extend.
In such cases, therefore, the courts may apply rules of interna-
tional law directly as rules of decision.
(2) The exercise of jurisdiction over vessels of foreign
nations seized on the high seas in time of war, by way of reprisals
or when ordered by municipal law, has been considered. The
general principle appears to be recognized that in time of peace
no jurisdiction may be exercised over vessels of foreign states
50On the arbitration see Moore's Digest, 1 5913-922. As a result of the
arbitration the United States paid Great Britain $473,151.26 as indemnity
for the seizures. Judicial discussions subsequent to the arbitration : see
The Alexander, 75 Fed. Rep. 519, Pacific Trading Co., vs. U. S., 75 Fed Rep.
519; La Ninfa, 75 Fed. Rep. 513, reversing 49 Fed. Rep. 575; Whitelaw vs.
U. S. 75 Fed. Rep. 513. The Behring Sea controversy is discussed at
length in Moore's Digest, i ;8oo-929, and Freeman Snow, Treaties and
Topics in American Diplomacy, Boston, 1894, pp. 471-509.
"Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet, 511; U. S.
vs. Reynes, 9 How. 127; Williams vs. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; In
re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 502-505, (1892) ; Jones vs. U. S. 137 U. S. 202,
212, (1890); U. S. vs. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 629, (1892). See British
case Regina vs. Keyn L. R. 2 Ex. D. 63, (1876) Scott 154, in which
criminal jurisdiction on vessels within three mile limit was refused in
the absence of specific authorization by the political dept. of govt. Soon
after this decision, the Territorial Water Jurisdiction, Act. 1878, 41-2
Viet. c. 73 gave such jurisdiction. In Mortensen vs. Peters, 14 Scot.
L. T. R. 227 (1906), Bentwich cases, 12, the court held that it was bound to
accept the jurisdiction given it by statute over offenses committed beyond
the three mile limit by foreign vessels.
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on the high seas. The law of the United States does, however,
provide for the assumption of jurisdiction over pirate vessels,
slave traders, and national vessels upon the high seas.
(a) Jurisdiction over pirates was given by the crimes act
of 1790s2 enacted under the constitutional authority of congress
to "define and punish piracies and offences against the law of
nations." Besides persons
' '
piratically running away" with
vessels or goods worth over fifty dollars on the high seas, the
act declared all persons guilty of acts punishable by death if
committed in the United States, or of other specified offenses,
pirates, and punishable by death. The courts distinguished two
classes of offenses in this act: (1) piracy by international law
and (2) piracy by national law. It was only for the former
offense that the courts could assume jurisdiction of acts com-
mitted on foreign vessels.53 In the latter class of offenses, juris-
diction was only assumed where the offense was committed on
a United States vessel or by a United States citizen.54
An act of 1819 55 amended this act, so as to make "piracy
as defined by the law of nations" punishable by death, and
piratical vessels subject to forfeiture. The act was practically
repeated in 1820, 56 and appears in the revised statutes as section
5368. It was repeated in the penal code of 1911, the death
penalty having been changed to life imprisonment by an act of
1897.57 The definition of piracy dependent upon the meaning
of that term by the law of nations was held sufficiently definite
to give criminal jurisdiction.58
Persons holding commissions from recognized belligerents,
even though not recognized as independent states, can not be
considered pirates59 and, although opinions have differed, the
weight of authority holds that the vessels of unrecognized insur-
52Act. Apr. 3, 1790, i stat. 113.
53U. S. vs. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, (1820) ; U. S. vs. Pirates, 5
Wheat. 184.
B4U. S. vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, (1818) ; U. S. vs. Holmes, 5 Wheat.
412, (1820).
55Act. Mch. 3, 1819, 3 stat. 513.
56May 15. 1820. 3 stat. 600; Rev. Stat. 5368.
"Penal Code 1911, sec. 290, Act. Jan. 15, 1897, 29 Stat. 487.
68U. S. vs. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, (1820).
59The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 4 Wheat. 497; The Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283; The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298; Ford vs. Surget,
97 U. S. 618; U. S. vs. Baker, 5 Blatch, 11,13.
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gents may not be treated as pirates.60 Foreign vessels have been
held forfeitable for piratical aggressions though the voyage was
not primarily one of piracy,
61 and seizure of innocent vessels
on probable suspicion of piracy exempts the captor from liability
for damages.
62
Property seized by pirates has been restored on payment
of salvage in the same manner, as in the case of the recapture
of prizes during war, though there is no limit to the time during
which restoration is possible, as seizure by pirates never divests
the original owner of his title.
63 A number of treaties have
required such restoration.
46
Treaties have provided that American citizens accepting
commissions against the other contracting party should be
treated as pirates. There has been doubt whether such treaty
provisions are valid because of the impliedly exclusive power
given by the constitution to congress to "define piracies."65
There have been no criminal prosecutions under such treaties.
The act is not one of piracy by international law and therefore
could apply only to United States citizens.
(b) Slave trading by United States citizens was made a
crime by an act of 1807,66 and denounced as piracy by a statute
of 1820
;
67 in this case, however, the crime was not one of piracy
by international law. In the early half of the nineteenth
century, the United States strenuously opposed Great Britain's
claims to visit and search foreign vessels suspected of slave trad-
ing, and to punish them as pirates. The practice was continued
during the Napoleonic wars,68 but Lord Stowell by a decision
The Three Friends, 166 U. S. i, 63, (1897), U. S. vs. the Itata, 56
Fed. Rep. 505; U. S. vs. The Weed, 5 Wall. 62; The Watchful, 6 Wall.
91. Contra see The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408, (1885), Navy
Regulations, 1885, ch. 20, par. 18. See Moore's Digest, 251097.
61U. S. vs. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210.
62The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat, i; The Palmyra, 12 Wheat, i.
63Wirt, Att. Gen., i op. 584, (1822).
64See Treaty with Spain, 1795, art. 9, p. 1643; U. S. vs. The Amistad,
15 Pet. 518.
8sThe Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152; Letter by Sec. of State Marcy,
referring to a proposed treaty with Venezuela of this character, Moore's
Digest, 2; 978.
6aAct. Mch. 2, 1807, 2 stat, 420, sec. 7.
67Act May 15, 1820, 3 stat. 600, Rev. stat. 5375.
6 The Amedie, i Act. 240, (1810) ; The Fortuna, i Dods. 81, (1811) ;
The Diana, i Dods. 95, (1813). The view was held in these cases that
foreign vessels seized during war would not be restored if engaged in
slave trading.
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in 181769 refused to recognize these claims as valid in time of
peace, and his view was followed by Chief Justice Marshall in
1825
;
70
consequently the "pirates" from slave trading were
only subject to United States jurisdiction when in domestic ves-
sels.
The treaty of Ghent with Great Britain in 181471 expressed
the hope that both countries would endeavor to suppress the
slave trade, and in the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 184272 the
United States agreed to maintain a squadron on the West
African cost to act in cooperation with a like English squadron,
each of them, however, to seize only vessels flying its own flag.
Great Britain definitely renounced her claim to visit and
search foreign suspected vessels in 1858, and at the same time
the United States senate by a resolution denounced the "visit,
molestation, and detention
' '
of United States vessels by force by
foreign powers "as a derogation of the sovereignty of the United
States." 73 A treaty with Great Britain of 1862 74 provided for
the mutual patrol of a conventional zone extending two hundred
miles from the African coast, and the seizure of slave traders, to
be tried in three mixed courts at Sierre Leone, Cape of Good
Hope, and New York. In 187075 the mixed courts were abolished
by treaty, the same provisions applying to national courts of
the two countries. By the general act for the repression of
African Slave Trade78 of 1890, which is a treaty ratified by
the United States and sixteen other powers, the visit, search
and seizure of vessels of signatory powers under five hundred
tons burden, by war vessels of any of the signatory powers, are
permitted in a prescribed zone about Africa. Suspected vessels
are to be sequestrated and their officers and crew turned over to
the country under whose flag they sailed. Slave trading by this
convention has been put on a footing resembling that of piracy,
though not exactly the same. Visit and search may only be
exercised against foreign vessels in the limited zone, and trial
is always by the country of the suspected parties.77
69Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, (1817).
70The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, (1825).
"Treaty with Great Britain, 1814, art. 10, Malloy, p. 618.
"Treaty with Great Britain, 1842, art. 8, Malloy, p. 655.
73Moore's Digest, 2 #46.
74Treaty with Great Britain, 1862, Malloy, p. 674.
"Treaty with Great Britain, 1870, Malloy, p. 693.
"General Act for the Repression of African Slave Trade, 1890, Mal-
loy, p. 1964.
77On the Slave Trade see Moore's Digest, 2;9i4-Q5i.
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(c) Jurisdiction over civil cases involving merchant vessels
on the high seas is inherent in the admiralty jurisdiction given
to federal courts by the constitution and by the judiciary act
of 1789. Cognizance of crimes committed on board national
vessels is not, however, inherent in the admiralty jurisdiction,
78
but, by statute, courts of admiralty are given jurisdiction over
offenses on United States vessels at sea, even when committed
by foreigners.79 The acts specified as piracy by national law
come under this head. The criminal jurisdiction over vessels is
not co-extensive with the civil admiralty jurisdiction. The latter
has been held to extend over the high seas to tide water mark
and in rivers so far as the ebb and flow of the tide, in the United
States having been extended over the Great Lakes and all navi-
gable streams.
80 The criminal jurisdiction, however, extends
only over United States vessels on the high seas beyond terri-
torial limits. Crimes on board vessels within territorial waters
of the United States81 or foreign countries82 are not within the
statutory grant of jurisdiction to courts of admiralty jurisdic-
tion, but are within the cognizance of the state or foreign
country where committed. Statutes have given consular courts
jurisdiction over crimes committed by seamen upon United
States vessels. 815 The jurisdiction extends where the vessel is
in the port of the country where the court is located.84
The national jurisdiction over public vessels is complete,
and exists even when the vessel is within foreign territorial
waters. This jurisdiction is exercised through the courts martial
78U. S. vs. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 366; U. S. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
(1820) ; U. S. vs. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412, (1820).
79Act. Apr. 30, 1790, I stat. 113; Rev. stat. 5346, 5576, Penal Code,
1911, sec. 272. The jurisdiction extends also to offenses committed on
Guano Islands. Trial is held in the district court of the district where the
offender is found or into which he is first brought, (Rev. stat. 730).
80The Genessee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Hine vs. Trevor, 4 Wheat.
555, (1866) ; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 44, (1866) ; Packer vs. Bird, 137
U. S. 661, (1891).
81 U. S. vs. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.
82U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 74, (1820), U. S. vs. McGill, 4 Dall.
426, (1806). U. S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249, (1893), seems to be contra.
In Reg. vs. Anderson, 11 Cox C. C. 198, (1868), a British case, the court
took jurisdiction of a crime by a United States citizen on a British vessel
forty-five miles up the Garonne of France. Moore's Digest, 25937. See
infra p. 42.
83Rev. Stat. 4084, 4088.
84In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, (1891).
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and executive authority. In the case of public vessels not of the
navy, the laws giving courts of admiralty jurisdiction of crimes
appear to apply as in the case of merchant vessels.
(3) The United States has in general recognized its duty
to abstain from the assumption of jurisdiction over acts com-
mitted in foreign countries, but certain exceptions to this general
rule have been recognized by law. For convenience we may
consider the subject under the four heads, (a) acts committed
by agencies of government, (b) by citizens, (c) by foreigners,
and (d) laws of extraterritorial effect.
(a) The general exemption of foreign public vessels, armed
forces, and diplomatic representatives from local jurisdiction is
recognized by international law. The law of the United States
provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over acts by its agencies
of this character even in foreign countries. Naval forces of the
United States in foreign jurisdiction continue subject to the
articles for the government of the navy, navy regulations and
naval instructions.85 Crimes committed on board such vessels
in foreign ports are subject to trial by court martial in the
same manner as if the vessel were on the high seas or in a home
port. Seamen of the navy are also subject to consular jurisdic-
tion for acts committed abroad.86
Armed forces may only enter foreign territory in time of
peace by special license, 87 but wherever they are they remain
subject to the articles of war, the army regulations, and the
general orders of the war department.88 As with naval forces,
crimes committed by members of such forces in foreign territory
are subject to court martial trial. Military law is personal, and
non-territorial in effect.
The exemption from local jurisdiction of diplomatic repre-
sentatives is recognized by international law and specified in the
instructions to diplomatic officers issued by the president in
1897.89 By these instructions diplomatic officers are forbidden
85See Navy Regulations, 1913; Articles for the government of the
Navy, Rev. Stat. 1624.
86Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 630, p. 268. Moore's Digest, 2; 611.
See Navy Regulation Nov. 2, 1875.
87See Dig. op. Judge Ad. Gen. 1912, p. 90.
88See Articles of War, Rev. Stat. 1342-1343; Dig. op. Judge Ad. Gen.
1912, pp. 511, 1071.
"Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, (1897),
Sec. 46, p. 18; Rev. Stat. 4063-4064.
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to submit to local criminal or civil jurisdiction, or to testify in
foreign courts without the express consent of the United States.90
They remain subject to the instructions of the department of
state and the president, by whom they may be recalled at pleas-
ure,
81 and to the law of the United States.
Consuls do not enjoy the exemptions of diplomatic officers
from local jurisdiction except in non-Christian countries. They
are, however, declared by the consular regulations of 1896 to
be exempt from jury and militia duties, and their archives are
not subject to local jurisdiction.92 Consuls abroad are subject
to consular regulations and the authority of the department of
state and the president. They may be punished in the United
States for crimes committed abroad.93 The consular regulations
declare United States consular officers to be immune from local
criminal and civil jurisdiction, and subject to diplomatic priv-
ileges in non-Christian countries.
94 In such cases their acts are
subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts as in the case
of ministers.
(b) Acts committed by United States citizens abroad are
not in general subject to the jurisdiction of United States law.
This applies to acts committed on national merchant vessels in
foreign ports. Thus the United States courts have held that
statutes conferring jurisdiction over crimes committed within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States do not apply to
crimes committed on vessels in foreign ports. 95 Crimes take
place where they take effect; consequently the court refused
jurisdiction in a case where an American citizen fired a shot
from an American vessel, killing a man in foreign jurisdiction.98
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Statutes have
provided for the punishment of crimes against the sovereignity
of the United States, committed by citizens abroad, such as the
unauthorized carrying on of diplomatic correspondence with
foreign governments.97 Another exception occurs in the case
of countries where consular jurisdiction has been established
90Diplomatic Instructions, 1897, Sec. 46, 48, 53, 56.
91Diplomatic Instructions, 1897, Sec. 272-280, Rev. Stat. 202.
92Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 71-75.
93Moore's Digest, 25267.
"Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 75.
95U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 74, (1820) ; U. S. vs. McGill, 4 Ball.
426, (1806) ; contra, U. S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249, (1893).
90U. S. vs. Davis, 2 Sumner C. C. 482, (1837).
9rAct. 1799, Rev. Stat. 5335. See Moore's Digest, 2:264.
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by treaty. Such treaties have been concluded with most non-
Christian countries, although that with Japan was abrogated in
1894, as have been those of countries which have since become
colonies of European states.98 The treaties usually specify the
limits of this jurisdiction, which has been further defined by act
of congress.
90
According to this statute such consuls have juris-
diction over crimes committed by United States citizens in that
country, or by sailors in United States vessels, even when the
man is a foreigner.
100 A similar jurisdiction is given to consuls
and commercial agents in places ''not inhabited by any civilized
people or recognized by any treaty with the United States."101
Besides this criminal jurisdiction consular courts exercise civil
jurisdiction in cases where American citizens are defendants.102
(c) The United States has of all countries been the most
consistent in its opposition to the doctrine of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreigners.103 As has been observed, the juris-
diction over citizens for acts committed abroad, a jurisdiction
which is permissible by international law and extensively exer-
cised by many countries, has been but sparingly provided for
in the law of the United States. In an exhaustive discussion of
98Treaties now in force with Borneo, China, Korea, Morocco, Tripoli,
Turkey, Persia, Siam, Tonga. Treaties have been concluded but since
abrogated or superseded by annexation with Algiers, Muscat, Zanzibar,
Japan, Madagascar, Samoa, Tunis.
"Act Aug. ii, 1848, 9 Stat. 276, as amended in Rev. Stat. Sec. 4083-
4130. Applies to China, Japan, Siam, Egypt, Madagascar, Turkey, Persia,
Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat, Samoa, and other countries with which
appropriate treaties may be concluded. Rev. Stat. 4129. Japan, Mada-
gascar, Tunis, Muscat, and Samoa have since been excluded by treaty.
100Consular regulations, 1896, Sec. 629. In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453,
(1891).
101Rev. Stat. Sec. 4088. This was held to permit the assumption of
jurisdiction by a special agent sent over for that purpose in a country
where no regular consul or commercial agent resided, by Att. Gen. Gar-
land. (18 op. 219, 1885).
102In exercising jurisdiction consular courts apply the law of the
United States, the common law, the law of equity and admiralty, and
"decrees and regulations" which ministers may make to "supply defects
and deficiencies" in the other bodies of law mentioned. Rev. Stat. 4986;
Gushing Att. Gen., 7 op. 503; Moore's Digest, 2;6i4-6i/.
108See the Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362; U. S. vs. Davis, 2 Sumner C. C.
482, (1837).
41] IN TIME OP PEACE 41
extraterritorial crime,
104 written by John Bassett Moore in con-
nection with the Cutting case, in which Mexico attempted to
assert jurisdiction over an American citizen for acts committed
against a Mexican citizen in the United States, only one instance
is mentioned in which, aside from treaty agreements, jurisdic-
tion is asserted over foreigners for acts in foreign territory.
This case occurs in a statute of 1856105 which authorizes consular
officers and secretaries of legation to administer oaths and per-
form notarial acts, which shall be valid in the United States.
The act also provides that persons committing perjury in such
oaths shall be liable to criminal punishment as if the act were
committed in the United States, and may be indicted in any
district where arrested. This statute was justified by Attorney
General Williams106 on the ground that the domicile of the
consul or diplomatic agent where the act was committed is to
be regarded as a portion of United States territory. Moore
thinks a more satisfactory justification can be found in the
implied consent given by the foreign government, to submit its
citizen to United States law, when he does these acts before
an officer recognized by international law and by the foreign
state's own law as competent to perform such functions.107
To this example may be added that already mentioned of
the jurisdiction exercised by consular courts over seamen of
foreign nationality serving on American vessels in foreign ports.
The consular regulations very specifically extend this jurisdic-
tion, and in the case of In re Ross108 its exercise was upheld by
the United States supreme court in the case of a British subject,
serving on an American vessel and found guilty of murder by
the consular court for an act done on the vessel while in the
harbor of Yokahama. The usual principle of jurisdiction over
acts done on national vessels coupled with the extraterritorial
jurisdiction over such vessels, granted to consuls by treaty in
this case, furnishes sufficient justification for this exercise of
jurisdiction over aliens for acts committed abroad.
104
J. B. Moore, Report on extraterritorial Crime, For. Rel., 1887,
p. 770. A large portion of this report is printed in Moore's Digest,
2 ;243-26o.
105Act. Aug. 18, 1856; Rev. Stat. 1750.
ioe\villiams Att. Gen., 14 op. 285.
107Moore's Digest, 25267.
108See Consular regulations, 1896, sec. 629; In re Ross, 140 U. S.
453, (1891).
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Not so easily justified is the jurisdiction given by statute
over every person committing assaults with a dangerous weapon
on vessels wholly or partly owned by United States citizens, on
the ' ' high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven,
creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
state". Under this statute jurisdiction was upheld of a crime
committed on an American vessel in the Detroit Eiver within
the territorial limits of Canada, thus limiting the term "par-
ticular state ' ' to states of the union.109
In general, however, the law of the United States gives
adequate recognition to the duty of abstaining from the exercise
of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime by aliens.
(d) United States courts have in general refused to give
an extraterritorial effect to laws, even when no limitation was
expressed in terms. Thus the supreme court refused to apply
the Sherman anti-trust law to prevent a monopoly in Costa
Rica. Justice Holmes speaking for the court, said, "All legisla-
tion is prima facie territorial, words having universal scope,
such as every contract in restraint of trade, *
*
will be
taken as a matter of course to mean only every one subject to
such legislation, not all that the legislator may subsequently
be able to catch."110
In 1908 Judge Advocate General Davis expressed an opinion
that declarations of war were laws of extraterritorial effect.111
Consequently the president could call out the militia for service
in foreign countries, under the constitutional and statutory
authority to call them out "to execute the laws." A statute
of 1908112 based on this opinion recognized such extraterritorial
laws, but the validity of this provision was denied in an opinion
of the attorney general in 1912.
113
109Rev. Stat. 5346. See U. S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U. S, 249, (1893).
In U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat 76, the court refused jurisdiction of
a crime by an American citizen in an American vessel in the river Tigress
of China. The statute under which indictment was made in this case was,
however, sec. 12, of the crimes act of 1790, (see Rev. Stat. 5576) which
extended jurisdiction only over the high seas. See also, Thomas vs.
Lane, 2 Sumn. i, U. S. vs. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72; Moore's Digest, 1 :937-<J38.
110American Banana Co. vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, (1909).
111See Cong. Record, 6oth Cong., ist Sess., 1908, vol. 42, p. 6940, 6661 ;
63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7778.
112Act May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 399, Sec. 5 p. 400.
113Att. Gen. Wickersham, 29 Op. 322, (1912). But see Act. Feb. 16,
1914, Sec. 4, in which the power to summon the naval militia for service
"within or without" the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is given.
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Though this view applies to ordinary laws, there are
undoubtedly laws of extraterritorial effect. Such, for instance,
are the articles of war, the articles for the government of the
navy, and official instructions to army, navy, consular and
diplomatic officers. These are laws of non-territorial character,
applying to particular persons wherever they may happen to be.
Such laws, however, have been applied only to citizens of the
United States, with the minor exceptions mentioned in the last
section, and consequently are not inconsistent with the obliga-
tion to abstain from extending laws, or assuming jurisdiction
over aliens abroad.
(4) The courts have affirmed on numerous occasions that
they can not assume jurisdiction over suits against foreign
states, or sovereigns, or their official representatives, such as
ministers and ambassadors.114 The commonwealths of the union
have also been considered sovereign in this respect, and no
suits against them entertained unless jurisdiction has been
specifically granted by the constitution.115 The government of
the United States is itself in this class and can not be sued unless
specific provision is found in statute.116
The courts have, however, held that a nominal suit to dis-
cover facts may be within their jurisdiction.117 They may also
assume jurisdiction of suits brought by sovereigns. As in such
suits the sovereign has voluntarily submitted to their jurisdic-
tion, setoffs may be allowed against him to the amount of his
claim, but no more.118 The whole proceeding can never result
in an actual judgment against a sovereign.
114Underhill vs. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250; Hassard vs. United States
of Mexico, 173 N. Y. 645, 61 N. Y. S. 939; Res Publica vs. De Long-
champs, i Dall. in, 116, (Pa.) ; Hatch vs. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, (N. Y. 1876) ;
Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 137.
116People vs. Dennison, 84 N. Y. 272; Beers vs. Arkansas, 201 How.
527. The immunity of states from jurisdiction in federal courts in cases
covered by the constitution was denied in Chisholm vs. Ga., 2 Dall. 419,
O/93). as a result of which the immunity was specifically granted from
suits by subjects of another state or a foreign state, in the eleventh
amendment.
"'Stanley vs. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Kawananako vs. Polyblank,
205 U. S. 349, 353-
117Manning vs. Nicaragua, 14 How. Prac. 517, (N. Y. 1857).
118People vs. Dennison, 84 N. Y. 272; King of Spain vs. Oliver, Fed.
Cas. 7813; U. S. vs. Eckford, 6 Wall. 490; The Siren 7 Wall. 152. See
also Von Hellfeld vs. Russian Govt., a German Case, Am. J. Int. Law,
1911, 5; 490.
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In a number of these cases the courts have specifically
invoked the principle that courts apply international law, and
have found the non-liability of sovereigns to suit among its
rules.119 In other cases, the fact that jurisdiction implies power
to enforce, a condition impossible as against sovereigns, was
considered sufficient to warrant a refusal of judgment.120 In
cases where the plaintiff sought relief for infractions of right
by his own sovereign, the principle that the power which may
alter the law can never be bound by it was held to render such a
jurisdiction out of the question. Thus in Kawananako vs. Poly-
blank,
121 Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said, "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal concep-
tion or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."
The duties of abstention are in the main of a political
nature, and beyond the power of municipal law to control.
There have, however, been treaties and statutes defining methods
of acquiring territory, the limits of the use of force against
foreign countries, and the extent of the national jurisdiction.
The courts also, although generally holding such questions
political, and following the political department of government
in any determination it may give regarding the international
duties of abstention, have laid down rules, especially on tho
question of jurisdiction. As in laying down these principles
upon which they and other public officers will act, they find
the rules in the law of nations, and apply them according to
the principle that courts of the United States apply interna-
tional law in appropriate cases, judgemade law furnisher an
effective municipal sanction to the fulfillment of the state's
duties of abstention.
119Hatch vs. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, (N. Y. 1876) ; Res Publica vs. De
Longchamps, i Ball, in, 116.
120American Banana Co. vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, (1909).
121Kawananako vs. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353.
CHAPTER III. OBLIGATIONS OF ACQUIESCENCE
INTRODUCTORY
As a state is in general bound to abstain from the exercise of
sovereignty outside of its territory, so in general it may resent
any obstructions to the free exercise of its sovereign rights within
its territory. As has been noted there are exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of abstention from the exercise of extraterritorial sover-
eignty. In like manner there are exceptions to the rule of com-
plete internal authority. International law specifies cases in
which sovereign rights may not be exercised even within the ter-
ritory, and thereby imposes a duty to acquiesce in these exemp-
tions. There is, however, great difference of opinion as to what
these exemptions are.
It seems that in common law countries the principle of ab-
solute territorial sovereignty is adhered to in theory with great
emphasis, but in practice numerous concessions are made.1 In
Roman law countries, on the other hand, many limitations of
strict territorial sovereignty are recognized as law, but in prac-
tice few more concessions are allowed than under the common
law. It is possible that the difference in theory can be traced to
the territorial isolation of England in the days when common law
originated, as distinguished from the situation of continental Eu-
ropean states, where the effect of contiguity and a common de-
scent from the Roman Empire was enhanced by the medieval
conception, still lingering in the Roman Law, of a world state, to
which all territorial states are subject. However, for otfr pur-
poses the origin of the difference in theory is unimportant. We
do not care whether the exemptions from territorial sovereignty
actually practiced were originally justified by a theory of comity
or of legal obligation. It remains that many of them are now
so habitually observed in practice as to be distinctly obligations
of international law. Others are observed with varying fre-
quency, so should be classed as obligations of comity and good
will rather than law. A third class of such concessions consists
1 See Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange vs. McFad-
don, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
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of obligations sometimes enunciated by theorists but seldom made
effective or maintained by practical diplomatists.
In the first class are the complete or partial exemptionsjrpjn
territorial jurisdiction of certain foreign agencie_s_ofgovernment,
such as executive heads, diplomatic officers, armed forces, public
vessels, consuls and sometimes of other foreign~Mb3ects, to which
may be added the exemptions from complete, control of _eertain
portions of territory^ such as international rivers and canals,
ports and territorial waters of the ocean^and recently_^cquired
territory.
In the second class are exceptions from the usual rule that
courts apply the law of the land. Such exemptions occur in cases
involving foreign persons, foreign judgments, foreign contracts,
etc. Here exists the most marked difference between the Anglo-
American and Continental theories. Writers of the latter school
usually consider it a duty of the state to assume jurisdiction of
cases and apply foreign law according to rules of private interna-
tional law.2 Common law writers, on the other hand, generally
consider the matter entirely one of comity and policy. 3 They
deny that a state is under an international duty to apply for-
eign law according to any rules other than those its own jurispru-
dence may direct. Consequently they sometimes object to the
term
"private international law" but consider the rules govern-
ing "conflict of laws" as a branch of the common law. Which
theory is best adapted to promote the welfare of men and na-
tions we shall not attempt to decide, but it is certain that no sys-
2See H. Bonfils, Manuel de Droit International Public. 3rd. ed.. Paris,
1901, p. 3 ; F. DeMartens, Traite de Droit International, 3 vols., Paris,
1883, 2; 391-400: See also Annuaire de 1'institut de Droit International,
1902, 1904, 1906, 1908 and compare attitude of representatives of Con-
tinental and Common Law countries in discussions of private interna-
tional law.
8See T. E. Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, nth ed., N. Y.,
1910, pp. 410-419: J. Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law,
3rd ed., London, 1890, pp. 1-7: Joseph Story, Commentaries on The Con-
flict of Laws, 8th ed., Boston, 1883, pp. 8-9, 24; F. Wharton, A Treatise
on the Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., 2 vols., N. Y., 1905, pp. 2-4: A. V.
Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict
of Law, 2nd ed., London, 1908, pp. 3-16: F. Pollock, First Book of Juris-
prudence, 2nd ed., London, 1904, p. 99: T. J. Lawrence, Principles of
International Law, 4th ed., N. Y., 1910, pp. 5-6: A. S. Hershey, The
Essentials of International Public Law, N. Y., 1912, pp. 4-5, Bibliography,
P- 13-
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tern for the application of law has been universally consented to
at present. Although American courts have occasionally applied
rules on the subject because they deemed them established by in-
ternational law,
4 their general tendency has been to regard prece-
dents of the common law alone. We will therefore exclude the
rules of private international law from consideration. At pres-
ent international law imposes no duty upon states to apply for-
eign law in certain cases.
In the third class are duties connected with the control of
private persons and commerce. It is sometimes asserted that states
are bound to acquiesce in the immigration of foreigners and the
emigration of inhabitants; the naturalization of aliens and the
expatriation of citizens ; and the importation and exportation of
goods.
5 If the state were really under an international obliga-
tion to acquiesce in these matters, if it had no legal right to say
who should enter or leave its territory, who should form its citi-
zenship and what commercial policy should be pursued, the
regime of territorial state sovereignty would be at an end. The
United States has certainly not acted upon this theory in its en-
tirety. It has passed laws prohibiting immigration not only of
various classes but of whole races, and laws expelling aliens after
they have arrived. In its diplomatic correspondence, instead of
maintaining acquiescence in emigration as a duty under interna-
tional law, it has considered it a duty of states to prohibit the
emigration of certain classes.6 Even less has unlimited admission
to citizenship been permitted by law. Large classes and whole
races are permanently excluded from this privilege. Laws per-
mitting naturalization have been framed with reference to na-
tional policy, not international duty. By admitting the right to
restrict emigration, the right to prevent the loss of its citizens by
4See Hilton vs. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1894), in which Justice Gray,
speaking for the court, decided that international law, public and private,
is part of the law of the United States and requires adherence to the
principle of reciprocity in applying foreign judgments. He therefore
refused to apply a French judgment, as French courts did not apply
foreign judgments, but in Ritchie vs. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235, at the
same time, he applied an English' judgment on the same principle^
Justices Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Jackson dissented in Hilton vs Guyot
on the ground that the common law was decisive, and it applied the
principle of res judicata to foreign as well as domestic judgments.
5See Bonfils, op. cit., sec. 412-414; Hershey, op. cit. p. 257, and note*
also bibliography, p. 273.
6See Moore's Digest, 25427.
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expatriation is admitted. Whether the citizens who have emi-
grated and reside abroad may expatriate themselves, acquire citi-
zenship in another country and claim the privileges of the new
citizenship on returning is a different question. The United
States has maintained that the recognition of the right of ex-
patriation is a duty of international law, but all nations have not
given assent to this doctrine.
7 The opinion which considers a
state bound to acquiesce in the freedom of commerce has cer-
tainly received no countenance from American practice. The
United States has completely prohibited exportation, by embargo
acts. It has prohibited trade with specified countries by non-
intercourse acts and has habitually placed serious limitations
upon importation by protective tariffs. No duty of acquiescence
in these fields is required by international law, and the subject
need no longer detain us.
Limiting consideration to the first class, we may discuss the
national measures enforcing the duty to acquiesce in limitations
upon the complete exercise of authority within the territory,
under three heads : (1) privileges of foreign agencies of govern-
ment and persons, (2) liabilities attached to newly acquired ter-
ritory, (3) exemptions of certain portions of territory from com-
plete control, or servitudes.
As in the case of the duty of abstention this duty is one di-
rected immediately to the sovereign power of the state. If the
sovereign refuses to acquiesce in the immunity of ambassadors,
and orders his courts to assume jurisdiction over them, the courts
must obey. If by an act of state he refuses to recognize the right
of inhabitants of acquired territory to their vested rights under
the former sovereign, the courts must obey.
8 Or if he refuses to
permit vessels in distress to enter his ports, and commerce to pass
upon his boundary rivers, his international canals and his terri-
torial waters, the obligation can not be enforced by municipal
law.9 In all of these cases, however, in the absence of express
7The "inherent right of expatriation" was enunciated by congress
in 1864, Rev. Stat, 1099-2000.
8See West Rand Central Gold Mining Co., vs. Rex., L. R. 2 K. B.
391 (1905), which held that "an act of state" tterred recovery from the
British government of a claim due from the Transvaal government
before acquisition. Discussion of this case by J. Westlake, "Is Int. Law
Part of the Law of England?", Law Quar. Rev., 22514.
9The fortifications of the Panama Canal amounts to an announce-
ment that the United States will not acquiesce in its freedom to com-
merce under all circumstances.
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statute the courts may enforce the duty by adhering to the rule
that international law is to be applied in appropriate cases, and
that statutes are to be interpreted so far as possible in accord with
that law. And where the rules of international law are expressly
declared by treaty, statute or executive order, the power of mu-
nicipal law to enforce is clear.
>
PRIVILEGES OF FOREIGN AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND PERSONS
(1) Foreign public vessels are granted the right of asylum
coupled with immunity from local jurisdiction in several trea-
ties,
10 and in a large number of treaties the United States has
agreed to accord the most favored nation treatment to the diplo-
matic representatives of the contracting power, 11 and special
privileges have frequently been thus accorded to foreign con-
suls. These privileges do not in general extend beyond the im-
munity of the consular archives from seizure, the inviolability of
the consulate, and the privilege of adjusting disputes between
sailors on national vessels and performing functions connected
with commerce. Most treaties specify that the consul shall be
subject to local jurisdiction in the same manner as citizens and
to most favored nation treatment. 12 By a few treaties consuls
are exempt from giving testimony, 13 and in non-Christian coun-
tries, where extraterritorial privileges are granted consuls usually
enjoy diplomatic immunities by treaty ; such privileges, however,
are not reciprocal.
14
The consular regulations and diplomatic instructions outline
10See Treaties, France, 1778-1798, art. 17, Malloy p. 474; 1800-1809,
art. 24, p. 504; Great Britain, 1704-1807, art 25, p. 604; Prussia, 1785-
1796, art. 19, p. 1483; 1799-1810, revived 1828, art. 19, p. 1493; Sweden,
1/83-1799, revived 1816, 1827, art. 19, p. 1732; Netherlands, 1782-1795,
art. 5, P. 1245-
11Such treaties have been concluded with twenty-one countries,
mostly in South and Central America. The Spanish treaty of 1902, also,
contained this stipulation (art. 12, Malloy, p. 1704).
12In 104 treaties with 51 countries provision for consular officers is
made. 20 special consular conventions with 15 countries have been
concluded. Consular conventions with practically all countries are now
in force. Russia, however, since the termination of the treaty of 1832,
by joint resolution of congress in 1911, is an exception to this rule.
13For example see treaty with France, 1853, art. 2, Malloy, p. 529.
"See Moore's Digest, 5, 37-40. Supra, pp. 39-40.
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the privileges of such officers. These executive orders are not of
importance in enforcing the country's duty of acquiescing in the
immunities of foreign resident officers, but they illustrate the
view of the law taken by the United States.
In several treaties private citizens of the contracting parties
are granted immunity from military service.18
(2) Courts have enforced the duty to acquiesce in the im-
munities granted by treaty and statute as well as others recog-
nized by international law. They have held that jurisdiction
may not be assumed of suits against foreign sovereigns,17
and former officers of foreign governments, 18 for politi-
cal acts, even when they are within the territory. The
same exemption has been held to apply to public ves-
sels19 and other personal property of a foreign state or sov-
ereign.
20 Public armed troops and soldiers have also generally
been held exempt when acting under orders of their sovereign, 21
but in the celebrated case of People vs. McLeod, 22 in which a
court of the state of New York refused to recognize such immu-
nities, a reverse attitude was taken. In this case the authorities
at Washington favored the release of McLeod in accordance
with international duty, but were unable to release him from
state authority. The case illustrates the obstacle which the divi-
15Consular Regulations, 1896, sec. 71-75, 82. Diplomatic instructions,
1897, sec. 18, 46-49.
16Such treaties have been concluded with sixteen countries. Those
with Argentina, 1853, art. 10, Malloy, p. 23; Congo, 1891, art. 3, p. 329;
Costa Rico, 1851, art. 9, p. 344; Honduras, 1864, art. 9, p. 955; Italy, 1871,
art. 3, p. 970; Japan, 1894, art. i, p. 1029; Paraguay, 1859, art. u, p. 136^;
Servia, 1881, art. 4, p. 1615; Spain, 1902, art. 5, p. 1703, are now in force.
"See Dicta by Chief Justice Marshall, in Schooner Exchange vs.
McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812). British case, Mighell vs. Sultan of
Johore, L. R., 1894, Q. B. D., i ; 149.
18Underhill vs. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250.
19U. S. Peters, 3 Dall. 121 ; Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7
Cranch 116, 137 (1812); Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424 (1902).
See British case, The Parlement Beige, L. R., 5 P. D. 197, 217 (1900),
Bentwich, p. 123; Scott, 220.
20Hassard vs. U. S. of Mexico, 61 N. Y. S. 939 (1899). British
case. Vavasseur vs. Krupp, L. R. 9, Ch. D. 351 (1878) ; Moore's Digest, 2,
558-593.
"Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424 (1902); Dicta Schooner
Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
"People vs. McLeod, 25 Wend, 253; 26 Wend, 663; See Moore's
Digest, 2; 24-25. McLeod was tried and finally acquitted on an alibi.
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sion of power between state and national government may offer
to the performance of international duties. Soon after this case,
by an act of 1842, 23 congress provided for the release of such per-
sons from state courts by habeas corpus issued by federal courts.
The exceptions to the general rule of exemption in cases
where it becomes necessary for the state to vindicate a violation
of its neutrality are considered under that subject.24
(3) By statute courts are forbidden to take jurisdiction of
cases against diplomatic ministers and members of their house-
holds upon either civil or criminal charges. 25*- This has been held
to apply to such officers accredited to third countries in transit
through the United States28 as well as those accredited to the
United States, but the person claiming immunity must be an
actual diplomatic officer. A consul general performing diplo-
matic functions -was held not to be within the immunity.27^Few
cases have come before United States courts involving, directly,
jurisdiction over diplomatic officers. Generally a release has
been effected by executive authority before the process has gone
so far. In a number of cases dealing with the punishment of per-
sons violating diplomatic immunities the question has been dis-
cussed. 28 The courts have also held that a diplomatic officer may
not be compelled to give testimony.29
For the better enforcement of these duties the constitution
has conferred jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors and
public ministers upon the federal courts, and has also given the
supreme court original jurisdiction in such cases.30 Statutes31
23Act Aug. 29, 1842, Rev. Stat. sec. 753; Moore's Digest, 2; 30.
24
Infra, p. 129 et seq.
25Act. Apr. 30, 1790, i Stat. 117, Rev. Stat, sec. 4063-4064.
26Wilson vs. Blanco, 56 N. Y. Superior Court 582; 4 N. Y. S. 714;
Scott, 206.
"In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403 See British case, Heathfield vs. Chilton,
4 Burr. 2015, Scott, 189. On diplomatic immunities generally see Ex
Parte Cabrera, I Wash. C. C. 232; Gushing Att. Gen., 7 op. 367 (1855) ;
Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, and other English cases, cited Scott,
191, note.
28U. S. vs. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205 (1808) ; Res Publica vs. De
Longchamps, i Ball, in (Pa. 1784); U. S. vs. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C.
531 (1825) ; U. S. vs. Benner, Baldwin 234.
29Guiteau's Trial, i; 136; Moore's Digest, 4; 645.
80
Constitution, Art iii.
"Judiciary Act, Sept. 24, 1789, sec. 9, n, 13, i Stat. 76, Rev. Stat
Sec. 687, 711, Judicial Code 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 256, cl. 8.
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have made jurisdiction over such officers or their households ex-
clusive in the federal courts, thus prohibiting the exercise of any
such authority by state courts, and preventing an occurrence in
reference to public ministers similar to that of the McLeod case,
in reference to foreign armed forces. Statutes have also pro-
vided that the supreme court "shall have, exclusively, all such
jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other
public ministers or their domestics or servants as a court of law
can have consistently with the law of the nations.
' '32
The courts have held that consuls are not entitled to the im-
munity of ambassadors, but are subject to criminal and civil ju-
risdiction.33 Consuls are generally held exempt from military
and jury service, but United States citizens holding foreign con-
sular positions may not claim this exemption, 34 and trading con-
suls are subject to the liabilities of native merchants in all that
concerns their business. 35 Treaty privileges of consuls are pro-
tected by the constitutional principle that treaties are law to be
applied by the courts. In a case in which a consul claimed immu-
nity from subpoena under treaty, the court held that even the
constitutional provision giving a person under criminal indict-
ment the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor" would not permit of serving process on such
a consul.36
The constitution confers jurisdiction, in cases affecting con-
suls, upon federal courts and original jurisdiction in such cases
upon the supreme court. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 juris-
32Rev. Stat. 687; Judicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087. sec. 233.
38Commonwealth vs. Kosloff, 5 Serg. and Rawle, 545, (Pa. 1816) ;
Coppell vs. Hall, 7 Wall. 542, (1868) ; Gittings vs. Crawford, Taney's
Decisions, I ; In Re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403 ; Berrien, Att. Gen. 2 op. 378,
(1830) ; Butler Att. Gen., 2 op. 725, (1835) ; Gushing Att. Gen. 6 op. 18,
367, (1854-1855). In U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297, (1793), a consul
was subjected to criminal jurisdiction. British cases, see Barbuit's case,
Cas. Temp. Talbot, 231 (1737) ; Clark vs. Cretico, i Taunt. 106, (1808) ;
Viveash vs. Beckers 3 M. & S. 284, (1814).
"Gushing Att. Gen., 8 op. 169, (1856).
"Coppell vs. Hall, 7 Wall 542, (1868).
38In Re Dillon, Fed. Cas. 710; Moore's Digest 5578. The court
held that the constitutional provisions only insure equal privileges in
obtaining witnesses to the accused and the government, not an absolute
right in either case. The French government maintained that rights
of its consul under international law as well as under treaty had been
violated by the serving of process which gave rise to this case.
"Judiciary Act j^ Rey Stat sec 7II> Q g
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diction of suits against consuls was given exclusively to federal
courts. By an act of 1875 this provision was repealed, giving
state courts a concurrent jurisdiction, but in the Judicial code of
1911 the jurisdiction of federal courts was again made exclusive.
The supreme court exercises original, but not exclusive, jurisdic-
tion in such cases.88
(4) A more extensive limitation upon territorial sovereignty
than the mere immunity of consuls in these respects, is the juris-
dictional privileges accorded by some treaties. The United States
has never concluded treaties by which foreign consuls or diplo-
matic officers exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in its territory
to the extent that such jurisdiction is commonly exercised in non-
Christian countries, but certain privileges have been accorded.
These privileges, which have always been reciprocal, generally
permit foreign consuls to "sit as judges or arbitrators in such
differences as may arise between the captain and crew of the ves-
sels belonging to the nations whose interests are instrusted to
their charge, without the interference of the local authorities,"
and to require the assistance of local authorities "to cause their
decision to be carried into effect or supported.
' >39 These treaties
undoubtedly impose a duty upon the United States to acquiesce
in the consular jurisdiction provided for. It has been held that
the authority is ministerial and not judicial,40 and in an early
opinion the court expressed the view that the treaties were not self-
executing, and local officers could not lend assistance without stat-
utory authority.
41 This view is not generally maintained, but to
avoid difficulties a statute of 186442 required United States courts
38Act. 1875, 18 Stat. 318. See Wilcox vs. Luco, 18 Cal. 639, (1898).
The court below held that the constitutional provision alone gave exclu-
sive jurisdiction to federal courts, but this was reversed in the state
supreme court. See Moore's Digest, 5 -,72-77, Scott, 205-206, note. Judicial
code 191 1, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 256, Cl 8: sec. 233.
39See Treaties with Prussia, 1828, art. 10, Malloy, p. 1499; France,
1853, art. 8, p. 531; Italy, 1878-1881, art. n, p. 980; 1881, art I, p. 983;
Sweden and Norway, 1827, art. 13, p. 1753; Austria-Hungary, 1870, art.
n. p. 42; Belgium, 1880, art. n, p. 97; Germany, 1871, art. 13, p. 554. See
also Consular Regulations, 1896, and Moore's Digest, 25298. The treaty
with France 1788-1798, art. 12, Malloy, p. 495 gave consular courts juris-
diction "of all differences and suits between subjects" of the respective
countries. See Moore's Digest 2:83-85.
40Cushing Att Gen., 8 op. 380, (1857).
41 See Moore's Digest, 2:298.
42Act June 11, 1864, 13 Stat. 12, Judicial, code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec.
271.
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and officers to issue process on application of consuls in fulfill-
ment of treaty obligations when that country accorded reciprocal
privileges as attested by proclamation of the president. The
president has proclaimed this situation with reference to most of
the treaties in force.43 The courts have enforced these provisions
by refusing jurisdiction of cases coming within the consular
privileges,
44 but it has been held that where disturbances affect
the tranquillity of the port, the national courts may always exer-
cise jurisdiction.
45
(5) An exemption from territorial jurisdiction which if car-
ried to excess might become a source of public danger is that
granted to persons within diplomatic residences, consulates or
public vessels. This is known as the right of asylum.46 It should
be noted that the immunity of public vessels and diplomatic and
consular residences does not necessarily imply a right of giving
asylum. Thus a great many treaties declare that consular resi-
dences shall be inviolable, but "in no case shall their offices and
dwellings be used as places of asylum.
' ' 47
Although this distinc-
tion may exist in reference to the duty of the foreign privileged
authority, it can not with reference to the duty of the state upon
whose territory this authority is located. If the state must ac-
quiesce in the immunity from entry of a diplomatic residence or
a public vessel, it must also acquiesce in its use as an asylum, so
far as immediate assertion of its authority is concerned. It can
of course protest and recover the fugitive by diplomatic means.
"Proclamations Feb. 10, 1870, May n, 1872; See Moore's Digest,
25299.
44Tellefsen vs. Fee, 46 N. E. 562, (Mass.) ; The Elwine Kreplin, 9
Blatch. 438; Williams vs. Wellhaven, 55 Fed. Rep. 80.
45This exception to the consular privilege is specified in all of the
treaties mentioned, (note 39), except that with France 1853, art. 8, p. 531.
See Wildenhus' case, 120 U. S. i ; Com. vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. 363, (Pa.) ;
Taft, Att. Gen., 15, op. 178, (1878).
46On the right of asylum see Moore's Digest, 25755. In early times
the privilege of giving asylum was recognized and often abused. Moore
says, "In some instances ambassadors of a thrifty turn realized enormous
profits by hiring and granting their protection to houses which they then
sublet to malefactors". Moore's Digest, 25759.
47See Treaties with Netherlands, 1878; Salvador, 1870; France, 1853;
Belgium, 1868; 1880; Italy, 1868; 1878; Roumania, 1881 ; Servia, 1881 ; The
German treaty of 1871, art. 5, Malloy p. 552, declares that consulates shall
be inviolable
"except in the case of pursuit of crime." See Moore's Di-
gest, 2:755-757.
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In its diplomatic instructions, consular regulations and naval
instructions, the United States forbids the granting of asylum ex-
cept in unusual cases.
48 This is the practice generally required
by treaties and may be said to be the law, although in a number
of cases American officials have given asylum, especially to politi-
cal refugees in South American countries.49
On the other hand the United States has generally recog-
nized the immunity of diplomatic residences and foreign vessels
of war from entry and service of legal process, although in an
opinion of 1794
50
Attorney General Bradford held that a writ of
habeas corpus could be served on a foreign public vessel, while
in 179951 Attorney General Lee thought civil or criminal process
might be served in a British man of war. In an opinion of 185552
Attorney General Gushing emphatically maintained the doctrine
of exemption, going even to the extent of extraterritoriality. In
several treaties the right of asylum to slaves on public vessels is
affirmed,
53 and in the Brussels act of 189054 slaves fleeing to war
vessels of the signatories are declared to become free. Consulates
do not enjoy immunities, by international law, and consequently
could under no circumstances give asylum, unless immunity is
granted by treaty, as is done in a number of cases.
Acquiescence in the right of asylum, so far as it is necessi-
tated by the immunity of diplomatic residences, consulates and
public vessels from territorial jurisdiction, is enforced by the
same means
;
55 but there is really no duty of acquiescence, for the
48See Diplomatic instructions, 1897, sec. 49-51 ; Consular Regulations,
1896, sec. 80; Navy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1649.
49See Moore's Digest, 2:781-883.
50Bradford Att. Gen., i op. 47, (1794).
"Lee Att. Gen., i op. 87, 89, (1799).
52Cushing Att. Gen., 7 op. 112; 8 op. 73, (1855, 1856).
63By the treaty with Algiers of 1795-1815, art. n, Malloy p. 3, the re-
turn of slaves fleeing to public vessels was required ; by that of 1816-1830,
art. 14, p. 14, Christian captives fleeing to United States public vessels
might be granted asylum. By the treaty with Tunis 1797-1824, art. 6, p. 1795,
the return of slaves was demanded, but as amended in 1824-1904, art. 6, p.
1801, slaves gaining asylum were free. The treaty with Madagascar, 1881-
1896, art. 7, p. 1071, forbade the giving of asylum to slaves.
"General act for the Repression of the Slave Trade, Brussel's Con-
vention, 1890, art. 28, Malloy, p. 1975.
"See U. S. vs. Jeffers, 4 Cranch C. C. 704, Scott, 256, (1836), in which
a constable was removed from office for arresting a fugitive slave in the
house of a British Secretary of Legation. See British case, Forbes vs.
Cochrane, 2 Barn. & Cress, 448, (K. B. 1824), Scott, 258, where it was
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state may, within its international right, protest the matter dip-
lomatically.
Resident subjects of foreign states are permitted no special
privileges or exemptions from territorial jurisdiction except those
specifically accorded by treaty, such as military exemptions. In
these cases the courts by directly enforcing treaty provisions as
law may enforce the states' duty of acquiescence.
LIABILITIES ATTACHED TO NEWLY ACQUIRED TERRITORY
The second duty of acquiescence relates to the rights of the
inhabitants of newly acquired territory and the liabilities
attached to the land. The rules governing these matters are
ordinarily spoken of as the law of succession. According to the
strict principle of territorial sovereignty, as soon as new terri-
tory is acquired, any relations between its inhabitants and the
new government would become matters of municipal law. No
obligations of international law could exist. The actual law,
however, recognizes this case as an exception to the usual rule
of complete territorial sovereignty. The land must be taken
subject to a kind of servitude. The acquiring state must
acquiesce in pre-existing rights of the inhabitants and pre-exist-
ing rights of third parties hypothecated upon the territory.
These obligations may be classified under three heads: (1)
treaties imposing obligations upon the former sovereign, (2)
liabilities attached to the territory, (3) rights of the inhabitants
derived from the former sovereign.
held that slaves reaching a British warship became free; hence Forbes,,
the owner of a plantation in Florida, had no action against Cockburn, com-
mander of a public vessel, for affording asylum to and carrying off such
fugitive slaves. For extended discussion of rights of asylum on public ves-
sels and limits of local jurisdiction over such vessels in port according to
English law, see Report of Royal Commission on Fugitive Slaves, 1876.
Great Britain forbade public vessel to give asylum to slaves by an order of
1875, (Br. and For. St. Papers, 66 -,892). The Royal commission appointed to
consider this order held as follows : For right of asylum and extraterrito-
riality, Phillimore, Bernard, Maine ; Contra, Cockburn, Archbald, Thesiger,
H. T. Holland, Fitzjames Stephen, Rothery, but they held that asylum
might be given as a matter of humanity and in any case the local authori-
ties could not recover the fugitives by entry of the vessel. It is interest-
ing to note that the line of cleavage is between publicists on international
law and common law lawyers and judges. See in reference to the work
of this commission, Maine, Int. Law, p. 88; Stephen, Hist, of the Crimi-
nal Law, 2:57; Jour, of Jurisprudence, 20, 1888; Moore, Digest, 2:848.
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(1) International law requires the new sovereign to recog-
nize the obligations of treaties concluded by the old sovereign
only in case of universal succession. There have been two cases
of this character in the history of the United States, those of
Texas and Hawaii. Both states had concluded treaties with
third parties before annexation.
56 In both cases, in the resolu-
tion of annexation the United States declared all treaties of the
former states abrogated. Japan offered some protest to the abro-
gation of her treaty with Hawaii but the United States dis-
avowed any intention of violating vested rights of Japanese sub-
jects under this treaty, and no specific case seems to have
arisen.57
(2) The second case has arisen in connection with the
annexation of Texas and Hawaii and the cessions of Spain fol-
lowing the war of 1898/'8 The United States assumed by statute
liabilities hypothecated upon the revenues to a specified amount
in the first two cases.59 In the case of the Spanish cessions the
06See Treaties of Texas with France, 1839, Marten's N. R., 16:987:
with Great Britain, 1840, Marten's N. R. G., 4:1506: 1841, Ibid, 4:609:
with Netherlands, 1840, Ibid. 1 5375 : See Moore's Digest, 1 1456. Texas
had also concluded treaties with the United States, see Malloy, pp. 1778-9,
which were of course abrogated by annexation. See treaty of Hawaii
with Japan, 1886, Br. and For. St. Pap., 77:941.
57
Joint Resolution, Mch. i, 1845, 5 Stat. 797; July 7, 1898, Sec. 4, Ger-
many claimed that she retained special rights in the Zulu Archipeligo un-
der protocol with Spain of Mch. n, 1877, after cession of the Philippines
to the United States, a contention denied by the United States. See
Moore's Digest 5; 346-352.
58The Act of Aug. 8, 1790, sponsored by Hamilton, whereby the na-
tional government, as succeeding to much of the sovereignty of the states
by the constitution of 1789, assumed their Revolutionary debts to the
amount of $21,500,000, may also be cited as a recognition of the duty of
the successor to sovereignty. I Stat. 142, Sec. 13.
69By the joint resolution of Mch. i, 1845, 5 stat. 797, consenting to the
admission of Texas to the Union, it was specified that Texas should re-
tain public funds, debts, taxes and dues owed the Republic, and vacant
lands, to be applied to the payment of debts which were in "no event to be-
come a charge upon the United States." By an act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat.
446, on consideration of a boundary modification and relinquishment by
Texas of "all claims upon the United States for liability of the debts of
Texas" the United States agreed to pay $10,000,000 to the state, half of
which was to be retained until "the creditors of the state holding bonds
and other certificates of the state of Texas for which duties on imports
were specially pledged shall first file at the Treasury of the United States,
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United States refused to include in the treaty of peace a pro-
vision presented by the Spanish plenipotentiaries by which the
United States was to assume "all charges and obligations of
every kind in existence at the time of the ratification of the
treaty of peace which the crown of Spain
* *
may have con-
tracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby relin-
quished and transferred, and which as such constitute an inte-
gral part thereof."
60 It also rejected a provision requiring that
"grants and contracts for public works and services" in Cuba,
Porto Eico, and the Philippines be "maintained in force until
their expiration, in accordance with the terms thereof, the new
government assuming all the rights and obligations thereby
attaching up to the present time to the Spanish government."
It, however, disavowed, any purpose "to disregard the obliga-
tions of international law in respect to such contracts."61 A
number of claims based on Spanish concessions were presented to
the government and were variously settled in accordance with
opinions of attorneys general and law officers of the "War Depart-
ment, which was then administering the Islands.62 As an
example may be mentioned the case of the Manila Railway Co.,
a corporation subsidized by the Spanish government which
releases of all claims against the United States." As few of the Texan
bonds were specifically pledged upon imports, the act gave rise to ques-
tion, but was held to require payment of all bonds. (See Gushing Att.
Gen. 6 op. 130, (1853), Corwin, Sec. of Treas., Sen. Ex. Doc., 103, (34th
Cong, ist Sess, p. 406-7). In the British claims arbitration of 1853, claims
for Texan bonds were presented and the commission held that the United
States was not liable, hence these claims were not within the competence
of the arbitral court. The matter was concluded by an act of Feb. 28,
1855, 10 stat. 617, by which the United States agreed to pay Texan
debts for which the revenues of the state were pledged to the
the amount of $7,750,000, to be apportioned pro rata among the creditors.
See Moore's Digest, 1 5343-347. In the Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898,
annexing Hawaii, "the public debt of the Republic of Hawaii" was as-
sumed by the United States to an amount not to exceed $4,000,000. See
Moore's Digest, 1:351.
60This applied to Cuba and Porto Rico. See Moore's Digest, 1 5352.
The United States delegation held that these obligations were incurred
in a fruitless effort to pacify the Islands extending over a long period of
years. The expenditure did not benefit the Islands and should be con-
sidered liabilities of the Spanish nation, not of the Islands. See Moore's
Digest, IJ35I-385-
61Moore's Digest, 1 5389-390.
62Griggs. Att. Gen., 22 op. 310, 408, 514, 520, 546; 23 op. 181 ; Knox,
Att. Gen. 23 op. 451.
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claimed a continuance of the periodic subsidies by the new gov-
ernment. The law officer of the Division of Insular affairs of
the War Department63 advised the non-allowance of the claim,
holding it to be a personal obligation of the Spanish sovereign,
but the attorney general64 took a contrary view, and in an official
opinion held that the United States was liable for this obligation
under international law.
To summarize, the United States has generally acknowledged
its obligation to pay debts pledged on the revenue, and contracts
for the improvement of territory to which it has succeeded. It
however, denied such an obligation with reference to the general
public debt of the dismembered state, in cases of partial suc-
cession.
(3) Certain rights of the inhabitants have generally been
specified in treaties ceding territory to the United States. Free-
dom to leave the country and retain their former allegiance
without loss of property, and in case of election to remain in the
territory, guarantees of civil rights, religious liberty and some-
times admission to American citizenship have generally been so
stipulated.
65 Similar provisions have been contained in resolu-
tions, statutes and executive orders relating to the annexation,
government and administration of new territory.66 By enforc-
ing these provisions the courts have enforced the government's
obligations under international law.
The enforcement of constitutional guarantees also acts to
protect the rights of inhabitants of such territory, but the courts
have drawn distinctions as to the applicability of these guar-
antees to different kinds of acquisitions. All of the constitutional
63Magoon's Reports, 177.
6
*Griggs Att. Gen., 23 op. 181 ; Knox Att. Gen., 23 op. 1451. See
Moore's Digest, 1 5389-410.
Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, art. 4, 5, 6, Malloy, p. 586; 1840,
art. 3, p. 656; France, 1803, art. 3, 6, p. 508; Mexico, 1848, art. 8, 9, n, p.
mi; 1853, art. 2, 5, p. 1121; Russia, 1867, art. 3, p. 1523; Spain, 1819, art.
5, 6, 8, p. 1653 ; 1898, art. 9,-i2, p. 1690.
68See Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787; Act. Aug. 7, 1789; in ref-
erence to Louisiana, Act. Oct. 2, 1803, 2 Stat. 245 ; Mch. 19, 1804, 2 Stat.
272; in reference to Texas, Joint Resolution, Mch. I, 1845, 5 Stat. 797; Act
Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 446, Feb. 28, 1855, 10 Stat. 617; In reference to New
Mexico, Act. Mch. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854; in reference to Hawaii, Joint Reso-
lution, July 7, 1898, Act. Apr. 30, 1900; in refernce to Porto Rico, Act Apr.
12, 1900, May i, 1900; in reference to Philippines, Act July I, 1902, Mch. 9,
1902; in reference to Guano Islands, Act 1856, Rev. Stat. 5570-5578.
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guarantees apply to incorporated territory such as Alaska,
67
and territory contiguous to the original colonies, but those con-
ferring privileges not "natural rights," but of a technical
nature relating peculiarly to the common law, such as trial by
jury, or of a political nature such as citizenship, do not apply to
inhabitants of unincorporated territory, such as the Philippines,
Hawaii, and Porto Rico.68 None of the constitutional guarantees
appear to apply to territory temporarily occupied and under
military government,
69 or to consular jurisdiction.70 It appears,
however, that the confiscation of property or the deprivation of
life or liberty of persons without "due process of law" in
actually acquired territory, would be prevented by constitutional
guarantees.
The United States courts have held that all public law
relating to forms of government, revenue systems, and adminis-
tration is abrogated by change of sovereignty,71 but in a number
of cases the executive has by order continued the former admin-
istrative authorities, in which case their acts are valid.72 The
67Rasmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S. 510.
68For this distinction and reference to "natural rights" see Justice
Brown, in Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 282. For its application to
Hawaii, Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 ; to th Philippines, Dorr vs.
U. S., 195 U. S. 138; and to Porto Rico, Gonzales vs. Williams, 192, U. S. I.
69Neeley vs. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 122.
70In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 464.
71Harcourt vs. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523 ; New Orleans vs. U. S., 10 Pet.
602; Davis vs. Concordia, 9 How. 280; U. S. vs. Vaca, 18 How. 556; Am.
InsL Co., vs. Canter, i Pet. 542 ; Pollard vs. Hagan, 3 How. 212-225 ; U.
S. vs. Reynes, 9 How. 127; U. S. vs. D'Auterine, 10 How. 609; Montoult
vs. U. S., 12 How. 47; U. S. vs. Yorba, i Wall. 412; Stearnes vs. U. S.,
6 Wall. 589 ; U. S. vs. Pico, 23 How. 321 ; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U. S.
70; Alexander vs. Roulet, 13 Wall. 386; Mumford vs. Wardwell, 6 Wall.
423. See Moore's Digest, 15304-311. For effect of succession on Revenue
Laws, see Flemming vs. Page, 9 How. ,603; Wirt, Att. Gen., i op. 483,
(1821) ; Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. 164; President's Proclamation, July
25, 1901, and Insular Cases, DeLima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. I ; Downes vs.
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; Dooley vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 222; Armstrong vs. U.
S. 182 U. S. 243 ; Huus vs. N. Y. & Porto Rico, Steamship Co. 182 U. S.
392 ; Goetz vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 221 ; Grossman vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 221 ;
Fourteen Diamond Rings, 103 U. S. 176; Dooley vs. U. S. 183 U. S. 151.
See Moore's Digest, 1:311-332.
"Joint Resolution, July 7, 1898, in reference to Hawaii; War Dept.
Circular, Feb. 1899, in reference to territory und^r military government;
act May I, 1900, in reference to Porto Rico. See Ely's Adm. vs. U. S. 171
U. S. 220, 230, ( 1898) . Moore's Digest, i ;3o6-3o8.
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system of private law in force has, however, been held to con-
tinue until specifically altered by statute. It is upon this prin-
ciple that the courts of all of the states, originally British colonies
or settled from them, have continued to apply the common law,
73
while those of Louisiana and Texas have applied the French and
Spanish systems of law respectively. The application of the
English law of admiralty in federal courts has been based on a
like principle.
74 The courts have applied the same principle to
other acquisitions of territory such as Florida, New Mexico, and
the Spanish cessions of 1898. 75
The inviolability of existing contracts and property rights
of inhabitants of acquired territory has been generally upheld
in reference to obligations owed by the former state itself to such
inhabitants. Inhabitants as well as persons of foreign states
benefit by the acquiescence of the new sovereign in its duty to
assume the public burdens attached to the territory.7' If a
73In Mortimer vs. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. S. 89, (1889),
Scott, in, a claim that Dutch law rather than English should apply in ref-
erence to the portion of New York City originally occupied by the Dutch
was denied. The British claim based on Cabot's discovery prior to Dutch
occupancy established, in the view of the court, the common law. The
court admitted that modern publicists hold that discovery not followed
by occupation is insufficient to give title to new territory, but thought
that, by the international law of that time, Cabot's claim was valid. As
an additional reason for its opinion the court seemed to cast some doubt
on the principle that succession does not alter the private law. Thus it
held that even if Cabot's claim were not sufficient to establish a prior Brit-
ish title, the Dutch law would have been abrogated by the British conquest
and acquisition in 1664. The court, however, suggested that the charter
of Charles II, of 1664, specifically established the common law. The in-
tervention of such an act of state would clearly bind municipal courts,
even if contrary to international law. It would seem that prescription
might have furnished sufficient basis for maintaining the predominance of
English law in this case, but it does not seem to have been relied upon.
74Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, (1815).
"Louisiana, see Keene vs. McDonough, 8 Pet. 308; U. S. vs. Turner,
ii How. 663; Florida, see Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, i Pet. 542; New Mex-
ico, U. S. vs. Power's Heirs, 11 How. 570, U. S. vs. Heirs of Rillieux, 14
How. 189; Leitsendorfer vs. Webb, 20 How. 176. In Chicago Pac. R. R. Co.
vs. McGlenn, 114 U. S. 542, the state law was held to apply in territory do-
nated by the state of Kansas to the Federal Government for a peniten-
tiary. See Mortimer vs. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co. 6 N. Y. S. 89, (1889),
Scott, in, note 73 above. See also U. S. vs. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, (1895) ;
Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410.
Supra, p. 57.
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definite act of the political department of government repudiates
such liability, there is no recourse for the inhabitants,
77
although
foreigners entitled to similar credits can still resort to diplomatic
protest.
Where the obligation is one between private parties,
treaties generally have required inviolability, and the courts
have emphatically maintained that the same doctrine holds in the
absence of treaty.
78 Thus Chief Justice Marshall, in upholding
a real estate right in Florida based on a grant by Spain, said, "It
is very unusual even in cases of conquest for the conqueror to do
more than to displace the sovereign and assume domain over the
country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law,
would be violated, that sense of justice and of right which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be
outraged if private property should be generally confiscated and
private rights annulled. The people change allegiance, their rela-
tions to their ancient sovereign are dissolved, but their relations
to each other and their right of property remain undisturbed.
' 'T9
"West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. vs. Rex. L. R. 2. K. B. 301, 401-
2, (1905), and article by J. Westlake, Law Quar. Rev., 22
-,14-26. In
this case it was held that an "act of state" barred the right of an inhabi-
tant of the Boer Republic to recover debts owed him by that republic,
from Great Britain, after succession.
78Wilcox. vs. Henry, i Dall. 69, (Pa., 1782) ; U. S. vs. Soulard, 4 Pet.
Si i, (1830) ; U. S. vs. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, (1833) ; U. S. vs. Arredondo,
6 Pet. 691 ; U. S. vs. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436 ; U. S. vs. Clarke, 16 Pet. 231 ; U.
S. vs. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 212, (1866) ; U. S. vs. Hansen, 16 Pet. 196,
Delassus vs. U. S. 6 Pet 117, 133, (1835) ; Mitchell vs. U. S. 9 Pet. 711,
(1835) J U. S. vs. Yorba, I Wall. 412; Townsend vs. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326;
U. S. vs. Anguisola, i Wall. 352 ; Airhart vs. Massieu, 98 U. S. 491 ; Coffee
vs. Grover, 123 U. S. i, 9, (1887) ; Ely's Adm. vs. U. S. 171 U. S. 220, 223,
(1898) ; See Moore's Digest i; 414-427. For citation of further cases see
Scott, cases, 97 note. By statute of 1860 congress authorized the courts to
settle land claims near the Sault Ste. Marie based on a grant of the King
of France in 1750, according to international law, the law of the country
from which the claim was derived, principles of justice and stipulations
of treaties. Under this act the court held that a grant of land on certain
conditions of occupancy was lost upon the grantee's failure to fulfill these
conditions after leaving the country because of Great Britain's succession
in 1760. The opinion of both the original grantee and his son that the
claim was lost, and the failure to advance a claim until seventyfive years
after the grant, confirmed the court's opinion that the claim was without
merit. See U. S. vs. Repentigny, 3 Wall. 211, (1866), Scott. 98.
79U. S. vs. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 86, (1833).
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This same principle has been applied in cases of succession
to insurrectionary and military governments. Private rights and
obligations, valid under the law of the previous defacto govern-
ment, have been enforced.
80 Neither public nor private obliga-
tions will, however, be held as valid if they were contracted in
support of armed resistance to the United States, or in rebellion.
Thus the courts have held that all acts of the Confederate govern-
ment of 1861 to 1865 were void. No rights could be derived from
its laws because its very existence was rebellion against the United
States. Acts of the states in rebellion, however, might be valid
if not in direct aid of the insurrection.81 Acts of the Confederate
congress accepted by them and enforced by their law, such for
instance as acts requiring the acceptance of Confederate paper
currency, were valid. Thus the United States courts, after the
war, enforced contracts for the payment of Confederate paper
for an equivalent value at the time the contract was made, in
United States money.82
To summarize, the United States has generally by treaty
obligated itself to permit the inhabitants of acquired territory to
retain their old allegiance if they wish. Treaties, statutes and
constitutional guarantees have insured them the usual immunities
of citizens. Treaty guarantees and the doctrine that courts apply
international law have insured the retention of the existingjsys-
tem of private law until changed by express act of the legislature,
and the inviolability of private property rights unless they were
directly involved in the promotion of hostilities or rebellion.
Statutes and executive orders have occasionally retained portions
of the previous system of public law and administration, but the
courts have affirmed that public law is abrogated by succession
unless express act of the sovereign intervenes.
80Succession to British Military Govt. of Castine, Me., 1814, U. S. vs.
Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, (1819) ; to confederate De Facto Govt. of Southern
states, 1861-1865, Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall, i, 9-11, (1868) ; The Ven-
ice, 2 Wall. 258; Hanauer vs. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 448; Bissell vs. Hey-
ward, 96 U. S. 580; Delmar vs. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 661 ; Horn vs..
Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570, 580; Baldy vs. Hunter, 171 U. S. 388, 392, (1890) ;.
Sprott vs. U. S., 20 Wall. 459, ( 1874) . See Moore's Digest, 1 145-80.
81On the distinction between acts of the Confederate government and'
of the state in rebellion, see Sprott vs. U. S. 20 Wall. 459, (1874) ; Williams
vs. B'ruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 191-2, (1877) ; Dewing vs. Perdicaries, 96 U. S.
193, d877) ; Ford vs. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, 604, (1878). See Moore's Di-
gest, i ;54-6o.
82Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall, i, (1868).
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SERVITUDES.
There have been at different times claims that certain por-
tions of territory are subject to servitudes or rights of use by
foreign powers and persons, which are beyond the authority of the
territorial sovereign to abridge. Thus it has been said that inter-
national rivers and canals are owned by adjacent states subject
to the rights of free commerce for all; that marginal seas and
straits are free to the innocent passage of foreign vessels, that the
territorial sovereign's control of ports is subject to the right of
asylum for vessels in case of imminent danger from stress of
weather or other cause
;
that certain portions of territory are sub-
ject to the right of innocent passage of foreign troops, and even
that all foreign territory, especially frontiers, is held by the ter-
ritorial sovereign subject to the right of foreign states to enter the
same for the purpose of enforcing order when self defense
demands.83 The United States for a long time maintained that
British territorial waters about Newfoundland were subject to
prescriptive fishing rights of United States fishermen.
If there are any such inalienable servitudes they clearly put
the territorial sovereign under a duty of acquiescence. By the
award of the Hague arbitration of 1910 between Great Britain
and the United States it was held that servitudes were contrary
to the doctrine of sovereignty maintained by international law,
and could be recognized
' '
only on the express evidence of interna-
tional contract;" hence the American claim that prescriptive
fishing rights on Newfoundland territorial waters constituted a
legal servitude in which Great Britain must acquiesce, was of
no avail.84
(1) It seems that possibly an exception to this broad
statement should be made in the case of boundary rivers. In that
case the right of free commerce could scarcely be unilaterally
restricted, and is universally recognized. United States courts
have recognized the principle by holding that vessels traversing
American waters of international rivers cannot be seized for
83Pleas of self defense were used to justify violations of Spanish and
Mexican territory in pursueing Indian marauders, and the landing of troops
in foreign ports to protect United States citizens as in the recent (1914)
case of Vera Cruz. See Moore's Digest, 2:400-425. On servitudes gener-
ally see Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed., p. 106; Moore's Digest, 2518.
84See text of this decision, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 4:948, 958, (1910),
Editorial Comment, Ibid. 8:859, (1914); also article C. P. Anderson, The
Final Outcome of the Fisheries Arbitration, Ibid. 7;i, 9, (1913).
65] IN TIME OP PEACE 65
violation of municipal statutes when bound for a foreign port.
85
(2) The right of asylum for vessels in distress has also been
affirmed in United States law. 86 The courts have refused to con-
demn vessels forced by stress of weather into ports closed by
statute or blockaded by right of war.87 The right of asylum,
however, is subject to the provision that the vessel, unless a
public one, shall be subject to the local jurisdiction. It can
therefore scarcely be said that the privilege constitutes a servitude
upon the port waters.
Most of these so-called servitudes are not maintainable by
modern international law. The United States has diplomatically
and judicially affirmed its absolute right to sovereignty over its
entire territory.
88
(3) Servitudes conceded by treaty are, however, clearly
recognized and certainly impose a duty of acquiescence upon the
country. The United States has specifically accorded by treaty
the right to certain countries of free commerce in international
rivers89 and in the Panama canal,90 the right of asylum in ports
to either private or public vessels in case of "stress of weather
or pursuit of pirates or enemies,"91 the right of using troops
85The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, (1824).
86Cushing, Att. Gen. 7 op. 122, (1855) ; The Santissima Trinidad, 7
Wheat. 283; Moore's Digest, 7:982-985. Great Britain treated Jefferson's
proclamation, prohibiting hospitality to British warships in 1807, after the
Leopard and Chesapeake affair, as a breach of international law. See
Moore's Digest, 6:1035.
87The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 17 Wall. 30; Moore's Digest, 2:339
et seq.
88Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116-136, (1812). See
Moore's Digest, 2:4-16.
89Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, art. 8, Malloy, p. 589; 1842, art. 3,
p. 643; 1846, art. 2, p. 657; 1854-1866, art. 4, p. 671; 1871, art. 26, p. 711,
decreeing free navigation in the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, St. John, Yu-
kon, Stikine, and Porcupine. With Mexico, 1848, art. 4, 7, p. mi; 1853,
art. 4, p. 1123, decreeing free navigation in the Colorado, Gila, and Bravo.
90Treaty with Great Britain, 1901, art. 3, Malloy, p. 783.
91The United States has concluded thirty-one treaties with twenty-
five countries in which this privilege is specified. Only two appear to be in
force, Bolivia, 1858, art. 9, Malloy, p. 117; Prussia, 1799-1810, revived 1828,
art. 18, p. 1492. The privilege of free entry to ports is now so universally
acknowledged that treaty stipulations are not necessary.
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on its territory in pursuit of marauding Indians92 and the right
to establish submarine cable terminals.93 The usual principle
that treaties are enforceable law tends to enforce these duties,
but acts of congress may always override such treaty privileges
so far as municipal law and the controlling power of municipal
courts are concerned.94
82Protocols with Mexico, 1882 to 1896, by which Mexico was permitted
to pursue marauding Indians in United States territory. Malloy, p. 1144-
"77.
8SSpecial permits with rules have generally been issued by the presi-
dent to companies desiring to land cables. On the power of the president to
give such permits see Richards, Acting Att. Gen., 22 op. 13, (1897) ; Griggs,
Att. Gen., 22 op. 408, (1899). See Moore's Digest, 2;4S2-466.
9*For a recent discussion of treaty servitudes or international con-
tracts, s"ee Aix-la-Chappelle Maestricht R. R. Co. vs. Thewis, Dutch Govt.
intervener, Apr. 21, 1914, a German case, reported Am. Jour. Int. Law.,
1914, 8:858, 907. In this case a portion of Prussian territory was held to
We subject to a servitude by which a Dutch Railway Company had the right
to operate under Dutch law. Germany claimed that a protocol of Mch. u,
1877, with Spain created a servitude for her benefit upon the Zulu Archi-
pelago, which remained after cession of the Archipelago to the United
States. The United States refused to recognize this claim. See Moore's
Digest, 5:351.
CHAPTER IV. OBLIGATIONS OF PREVENTION.
INTRODUCTORY
The municipal laws designed to insure the abstention of the
government from illegal acts outside of its territory, and its
acquiescence in recognized exemptions from its complete control
of its own territory have been considered. But its duties under
international law do not stop here. The government is respon-
sible for the acts of its officers and its civil population. It is
therefore under an obligation to take positive measures to pre-
vent contraventions of international law by such persons.
The duties of prevention bear a relation to duties of absten-
tion and acquiescence. The responsibility of the government for
its subjects extends no further than its own duties. It need pre-
vent nothing which it is not itself bound to abstain from author-
izing. In fact it does not extend so far. There are many acts
of its subjects which the government is not responsible for and
which it need not prevent, but which it must itself abstain from.
This is especially evident in the law of neutrality. A neutral
government need not prevent the export of arms by its subjects
to belligerents, but it must itself abstain from such commerce.
In the law of peace the same principle applies. The government
must abstain from authorizing the use of force outside of its ter-
ritory or intervening in the affairs of foreign governments, but
it is not responsible, if its subjects do such acts abroad, without
authorization. 1 For acts within its territory the responsibility
is much greater and hence also is the duty of prevention. For
acts of public officers either in its territory or abroad the respon-
sibility of the government is much greater than in the case of
private persons, and hence the duty of prevention is more
arduous. We may therefore conveniently consider the subject
in reference, (1) to agencies of government, and (2) to the civil
population. Although the international duties imposed by
1See Moore's Digest, 6:787. The United States does recognize a
certain responsibility for acts of its citizens in promoting insurrection
against states in which it has consular jurisdiction, even when committed
abroad. The immunity of United States citizens from local jurisdiction
in such cases is accountable for this exception to the general rule. See
Rev. Stat. sec. 4090, 4102. Infra p. 74.
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treaties are considered in connection with corresponding duties
of international law, the general duty of (3) preventing infrac-
tions of treaty provisions may conveniently be considered here.
ACTS BY AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT.
(1) The agencies of government which come in contact
with foreign nations in time of peace are the navy, the diplomatic
service and the consular service. International law requires that
naval vessels obey local regulations on entering foreign jurisdic-
tion, abstain from prohibited acts, and exchange salutes on
meeting foreign public vessels. Special duties, when enjoying
the hospitality of ports, such as refusing asylum to criminals,
slaves and political refugees, are sometimes required by treaty.
These duties are specified in the permanent navy regulations
and naval instructions2 issued under authority of the president,
and are enforced by the executive control exercised over the navy
at all times by the president as commander-in-chief, through the
navy department, and the authority of courts martial in enforc-
ing the statutory articles for the government of the navy.
3
A case involving the enforcement of navy regulations arose
in 1893. During the naval revolt in Brazil, Commodore Stanton,
an American naval commander, on entering the port of Rio
Janeiro, exchanged visits and fired salutes in honor of the naval
insurgents. The Brazilian government protested and the navy
department on investigation found that Commodore Stanton had
violated article 115 of the Navy Regulations of 1893, providing
that "no salute shall be fired in honor of any nation * *
not formally recognized by the government of the United States. ' '
As the offense was due to mistake rather than intent the depart-
ment, although holding that Commodore Stanton had committed
"a grave error of judgment," restored him to his command.4
Armed forces are forbidden passing into foreign territory
without license, and on such occasions continue subject to mili-
tary commissions, and army officers are required to observe cer-
tain formalities in dealing with representatives of foreign gov-
ernments.5
2Navy Regulations, 1913 sec. 1502, 1633-1634, 1641-1651 under authority
of Rev. Stat. sec. 1547.
3Rev. Stat. sec. 1624.
4See Moore's Digest, 1 1240-241.
"Dig. op. Judge. Ad. Gen. 1912, C. R. Rowland ed. pp. 90, 106. Army
Regulations, 1913, sec. 398; 407; 889, ch. 3.
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(2) Diplomatic officers are likewise subjected to duties
while in foreign countries. International law requires diplo-
matic officers to observe diplomatic etiquette, in making visits,
being admitted to audiences and in matters of precedence. It
requires abstention from public addresses or expressions of
opinion likely to be offensive to the state to which the minister
is accredited, and it seems that modern international law
requires the minister to prevent his residence being used as a
place of asylum by fugitives from justice. This duty is also
specified in a number of treaties. In exchange for his immunity
from local jurisdiction the diplomatic officer is also required to
be especially strict in his observance of local laws. These
duties are specified with considerable definiteness in the Instruc-
tions to Diplomatic Officers6 issued by the president under
authority of statute,
7 and a number of them are specified in the
statutes themselves. Thus statutes specifically forbid ministers
to correspond or give information relating to the affairs of the
foreign government to which they are accredited to any but the
proper United States officials,8 and specify a number of matters
relating to costume, absention from post, correspondence,9 etc.
The permanent instructions and statutes as well as special
instructions issued by the president or secretary of state 10 are
enforced by executive control of the ministers' tenure of office,
requirements of bonds on acceptance of mission, and criminal
liability for misconduct in office.
By the constitution the president with the advice and con-
sent of the senate has the power of appointing diplomatic offi-
cers,
11
although special agents have been appointed by the presi-
dent alone. 12 By statute such appointments (or rather salaries
for appointees) are limited to citizens of the United States, 13
and provision has been made to prevent the performance of diplo-
matic functions by unofficial representatives by making such acts
criminal. 14
Instructions to Diplomatic Officers, 1897, sec. 1-136.
7Rev. Stat. sec. 1752.
8Act Aug. 18, 1850. Rev. Stat. 1751.
9Rev. Stat. sec. 1674-1688.
10See Moore's Digest, 5:565.
"Constitution, Art. 2 sec. 2, Cl. 2.
12See Moore's Digest, 4:412.
18Rev. Stat. 1744; Moore's Digest, 4:457.
14Act Jan. 30, 1799; Rev. Stat. 5335. This act resulted from the
efforts of Dr. Geo. Logan, who attempted on his own responsibility a
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Ministers are required by statute to give bond for the faith-
ful performance of their duties, and it has been held that the
appointment is not complete until the execution of this bond.
15
Diplomatic officers are subject to special orders of the president
generally transmitted through the department of state, and the
president may recall such officers at discretion. By statute diplo-
matic officers have been made responsible for negligence and mis-
conduct in office. 16 Criminal prosecution in United States courts
for violation of statutory duties would therefore seem possible.
(3) International law imposes duties upon consuls while in
service in foreign territory. They may not enter upon their
functions until they have received an exequatur from the govern-
ment to which they are assigned, and they are bound by its
terms. They must observe the local law, 17 although by treaty
they are generally exempted from military and jury service,
etc. Consulates are frequently declared immune from local
jurisdiction by treaty, but it is also a rule of most of these
treaties that the consul must refuse to give asylum to persons
sought by local authorities. 18
These duties of consuls are specified in detail in the Consular
regulations issued by the president under authority of statute,19
and a number of them are specified in the statutes themselves.20
These regulations and statutes are enforced through the executive
control exercised over consuls by the president through the
department of state, by requirements of bonds and by amen-
ability to criminal prosecutions in the United States for acts done
abroad.
Consuls are appointed by the president with the advice and
consent of the senate,
21 and it appears that inferior consular
mission of conciliation in France in 1798. It is known as the "Logan Act."
There have been no prosecutions under it. See Moore's Digest, 45448-
450. Reference is made to the act in U. S. vs. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795,
Soi ; American Banana Co., vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 356.
"Williams vs. U. S. 23 Ct. Cl. 46; Moore's Digest, 4:457. On liability
of bondsman, see U. S. vs. Bee, 4 C. C. A. 219.
16Act. June 27, 1860, Rev. Stat. 4110; See also Rev. Stat. sec. 1734;
act Dec. 21, 1898, 30 Stat. 771.
"See Moore's Digest, 55698.
"Supra, p. 54.
"See Consular Regulations, 1896. Duties under International law,
sec. 71-76; under treaties, 77-93; under authority of Rev. Stat. sec. 1752.
20Rev. Stat. sec. 1751-1752; 1716-1737; Act June 30, 1902, 32 Stat. 547.
"Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2; Cl. 2.
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officers may be appointed by the president alone or even by
diplomatic or superior consular officers.
22
According to a statute
of 1906,
23
only American citizens may be appointed to positions
with a salary of $1,000 a year or more. A limited application
of the civil service principle in making appointments has been
put into operation by executive order.
24 Consuls are subject to
special instructions of the department of state and the president,
and may be removed at the president's discretion.
Consuls are required by statute to give bond for the faithful
performance of their duties and they are subject to criminal
prosecution in the United States courts for specified acts com-
mitted abroad such as accepting appointments as administrator
without giving bond or account of money, exacting excessive
fees, making false oath, neglecting duty toward seamen, making
false certification of property,
25
etc., as well as for general mis-
conduct in office.26
The international duties of these governmental agents are
enforced largely through methods of executive control. The
executive orders and instructions prescribing the conduct of such
officers are specifically authorized by statute and are to be
regarded as law27 which may be effectively enforced through the
appointment and removal power of the executive. The require-
ments of bonds, the amenability of naval officers to courts martial,
and of consular and diplomatic officials to the criminal jurisdic-
tion of American courts for specified statutory offenses, add fur-
ther sanction to the enforcement of these duties.
ACTS BY THE CIVIL POPULATION.
Governments are not generally responsible for acts by pri-
vate citizens committed abroad or on the high seas. 28 Private
"Act Apr. 5, 190)6, sec. 2, 3; Consular Regulations, 1888, sec. 8, 7;
1896; sec. 21. See U. S. vs. Eaton, 169 U. S. 331. Moore's Digest, 5; 8-9.
23Act Apr. 5, 1906, sec. 5; Moore's Digest, 5; 12.
24Ex. Ord. June 27, 1906; Dec. 12, 1906; Apr. 20, 1907; Dec. 23, 1910.
under authority Rev. Stat. sec. 1753, Act Apr. 5, 1906, and May 11, 1908.
See Information Regarding Appointments and Promotions in the Consular
Service of the United States, Govt. Printing Office.
2BRev. Stat. sec. 1716, 1728, 1734-1737; act Dec. 21, 1898, 30 stat. 771;
act June 30, 1902, 32 stat. 547.
28Act June 22, 1860, rev. stat. sec. 4110; Moore's Digest, 25267, note.
27See Rev. Stat. sec. 1752. On legal status of executive orders and
regulations, see J. A. Fairlie, The National Administration of the United
States of America, N. Y. 1905, p. 27.
28See Moore's Digest, 65787.
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individuals in such cases are amenable to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the foreign government, or if they commit piracy on the
high seas to those of any government catching them. They may
be punished, but their government can not be held responsible
for their acts, and no reparation may be demanded. This prin-
ciple does not apply in countries where citizens are exempt from
local jurisdiction by treaty, and consequently in such places the
responsibility of the government of nationality continues, to a
limited extent.
There has been some difference of opinion as to whether a
state is responsible for the acts of private citizens even within
its territory, but the doctrine of responsibility appears to be
established.29 A state is supposed to maintain order and protect
life and property within its territory. It therefore is liable to
make reparation for failure to do so if such failure results in an
injury to a foreign state or its citizens.
This principle is subject to exceptions. Where insurrec-
tions are of considerable magnitude or where the country is
invaded by hostile forces, incidental injury to aliens is beyond
the power of the government to prevent, and the government is
therefore not responsible. The general principle, however, is
as stated, and clearly implies a duty on the part of the state to
prevent acts injurious to foreign states or persons being com-
mitted by its civil population.
The subject may be considered under the three heads, (1)
injury to foreign states, (2) injury to resident foreign public
officers, (3) injury to alien private persons.
(1) International law requires a government to prevent
persons within its jurisdiction doing acts directly injurious to
foreign states. The supreme court of the United States has held30
that the measure of this duty is "due diligence" and that as
foreign relations are exclusively in the hands of the national gov-
ernment, legislation punishing acts directed against foreign gov-
ernments is warranted under the constitutional authority to
"define and punish * * offenses against the law of
nations."31 By treaty the United States has recognized its obli-
gation to prevent injury to adjacent states by hostile bands of
29See article by Julius Goebel, Jr., The International Responsibility
of states for injuries sustained by aliens on account of mob violence,
insurrection and civil war. Am. Jour, of Int. Law. 8;8o2, Nov. 1914.
80U. S. vs. Arjona, 120 U. S. 4/9, (1887), Moore's Digest, I ;6i.
"Constitution, art. i, sec. 8, cl. 10.
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Indians, and forcible measures have been taken to suppress such
marauding bands.32 The manufacture or uttering of counterfeit
foreign money or bank notes is made a crime by national
statutes,
33 and the courts have declared that such acts are pro-
hibited by international law.34 Transporting dynamite and
other explosives from the United States in vessels bound to
foreign countries except in the manner provided by statute is
also made a crime.35
The duty to protect foreign governments against dangerous
characters entering under false passports is recognized by making
the issuance of passports by unauthorized persons a crime.39
The duty of assisting the administration of justice in foreign
countries and preventing frauds upon it by persons in the
United States is recognized through provisions requiring certain
United States officials to respond to letters rogatory from foreign
governments requesting testimony in cases in which that govern-
ment is interested, by issuing process to obtain such testimony
from residents. The failure to respond to such summons, on the
part of residents of the country, is made a penal offense. 37
82Treaties with Spain, 1795-1902, art. 5, Malloy, p. 1642; Mexico,
1831-1853, art. 33, p. 1095; 1848-1853, art. 11, p. 1112. The government of
Mexico protested that the United States was not fulfilling these treaty
obligations, but at a mixed commission arbitration under treaty of 1868,
Malloy, p. 1128, the Mexican claim was not allowed. See Moore, Int. Arb.
352430; Moore's Digest, 25434. By treaty of 1853, art. 2, p. 1122, the
United States was released from this obligation to Mexico. But in
protocols from 1882 to 1896, reciprocal permission was given to pursue
marauding Indians across the boundaries of the two countries. Corres-
pondence has taken place in reference to the suppression of Indians on
the Canadian frontier, but no treaty was negotiated. See Moore's Digest,
2 J434-442.
88
Act, May 16, 1882, 23 Stat. 22; Penal Code of 1910, Act, Mch. 21,
1909, 35 Stat. 1088, in force Jan. i, 1910, sec. 156-162. Printed with
annotations, G. B. Tucker and C. W. Blood, The Federal Penal Code of
1910.
34U. S. vs. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479. Moore's Digest, 1 561 52, 450. A
similar view was taken in an English case, Emperor of Austria vs. Day
and Kossuth, 2 Giff. 628, (1861), in which an injunction was issued to
restrain counterfeiting of Hungarian securities on the ground that the
law of nations, which is part of the law of England, requires one nation
to protect the prerogative privilege of a foreign sovereign to issue money.
85Rev. Stat. sec. 4278, 5353; Act, May 30, 1908, 35 Stat. 554, Penal
Code of 1910, sec. 232; Moore's Digest, 25431.
88Rev. Stat. 4078, Act of June 14, 1902, 30 Stat. 386.
"Rev. Stat. 4071-4083, 771-875; Moore's Digest, 25104-113.
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A further recognition of this duty is found in the statute
giving consular courts jurisdiction of acts by American citizens
promoting insurrection against the state in which they are
located. Such offenses may be punished by death provided the
consul and his associates agree and the United States minister
gives his approval.
38 The American minister is also authorized
to use the military or naval forces of the United States to prevent
American citizens participating in such insurrections.39 This
extension of the duty to prevent injury to foreign states by pri-
vate persons to acts committed in foreign countries is one ex-
ception to the rule. The exemption of United States citizens from
local jurisdiction in countries granting extraterritorial consular
jurisdiction, however, imposes the duty of prevention upon the
United States in such cases. American citizens continue under
the jurisdiction of the United States even though resident abroad,
so it continues to be responsible for their acts.
With the doctrine that the federal courts have no common law
criminal jurisdiction, acts injurious to foreign governments can
not be prevented through the imposition of criminal penalties by
federal courts, except in cases covered by statutes. Although
congress has the power to cover completely the field of such
penal legislation through its power to punish offenses against the
law of nations, the offenses actually covered are comparatively
few. The president undoubtedly has power to take preventive
measures in matters covered by treaty, and as to duties required
by international law in his general control of foreign relations,
but a large part of the duty of prevention in this respect remains
with the state governments. State courts may assume a juris-
diction over any act injurious to foreign governments according
to the common law, and through their general police power the
state governments may prevent attempts or plots with such aims
in view.40
Controversy has arisen respecting the injury of water power
locations in one country by depletion or diversion of the river in
an adjacent country. It has been held that such acts are cogniz-
able in state courts when proceedings are instituted by citizens
of another state of the union, and probably a similar rule would
apply in reference to like injuries to foreign states.41
88Rev. Stat sec. 4102.
89Act, Jan. 16, 1860, 12 Stat. 77; Rev. Stat. 4090.
*Moore's Digest, 25432.
41Stillman vs. Man. Co., 3 Wood and M. 538; Foot vs. Edwards, 2
Blatch. 310; Miss, and Mo. R. R. vs. Ward, 2 Black 485; Wooster vs. Man.
75] IN TIME OP PEACE 75
After the assassination of President McKinley, there was
diplomatic agitation for the passage of uniform laws preventing
anarchistic plots, and President Roosevelt, in his message of Dec.
3, 1901, recommended legislation by congress.42 No national
statutes, except those excluding anarchists from entering the
United States,43 bear on the point, but state laws may prevent
anarchistic agitation and also plots to commit other varieties of
crime abroad. In a letter of Secretary Bayard in 1885,44 in reply
to a communication from the British government asking whether
participation in the Irish National League was not punishable un-
der the United States laws, it was stated that no national statutes
penalized such offenses against foreign governments, but
' '
if any
person in the state of Pennsylvania take measures to perpetrate
a crime in a foreign land, such an attempt, coupled with prepara-
tion to effectuate it, though not cognizable in the federal courts,
is cognizable in the courts of the state of Pennsylvania. It is
only necessary, to obtain legal action in such prosecution, that
an oath specifying the offense be made before a state magistrate,
and the state prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction of the
locality notified of the initiation of proceedings."
45
(2) Certain foreign public officers are entitled to special
protection by international law; consequently a special duty of
prevention is incumbent upon the government in relation to them.
Diplomatic agents are the most important of these privileged
foreign officers.
In 1784 the court of oyer and terminer of Philadelphia in
Res Publica vs. De Longchamps46 declared the person of a public
minister "sacred and inviolable." "Whoever," said the court,
"offers any violence to him not only affronts the sovereign he
represents but also hurts the common safety and well being of
nations; he is guilty of a crime against the whole world." It
added that the ' ' comites ' ' and household of the minister are like-
Co., 31 Me. 246; In re Eldred, 46 Wis. 530; Thayer vs. Brooks, 17 Ohio,
489; Armendiaz vs. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623; See Moore's Digest, 25451.
42See Moore's Digest, 4:95-96: 2:432-434.
48Act, Mch. 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 12, 13. See Turner vs. Williams, 194,
U. S. 279, (1904).
44See Moore's Digest, 2 5432.
"The prevention of acts injurious to foreign states in time of war
while the United States is neutral is provided for in neutrality statutes.
See infra p. 114 et seq.
4a i Dall. in, (1784) ; Moore's Digest, 4:622.
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wise inviolable. In cases involving public ministers the court
held that the law of nations should be applied, and in pursuance
of this principle found De Longchamps criminally liable for an
assault upon the Secretary of the French Legation. Much diffi-
culty was experienced by the court in reconciling its duties as a
municipal court with those as a court of international law. In
the former capacity it must give a definite sentence, in the latter
it must give a sentence satisfactory to the injured party, the
king of France. It finally concluded that "the defendant can
not be imprisoned until his most Christian Majesty shall declare
that the reparation is satisfactory." Apparently a de facto
incarceration without formal sentence of imprisonment, which
if given at all would have to be "certain and definite," seemed
the only way out of the dilemma.
This view of the status of municipal courts in performing
such duties, based on Lord Mansfield's opinion in Triquet vs.
Bath,
47 and the English treatment of the case of the Russian
Ambassador in 1708,48 is probably now obsolete. The state's
duty is to prevent injury to diplomatic agents by any suitable
means. The criminal prosecution and the kind of punishment
imposed on persons assaulting ministers are thus not specified
by international law. Such measures are law supplementary to
international law.
By a statute of 1790*9 the "offering of violence to the person
of a public minister, in violation of the law of nations" is pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not over three years, and fine at
the discretion of the court. This act includes assaults upon mem-
bers of the minister's household and upon his residence.50 Appar-
47Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr 1478, (1764), Scott, 6.
48The arrest of the Ambassador of the Czar of Russia in 1708 gave
rise to high feeling on the part of that potentate which was finally
assuaged by sending a handsomely illuminated apology prepared for the
occasion. As a result of this case a statute, 7 Ann 12, (1708) ; Scott,
p. 4, was passed, to prevent other such occurrences in the future.
49Act Apr. 30, 1790, i Stat. 118, Rev. Stat. 4062-4065.
80U. S. vs. Hand, 2 Wash. C. C. 435 ; See also on scope of act, U. S.
vs. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; Black Att. Gen. 9 op. 7, (1857); U. S. vs.
Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205, (1808) ; In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403, (1889).
Similar statute in Great Britain, 7 Ann 12, printed Scott, 4; and Cross vs.
Talbot, 8 Mod. 288; Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr, 1478. (1764); Heathfield
vs. Chilton, 4 Burr. 2015, (1767) ; Parkinson vs. Potter, L. R. 10 Q. B.
152, (1885) ; McCartney vs. Garbutt, 24 Q. B. D. 36, (1890) Scott 191-196;
Moore's Digest, 4:622-628.
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ently it does not include the sending of anonymous and threaten-
ing letters to a minister. In 1793, in the case of U. S. vs.
Ravara,
51 tried in the United States circuit court at Philadelphia,
although the statute was in force the offender was indicted at
common law for sending such letters to the British minister. The
court, consisting of Justices Jay and Peters, found him guilty.
With the present view that federal courts have no common law
jurisdiction, such a prosecution would now be impossible in the
federal courts.
The duties of prevention do not stop with the protection
from personal injury of the minister and his household. His juris-
dictional immunity must also be protected. The courts are for-
bidden by statute52 to take jurisdiction of either criminal or civil
cases against public ministers or their servants, and persons ex-
ecuting process on such privileged characters are declared "viola-
tors of the law of nations" and subject to criminal punishment.
This statute has been enforced by the courts in a number of
cases.
53
Foreign consuls,54 naval officers, 55 and persons in the mili-
tary forces
56 have been held not to enjoy such immunities and are
not included in the terms of the statute mentioned. Such offi-
cers are given no protection other than that accorded aliens, ex-
cept in so far as special treaties provide. They are, however,
recognized as being exempt from personal liability to a limited
extent for acts done under authority of their government. They
are therefore protected from prosecution in the state courts by an
act giving the federal courts power to release from the state courts
on habeas corpus, subjects of foreign states in custody for acts
done,
' '
under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protec-
51U. S. vs. Ravara, 2, Ball. 297, (1794) ; Fed. Cas. 16, 122. The
defendant in this case was a Genoese Consul but the court held that no
immunity from prosecution attached to this position. He was ultimately
pardoned on condition that he give up his exequatur. See Moore's Digest,
5565. See also Bradford, Att. Gen., i op. 52, (1794); Lee Att. Gen., I
op. 71; (1797); Moore's Digest, 4:629-630.
B2Act, Apr. 30, 1790, i Stat. 117, Rev. Stat. 4063-4064. The Supreme
court is authorized to issue writs of mandamus to courts or public officers
of the United States in cases where ambassadors, public ministers, consuls
or vice-consuls are parties. Judicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 234.
63Ex Parte Cabrera, i Wash C. C. 232 ; U. S. vs. Benner, Baldwin 234 ;
Moore's Digest, 4:631-635.
B4In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403, (1899).
"Bradford Att. Gen., i op. 49, (1794) ; Nelson Att. Gen. 4 op. 336,
(1844).
56
People vs. McLeod 25 Wend. 483; See also 26 Wend. 663.
78 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [78
tion, or exemption claimed under the commission or order or
sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity
and effect whereof depends upon the law of nations." 57
Where consulates are declared inviolable by treaty and pub-
lic vessels are in port, the government is under an obligation to
prevent violation of such places. The usual method of keeping or-
der by the police and, if necessary, by the employment of armed
force, serve to fulfill this duty.
68
(3) It has been officially held in the United States that resi-
dent aliens owe temporary allegiance to the government, must
submit to its laws, B9 are entitled to the judicial remedies for
wrongs open to citizens,
60 but that the United States government
is not responsible for injuries to them by acts of private tres-
passers.
61 The alien must get his remedy by the usual legal pro-
cesses or not at all. This view, it will be seen, puts aliens on the
same legal footing as citizens. They have no immunities or ad-
vantages. In fact their rights are less secure than those of citi-
zens, for they do not enjoy political privileges, and by the alien
act62 in force from 1798 to 1801 they were liable to expulsion by
57Act, Aug. 29, 1842, Rev. Stat. sec. 753. This act resulted from the
inability of national authority to liberate McLeod, on trial for murder in
New York. The British government and the political department of the U.
S. government took the view that his act, done as a soldier and recognized
by the British government, was one for diplomatic reparation, and personal
liability could not attach. See Moore's Digest, 2524-30.
68The President may use the military and naval forces of the govern-
ment and call out the militia to repel invasion, suppress insurrection and
execute the laws of the Union. This includes the execution of treaties.
See Act. Mch. 3, 1827, in re military and naval forces, and act, May 2,
1792, Jan. 21, 1903, Feb. 16, 1914, in re the militia, under authority of con-
stitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14.
"Carlisle vs. U. S. 16 Wall. 147; Moore's Digest, 4; 9-17.
60Cushing, Att. Gen. 7 op. 229, (1855) ; Taylor vs. Carpenter, 3 Story,
458; Breedlove vs. Nicollet, 7 Pet. 413; Moore's Digest, 4;-.
"Nelson Att. Gen., 4 op. 332, (1844) ; The Resolution, Fed. Court of
Appeals, 2 Dall. i, (1781) ; Lincoln Att. Gen., i op. 106, (1802) ; Moore's
Digest, 4J7; 6 1787-791.
2
Act, June 25, 1798, i Stat. 570, to be in force two years. Expulsion
within three years of landing of excluded classes is permitted in the
present immigration laws, Act, Mch. 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213, sec. 20, 21;
Moore's Digest, 45172. This however, is really a measure to enforce
the exclusion of undesirable classes and should be distinguished from
acts providing for expulsion of aliens, common in Europe, but represented
in the United States by the single instance mentioned.
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order of the president. This view denies the doctrine of interna-
tional responsibility for the safety of resident aliens, yet is the one
generally expressed by the United States government. When
reparation has been made by the government it has been as a
' '
gratuity.
' '
It has been denied that the government was under
an obligation of international law to prevent injuries to aliens or
to make reparation.63
This opinion to the contrary, it seems clear that responsibil-
ity is recognized in practice as a rule of international law.
84 The
principle is recognized by a number of state governments in laws
making counties responsible for property losses and damages
caused by mob violence. 65 Even though the United States denies
the theory in principle, it has generally observed it in practice.
We may therefore consider the measures taken to prevent injury
to aliens.
By statute it is provided that persons violating safe conducts
or passports of aliens shall be criminally liable in the federal
courts.68 In numerous treaties rights of resident aliens are speci-
fied, extending to such matters as protection of life and property,
right to own land, to make devises and bequests, and to have re-
course to local courts of justice. In some of them it is specified
that subjects of the contracting powers shall have the same rights
as citizens when in the United States, and most favored nation
rights are frequently guaranteed to subjects of the respective
powers. Treaty rights of this character are protected by the
courts applying treaties as law.67
The courts have held that aliens within the territory are en-
titled to the same protection in their personal rights as citizens
and no more,68 and this has been the principle generally acted
upon in preventing injuries even when treaties do not specify
such a privilege. The constitutional guarantees operate to pro-
ft3See Letter of Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, 1886, For. Rel. 1886, p.
158, Moore's Digest, 4;826-835. See Act, June 8, 1896, Moore's Digest,
4:850.
64See Article by Julius Goebel, Jr., The International Responsibility
of states for injuries sustained by aliens on account of mob violence, insur-
rection and civil war, Am. Jour, of Int. Law, 8;8o2, Nov. 1914.
"Illinois Rev. Stat., 1913, c. 38, sec. 2s6a-256g-256w ; pp. 854, 857.
M
Act, Apr. 30, 1790, i Stat. 118, Rev. Stat. sec. 4063; Moore's Digest,
4:623.
67Hauenstein vs. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483.
88B'utler Att. Gen. 3 op. 254, (1837) ; People vs. Warren, n N. Y. Cr.
R. 433; Moore's Digest, 4;2.
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tect aliens resident in the country, though they are not effective
to prevent arbitrary administrative methods in excluding aliens
before arrival69 or expelling those illegally entering.
70
The ordinary exercise of the police power, prevention of in-
jury to persons, and punishment of offenders is in the hands of
the state governments. It is therefore upon them that the duty
of preventing injury to aliens largely devolves. The principle
that treaties are enforcable law enunciated by the constitution is
binding upon state as well as federal courts, and states have en-
forced the treaty rights of aliens in cases coming before them
subject to the right of appeal to the United States supreme
court should such rights be neglected. A similar control may be
exercised in respect to the general protection of property and per-
sonal rights by such constitutional guarantees as those prohibiting
state laws "impairing the obligation of contracts", or taking life,
liberty or property without "due process of law." Thus the na-
tional government can in a measure prevent the confiscation of
contract debts of foreigners, a matter which has been of interna-
tional importance especially in Latin American countries, al-
though it is not clear that international law imposes such a
duty.71 But in the punishment and control of private individ-
uals violating rights of aliens, either guaranteed by treaty or by
international law, no such method of federal control over the
state government exists. The international responsibility falls
upon the national government. It has therefore sometimes hap-
pened that the national government has made reparation for fail-
ure on the part of the states to perform this duty of prevention
even though it had by law no means of controlling the states or
offering adequate protection itself.
During the decade from 1890 to 1900 a number of cases
arose in which Italians were murdered or injured by mobs and
in which the state authorities appear to have been lax in per-
forming their duties of prevention. Presidents Harrison and
McKinley strongly urged congress to enact laws giving the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction of cases involving injury to aliens, espe-
cially where treaty rights were involved, as was the case in the
88U. S. vs. Williams, 194 U. S. 292; U. S. vs. JuToy, 198 U. S. 253, 263.
Zakonite vs. Wolf, 226, U. S. 212.
"Constitution, art. 2, sec. 10, cl. I ; amendment 14, in reference to
states and amendment 5, in reference to Congress. The United States
has generally refused to prosecute claims of its citizens based on contract,
even where the contract was with the foreign government itself. See
Moore's Digest 6 J7OS-738, 6 ;28s-289.
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Italian outrages.
72 It seems that there is adequate constitu-
tional basis for such legislation, both in the implied power of the
national government to enforce treaties which it may constitu-
tionally conclude, and in the power to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations. W. W. Willoughby has said in this
connection, "There would seem to be no valid constitutional ob-
jection to an act of congress giving to the federal courts cogniz-
ance of all offenses for which the United States may according
to the law of nations be held responsible to foreign powers.
' ' 73
INFRACTION OP TREATIES
(1) Treaties may be declaratory of international law, in
which case the contracting states have no more rights and no more
duties than they would have under international law. They may
be amendatory of international law, such as general international
conventions, in which case, after ratification, their provisions are
international law and the contracting states are under new du-
ties according to them. Or they may create exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of international law, being in nature similar to contracts.
In some such treaties the national obligations are made greater
than under international law, as in treaties guaranteeing spe-
cial protection to aliens or special protection to territory such as
Panama and Cuba. In other cases the national duties are made
less than they would be under international law. The protocols
with Mexico relating to Indian marauders and the capitulations
of Turkey and other non-Christian countries reduce the usual
obligations of abstaining from exercising force and jurisdiction
in foreign territory, although they add new obligations inciden-
tal to the exercise of these privileges.
Treaty stipulations are considered in this thesis in connec-
tion with the rules of international law to which they relate, the
general view being taken that treaties when duly ratified are ex-
propria vigore municipal law, and whichever one of these classes
they fall into they will be enforced as such by United States
courts or executive officials.
72Pres. Harrison's Message, Dec. 9, 1891, For. Rel. 1891, v; Moore's
Digest, 65840; Pres. McKinley's Message, Dec. 5, 1899, For. Rel. 1899,
xxii, Moore's Digest, 6)846; Dec. 3, 1900, For. Rel., 1900, xxii. Moore's
Digest, 6:874.
7SW. W. Willoughby, The Am. Const System, N. Y., 1904, p. 108.
See also U. S. vs. Arjona, 120 U. S., 479, (1887), on the subject, also E.
S. Corwin, National Supremacy, N. Y. 1913.
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At this point the subject matter of treaties will not be con-
sidered, but rather the general method of treaty enforcement
the measures which the United States has taken to prevent the
infraction of treaties.
(2) The most important provision of this character is found
in the constitution of the United States, which declares that,
"this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made or which
shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be
the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or law of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.
' '74
What agreements are treaties in the meaning of this provi-
sion is a question of municipal law. The constitution requires
that two-thirds of the senate concur with the president in mak-
ing treaties;75 it therefore seems that executive agreements, of
which a considerable number have been concluded by the presi-
dent alone, 76 would not be
' '
the supreme law of the land
' ' in this
sense. There is undoubtedly a limit to the scope of the treaty
power, from the constitutional division of power between state
and national government, but where the line is to be drawn has
not been defined. It certainly appears to extend beyond the legis-
lative power of congress.77 Ratification and proclamation also ap-
pear to be necessary before a treaty is valid in the sense of the
constitution.78 Even when these conditions are complied with
and from a technical standpoint the treaty is clearly within the
terms of the constitutional provision there are important limita-
tions to its full effect as municipal law in the sense of that term
as adopted in this thesis.
In this connection the dual character of the obligation im-
posed by treaties must be borne in mind. A treaty primarily
creates obligations between states. The recognized representa-
tive of the state, that is its government, may alone be held
responsible for the infraction of treaties so far as the other con-
tracting parties are concerned. This is the only function of
74
Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2.
"Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2.
76See Moore's Digest, 5:210-218.
"Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 276, (1817); Geofroy vs. Riggs,
133 U. S. 258; Hauenstein vs. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483. Contra Prevost
vs. Greneaux, 19 How. i; Moore's Digest, 5;i66; 175-179.
78See Moore's Digest, 5:202-210.
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treaties in many countries including Great Britain. It is for the
political department of the government to decide upon and
enact appropriate measures for putting them into effect. Pri-
vate rights under municipal law are not affected until such
action is taken.79
In the United States, however, aside from this primary obli-
gation imposed upon the government, treaties often impose obli-
gations immediately upon individuals. The constitution has de-
clared, in order to provide for the performance of the duty by
the government, that treaties are law and immediately effective
in altering private rights and liabilities, and the courts must take
cognizance of them in that capacity. Thus in England if the
government wishes to escape liability for infractions of treaties
stipulating a change in private rights it must always pass statutes
providing for their enforcement. In the United States this bur-
den is shifted from congress by the constitutional provision, al-
though in some cases additional legislation may be necessary,
especially where an appropriation of money is required to make
the treaty effective.
(3) This secondary function of treaties, however, is gov-
erned entirely by municipal law. Hence, although the interna-
tional obligation of treaties can not be altered except by mutual
consent,
80 the terms of the treaty itself,
81
or, as is generally ad-
mitted, by an entire change of the conditions upon which the
treaty was founded, 82 the obligations of individuals and officers
of government under it, are always subject to the will of the sov-
ereign. An act of congress specifically abrogating a treaty,83 or
a subsequent and conflicting statute by that body,84 will abrogate
79See Holland. Studies in International Law, p. 190-193, Westlake, Is
International Law Part of the Law of England? L. Q. R. 22 -,14.
80See Moore's Digest, 5:319-322; 363-364.
81See Moore's Digest, 5:322-335.
82See Moore's Digest, 5 ;355-356. This principle is generally spoken of
as the implied reservation contained in all treaties of "rebus sic stantibus."
"There will be no state in the position to conclude a treaty for all time
wherein lies a perpetual limitation of its own sovereignty." Heinrich
Treitschke, Politik, Leipsic, 1899, 2:550.
83Act July 7, 1798, i stat. 578, abrogating French treaty of 1778.
Moore's Digest, 5:356-363.
84Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580; Whitney vs. Robertson, 124 U.
S. 190, (1888); The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U. S. 581, (1889);
Homer vs. U. S., 143 U. S. 570; LaAbra Silver Mining Co., vs. U. S. 175
U. S. 423, 460, (1899) ; Moore's Digest, 5:364-370.
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a treaty so far as municipal law is concerned, although vested
rights created under it will be protected by constitutional guar-
antees in the same manner as vested rights under repealed stat-
utes. 85 The observance of a treaty, although a duty of interna-
tional law, is a political question subject to the discretion of the
sovereign and beyond the power of municipal law to control.
However, by requiring that any such statute be unequivocal and
incapable of reconciliation with the treaty by interpretation,88
the courts of the United States can do much toward enforcing the
duty of the government not to abrogate treaties. Applying this
principle, United States courts have held that war does not termi-
nate treaties. It suspends them in respect to private rights of
enemy persons and brings them into effect in respect to provi-
sions specifically related to rights during war.87
In addition to the power of the political department of the
government to terminate treaties it also has exclusive control of
many treaty provisions which are by their nature incapable of
enforcement by municipal law. Treaty obligations to pay money,
to cede territory, to enact laws, to enter into constructive enter-
prises such as the Panama Canal or to make a particular disposi-
tion of military and naval forces are addressed to the political de-
partment of the government. The courts hold them political ques-
tions and will follow the political department in interpreting
them.88 They can not be enforced as municipal law.
The only treaty provisions which are law actually enforce-
able by regularly constituted municipal authorities are those
"Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 277, (1817) ; Society for the Pro-
pagation of the Gospel vs. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464; Carneak vs. Banks,
10 Wheat. 182; Moore's Digest, 55386-387.
8 In re Chin A. On, 18 Fed. Rep. 506.
87Society for the Propagation of the Gospel vs. New Haven, 8 Wheat,
464, 494, (1823) ; Carneak vs. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181. Great Britain took
a similar view in respect to a statute giving effect to a treaty which in
terms was "to continue in force so long as the said treaty between his
majesty and the United States should continue in force, and no longer."
It was held that the War of 1812 did not terminate the treaty hence the
statute remained valid. See 37 Geo. Ill, c. 97, (1797), in re treaty 1794,
art 9, Sutton vs. Sutton, i Russell and Mylne, 663 ; Moore's Digest, 5 1373.
The United States did not agree to the Spanish claim that the war of
1898 abrogated all treaties between the two countries. See Moore's Digest,
5 J375-376.
88Doe vs. Branden, 16 How. 635; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314; The
Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat, i; Bottiller vs. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238.
Moore's Digest, 5; 241-242.
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parts relating to the control of persons and inferior officers of
government within the jurisdiction of the government. This en-
forcement may be either judicial or executive.
Judicial enforcement is secured by the power to hold invalid
legislation or constitutional provisions of states in conflict with
treaties,
89 to compel administrative officials to perform acts by
mandamus, or to refrain from action by injunction, and to apply
treaties directly as rules of decision in adjudicating private
rights, such as privileges granted aliens, and foreign officers resi-
dent in the country, prize rights of neutrals and enemies in time
of war, etc. By such measures as injunction, the imposition of
criminal penalties and civil liability in tort, courts both state and
federal may also prevent the infraction of treaty rights of alien
persons or foreign states by private persons within their jurisdic-
tion.
Executive authorities may also take measures to enforce trea-
ties directly. It has been held that imprisonment of persons in
pursuance of treaty stipulations by executive authorities, in the
absence of legislation, judicial process or declaration of martial
law, is not an unconstitutional exercise of power nor a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law.80 It would thus seem
that executive measures appropriate to the fulfillment of treaty
obligations may be effectively used under no authority other than
the treaty itself.
Legislative authority is necessary to make treaties effective
in many cases, especially in those requiring an expenditure of
money.
91 It is generally considered to be a duty of congress to act
where its aid is required,92 but in the case of a treaty with Mexico
of 1883, providing that necessary legislation should "take place
within twelve months from the date of exchange of ratifica-
tions,"
93
congress failed to perform this duty. In many other
cases the enforcement of treaties can be made more effective by
89Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Ball. 199, (1796) ; Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat.
259; Hauenstein vs. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483; Gordon vs. Kerr, i Wash.
C. C. 322; Moore's Digest, 5J37I-372.
Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (U. S. Circuit Court, Cal.
1913). See also in re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 as illustrating general executive
power to safeguard broad general interest, and its application to treaty
enforcement by E. S. Corwin, National Supremacy, N. Y., 1913, p. 293.
91See Moore's Digest, 55221-223.
92Cushing Att. Gen., 6 op. 296, (1854).
83Treaty with Mexico, 1883, art. 8, Malloy, p. 1151. See Moore's
Digest, 5;222.
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legislative action. Statutes and orders imposing criminal penal-
ties, creating administrative positions, directing public officers,
etc., have often been enacted and promulgated for this purpose.
Rules contained in treaties are similar to those contained in
international law in their relation to the municipal law of the
United States. In both cases the rules are primarily obligatory
upon the government, and in both cases, as a municipal measure
to aid in the enforcement of the government's obligations, it is
provided that the rules shall be part of municipal law and di-
rectly enforceable by courts and executive officers in appropriate
cases. In both cases also many of the rules are by their nature in-
capable of immediate enforcement as municipal law, because the
courts can not exercise jurisdiction over the parties or subject
matter. In such cases they are political questions, and the na-
tional duties under them may be fulfilled through discretionary
executive action or the enactment and enforcement of supplemen-
tary laws.
CHAPTER V. OBLIGATIONS OF VINDICATION
INTRODUCTORY
The duties of prevention relate to acts committed by private
individuals for which the government is responsible, and which
it is bound to prevent. The government is not responsible for
acts of aliens, but international law sometimes requires it to treat
violators of international law, even when they are aliens, in a spe-
cified manner. The obligation of states is not limited to the
mere negative one of not doing harm to others, but as members
of the family of nations they owe at least a moral duty to that so-
ciety to take measures to promote its general welfare. They must
vindicate their sovereignty, when foreigners violate international
law in their territory or foreign criminals attempt to find refuge
there, by exercising jurisdiction over such persons according to
the requirements of international law. And they must vindicate
their position in the family of nations by cooperating with other
nations in constructive activity for the general good.
Duties of this character are for the most part in a process of
becoming, rather than being already established law. In time of
peace, customary international law does not require such activity,
yet the progress of conventional law, in requiring duties of this
character, leads to the belief that some of them may be soon rec-
ognized as obligations of the law of nations.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Such international conventions as those providing for an in-
ternational bureau of weights and measures, 1 for the interna-
tional protection of industrial property,
2 for the protection of
submarine cables,3 for the repression of the African slave trade,4
for a Universal Postal Union, 5 for the protection of literary and
International Bureau of Weights and Measures, 1875, Malloy, p. 1924.
Convention for International Protection of Industrial Property, 1883,
Malloy, p. 1935.
'Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables, 1884, Malloy, p. 1949.
4General Act for the Repression of African Slave Trade, 1890, Malloy,
p. 1964.
Universal Postal Conventions, 1891, 1897. Concluded by Act of June
S, 1872. See Moore's Digest, 5 -,220.
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artistic copyrights,
8 for promoting sanitation and preventing epi-
demic diseases,7 are adhered to by large numbers of states includ-
ing the United States, and impose duties upon states for the gen-
eral good of the civilized world. Similar duties are imposed by
the Geneva and the Hague conventions, although their rules are
largely declaratory of international law and define obligations
owed to single states rather than those required for the general
good alone. In its most recent interpretation of the Monroe Doc-
trine the United States appears to have recognized that it must
assume certain responsibilities in connection with countries of
the "Western Hemisphere. The administration of customs duties
on several occasions in Latin American countries, for the purpose
of paying obligations owed by such countries to European na-
tions, is an illustration of the exercise of this duty ;8 and the ac-
tivity of the various Pan-American congresses indicates further
special duties connected with the affairs of the new world.9
These obligations are spoken of as duties of international co-
operation,
10 and the law regulating them as international admin-
istrative law. " There has been a great deal of municipal legis-
lation for enforcing these duties, and judicial opinion interpret-
ing them, but as they are not yet duties imposed by international
law aside from convention we will not attempt to consider the
subject here.
PREVENTION OP CRIME
There is, however, one duty of a similar character which is so
habitually practiced and is so well established that it can almost
be said to constitute a real duty of international law. That is the
duty to aid in the suppression of the more serious crimes. The
power of national courts to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction
Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyrights, 1902, Malloy, p. 2058.
'International Sanitary Convention, 1903, Malloy, p. 2066.
8See President Roosevelt's Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1904, For. Rel.
1904, xli ; Moore's Digest, 6 5596.
Act May 24, 1888, Moore's Digest, 6:599-604. Treaties of the Central
American Peace Conference, 1907, Malloy, p. 2391-2400. The duty of pre-
serving order in Cuba and Panama is recognized by treaties, Cuba, 1903,
p. 362-4, Panama, 1903, art. 23, p. 1356.
10See Moore's Digest, 2 5466-488.
"See P. S. Reinsch, International Unions and their administration.
Am. Jour. Int. Law, i ;579-673. (1907) : Int. Adm. Law and National Sov-
ereignty, Am. Jour. Int Law, 35145, (1909); Public Int. Unions, Boston,
191 1 ; Hershey, Essentials of Int. Pub. Law, p. 5, bibliography, p. 14.
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on the high seas for the punishment of pirates is well recognized
by international law, and it seems that a positive duty to exercise
this authority and suppress piracy is likewise fairly established.
A government that does not take adequate measures to suppress
piracy may expect other governments to intervene and punish pi-
rates even within its jurisdiction.12 The slave trade conventions
have recognized a similar obligation to suppress this commerce.
The municipal measures which the United States has taken to
perform these duties have been discussed.13
Attempts have been made to conclude international conven-
tions requiring states to prevent the emigration of criminals from
their territory and to establish international police bureaus for
the detection of criminals, but it can not be said that interna-
tional law as yet imposes obligations of this character.14 The
duty of punishing its own criminals and giving up criminals seek-
ing asylum in its territory to the state where the crime was com-
mitted is sometimes considered a duty of international law,15
and it certainly is a duty very commonly observed. However,
the assertion that states are positively required by international
law to extradite criminals appears to be erroneous. Extra-
dition is not a duty of international law. 16 In the absence of
a treaty, states are not under an obligation to surrender
criminals. The duty has, however, been so universally acknowl-
edged by conventional law that a brief consideration of the laws
of the United States relating to its enforcement may be appro-
priate.
EXTRADITION
That no legal obligation to extradite criminals exists in the
absence of treaty has been affirmed by courts and political officers
of the United States.17 There have, however, been some cases of
12See the Amelia Island case, President Monroe's message, Nov. 17,
1818, Moore's Digest, 15173: 2:406-408.
"Supra, pp. 34-36.
14Such efforts have been made especially in reference to the suppres-
sion of anarchists; see Moore's Digest, 4:95-96: 2:432-434.
"See Sir. E. Clarke, A treatise on the Law of Extradition, 4th ed.
1903, ch. i ; Chancellor Kent, In Matter of Washburn, 4 Johns Ch. 105, 107,
(N. Y.) ; Hershey, op. cit., p. 263, note 69.
16See Moore on Extradition, 1:13-20: Moore's Digest, 45245.
"Commonwealth vs. Deacon, 10 S. and R. 125; U. S. vs. Rauscher,
119 U. S. 407; Terlinden vs. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 289, (1902) ; Moore's Di-
gest, 45245-246.
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extradition without treaty, but the act has been described as one
dictated by courtesy rather than by legal obligation.18 The in-
ternational duty recognized by the United States, therefore, is
that of obeying the extradition treaties.
(1) Provision for extradition of murderers and forgers was
made in the treaty with Great Britain of 1794, in force till 1807.19
The first general extradition provision was in the Webster-Ash-
burton treaty of 1842 with Great Britain.20 Since that time trea-
ties have been concluded with almost all important countries,
21
and they generally specify that persons indicted for the more se-
rious crimes shall be extradited. Express exclusion is ordinarily
made of political offenders.22
Although there have been some state laws providing for ex-
tradition to foreign governments, 23 the better opinion seems to be
that the national government alone has the power to deliver up
fugitives from foreign countries.24 National statutes25 since 1848
have provided for the apprehension and preliminary trial by fed-
eral courts of persons whose extradition is requested, although it
has been held that, treaties being law, the courts can perform
such functions in the absence of statute.26 The courts have held
18See case of Arguelles, Moore on Extradition, 1 533 : Moore's Digest,
4;249.
19Treaty with Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. 27, Malloy, p. 605.
20Treaty with Great Britain, 1842, art 10, Malloy, p. 655.
"Eighty-four treaties with fifty countries have been concluded. The
independent states with which there appear to be no treaties at present
are as follows : Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Paraguay, Uru-
guay, China, Persia, Siam, Liberia, Abyssinia. There is no extradition
treaty with the German Empire, but treaties are in effect with the North
German Union and the folowing states of the empire : B'aden, Bavaria,
Bremen, Hanover, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz,
Oldenburg, Prussia, Schamberg-Lippe, Wurtemburg.
"Ornelas vs. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, (1896) ; In re Ezeta. 62 Fed. Rep.
972 ; Moore's Digest, 4 ;332-354-
23Treaty with Mexico, 1861, art. 2; Law of New York, 1822, p. 134,
N. Y. Rev. Stat. 1827, declared unconstitutional in People vs. Curtis, 50
N. Y. 321, (1872) ; Moore on Extradition, 1 553: Moore's Digest, 4:240.
2*Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 579, (1840) ; Legare, Att. Gen. 3 op.
661, (1841) ; People vs. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, (1872) ; U. S. vs. Rauscher,
ilpU. S. 407, 414, (1886).
25Act. Aug. 12, 1848; 9 Stat. 302, act June 22, 1860, 12 Stat. 83, Rev.
Stat. sec. 5270-5280.
2
'A number of extradition treaties were concluded before the first
statute in 1848, and extraditions were made under them. See The British
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that extradition need not be given for offenses not specified in the
treaty, but the meaning of the offense named in a treaty will be
determined by the law of the country where it was committed.27
(2) Constitutional guarantees require that "due process of
law ' ' be given to persons in the territory of the United States be-
fore extradition. This necessity is satisfied if evidence sufficient
to warrant commitment for trial in the United States28 or to in-
dicate probable guilt
29 is forthcoming, even though the party is
to be extradited to foreign territory under military occupancy of
the United States, where the usual forms of trial guaranteed to
inhabitants of the United States may not be had.30 Many coun-
tries refuse to extradite their citizens, and a number of treaties
to which the United States is a party specifically exempt them,
but the United States does not recognize this exemption in the
absence of specific treaty provision.
31
(3) The actual surrender of the accused is an executive act
and is performed by the president through the secretary of state,
except in certain treaties with Mexico,32 in which the state au-
thorities along the frontier are given power to surrender accused
persons within their jurisdiction. The treaties themselves fur-
nish sufficient authority for the exercise of this power,
33 but it
can not be exercised until the evidence has been heard and certifi-
cation given by the proper judicial authority.34 It seems that
even after such certification the president's power is not merely
administrative. He may in his discretion refuse to surrender a
Prisoners, i Wood and M. 66; (U. S. C. C, 1845) U. S. vs. Watts, 14 Fed.
Rep. 130; U. S. vs. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407; Moore's Digest, 4:270-273. U.
S. vs. Robbins, Bees Admr. 266; Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 176, (1847).
See E. S. Corwin, National Supremacy, N. Y., 1913, p. 277 et. seq.
2TThis is frequently required by the terms of the treaty. See Ben-
son vs. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457, 466, (1880) ; In re Farez, 7 Blatch. 345,
Moore's Digest, 4 5273-278.
"Nelson Att. Gen., 4 op. 201, (1843) ; Moore's Digest, 4:388-391.
29In re Ezeta, 62 Fed. Rep. 972.
80Act. June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 656, providing for extradition to territory
under military government, and Neeley vs. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, (1901),
upholding the statute, Moore's Digest, 4:287-306.
31Neeley vs. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, (1901) ; Moore's Digest, 4:287-306.
"Treaty with Mexico, 1861, art. 2, Malloy, p. 1126.
33Terlinden vs. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 289, (1902); Moore's Digest,
4 ;397-399.
"Gushing, Att. Gen., 6 op. 217, (1853) ; Nelson, Att. Gen., 4 op. 240,
(1843).
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person found liable by the courts.
35 The ultimate fulfillment of
the duty of extradition is therefore a political rather than a legal
one according to the law of the United States. Municipal law
can not compel the president to deliver criminals, although after
action by the courts it is undoubtedly his duty to do so, except in
extraordinary cases.
RETURN OF DESERTING SEAMEN
The return of deserting seamen to their vessels is a matter
resembling extradition. As in that case, international law im-
poses no duty in the absence of treaty, 36 but the United States
has assumed the obligation in a number of treaties,37 and stat-
utes38 have provided that deserting seamen may be seized on ap-
plication of the consul of a foreign government having an appro-
priate treaty with the United States, and on proof of desertion
be delivered up to the consul. It has been held that seamen con-
signed to vessels being built for a foreign government and still in
dry dock are within the meaning of these treaties and statutes.39
At the present time, international law imposes no duties of
vindication on states in time of peace, although it requires them
to observe treaties and international conventions, imposing new
duties of this character upon them. The rapid multiplication of
these treaties in recent times and the almost universal acceptance
of the principles of some of them indicate that, in certain fields,
cooperation and mutual aid have become recognized as essential
to the life of civilized nations, and while states may not yet be
under a legal obligation to accede to such treaties or the princi-
ples they embody, international comity certainly imposes a moral
obligation which cannot be long neglected. The rules of munici-
pal law enforcing these moral obligations of cooperation in hu-
manitarian and industrial matters and mutual aid in the sup-
pression of crime are therefore closely related in international
importance to like measures enforcing positive legal obligations
of international law. The accession to treaties of this kind is a
purely political matter and beyond the control of municipal law,
but the usual measures for enforcing treaties in the United
States apply when once they are concluded.
85See Moore's Digest, 45399-400.
86Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 431, 467-469; Gushing Att. Gen.
6 op. 148, 209; Moore on Extradition, sec. 408; Moore's Digest, 4;4i7-42O.
87This provision has been contained in fifty-two treaties with thirty-
five countries.
S8Rev. Stat, 5280 ; on procedure, see Rev. Stat sec. 4079-4081.
"Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424.
CHAPTER VI. OBLIGATIONS OF REPARATION
INTRODUCTORY
Reparation is a duty owed by a state in case of a failure to
observe any of its obligations under international law. If it com-
mits any forbidden acts itself, or fails to prevent its subjects
from doing so, it must make amends to the injured state or its
subjects. This applies to violations of the duties of states when
neutral or belligerent, as well as in time of peace. To enumerate
the occasions on which reparation is due would, therefore, be to
recapitulate practically the whole of this paper. It is not the
purpose of this chapter to discuss the occasions upon which the
United States has given reparation, but rather to consider the
general laws by which the duty to make reparation is enforced.
Like all obligations of international law, reparation is pri-
marily a duty of states. No matter who the perpetrator of the
wrong, whether a private person or a diplomatic officer, if it is a
breach of international law the state will be held liable. Viewed
from this standpoint, reparation is beyond the control of munici-
pal law. As an obligation upon the sovereign power, municipal
law can lend no effective sanction, although it can, by proper
constitutional agreements, insure a distinct recognition, both na-
tional and international, of the authority which is to be consid-
ered the responsible agent of sovereignty in this respect, and can
furnish a machinery whereby the demands required by a just ob-
servance of the duty of reparation may be made known.
Furthermore, although the state is ultimately held respon-
sible, material reparation may often be had more expeditiously
by direct recourse to the private person, officer or department of
government immediately at fault. Municipal law may enforce
the duty of such persons and departments to make reparation.
It is true that the municipal enforcement of the duty to
make indemnity incumbent upon the immediate perpetrators of
the wrong is often used as a basis for denying the duty of
' '
repa-
ration" altogether, using the term to signify solely an idemnifi-
cation by the government of the state at fault.1 This view is be-
1See especially Secretary of State Evarts and Secretary of State Bay-
ard, official correspondence on Chinese outrages, 1880-1885, Moore's Di-
gest, 6 1820-835.
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lieved to be untenable. If a breach of international law has been
committed, the state through its recognized government is re-
sponsible, no matter what advantages of recourse to the imme-
diate party at fault its municipal law may give. The duty of the
government to make reparation can only be escaped by proof
that the tort was not one of international law. If it is admitted
that international law requires a state to give reasonable protec-
tion to aliens in its territory, then an injury to such aliens by
mob violence implies an obligation of reparation and indemnity
by the government, no matter what remedies from the immedi-
ate perpetrators, through courts of justice, municipal law may
permit. Escape from the obligation of the government can only
be based on a denial of the statement that international law im-
poses such an obligation of prevention.
But although the state can not escape the obligation to make
reparation for breaches of international law, through its govern-
ment, this does not prevent it providing other means by which
the injured party may obtain reparation, through municipal
law. Such municipal remedies may be more rapid and satisfac-
tory to all parties concerned than recourse to the government
through diplomatic channels. If satisfaction is obtained from
the person or officer guilty the state's duty of reparation is ful-
filled, and to its fulfillment in this manner municipal law may
lend a sanction. The question may therefore be treated under
two heads, (1) reparation by the national government, (2)
reparation by inferior governmental divisions, public officers
and private persons.
REPARATION BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Under the constitution, exclusive control of foreign relations
is in the hands of the national government of the United States.
In this field it is sovereign. The municipal law of the United
States can not compel it to observe its duties of reparation. On
numerous occasions the duty has been recognized, through the
voting of indemnities by congress, the authorization of salutes to
a foreign flag or public apology, but it has been done as a matter
of policy, comity, foreign pressure or sense of international obli-
gation, not from any coercion of municipal law.
Although the duty of the national government to make rep-
aration can not be compelled by municipal law, the probability
of the duty being performed will be greatly increased if munici-
pal law (1) places no obstacles in the way of such performance,
and (2) establishes a machinery for the determination and set-
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tiement of claims for reparation. Municipal law may thus be of
great importance in the fulfillment of this international duty.
(1) The obstacles if any which the constitutional system of
the United States places in the way of an adequate performance
of the duties of reparation will be considered according to the
character of those duties. Reparation may take the form of (a)
apology, or salute of a foreign flag, (b) cession of territory, (c)
pecuniary indemnity, (d) punishment or surrender of offenders,
or (e) release of persons held in custody in contravention of in-
ternational law.
(a) Such formal modes of reparation as apology and salute
of the flag are entirely executive in nature. The president
through his control of foreign relations exercises unrestrained
discretion in these matters.2
(b) Reparation by cession of territory generally results from
war. The United States demanded such indemnity, although it
can scarcely be called reparation, in the Mexican and Spanish
wars, but it has never made cessions for this reason itself. The
power to cede territory is generally agreed to be inherent in the
treaty power, consequently, if necessary, reparation of this char-
acter could be made by the president with the advice and con-
sent of two-thirds of the senate.3
(c) Pecuniary indemnity is the most common form of repa-
ration, and it clearly cannot be made without the express con-
sent of congress. Congress by the constitution has control of the
purse, and consequently no indemnity can be paid without an
appropriation by it, although lump appropriations for the gen-
eral purpose of settling claims might be voted, to be expended at
2For reparation by apology see The Trent Affair. No formal apology
was made, but Great Britain recognized the return of Mason and Slidell
and Secretary of State Seward's note as equivalent to the apology de-
manded. Moore's Digest, 7 ',771. For reparation by salute of flag see case
of French Consul subpoenaed in San Francisco, Moore's Digest, 5 ;8o ;
case of The Florida seized in Brazilian territorial waters, Moore's Digest,
751091; Case of Spanish consulate attacked at New Orleans, Moore's Di-
gest, 61813.
8Lattimer vs. Poteet, 14 Pet. 14. There has been dicta to the effect
that the consent of a state is necessary before any of its territory may be
ceded. See Geofroy vs. Riggs, 133 U. S. 267; Insular cases, 182 U. S. 345,
though in this case the court admitted that territory of a state might be
ceded to buy peace after a disastrous war without such consent. See But-
ler, Treaty Making Power, 1541 1-413; 25238, 287-294; Moore's Digest,
5JI7I-I7S-
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executive discretion. As the steps leading to reparation and the
correspondence on the subject are conducted by the president,
a failure on the part of congress to appropriate for a reparation
the validity of which had been admitted by the executive, might
lead to serious trouble. As a matter of fact congress appears to
have followed the recommendations of the president in this re-
spect.
4
However, the probability of the national government paying
indemnities depends somewhat upon its control of the actual
perpetrators of the wrong. The breach of international law
may have been through an act of the national government itself
or an agent acting under express authority, in which case no
such question would arise. It may have been through the
unauthorized act of an officer of the national government abroad
or within the territory of the United States. As such officers
if military or naval are under the constant control of the gov-
ernment through courts martial and military law and if civil
are under executive control and are frequently bonded, the
government would have no grounds for denying its responsi-
bility from this cause.
Where the offense has been committed by a state officer or
a private citizen within the territory of a state, it seems to be
settled that the constitution does not bar the national government
from prosecuting the offender in its own courts if his act violates
international law or a treaty.5 It is also clear that no such
jurisdiction may be exercised unless statutes specifically provide
for it.6 Statutes have provided for the extension of the jurisdic-
4As examples of pecuniary indemnity voted by congress, see Case of
Spanish Consul, Act, Aug. 31, 1852, 10 Stat. 898; Mch. 3, 1853, 10 Stat.
262, Moore's Digest, 6:814-818; Rock Springs Anti Chinese Outrage, Oct.
19, 1888, 25 Stat. 565,566; Italian Lynchings, New Orleans, 1891, Moore's
Digest, 6 5840 ; Colorado, June 8, 1896, Moore's Digest, 841 ; Hahnville,
La., July 19, 1897, 30 Stat. 105,106; Tallulah, La., 1899, Moore's Digest,
65846; Erwin, Mass., Mch. 3, 1903, 33 Stat. 1032; English Seaman injured,
New Orleans, June 8, 1896; Mexican Lynching, Yreka, Cal., July 17, 1898,
30 Stat. 653 ; in Texas, March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1010.
8W. W. Willoughby, The Am. Const. System, N. Y., 1904, p. 108; E.
S. Corwin, National Supremacy, N. Y., 1913 ; U. S. vs. Arjona, 120 U. S.,
479, (1887).
6On the strictly statutory character of the jurisdiction of federal
courts except the supreme court see U. S. vs. Worral, 2 Dall. 384, (1/98),
and general terms of judiciary act of 1789, Rev. Stat. 687-750 granting
less jurisdiction than is included under constitutional provisions. Somewhat
contra see In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 584, saying, "Every government is en.
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tion of federal courts over persons violating diplomatic immuni-
ties, and over a few specified offenses against foreign states, 7 but
no such provision has been made where the offense is against the
general rights of aliens or consuls residing within the country. It
is not surprising, therefore, that for offenses of this character the
United States has been very reluctant to admit a duty of repara-
tion. Where it can not punish offenders, or take measures to pre-
vent a recurrence of outrages, the national government has felt
that it is not legally responsible, and where it has made indem-
nity has done so as a "gratuity" rather than an obligation.8 If,
however, as appears to be the case, international law imposes a
duty of preventing injury to resident aliens, no such plea will
avail. The United States government is the only authority with-
in the territory of the United States known to foreign states,' and
will be held responsible for violations of international law or
treaties, whether it in fact can control the guilty persons or not.
It therefore seems that statutes should give the federal courts jur-
isdiction over offenders of this character.9
(d) Frequently the injured state has specifically demanded
the punishment of offenders as reparation.10 Here also the con-
trusted by the very terms of its being with powers and duties to be exer-
cised and discharged for the general welfare, and has a right to apply to
its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and
the discharge of the other." The supreme court appears to have an in-
herent jurisdiction by the constitution subject to the power of congress to
limit it, but as positive grants of jurisdiction by congress are held to nega-
tive all other jurisdiction, its jurisdiction in reality extends no further
than provided by statute. See U. S. vs. Moore, 3 Cranch 159,170,172;
Durousseau vs. U. S. 6 Cranch 307,313; Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506,
513-
7Supra, p. 71 et seq.
8See Diplomatic correspondence and congressional action on indem-
nities for injury to Spanish consul, 1851, Chinese Outrages, 1880-1885, Ital-
ian Lynchings, 1891-1901, etc., Moore's Digest, 6 ',811-849. In the last of
the Italian cases the act of congress Mch. 3, 1903, 33 Stat. 1032, appro-
priated $5,000 "out of humane considerations without reference to the
question of liability therefor to the Italian Government." Moore's Digest,
6:849.
9See Messages Pres. Harrison, Dec. 9, 1891 ; Pres. McKinley, Dec. 5,
1899, Dec. 3, 1900, Moore's Digest, 6 ;84O,846-847, in which such legislation
is recommended.
10See case of French Privateers, 1811, Moore's Digest, 65809; Chinese
Outrages, Denver, Colo., 1880, Moore's Digest 6;82o; Italian Lynching,
New Orleans, 1891, Moore's Digest, 65838.
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stitutional division of power between state and national govern-
ments has offered an obstacle to the performance of this demand.
In the case of army and naval officers11 and civil officers of the
United States government, misconduct in office is made a crime
against the United States, and offences by such officers are cog-
nizable by federal courts. The same is true of persons guilty of
violating the immunities of foreign diplomatic officers, or the
obligations of neutrality, and a few other acts forbidden by in-
ternational law, such as counterfeiting foreign securities. No
statutes have, however, given the federal courts criminal juris-
diction of persons violating rights of aliens guaranteed by treaty
or international law, and consequently unless the state govern-
ment, which cannot feel the pressure of international responsi-
bility, chooses to prosecute such offenders,
12 the duty will not be
performed. The constitution undoubtedly permits such an
extension of federal jurisdiction, and it would seem that the ade-
quate enforcement of international obligations demands it.
In the place of punishment of offenders against interna-
tional rights, states have sometimes demanded as a reparation
that they be delivered up for punishment by its own tribunals.
This was demanded by the Russian Czar upon the arrest of his
ambassador in London in 1708,13 and by the King of France upon
the assault of his secretary of legation at Philadelphia in 1784.
1*
The demand was refused in both of these cases and it seems that
no such obligation of reparation exists under international law.
A state may extradite fugitives from justice in its territory for
offenses committed abroad, 15 but the theory of territorial sover-
eignty upon which international law is so largely based places it
under no obligation to surrender persons for acts committed
"On court martial punishment of the commander of the United
States vessel Wachusett, in reparation for the seizure of the confederate
cruiser Florida in Brazilian territorial waters, see Moore's Digest, 7; 1090.
12The Continental Congress recommended that the states prosecute
offenses against the Law of Nations, (Res. Nov. 23, 1781, Journ. Cong.,
7;i8i, Ford ed., 2151137) and offered to pay for the prosecution of such
offenses, (Res. Aug. 2, 1779, Ibid., 55232, Ford ed., 145914).
18 See statement of this case in Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr, 1478, (K.
B. 1764), Scott, 6., Holland, studies in international law, p. 187.
14Res Publica vs. De Longchamps, i Dall. in, (Pa. 1784).
15In countries which adhere to the theory of jurisdiction by nation-
ality even extradition for offenses committed abroad is refused in the case
of their own subjects. See Italian refusal to extradite its subjects even
when no exemption was specified in treaty. Moore's Digest, 45290-297.
In this case Italy punished the persons whose extradition was asked.
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within its own jurisdiction. To do so would be to acknowledge
an extra-territorial effect of the laws of the foreign country. In-
ternational law may require a state to punish offenders as a repa-
ration for international wrongs, but it does not require it to sub-
mit them to the punishment of the injured state.
(e) On several occasions the release of officers or persons
held under public authority has been the form of reparation de-
manded. Where the person is held by the executive or judicial
authority of the national government, that authority can grant
release, in the former case by executive action as in the Trent af-
fair of 1861
;
18 in the latter by writ of habeas corpus which may
be instituted by executive authority, or by a direct statutory pro-
hibition of jurisdiction as in the case of foreign diplomatic of-
ficers.17
Where the person is held by authority of a state court, again
an obstacle may be presented to the effective fulfilling of interna-
tional duty, as was illustrated in the case of McLeod,18 an English
soldier, held by authority of the state of New York for an alleged
murder, and whose release was demanded by Great Britain. In
this case the national government was unable to effect a release,
and as a consequence a statute19 was soon after passed providing
that persons held by state authority whose release was demanded
on grounds of international law might be brought before the fed-
eral courts on habeas corpus, in which case the national authori-
ties might upon satisfactory evidence bring about a release. The
statutory provisions excluding cases against diplomatic agents
from the jurisdiction of state courts altogether, remove this
obstacle from the release of such persons by national authority.
It seems that the constitution offers no obstacle to the ob-
servance of all national duties of reparation. The principle of
national supremacy in the fields constitutionally delegated to the
national government, including foreign relations, permits of leg-
islation by congress and the exercise of jurisdiction by federal
courts, "necessary and proper" to fulfill all duties required by
international law or treaty.20 However, additional legislation to
16On release of Mason and Slidell as a reparation for their illegal
seizure from the British vessel Trent, see Moore's Digest, 7 -,768-770.
17
Act, Apr. 30, 1790, i Stat. 117, Rev. Stat. sec. 4063-4064.
"People vs. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483, (N. Y. 1841) in which an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus was refused by the state court See
Moore's Digest, 2:24-25.
19
Act, Aug. 29, 1842, Rev. Stat. 753, Moore's Digest, 2530.
20See Pomeroy, J. N., An introduction to the Constitutional law of
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make some of this constitutional power effective seems to be nec-
essary.
(2) The fulfillment of the duty of reparation may be se-
cured by the provision of an adequate machinery for prosecut-
ing claims for reparation. The final method for prosecuting any
claim for reparation is the resort to force by way of intervention,
reprisal or war. Observance of the "duty" of reparation, if it
can be called a duty under such coercion, is a matter of policy
and certainly requires no additional sanction from municipal
law. We have to do solely with the duty of making repartion for
acknowledged breaches of international law.
The prosecution of claims for reparation may be by, (a) judi-
cial means provided by municipal law, (b) diplomacy, or (c)
arbitration.
(a) By an act of 185521 a court of claims was established, at
first as an advisory body, but later
22
as a court with power to com-
pel payment of money from general appropriations for that pur-
pose. Aliens are permitted to prosecute suits in the court of
claims if their government accords a like privilege to the United
States citizens, and most European governments have been in-
cluded in this class. 23 The jurisdiction of the court extends over
claims founded on acts of congress, executive regulations, con-
tracts express or implied with the United States, damage cases
not sounding in tort and all claims referred to it by either house
the United States, gth ed., N. Y., i88& p. 571 Corwin, E. S., National
Supremacy, N. Y., 1913, passim.
21
Act, Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612.
22
Act, Mch. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765. Under this act the court was still
simply advisory, as the Secretary of the Treasury had a discretionery
power to revise its decision ; consequently the supreme court refused the
appellate jurisdiction given to it. (Gordon vs. U. S., 2 Wall. 561). This
difficulty was remedied by the act of Mch. 17, 1866, see also Tucker act,
Mch. 2, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, U. S. Rev. Stat. 1059, 1089, Judicial Code, 1911,
36 Stat. 1087, sec. 142,180.
23Act, July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 243; Rev. Stat. 1068. Judicial Code
Privileges accorded subjects of Great Britain, (U. S. vs. O'Keefe, n
Wall. 178; Carlisle vs. U. S. 16 Wall. 147) Belgium, (DeGive vs. U. S.
7 Ct. Cl. 517) ; France, (Rothschild vs. U. S. 6 Ct. Cl. 204; Dauphin vs.
U. S. 6 Ct. Cl. 221) ; Italy, (Fichera vs. U. S. 9 Ct. Cl. 254) ; Prussia,
(Brown vs. U. S. 5 Ct. Cl. 571) ; Spain, (Molina vs. U. S. 6 Ct. Cl. 571) ;
Switzerland, (Lobsiger vs. U. S. 5 Ct. Cl. 687). See Roger Foster, A
Treatise on Federal Practice, Civil and Criminal, 5th ed., 3 vols., Chi-
cago, 1913, 3 52309.
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of congress.
24 It is expressly stated, however, that the jurisdic-
tion does not extend to claims
"growing out of or dependent
upon treaty stipulations entered into with foreign nations or with
Indian tribes. ' >25 As the court 's jurisdiction is limited to the ex-
press terms of statute it does not extend to claims based on gen-
eral international law. The court therefore could not aid in en-
forcing the national duty of reparation unless congress had first
acted, except in so far as the obligation to pay contract debts
may be considered a duty of international law.
(b) Diplomatic representation is the most frequent method
of presenting demands for reparation. These must be presented
to the Department of State and must come from a foreign gov-
ernment through its diplomatic representative in the United
States. 26 The Department of State will not listen to a claim pre-
sented by a foreign private person and congress will not con-
sider any alien claims not coming through the Department of
State.27 The action of the Department of State upon claims is
entirely discretionary, and its recommendation to congress al-
though generally followed has no controlling effect. Congress
having acted, it would seem that the payment of claims becomes
a purely administrative act and the foreign claimant can have
recourse to the court of claims on the authority of this statute,
or to an action of mandamus to compel payment by the Secretary
of the Treasury or the Secretary of State.
(c) The conclusion of arbitration treaties and the determi-
nation to submit any particular claim to arbitration are political
questions and beyond the power of municipal law to control. The
United States has concluded a large number of special as well as
general arbitration treaties.
28 The former usually specify the
procedure to be observed and the subjects to be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the arbitral court. 29 The latter provides that all
24Act, Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612; Rev. Stat. 1059. Judicial Code, Act,
Mch. 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 145, District courts now exercise a con-
current jurisdiction in these matters, Ibid., sec. 24.
28Act, Mch. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765, sec. 9, Judicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat.
1087, sec. 153.
26U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, Moore's Digest, 6;6o7-6o9.
"Magoon's Reports 338; see also 43 Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 496,
committee on war claims, May 2, 1874; Moore's Digest, 6;6o8.
28Supra, p. 26, note 18.
29It has been held that decisions of an arbitral court beyond its com-
petence as defined by treaty are void. See Comegys vs. Vasse, i Pet.
193; Trevall vs. Bache, 14 Pet. 95; Judson vs. Corcoran, 17 How. 612;
Moore's Digest, 7:30-33.
102 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [102
questions of a class or all questions except those of a specified
class shall be submitted to arbitration, yet although treaties are,
by the constitution, the law of the land, cases do not come before
arbitral tribunals automatically. The submission of any case is a
political question, upon which the executive power of the govern-
ment has discretion.
A claim having been submitted to arbitration and an award
given, the matter is subject to enforcement by municipal law. It
has been held that an arbitral decision is final and as binding on
the courts as an act of congress.
30 It would therefore seem that
the payment of the award is purely administrative in character,
and can be compelled by mandamus. This however is not true in
cases in which the award has been for the United States, and its
citizens claim payment. If it develops that fraud was practiced,
the United States government can reopen the whole matter and
refuse payment to its citizens. 31 The arbitral decision is res jud-
icata as between the governments, but not as between the govern-
ment and its own subjects.
Although the submission of questions to arbitration even
under general treaties is a political question and beyond the con-
trol of municipal law, the establishment of a mode of procedure
by means of such treaties and of a permanent panel of judges as
is provided by the Hague conventions undoubtedly affords an im-
portant sanction to the equitable fulfillment of duties of repara-
tion. The establishment of a permanent court of arbitration with
recognized jurisdiction, as was attempted and notably favored
by the United States' delegation at the second Hague conference,
would add an even more effective sanction of similar character.
REPARATION BY INFERIOR GOVERNMENTAL DIVISIONS, PUBLIC OFFI-
CERS, AND PRIVATE PERSONS
As has been stated, the national government of the United
States is primarily responsible for all breaches of international
law by itself or its citizens and reparation for such torts may al-
ways be expected from it. This does not, however, prevent the
injured party seeking reparation from inferior governmental or-
gans, officers, or individuals. We may therefore consider the mu-
80Comegys vs. Vasse, i Pet. 193, 212. La Ninfa, 75 Fed. Rep. 513,
(1896).
"Frelinghuysen vs. Key, no U. S. 63; Boynton vs. Elaine, 139 U. S.
306; U. S. vs. LaAbra Silver Mining Co., 32 Ct. Cl. 462, (1897) ; LaAbra
Silver Mining Co. vs. U. S., 175 U. S. 423, (1899). See Moore's Digest,
7565-68.
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nicipal measures enforcing the duty of such persons to make
reparation.
(1) The constitution permits the extension of the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts to controversies "between a state or the citi-
zens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects,"82 but not
to "suits in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States * * by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state."33 The exemption does not extend to suits prosecuted by
foreign states. It therefore seems that so far as the constitution
is concerned, a foreign state could bring action for reparation
against one of the commonwealths of the union in the federal
courts although its subjects acting individually could not. The
statutes, however, have not provided for such a jurisdiction ; con-
sequently there have been no such actions. Foreign states have al-
ways asserted that the government of the United States is the only
authority recognized by them as responsible, and have refused to
have direct recourse to state governments, even when the state has
offered to make indemnity.84
Some states have established courts of claims in which they
may be sued under limitations,35 and a number of them have pro-
vided by law for the responsibility of cities and counties for prop-
erty losses and lynchings.36 These methods of recovery are open
32Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2, cl. I.
33Constitution, Amendment n.
34See case of French Privateers, 1811, in which the State of Georgia
offered to make indemnity for injury to French seamen in Savannah.
Moore's Digest, 6:809.
3BIllinois Act, Mch. 23, 1819, Laws 1819, p. 184; Act, Jan. 3, 1829, Rev.
Laws, 1832, p. 593, repealed Rev. Stat. 1845, P- 464, permitting the audi-
tor of Public Accounts to be sued for the state. 111. Act, May 29, 1877,
laws, 1877, p. 64, creating a commission of claims "to hear and deter-
mine all unadjudicated claims of all persons, against the state of Illinois"
and submit them to the auditor of public accounts who is to lay them before
the general assembly. 111. Act, May 16, 1903, laws 1903, p. 140, creating a
court of claims with a similar authority. See N. Y. Laws, 1870, c. 321 ;
1876, c-444; 1883, c.2OS; 1897, c-36; Mass. Rev. Laws, c.2Oi. See Freund,
Cases on Administrative Law, St. Paul, 1911, p. 363-367.
88As examples, see 111. Rev. Stat. 1913, .38, sec. 256a-256g, p. 854, mak-
ing a city or county liable for three-fourths damages for property losses
caused by a mob of over twelve persons, with the proviso that such liabil-
ity does not prevent recovery from individual perpetrators ; c.28, sec. 256w,
p. 857, creating a liability of $5000 upon counties and cities for lynchings,
recoverable by the survivors of the person lynched.
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to aliens or foreign sovereigns under the usual provisions open-
ing courts to such persons.
(2) Recourse against private persons or officers of govern-
ment may be had by either foreign individuals or sovereigns.37
Such suits may also be commenced in the name of a foreign
state.38 Foreign states or persons bringing such suits have the
advantage of the usual principles of law applicable to suits
brought for the recovery of claims or damages by citizens. 39 The
foreigner in such a case has the additional advantage of an op-
tion in bringing his case in either the state or federal courts. By
the constitution the jurisdiction of the federal courts may be ex-
tended to controversies "between a state or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens or subjects," and statutes have pro-
vided for the exercise of this jurisdiction as to such suits against
citizens.40
The usual principles of liability of officers apply in suits
brought by aliens as well as by citizens. In principle Anglo-
American law considers officers liable for wrongful acts, in which
case they would be liable for torts violating international rights
of foreign states or persons.
41
. The tendency, however, is to re-
lieve officers from such liability either by statute or judicial deci-
37King of Spain vs. Oliver, 2 Wash. C.C. 429.
38The Saphire, 11 Wall 164 and Moore's Digest, 2 ',85-87. English
cases, U. S. vs. Prioleau, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 7, (1865) ; U. S. vs. McRae,
L. R. 8 Eq. 69, (1869) ; Moore's Digest, i -,65-66.
89Cushing, Att. Gen., 7 op. 229, (1885) ; Taylor vs. Carpenter, 3 Story
458; State vs. Chue Fan, 42 Fed. Rep. 865; Crashley vs. Press Pub. Co.,
179 N. Y. 27, (1904) ; Moore's Digest, 457-9.
40Gonstitution art. 3, sec. 2, cl. i. United States district courts have
jurisdiction of civil suits where the matter of controversy is over $3,000
"between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects," (Ju-
dicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 24, cl. i) and "of all suits brought by
any alien for a tort only in violation of the Law of Nations or of a treaty
of the United States" (Ibid, sec. 24, cl. 17). All suits of which district
courts have original jurisdiction, or in which the parties are of diverse
citizenship and there is danger of local prejudice, may be removed from
state courts to U. S. district courts by motion of the defendant. (Ibid. sec.
28). Most of these provisions were in the Judiciary act of 1789, Rev. Stat.
sec. 563, cl. 16, sec. 629, cl. I. Removal of cases involving aliens to cir-
cuit courts was provided in an act of Aug. 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 434, sec 2, on
which see New Orleans Co., vs. Rabasse, 10 So. 708, Breedlove vs. Nicolet,
7 Pet. 413. The circuit courts were abolished by the judicial code of 191 1,,
sec. 289.
41Littlf vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, (1804).
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sion when they act in good faith, the state sometimes assuming
the liability in such cases. The responsibility of private persons
would be governed by the law of torts and contracts of the state
where the action was brought, the same remedies generally being
open to the alien as to a citizen.
42
42See reference to this mode of indemnification in letter of Secretary
pf State Bayard, For. Rel. 1886, p. 158, in reference to Chinese Outrages
at Rock Springs, Wyo., 1885, in which reference is also made to the right
of aliens to remove cases to federal courts. Moore's Digest, 6:831-832.
PART II. OBLIGATIONS AS A NEUTRAL
TOWARD BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER VII. INTRODUCTORY
The obligations of neutral states have been classified by Hol-
land1 as obligations of (1) abstention, (2) acquiescence and (3)
prevention. To these Lawrence2 adds two, the duties of (4) res-
toration and (5) reparation.
(1) The obligations of abstention peculiar to neutrality re-
late to matters which the state itself must obstain from doing, and
are outside of the jurisdiction of municipal law. Whether a
state by performing its duties of abstention shall remain a neu-
tral, or whether by refusing to perform them it intervenes and
thus itself becomes a belligerent is a question which is always to be
determined by the political departments of the goverment. Mun-
icipal law can not in any way effect the power of the state thus to
exercise its sovereignty. It may be noted that certain acts of ab-
stention are specifically required by one of the Hague conventions
of 1907. Thus neutral states are required to abstain from partial-
ity in dealing with belligerents, from supplying belligerent
powers with "warships, ammunition, or war material of any
kind,
' '
and from partiality in applying
' '
conditions, restrictions
and prohibitions" upon the admission of belligerent warships or
prizes into their territorial waters.
3 By the constitution4 treaties
are declared to be a part of the law of the land; consequently
these provisions might be regarded as rules of municipal law. In
reality, as they are directory upon the state itself they can not be
enforced by any regularly constituted state authority, so scarcely
deserve that title. They are rules directory upon the political
organs of government, but are not enforceable rules of municipal
law. The duties of obstention discussed under the law of peace
likewise apply to states in time of neutrality.
*T. E. Holland, Neutral Duties in Maritime War, Proceedings of the
British Academy, 252, quoted Moore's Digest, 7:863.
2T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4th ed., N. Y.,
1910, p. 629.
3Hague Conventions, 1907, v, art. 9, xiii, arts. 6, 9.
Constitution, art vi, sec. 2.
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(2) The neutral state's obligations of acquiescence are en-
tirely passive. They require the state to submit without protest
to incidental inconveniences and detractions from its ordinary
rights under international law caused by the operation of ac-
knowledged privileges of belligerents. The most prominent of
these inconveniences is the loss to its subjects which results from
the exercise of belligerent rights in interfering with maritime
commerce such as the right of visit and search, seizure, and con-
fiscation after adjudication for breach of blockade, contraband
trade, unneutral service and similar acts. A neutral state must
also acquiesce in occasional losses by its citizens resident in bel-
ligerent countries, when such losses are incidental to the conduct
of hostilities. The duty of acquiescence simply requires the ac-
knowledgment by the neutral state that the ordinary rights of its
citizens under international law are modified in their relations
with a belligerent community or state. The form which a breach
of this duty would take would be the making of unwarranted dip-
lomatic protests or intervention. As in the case of abstention
both of these acts are prerogatives of sovereignty and incapable
of limitation by municipal law. The duties of acquiescence con-
nected with exemptions from territorial jurisdiction and servi-
tudes apply to states in neutrality as well as in peace.
(3) The duty of prevention requires a state to prevent un-
neutral acts by its citizens and agencies of government, and the
unneutral use of its territory. It is in this field that municipal
law is most essential for the preservation of neutral obligations.
(4) The duty which Lawrence has in mind when he speaks
of ' ' restoration ' ' is the duty which a neutral state is under to re-
store to the original owner
5
prizes captured in its waters or
illegally brought to its ports. It seems that the use of the term
restoration as describing this duty is unfortunate as it im-
plies that the duty is one owed to the power to whom the prize is
restored. If this were true, if the owner of the vessel captured
in violation of neutrality had a right to its restoration, he could
make his claim if the vessel were in the custody of a belligerent as
well as a neutral prize court. This, however, is not the case. It
is a recognized principle that the owner of the vessel can not
claim restoration in a belligerent prize court, on the ground that
the seizure was in violation of the neutrality of a third state.
6 The
BLawrence, op. cit, p. 649.
6"A capture within neutral waters is, as between enemies, deemed to
all intents and purposes rightful; it is only by the neutral sovereign that
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prize is restored not as a reparation to the state from which it
was taken, but as a vindication of its own neutral rights by the
neutral state. 7 Like international cooperation and the extradi-
tion of criminals, it is an obligation growing out of the general
interest of humanity which requires the greatest possible restric-
tion of the area of war. Unlike them, however, it is a duty re-
quired by international law even in the absence of treaty stipula-
tions, and reparation may be demanded in case of failure to ob-
serve it.
8 We will therfore include the duties which Lawrence
discusses as duties of "restoration" in the subject "obligations of
vindication. ' ' There are other obligations which will logically be
included in this subject, such as that to intern belligerent troops
entering neutral territory and to enforce observation of the
twenty-four hour stay and twenty-four hour interval rules by
belligerent vessels taking asylum in its ports.
(5) The duty of reparation refers to the obligation which a
neutral state is under to make suitable amends to the injured bel-
ligerent for a failure to perform any of its other duties as a neu-
tral. The reparation may assume the forms of payment of dam-
ages, restoration of property or public apology. The payment by
Great Britain of the Alabama claims award in 1871 is a classic
its legal validity can be called in question; and as to him only it is to be
considered void." The Ann, 3 Wheat 435, 447, (1818). See also, The
Adela, 6 Wall. 26/6, (1867) ; The Sir Wm. Peel, 5 Wall. 535; The Lilla, 2
Sprague, 177; The Florida, 101 U. S. 37, (1879). English cases, The Eliza
Ann, i Dods. 244, (1813) ; The Purissima Conception, 6 Rob. 45, (1805) ;
The Diligentia, i Dods. 404, 412, (1814) ; The Etrusco, Lords, 1795, 3 Rob.
31 ; The Vrouw Anna Catherina, 5 Rob. 144. See Scott, Cases, pp. 684-
691; Moore's Digest, 6;iooo, 7:511, 1089.
7If the property has been captured within the jurisdiction of the neu-
tral, the neutral "may indeed inflict pecuniary or other penalties on the
parties for such violation ; but it then does it professedly in vindication of
its own rights, and not by way of compensation to the captured." La Ami-
stad de Rues, 5 Wheat. 385. See also La Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298, ( 1819) ;
The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283,496. Fenwick, op. cit. p. 90, says:
"Where vessels have been fitted out and armed or have increased their
force, in violation of the neutrality of the United States, the courts of the
United States will intervene to effect a restitution of prizes captured by
such vessels, not because the capture is illegal as between the captor and
the former owner, but because the neutral state has the right to vindicate
its own sovereignty by divesting possession of property acquired as the re-
sult of a violation of its sovereignty."
8Commodore Stewart's Case, i Ct Cl. 113, (1864), Scott, 910. Infra
p. 134, note 25.
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example of the performance of this duty. There are no duties
of reparation peculiar to the law of neutrality. The provisions,
of United States law enforcing this duty in time of peace apply
equally well to the enforcement of obligations arising in time of
neutrality.
We will then consider the municipal measures enforcing the
obligations of the United States as a neutral under two heads,
(1) the obligations of prevention, and (2) the obligations of vin-
dication.
It is probably desirable to present in more detail the basis of
distinction between these two classes of duties. The duty of pre-
vention differs from the duty of vindication in that the former
relates to certain obligations a neutral state is under in reference
to its own subjects and territory, while the latter is concerned
with the treatment of foreign subjects and agencies of govern-
ment. International law does not define the means which a state
must take in performing its duties of prevention. It is of no in-
ternational importance whether it chooses to control its subjects
and the use of its territory by means of criminal penalties, re-
quirements of bonds or other guarantees, or the use of military
force
;
so long as it exercises
' ' due diligence
"
or
"
the means at
its disposal," the methods are entirely a matter of internal pol-
icy. On the other hand, in performing the duty of vindication
the state is dealing with persons who are not its own subjects.
It is really acting as an agent of the society of nations to adjudi-
cate a breach of international law. Consequently that society is
interested in the method of treating these violators of interna-
tional duty, and specifies in international law that illegal prizes
shall be restored, belligerent troops shall be interned, vessels ille-
gally in ports shall be expelled or sequestrated, etc.
In general, therefore, the municipal rules enforcing duties
of prevention consist of rules supplementary to international law,
while those enforcing duties of vindication consist of rules of in-
ternational law which are also rules of municipal law.
It may be added that the same act may entail obligations of
both kinds. A neutral state may be required to prevent a speci-
fied infraction of its neutrality. If it is unsuccessful in prevent-
ing this act, it may be required to vindicate its neutrality in a
particular manner. Thus a neutral state is under an obligation
to prevent hostilities in its territorial waters. Yet if a prize is
there taken in spite of its efforts, the duty of vindication requires
it to adjudicate this prize and restore it to its situation before
capture.
CHAPTER VIII. OBLIGATIONS OF PREVENTION.
TREATY PROVISIONS
(1) The United States has recognized certain duties of
prevention as incumbent upon it by treaty. Many of the early
treaties of the United States contain an article stipulating for
the preservation of "perpetual peace and amity" between the
two parties.
1 In Henfield's case,
2 which arose in 1793, such
provisions in the treaties with Netherlands3 , Prussia4 , and Great
Britain5 were made one of the bases for the government prose-
cution of a person accused of accepting a commission from
France who was at war with these countries. General princi-
ples of international law were also relied on in the case, but
the main support for the indictment seemed to be that Hen-
field's acts were prohibited by these treaties, which were law
in the United States. Though the court accepted this view at
that time, it is clear that criminal indictments could no longer
be supported under such general treaty provisions6 , and as a
matter of fact few treaties now in force contain the perpetual
peace and amity clause in the mandatory form it assumed in
the early treaties.
By another common provision in early treaties the con-
tracting parties bound themselves when neutral to prevent their
JAs an example of this kind of treaty may be mentioned that with
France, in force from 1778 to 1798, which said, "There shall be a firm,
inviolable, and universal peace and a true and sincere friendship between"
etc., Malloy, p. 469. The same phrase introduces the treaty with Sweden
of 1783, p. 1725; with Prussia, 1785-1796, p. 1477; with the Netherlands,
1782-1795, p. 1234; with Great Britain, 1794, p. 591. Most of these treaties
have been abrogated or superseded and the more recent treaties generally
relate to particular subjects such as commerce, extradition, consular privi-
leges, etc., and do not contain the specific peace and amity clause. This,
however, is not universally true. The treaty with Spain of 1902 begins
with an article of the character formerly so common, p. 1701.
2In re Henfield, Fed. Cas. 6360, (1793).
3Treaty with the Netherlands, 1792-1795, art. i, Malloy, p. 1234.
4Treaty with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. I, Malloy, p. 1477.
Treaty with Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. i, Malloy, p. 591.
6U. S. vs. Worral, 2 Ball. 384, (1798) ; U. S. vs. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32,
(1812).
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subjects from accepting privateering commissions or letters of
marque to serve against the other. 7 Often the stipulation was added
that offenders were to be punished as pirates.8 Such provisions
were frequently mentioned by the courts as the basis for assum-
ing jurisdiction over prizes brought into United States ports,
and for restoring them to their original owners when it was
proved that the captor was an American citizen operating
under a foreign letter of marque.9 No criminal prosecutions
have, however, been instituted under strength of the treaty
provisions alone, although there would seem to be greater war-
rant for such action than under the general peace and amity
provisions invoked in the Henfield case. On the contrary, the
court in The Bello Corrunes, commenting on the fact that the
acceptor of a certain commission to cruise against Spain ought
to be indictable as a pirate according to the treaty with that
country, expressed the opinion that under the ''free institu-
tions of this country" such action would probably be impossi-
ble.10 The fact that this duty was undertaken as a privilege,
accorded to the contracting party, indicates that it was not
regarded as a duty demanded by international law. Priva-
teering itself is now prohibited by international law and states
are therefore under the general obligation to prevent the ac-
ceptance of letters of marque by their subjects. The matter is.
7The acceptance of letters of marque to serve against the contracting
party is forbidden in the following treaties: France, 1778-1798, art. 21,.
Malloy, p. 475; Bolivia, 1858, art. 25, p. 121 ; Central America, 1825-1839,
art. 24, p. 167; Chili, 1832-1850, art. 22, p. 178; Colombia, 1824-1836, art.
22, p. 299, 1846, art. 26, p. 310; Dominican Republic, 1867-1898, art. 25, p.
411; Ecuador, 1879-1892, art. 25, p. 428; Guatemala, 1849-1874, art. 24, p..
868; Hayti, 1864-1905, art. 31, p. 929; Netherlands, 1782-1795, art. 19, p.
1239; Peru, 1870-1886, art. 28, p. 423; 1887-1899, art. 26, p. 1439; Prussia,
1785-1796, art. 20, p. 1483; 1799-1810, art. 20, p. 14935 1828, art. 12, p. H99;
Salvador, 1850-1870, art. 26, p. 15451 1870-1893, art. 26, p. 1559; Spain, 1795-
1902, art. 14, p. 1645; Sweden, 1783, art. 23, p. 1733, renewed, 1827, art. 17,.
p. 1754; Venezuela, 1860-1870, art. 25, p. 1853; Great Britain, 1794-1807,
art. 21, p. 603.
8It is provided that offenders shall be treated as pirates in the follow-
ing of the above treaties: Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Netherlands,
Peru, Prussia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain.
Talbot vs. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133; The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152,.
(1821).
10The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152, (1821) ; Treaty with Spam, I795-
1902, art. 14, Malloy, p. 1645.
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mentioned in few if any particular treaties in force, but is con-
sidered in general law-making treaties and in statutes.
Article 22 of the treaty with France, of 1778, made it un-
lawful for foreign privateers other than those of France "to
fit their ships" in the ports of the United States, or to sell or
exchange prizes which they had captured or to purchase pro-
visions in excess of an amount necessary to supply them to the
nearest home port. Since an implied exception was made in
the case of France11 it seems that the duties here mentioned
were not at that day conceived of as duties imposed by inter-
national law. Similar provision, without the exception for the
benefit of the contracting parties, has been inserted in a num-
ber of other treaties.12 The special privilege accorded to France
in this respect was the basis of much diplomatic difficulty in the
early days of the United States, and it was finally abrogated in
179813 by act of congress. It is now clear that the duty to pre-
vent the fitting out of armed vessels is required by interna-
tional law, and no nation can be accorded special privileges in
this regard compatibly with the continued maintenance of neu-
trality. The United States recognized this fact in the treaty of
Washington with Great Britain in 1871. 14 Article six of that
treaty stated that a neutral government is bound to exercise
"due diligence" to prevent (1) the fitting out within its juris-
diction of vessels intended to cruise against foreign states and
the departure of such vessels, and (2) the use of its ports or
waters as a "base of naval operations" for the augmentation of
military supplies or for the recruitment of men. Although this
treaty was concluded with the immediate purpose of furnishing
a basis for adjudicating the so called Alabama claims, both coun-
tries expressly declared their intention to be bound for the fu-
ture by these provisions. The treaty is still in force and is law
in the United States.
"Treaty with France, 1778-1798, art. 17, 18, Malloy, p. 475.
12The selling of prizes, fitting out of privateers, and purchasing of vic-
tuals by warships except sufficient to reach the nearest home port is pro-
hibited to enemies of the contracting party in the following treaties:
France, 1778-1798, art. 22, Malloy, p. 475; 1800-1809, art. 25, p. 504; Domin-
ican Republic, 1867-1898, art. 24, p. 411; Hayti, 1864-1005, art. 31, p. 929;
Venezuela, 1860-1870, art. 24, p. 1853; Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. 24, p.
604.
13Act of July 7, 1798, i stat. 578.
"Treaty of Washington, with Great Britain, 1871, Malloy, p. 703.
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(2) The greater part of these duties formerly stipulated
for in treaties with single countries have now been incorporated
in the Hague conventions and thus given more definite recogni-
tion as principles of international law. Those dealing with neu-
tral duties are, however, by their terms binding only when all
of the parties in the war are signatories.
15 These conventions re-
quire a neutral state to prevent, by the use of force if necessary,
the transportation of troops across its territory, or the use of
neutral territory for erecting wireless stations or for recruit-
ing.
16 but it is stipulated that no obligation exists to prevent in-
dividuals crossing its frontiers for foreign service, or the expor-
tation of arms by private persons.17 In reference to naval war,
the neutral must use the "means at its disposal" to prevent the
making of captures in territorial waters, the setting up of bellig-
erent prize courts in its territory, or the use of its ports as a
"base of naval operations." 18 The principle of the treaty of
Washington, requiring the neutral state to prevent the fitting out
or departure of armed vessels from its shores, is embodied prac-
tically verbatim.
19 The neutral state is also required to prevent
belligerent war vessels and prizes, enjoying the right of asylum
in its ports, from exceeding the privileges accorded them by in-
ternational law. Thus it must enforce the twenty-four hour stay
and twenty-four hour interval rules and must prevent the carry-
ing out of repairs by war vessels other than those "absolutely
necessary to render them seaworthy," and the augmentation of
their fighting force or armament. Fuel may only be given suffi-
cient to reach the nearest home port and only once in three
months in the same port to vessels of the same belligerent
power.
20 Failure to enforce these rules would constitute the neu-
.tral port a "base of naval operations."
As treaties are declared by the constitution to be part of the
law of the land, it would seem that executive officers and courts
are justified in assuming authority to carry out any of these pro-
visions, even in the absence of express statutory authority. This
view was upheld in the case of Ex parte Toscana.21 This case
does not relate to a duty of prevention, but to the provision of
"Hague Conventions, 1907, v, art. 20; xiii, art 28, Malloy, pp. 2290-
2352.
16
Ibid., v, arts. 2-5, 10; xiii, art. 5.
17
Ibid., v, arts. 6-8, xiii, art. 7.
18Hague Conventions, 1907, xiii, arts. 2, 4, 5, 25, 26.
19
Ibid., xiii, art. 8.
20
Ibid., xiii, arts. 13, 14, 16-21.
21Ex parte Toscana, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913)-
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the Hague convention of 1907 requiring a neutral state to vindi-
cate its sovereignty by interning belligerent troops crossing its
frontier. It would seem that if executive officers have power to
perform that duty under authority of the treaty alone, a similar
exercise of authority in performing duties of prevention would
be upheld. Undoubtedly criminal prosecutions could not be un-
dertaken solely under authority of the conventions,22 but it is
believed that this case is authority for the view that executive
action temporarily restraining property or persons, for the pur-
pose of carrying out any of the duties of prevention required by
treaty, would be upheld as valid and not in conflict with consti-
tutional guarantees of "due process of law," etc.
There are, however, statutory means provided for the more
effective enforcement of most of the duties of prevention defined
in these treaties, as well as those required by the general princi-
ples of international law not specified in treaties or international
agreements.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(1) In 1794 the first neutrality statute was enacted.
23 It
defined certain actions on the part of citizens of the United
States in aid of one of the belligerents as subject to criminal pun-
ishment, and gave administrative authority for the enforcement
of these provisions.
The enactment of this statute was the outgrowth of two
events, (1) the neutrality proclamation of the president and (2)
the unsuccessful attempt to obtain a criminal conviction for a
breach of neutrality under treaties, these proclamations and the
common law. Washington's neutrality proclamation of April
22, 1793,
24
after reciting the state of war which existed and the
intention of the United States to remain neutral, said, "I have
22On lack of a common law criminal jurisdiction in federal courts see
U. S. vs. Worral, 2 Ball. 384, (1798), U. S. vs. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32,
(1812). A federal criminal jurisdiction based on treaties and international
law was upheld in In re Henfield, Fed. Cas. 6360 (1793) and U. S. vs. Ra-
vara, 2 Ball. 297, Fed. Cas. 16,122, (1793).
28Act June 5, 1794, i stat. 381.
"Proclamation, April 22, 1793, n stat. 753; Am. St. Pap., For. Rel.,
1:140; Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-
1897, J. D. Richardson, ed., 10 vol., Washington, 1896-1899, 1:157. See
also Rules adopted by the cabinet as to the equipment of vessels in the
ports of the United States by belligerent powers, Aug. 3, 1793, Richard-
son's Messages, 10:86.
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given instructions to those officers to whom it belongs to cause
prosecution to be instituted against all persons who shall, within
the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law
of nations with respect to the powers at war or any of them."
This proclamation was followed by a more vigorous one of March
24, 1793,
25 which specified various offences against neutrality
which would be regarded as criminal, and especially "required
all courts, magistrates and other officers * * to exert the power
in them severally vested to prevent and suppress such unlawful
assemblages and proceedings and to bring to condign punish-
ment those who may have been guilty thereof."
The contents of these proclamations indicate the belief that
breaches of neutrality by individuals could be punished without
specific statute, and this view was upheld by the court in the
case of Gideon Henfield. Henfield, who was accused of serving
on board a French vessel, was brought to trial in the summer of
1793 after Washington's first proclamation and before his sec-
ond. The United States Circuit court of Pennsylvania, com-
posed of Justices Wilson, Iredell, and Peters, charged the jury to
find Henfield guilty of breaches of neutrality because he had vio-
lated the law of nations which was part of the common law, be-
25Proclamation, March 24, 1794, n stat. 753; Richardson's Messages,
I :I57- Neutrality proclamations of similar character have been issued by
the president in succeeding wars in which the United States has been neu-
tral. Franco-Prussian War, (Aug. 22, Nov. 8, 1870, 16 stat. 1132; Rich-
ardson's Messages, 7; 86; 89): Russo-Japanese War, (Feb. n, 1904, 33
stat. 2332) : Turco-Italian War, (Oct. 24, 1911, 37 stat. 1719) : Great War,
(Aug. 4-27, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, g;i Jan. 1915). On a num-
ber of occasions neutrality proclamations have been issued calling atten-
tion to a state of insurrection or insurgency, when belligerency has not
been recognized, and to the provisions of the neutrality laws applicable in
such circumstances. Revolt of Spanish colonies, (Nov. 27, 1806; Sept. i,
1815, Richardson's Messages, 15404, 561): Canadian Insurrection, (Jan.
5; Nov. 21, 1838; Sept. 25, 1841, 11 stat. 784-786; Richardson's Messages,
3:481 -482, 4:72) : Cuban Filibusters, (Aug. 11, 1849; April 25, 1851; May
31, 1855, ii stat. 787; Richardson's Messages, 5:7,111,272) : Mexican Fili-
busters, (Oct. 22, 1851; Jan. 18, 1854, Richardson's Messages, 5:112,271) :
Nicaraguan Filibusters, (Dec. 8, 1855; Oct. 30, 1858, 11 stat. 789,798; Rich-
ardson's Messages, 5:388,496) : Fenian Invasion of Canada, (June 6, 1866;
May 24, 1870, 14 stat. 813; 16 stat. 1132; Richardson's Messages, 6:433:
7:85) : Cuban Revolution, (Oct. 12, 1870; June 12, 1895; July 27, 1896, 16
stat. 1136; 29 stat. 870,881; Richardson's Messages, 7:91, 9;5Qi, 694); In-
surgency in Dominican Republic, (Oct. 14, 1905, 34 stat. 3183) : Mexican
Revolution, (Mch. 2, 12, 1912, 37 stat. 1732-1733)-
116 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [116
cause he had violated certain treaties of peace and amity be-
tween the United States and some of the belligerent powers, and
because he had endangered the safety and security of the United
States. In spite of this the jury refused to find Henfield guilty
largely on account of the popular republican sympathy for rev-
olutionary France.
In order to prevent the recurrence of such an event the
president urged upon congress the passage of a neutrality act
specifying crimes against neutrality and fixing adequate penal-
ties. The result was the act of June 5, 1794,26 already mentioned.
Since that time neutrality acts of similar character have been
constantly in force in the United States.27
For some time after the passage of this act there was doubt
whether such offenses were not indictable at common law, in the
federal courts, in the absence of a specific act. It was only grad-
ually that the doctrine that federal courts enjoy no common law
jurisdiction, developed. In the case of the United States vs.
Ravara,
28 which involved the sending of threatening letters to a
diplomatic minister, the United States Circuit court of Pennsyl-
vania maintained its jurisdiction in a criminal case at common
law. In the cases of the United States vs. Worral29 in 1798 and
United States vs. Hudson30 in 1812, the latter in the supreme
court of the United States, the theory of a Common law jurisdic-
tion in federal courts was denied and since then this view has in
the main been adhered to. It thus appears that in the present
state of the law, in the absence of statute, offenses against neu-
trality would not be criminally punishable.
26Act June 5, *794, i stat. 381.
27The act of June 5, 1794, (i stat. 381) was to last two years. It was
renewed Mch. 2, 1797, (i stat. 497), amended, June 14, 1797, (i stat. 520)
and made permanent April 24, 1800, (2 stat. 54). This was amended by
the temporary act of Mch. 3, 1817 (3 stat. 370) and the whole statute was
revised in the permanent act of April 20, 1818, (3 stat. 447). A temporary
amendment was passed March 10, 1838, (5 stat. 212). The act of 1818 was
repeated in the Revised Statutes of 1878 (sec. 5281-5291) and with a few
alterations in the Penal Code of 1910, (35 stat, 1088, sec. 9-18, 303). Acts
of April 22, 1898, (30 stat. 739), March 14, 1912, (37 stat. 630) and March
4, I9i5i should be regarded as amendments to the neutrality statutes. For
excellent discussion of the neutrality laws, giving the authoritative inter-
pretation by the courts, see C. G. Fenwick, The Neutrality Laws of the
United States, Washington, 1913, passim.
28U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297, Fed. Cas. 16,122, (1793).
29U. S. vs. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, (1798).
SOU. S. vs. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, (1812).
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(2) The crimes defined by the neutrality statutes may be
roughly classified as (a) accepting commissions, (b) enlisting
in the service of a belligerent, (c) setting on foot military or
naval expeditions, and (d) using the territory of the United
States as a base of military or naval operations.
(a) "Accepting and exercising" a commission within the
United States for service against a foreign state is a crime when
performed by United States citizens.31 There has been only one
prosecution under this provision, that of Isaac Williams in
1797.32
(b) Enlisting in the service of a foreign state or political body
within the territory of the United States, or "hiring or retain-
ing" others to do such an act or to leave the country with "in-
tent" to do so is a crime for either citizens or aliens, 33 but it has
been held that the section does not forbid leaving the country
with intent to enlist abroad, either individually34 or in parties.35
(c) "Setting on foot military expeditions" within the ter-
ritory of the United States is made a crime 36 and has been held
to apply even though the expedition is directed against unrecog-
nized insurgents.
37 Hostile "intent" must, however, be proved.38
A mere departure of bodies of men, even with arms, may not
constitute a "military expedition" in the meaning of the stat-
ute.39 Several sections of the neutrality statutes were designed
particularly to prevent the "fitting out and arming"40 and
31Rev. Stat. sec. 5281, Penal Code of 1910, 35 stat. 1088, sec. 9.
82U. S. vs. Isaac Williams, 2 Cranch, 82, note., Fed. Cas. 17,708, (1797).
See also charge to Grand Jury, McLean, Fed. Cas. 18,265, (1838).
33Rev. Stat., sec. 5282, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 10.
34U. S. vs. Hertz, Fed. Cas. 15,337, (1855), U. S. vs. Kazinski, Fed.
Cas. 15,508, (1855).
86U. S. vs. Nunez, 82 Fed. Rep. 599 ; U. S. vs. O'Brien, 75 Fed. Rep.
900. On this offense see also Lee, Att. Gen., i op. 63 ; Gushing, Att. Gen.,
7 op. 377; In re Henfield, Fed. Cas. 6360, (i793)-
36Rev. Stat., sec. 5286, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 13.
"Wiborg vs. U. S., 163 U. S. 632; U. S. vs. O'Sullivan, Fed. Cas. 15,-
974. Contrary The Three Friends, 166 U. S. i. See also letter of Secre-
tary of State Bayard, July 31, 1855, For. Rel., 1855, p. 776, and 21 op. 267.
88U. S. vs. O'Sullivan, Fed. Cas. 15,975-
89U. S. vs. Hart, 74 Fed. Rep. 724. Other prosecutions under this section
see, U. S. vs. Hart, 78 Fed. Rep. 868; U. S. vs. Lumsden, Fed. Cas. 15,641 ;
U. S. vs. Murphy, 85 Fed. Rep. 609; U. S. vs. Ybanez, 53 Fed. Rep. 536;
U. S. vs. Hughes, 75 Fed. Rep. 267. See also Charge to Grand Jury, Mc-
Lean, Fed. Cas. 18,267, (1851).
<Rev. Stat. sec. 5283, 5284, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 11,303.
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"
augmenting the force"41 of privateers. These were important
in the days of the Napoleonic wars and the revolts of the Span-
ish and Portuguese colonies in South America in the early nine-
teenth century, and there were many prosecutions under them.42
With the revolution in naval architecture which the use of steel
has brought, and the abolition of privateering by the Declaration
of Paris of 1856, privateering by individuals is no longer impor-
tant, although there were prosecutions under these provisions as
late as 1891 for fitting out naval expeditions for use in Spanish
American revolutions.43 This same change, however, has made
the construction and sale of an armed vessel to a belligerent a
violation of neutrality in itself.
44 There have been efforts to
apply these provisions to prevent the sale of armed vessels to
belligerents. The courts have, however, held that an "intent"
to use the vessel in hostilities must be shown, and "intent" im-
plies more than a mere knowledge of the use to which it will be
put.
45 There is no provision making the bona fide sale of ves-
41Rev. Stat. sec. 5285 ; Penal Code of 1910, sec. 12.
"Criminal Prosecutions, see, U. S. vs. Guinet, 2 Ball. 321, (1/95)
Scott 695; U. S. vs. Smith, Fed. Cas. 16,3423, (1-806) ; U. S. vs. Skinner,
Fed. Cas. 16,309, (1818) ; U. S. vs. Quincy, 6 Pet. 445, (1832), Scott 706;
U. S. vs. Trumbull, 48 Fed. Rep. 99, (1891), Scott 731. See also Nelson,
Att. Gen., 4 op. 336, (1844). Forfeiture of vessels, see, Ketland vs. The
Cassius, Fed. Cas. 7743; Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, (1818) ; The Me-
teor, Fed. Cas. 9498, (1866), reversed, Fed. Cas. 15,760, Scott 711; The
Mary N. Hogan, 18 Fed. Rep. 529; U. S. vs. 214 Boxes of Arms, 20 Fed.
Rep. 50; The City of Mexico, 28 Fed. Rep. 148, (1886) ; The Carondolet,
37 Fed. Rep. 799, (1899); The Conserva, 38 Fed. Rep. 431; The Three
Friends, 166 U. S. i, (1897) ; The Itata, 56 Fed. Rep. 505; The Laurada,
85 Fed. Rep. 760, (1898). Restoration of prizes captured by war vessels,
see infra pp. 135-136.
43U. S. vs. Trumbull, 48 Fed. Rep. 99, (1891), Scott 731.
44See Scott 720, note. A modern steel warship constitutes a "mili-
tary expedition" in itself and it cannot be treated as other articles of con-
traband, the sale of which by private persons is permissible. See Snow,
cases, p. 437-438; Editorial Comment, J. B. Scott, Am. Jour. Int. Law.,
9;i77, Jan. 1915.
4BThe Meteor, Fed. Cas. 15,760, reversing Fed. Cas. 9,498; The San-
tissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283 ; LaConception, 6 Wheat. 235 ; The Bello
Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152; U. S. vs. Quincy, 6 Pet. 445; The Laurada, 98 Fed.
Rep. 983 ; Moodie vs. The Alfred, 3 Dall. 307 ; 5 op. 92. The contrary view
was offered by Attorney General Legare, (3 op. 747) and by Justice Betts,
in the Meteor, (Fed. Cas. 9,498) although his decision was reversed on
this point in the Circuit court, (Fed. Cas. 15,760). The correctness of the
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gels to a belligerent a crime, although it was acts of this kind
which the United States complained of in the Alabama Claims
controversy.
46
(d) Certain acts which would constitute the ports or terri-
tory of the United States a "base of naval or military oper-
ations" have been made criminal offenses. The setting on foot
of military expeditions, the fitting out and arming of privateers,
or augmenting of their force have been mentioned. A joint res-
olution of April 22, 1898,47 authorizing the president to prohibit
the exportation of coal or military material. This was amended
on March 14, 191248 making such exportation a penal offense ex-
cept under exemptions specified by the president. This applies
only after the president has made a proclamation that "condi-
tions of domestic violence" exist in an "American country" and
are being promoted by "munitions of war procured from the
United States. ' ' An act of March 4, 191549 authorized the presi-
interpretation which excludes the sale of armed vessels from the prohibi-
tion of the section is indicated by the fact that a bill to prevent the sale of
armed vessels to belligerents was presented in the House of Representa-
tives in 1817. It Was lost in the Senate. (See Annals of Congress, I4th
Cong., 2nd sess. p. 719). Also in 1866, when popular sympathy was
aroused over the Fenian uprising and it was felt that the neutrality laws
were too strict, a bill was presented in the House to prevent the recur-
rence of a decision similar to that of Justice Betts in the Meteor which
had recently been given. The bill consisted of a revision of the neutrality
acts including the provision that nothing be construed to prevent the sale
of armed vessels to belligerents. This bill was also lost in the Senate.
(See Cong. Globe, 39th cong. ist sess. p. 4194-4197, and House Report, No.
100, 39th cong., ist sess). On this general subject see Fenwick, op. cit. pp.
37, 48-49, 108-109.
46On the Alabama award see, Moore, Int. Arb., 1 5495-682, 4 54057-
4178; 514639-4685; Moore's Digest, 711059-1076; Montague Bernard, His-
torical account of the neutrality of Great Britain during the American
Civil War, London, 1870; Caleb Gushing, The Treaty of Washington, N.
Y., 1873 ; Scott, 713-720.
47Act April 22, 1898, 30 stat. 739. This joint resolution was a war
measure, intended to conserve to the United States the supplies of war ma-
terial manufactured in the country and had no connection with obligations
of neutrality but it was used as a basis for the neutrality proclamation of
President Roosevelt, on Oct. 14, 1905, (34 stat. 3183), forbidding the
exportation of arms to Dominican Republic where a revolution was going
on. See Fenwick, op. cit. p. 56.
48
Act, March 14, 1912, 37 stat. 630.
49
Act, March 4, 1915, 38 stat. 1226.
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dent to direct customs officers to detain vessels which are sus-
pected of carrying fuel, arms, men, or supplies to foreign war-
ships hovering outside of the harbor, and persons engaged in
thus using American territory as a base of naval operations are
subject to criminal indictment. The provisions of this act were
suggested by a circular of the Department of State of September
19, 1914,
50 in which the detention of vessels engaged in such un-
neutral acts was authorized.
Fines ranging up to $10,000, imprisonment ranging up to
ten years, and forfeiture of unneutrally used vessels and other
property are provided for these various offenses.51
(3) Besides the criminal provisions, statutes have provided
other means for preventing infractions of neutrality. District
courts are given jurisdiction of vessels fitted out in violation of
neutral duties with authority to condemn them.52 The president
is authorized to employ the military and naval forces of the
country to enforce the provisions of the act after judicial process
shall have been ineffective,53 and to require foreign vessels to de-
part from ports of the United States when such stay would be
contrary to international law or treaty.54 United States minis-
50Circular of the Department of State, Sept. 19, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour.
Int. Law., 95122, Jan. 1915.
"Penalties : Accepting foreign commission, fined not over $2,000, im-
prisoned not over 3 years, (Penal Code of 1910, sec. 9) ; enlisting in for-
eign service, $1,000, 3 years, (P. C. sec. 10) ; setting on foot military expe-
dition, $3,000, 3 years, (P. C. sec. 13) ; fitting out and arming vessel, $10,-
ooo, 3 years, or 10 years if to cruise against United States citizens, and
forfeiture of vessel, (P. C. sec. 11,303) ; augmenting force of vessel, $1,000,
I year, (P. C. sec. 12) ; exportation of arms to American country when
prohibited by proclamation, $10,000, 2 years, (Act, March 14, 1912, 37 stat.
630) ; supplying belligerent vessels from United States ports, $10,000, 10
years, (Act, March 4, 1915).
"Rev. Stat. sec. 5383, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 12.
6SRev. Stat sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14. Only military, not
civil force may be used under this authority, see Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat.
246; Nelson, Att. Gen., 4 op. 336, (1844). This view somewhat modified,
21 op. 273.
"Rev. Stat. sec. 5288, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 15. Fenwick expresses
the opinion that this section, the same as the preceding, authorizes the
president to act only when judicial action is impossible, through lack of jur-
isdiction due to the public character of the vessel or of sufficient evidence to
permit of successful prosecution. It seems, however, as though in terms
the president is left discretion as to the occasions upon which the author-
ity may be properly exercised. See Fenwick, op. cit. p. 95.
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ters in countries where the United States maintains consular
courts may issue writs to prevent American citizens enlisting
for service against any foreign country, and are authorized to
use any military force of the United States available to carry
this power into effect.50 Collectors of customs are required to
detain vessels "manifestly built for military purposes" leaving
ports of the United States when circumstances render an unneu-
tral use probable,
56
or, on order of the president, any vessel sus-
pected of carrying arms or supplies to belligerent war vessels
hovering outside of the port.57
Armed vessels owned in whole or in part by citizens of the
United States, clearing out of ports of the United States, may
be required to give bond that they will not be used by the own-
ers themselves to commit hostilities.58 This provision was de-
signed to prevent the use of American owned privateers in war.
There would be no breach of the bond if vessels were sold to a
belligerent and used by him to commit hostilities.59
Federal courts are given "authority to hold to security of
the peace and for good behavior in cases arising under the con-
stitution and laws of the United States."60 This provision has
been utilized to aid in the enforcement of neutrality obligations
of prevention. In the case of United States vs. Quitman,61 aris-
ing in 1854, Quitman refused to answer certain questions of a
Grand Jury which was investigating alleged violations of neu-
trality in connection with the Cuban revolution. For this refu-
B5Act, June 12, 1860, 12 stat. 77, Rev. Stat. 4090. Consular courts are
given jurisdiction over United States citizens promoting "insurrection or
rebellion against the government" of the country where the court is lo-
cated, with power to decree the death penalty provided the United States
minister approves. Rev. Stat. sec. 4102. Supra pp. 39, 74.
86Rev. Stat. 5290, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 17. This provision was sug-
gested by Hamilton's "Instructions to the collectors of Customs of the
United States" of Aug. 4, 1793. Am. St. Papers For. Rel., I -.40. The cus-
toms collector is liable for detention of vessels without probable cause, see
Hendricks vs. Gonzales, 67 Fed. Rep. 351.
"Act March 4, 1915, 38 stat. 1226.
B8Rev. Stat. sec. 5289, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 16.
"Because of the modern practice of converting merchantmen, al-
though privateering is technically abolished, the provision is not obsolete.
It seems probable, however, that it would be wise to extend its provisions
to require bonding of vessels against sale to a belligerent, as this is now
prohibited by international law. See Fenwick, op. cit. pp. 96, 154.
80Rev. Stat. sec. 727, Judicial Code, 1911, 36 stat. 1087, sec. 270.
81U. S. vs. Quitman, Fed. Cas. 16,111, (1854).
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sal the court held that under this statute bonds should be re-
quired of him to observe the neutrality laws.
EXECUTIVE ACTION
In addition to the authority given to administrative, judi-
cial and executive officers by statute, much authority exists in-
herently in such officers to enforce neutrality obligations. The
opinion has been expressed that the president as chief executive
may perform acts necessary to enforce treaties in the absence of
statutory authority.
82 Such matters as preventing abuse of the
privilege of asylum by belligerent warships, the passage of
troops on neutral territory, and the unneutral use of radio-tele-
graph stations are prohibited by the Hague conventions as well
as customary international law and may be enforced by executive
action. Executive orders have provided for the supervision and
censorship of radio-telegraph stations,63 and the detention of ves-
sels suspected of carrying supplies to belligerent warships,64 on
this basis. The shipping of submarines for sale to a belligerent
power has also been prevented by executive action. 65 The execu-
tive disapproval of loans to belligerents, although not required
by international law, is another illustration of inherent execu-
tive authority in these matters.
66
Courts have held that jurisdiction of vessels fitted out in
violation of neutrality, or prizes taken by them, is inherent in
the admiralty and prize jurisdiction, and may be exercised in the
absence of statute.67 A large range of discretionary power to
prevent unneutral use of territory or unneutral acts by Ameri-
can citizens undoubtedly exists in revenue officers, marshals and
other civil officers of the United States.
62Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913) ; See also In re Debs,
158 U. S. 564, (1895), on inherent power of executive and judicial officers
to carry out the obligations and functions of government.
"Executive Order, Aug. 5, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 9;iiS, Jan.,
"Circular of Dept. of Stat., Sept. 19, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law.,
95122, Jan., 1915.
65Letter by Secretary of State Bryan, Dec. 7, 1914, Am. Jour. Int. Law,
9;i77, (Jan., 1915). Also Editorial Comment, J. B. Scott, Ibid., 9;i77-
See also circular of Dept. of State with reference to the status of armed
merchant vessels, 1914, permitting detention of suspected vessels by port
authorities. Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, g;i2i, (Jan., 1915)-
86See Editorial Comment, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 8:856 (1914).
"Glass vs. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6, (i/94) ; Talbot vs. Jansen, 3
Dall. 133, (1796) ; The Estrella, u Wheat, 298, (1819).
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COMMERCIAL EMBARGOES
Another class of acts which relates somewhat to the en-
forcement of duties of prevention are the embargo acts passed at
different times. The acts of 1898 and 1914 requiring an embargo
on arms under certain conditions have already been mentioned.
Of somewhat different character are commercial embargoes,68
the most important of which were those passed during Jeffer-
son's administration, while the United States was a neutral dur-
ing the Napoleonic wars in Europe.
There is not and never was a rule of international law
which requires a neutral state to prevent shipments of merchan-
dise or of arms to a belligerent or to any one else. This is spe-
cifically stated in the Hague Conventions of 1907.69 The self-
made ' ' international law ' ' in the extraordinary Berlin and Milan
decrees of Napoleon and the British order in council70 forbade
neutral commerce with practically all of Europe, and it might be
inferred that the American Embargo of 1807 to 1809 was in aid
of these decrees. It must be understood, however, that these de-
crees and orders did not assert that neutral states were under
obligations to prevent their subjects engaging in such commerce.
They simply asserted that the ordinary rule of self-help, by which
belligerents can seize neutral vessels as prize, would be applica-
ble to a much wider range of circumstances than permitted by
the ordinary rules of blockade, contraband and unneutral service.
The embargo and non-intercourse acts are therefore to be re-
garded as rules of domestic policy, dictated by reasons entirely
unrelated to international law. It was not to aid in the enforce-
ment of its duties as a neutral either under international law
or under the law asserted by Napoleon's decrees or the British
orders in council that they were enacted. Their purpose was
rather one of retaliation against these extensions of international
68Embargo acts, Mch. 26, 1794, i stat. 400; Apr. 2, 1794, i stat. 401 ; Apr.
18, 1794, i stat. 401; May 22, 1794, I stat. 396; June 4, 1794, i stat. 372;
Dec. 22, 1807, 2 stat. 451 ; Jan. 9, 1808, 2 stat. 453; Mch. 12, 1808, 2 stat.
4735 Apr. 25, 1808, 2 stat. 499; Jan. 9, 1809, 2 stat. 506, act of Dec. 22, 1807
repealed Mch. i, 1809 and non-intercourse act in reference to France and
England substituted. See Moore's Digest, 7:142-144.
69Hague conventions, 1907, v, art. 7, Malloy, p. 2298; xiii, art. 7, Mal-
loy, p. 2359.
70For text of British Orders in Council and Napoleon's decrees, see
Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., 3:262-286; British and Foreign State Papers,
8:401-513; De Martens, Nouveau Recueil, 1:433-549-
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law. It is noteworthy that the enactment of the embargo by the
United States permitted Napoleon to extend his view of interna-
tional law even further by his Bayonne decree71 ordering the
seizure of all United States vessels at sea on the ground that he
was simply helping the United States enforce its own law. This
view was of course unwarranted. No domestic law of the United
States could add to the belligerent rights of either party to the
war.
INTEROCEANIC CANALS
The United States has recognized special obligations of pre-
vention as encumbent upon it in relation to the Panama Canal,
by treaty, and has provided for their enforcement by executive
orders. In its treaties with New Granada, (now Colombia) of
1846,
72 and with Nicaragua of 1867,73 the United States guar-
anteed the neutrality of any canal that might be constructed in
either of these countries. In the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with
Great Britain of 1850,
74 the two countries agreed jointly to guar-
antee the neutrality of any interoceanic canal in the central
American region, but it was provided that neither should exer-
cise exclusive control of such a canal. Thf Hay-Pauncefote
treaty of 190176 superseded this treaty. Great Britain accorded
the United States the right to construct and maintain a canal
and to provide regulations for managing it. The United States
agreed to adopt substantially the rules of the Suez canal conven-
tion to ensure its neutralization. Specific regulations require
the United States to prevent, in the canal or adjacent waters to
a three mile limit, blockades, the exercise of belligerent rights,
hostile acts, the revictualing of belligerent vessels, the embark-
ation or disembarkation of troops or munitions of war except in
case of accidental hindrance of transit. It must compel vessels
to complete transit with the least possible delay and must en-
force the twenty-four hour stay and twenty-four hour interval
rules. To perform these duties the United States is authorized
to use necessary military force.
In its treaty of 1903 with th'e Republic of Panama
76 the
United States guaranteed that country's independence and was
71 Bayonne Decree, Am. State Pap., For. Rel., 3:291.
"Treaty with Colombia, 1846, art. 35, Malloy, p. 312.
"Treaty with Nicaragua, 1867, art. 15, Malloy, p. 285.
"Treaty with Great Britain, 1850, Malloy, p. 660.
"Treaty with Great Britain, 1901, Malloy, p. 782.
"Treaty with Panama, 1903, art. i, 18, 23, Malloy, p. 1349.
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guaranteed complete sovereign rights in perpetuity over a strip
of territory known as the Canal Zone, extending five miles either
side of the canal route exclusive of the cities of Panama and
Colon. The United States guaranteed the perpeutal neutrality
of the canal and agreed to use armed force and if necessary erect
fortifications in the canal zone for that purpose.
The canal was completed in 1914 and regulations for its
operation and navigation were promulgated by executive order
July 9, 1914.
77
Following the outbreak of European war in Au-
gust, 1914, the president promulgated supplementary rules un-
der date of Nov. 13, 1914, 78 designed to carry out treaty require-
ments for preventing unneutral acts in the canal. The regula-
tions were based on the Hay-Pauncefote and Panama treaties,
the Suez Canal convention of Oct. 29, 1888,79 the rule issued
thereunder on Feb. 10, 190480 following the outbreak of the
Eusso-Japanese war, and the general requirements of neutrals as
defined in the Hague conventions.81 These rules defined public
armed vessels and auxiliary belligerent vessels, for both of which
classes it prescribed the rules required by the treaties mentioned.
The enforcement of these regulations was ensured by requiring
vessels to give written assurances to obey them before entering
the canal. In addition to the treaty requirements the regula-
tions forbade the presence of more than six war vessels of one
belligerent or its allies* in the canal or adjacent waters at a time,
and the passage of air craft over the Canal Zone. A protocol
was concluded with the Eepublic of Panama in October, 1914,82
to ensure the cooperation of that republic in carrying out the
neutrality requirements that a war vessel be prevented recoaling
in the same country within a period of three months. For the pur-
pose of this requirement, the Eepublic of Panama and the Canal
Zone were considered the same country.
"Rules and Regulations for the operation and navigation of the Pan-
ama Canal, July 9, 1914.
"Proclamation prescribing rules and regulations for the use of the
Panama Canal by belligerent vessels, Nov. 13, 1914. For text see Supp.
Am. Jour. Int. Law., 9; 126, Jan. 1915. See also editorial comment in Am.
Jour. Int. Law., 91167, Jan. 1915.
"Convention of Constantinople, Oct. 28, 1888, Martens, Nouveau Re-
cueil, ser. II; 15:557; British and Foreign State Papers, 78:18.
80Rules for the use of the Suez Canal by belligerent vessels, Feb. 10,
1904, British and Foreign State Papers, 102 5591.
81Hague conventions, 1907, xiii, Malloy, p. 2352.
"Protocol with Panama, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law., 95128, Jan.
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It will be seen that the duties of prevention undertaken in
these regulations are largely the same as those required of all
neutral territory. The requirements are, however, stricter in
some cases, as the rights of fueling, repairing, and replenishing
stores are more limited. The regulation interprets the twenty-
four hour stay rule as permitting a twenty-four hour stay in ad-
dition to the time occupied in transit of the canal.
The regulations seem to have adequately covered the duties
specifically undertaken by the United States in reference to the
Canal, as well as the duties encumbent upon it for preserving the
neutrality of all its territory.
ACTS BY AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT
Aside from the duties of prevention incumbent upon the
United States in reference to its civil population, international
law and treaty require it to prevent unneutral acts by public of-
ficers. On the outbreak of wars, special instructions have been
generally sent to diplomatic officers, often relating especially to
duties imposed upon such officers in belligerent countries in case
affairs of the other belligerent are entrusted to them. On the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 an executive order
directed "all officials of the government, civil, military and
naval not only to observe the President's proclamation of neu-
trality but also to abstain from either action or speech which can
legitimately cause irritation to either of the combatants.
83 "
The Navy regulations enjoin naval officers to observe strict
neutrality on all occasions.
84 These regulations can be enforced
by court martial, a procedure resorted to in the case of an un-
neutral act by a naval commander in 1844 during the war be-
tween Montevideo and Buenos Ayres. 85
The obligations of prevention incumbent upon neutral states
have been recognized by the United States in treaties and stat-
utes, and the duties thus recognized seem to be in accord with
international law. The failure of statutes to recognize the duty
to prevent sales of armed vessels to belligerents is only an appar-
ent exception, as the United States has acceded to this principle
in the Treaty of Washington and the Hague conventions of 1907,
83Executive Order, March 10, 1904, For. Rel., 1904, p. 185, Moore's Di-
gest, 7 ;868. See also instructions to diplomatic and consular officers, Aug.
17, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 9;n8, (Jan., 1915).
84Navy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1502, 1633-1624, 1645, 1647.
85Moore's Digest, i ;i78.
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which are according to the constitution a part of the law of the
land.
The means relied on for enforcing these duties are (1) the
deterrent effect of criminal punishment by fines and imprison-
ment, (2) the forfeiture of property involved in violations of
neutrality, (3) the requirement of bonds of good behavior in sus-
picious cases, (4) the grant of jurisdiction to courts over cases
involving breaches of neutrality, with implied power to enforce
their judgments, (5) direct executive action to enforce criminal
provisions, expel or detain foreign vessels, and otherwise pre-
vent illegal acts, with a resort to the army, navy, and militia of
the United States if necessary, (6) control of public officers by
executive action and by courts martial.
While specific provision is made by statute for the use of
these means in many cases, it seems probable that where such au-
thority is not given by statute, executive and judicial officers
can apply appropriate means for enforcing the duties specified
by treaty or the Hague conventions. Treaties are part of the law
of the land, and the executive and judiciary, being under oath to
enforce the laws, can, it would seem, use all available means to
enforce them.
In the field of international law defining neutral duties the
United States holds an honored position. Its early neutrality
statutes enforcing obligations in this field laid down a standard
of conduct which was not required by international law at that
time but has since become recognized as obligatory. The neutral-
ity act of 1794 was influential in creating new international
law. Canning said of American practice in this respect, "If I
wished for a guide in the system of neutrality, I should take that
laid down by America in the days of the presidency of Washing-
ton and the secretaryship of Jefferson."
86 This unique position
86
Cited, Syngman Rhee, Neutrality as influenced by the United States,
Princeton, 1912, p. 106. See also opinion of J. W. Foster, and of Rhee,
Ibid., pp. 104,111. W. E. Hall, not inclined to flatter the United States, says
of its practice in reference to neutrality obligations, "The policy of the
United States in 1793 constituted an epoch in the development of the
usages of neutrality. There can be no doubt that it was intended and be-
lieved to give effect to the obligations then incumbent upon neutrals. But
it represented by far the most advanced existing opinion as to what these
obligations were, and in some points it even went farther than authorita-
tive international custom has up to the present time advanced. In the
main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now
admitted by the community of nations." W. E. Hall, A Treatise on In-
ternational Law, 4th ed., London, 1895, p. 6:6.
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is undoubtedly due in large measure to the situation of the
United States as the most important power of European civiliza-
tion remaining neutral in various European wars. It indicates,
however, the effect which municipal law may have in creating
new international law.
CHAPTER IX. OBLIGATIONS OF VINDICATION.
INTRODUCTORY
Duties of vindication are necessitated by the failure of bel-
ligerent troops, warships or prize crews to observe their obliga-
tions as belligerents toward neutrals, and some of them also im-
ply a failure on the part of the neutral state to perform its du-
ties of prevention. Thus a neutral state is bound to prevent hos-
tilities in its land or water territory, but if it fails in this it
must perform its duty of vindication by interning troops, or re-
storing prizes captured in the course of such hostilities.
Most of the obligations of this kind are specified in the
Hague conventions, and consist of measures to be taken by the
neutral state in case of violations of its territory by land forces,
hostilities in its territorial waters by naval forces or violations
of the right of asylum by belligerent warships or their prizes.
There are a number of general requirements laid down for
belligerent warships which a neutral is at liberty to modify by
law. Thus a neutral state is permitted to vary the general rule
demanding that all belligerent vessels be equally permitted to
enter its ports, by forbidding such entrance to vessels which have
violated its neutrality.
1 It may also vary the twenty-four hour
stay rule by municipal regulations,2 and the general rule per-
mitting no more than three belligerent warships in a port at one
time. 3 The conventions also give a neutral power the right to
grant asylum to belligerent prizes on condition that it sequestrate
them, pending adjudication, but this provision was not ratified
by the United States.4
1Hague Conventions, 1907, xiii, art. 9, Malloy, p. 2352.
2
Ibid., xiii, arts. 12-14, 19.
slbid., xiii, art. 15.
4
Ibid., xiii, art. 23. This permission was a variation from the gen-
eral rule laid down in articles 21 and 22 which forbade the giving of asy-
lum to prizes except in cases of "unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or
want of fuel or provisions," and even then only temporarily. The United
States ratified the convention with a proviso excluding article 23, thereby
recognizing it as neutral duty to refuse to permit prizes to be sequestrated
in her ports. See Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1908,
p. 76. It is interesting to note that the United States had specifically per-
mitted the sequestration of prizes in a number of its early treaties. See
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International law in these cases imposes a belligerent duty
but no corresponding neutral duty of vindication. The bellig-
erent duty is for the benefit of the neutral and if the neutral in-
dicates by local law that it does not care to avail itself of this
benefit international law is unconcerned. These subjects there-
fore do not form obligations of vindication; they are rather ex-
ceptions to those obligations.
Eliminating these exceptions, the duties of vindication rec-
ognized by the United States by treaty may be classified as (1)
the internment of belligerent troops violating neutral territory,5
(2) the internment of belligerent warships violating the law of
asylum,
6 (3) the expulsion of belligerent warships after a
twenty-four hour stay, subject to exceptions,7 (4) the detention
of belligerent warships in accordance with the twenty-four hour
interval rule,
8
(5) the restoration of prizes captured in neutral
waters or brought into neutral ports in violation of the law of
asylum, and the internment of the prize crew.9 These are posi-
tive duties imposed upon the neutral state, and failure to per-
form them will furnish grounds for diplomatic complaint and
demand for reparation by the injured belligerent.
The performance of these duties involves an assertion of ju-
risdiction over foreign prizes, warships or armed forces, agencies
which under ordinary circumstances are exempt from the juris-
diction of any sovereign but their own. It is therefore of im-
portance to investigate the measures which the United States
has taken for performing its duties of vindication by the exercise
of this extraordinary jurisdiction. The subject may be conven-
iently divided into the three parts, (1) illegal prizes, (2) illegal
treaties with France, 1778-1789, art. 17, p. 474;. 1800-1809, art. 24, p. 504;
Netherlands, 1782-1795, art. 5, p. 1245; Sweden, 1783-1799, revived 1816,
1827, art. 19, p. 1732; Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 19, 21, p. 1493; Great Britain,
1794-1807, art. 25, p. 604. Treaties with Tripoli, 1805, art. 17, p. 1792 and
with Algiers, 1795-1815, art. 10, p. 3; 1815-1830, art. 18, p. 10, permitted
United States vessels to sequestrate and sell prizes in their ports and for-
bade the sale of prizes taken by any of the Barbary states from the United
States in a similar manner. Asylum to merchant vessels and in most
cases to warships and privateers also when necessitated through "stress of
weather or pursuit of pirates or enemies" is provided for in treaties with
twenty-five countries, a few of which are still in force.
'Hague Conventions, 1907, v, arts. 11-12, Malloy, p. 2300.
6
Ibid., xiii, arts. 21, 24.
7
Ibid., xiii, arts. 12, 13.
"Ibid., xiii, art. 8.
9
Ibid., xiii, arts. 3, 21, 24.
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acts of belligerent warships, (3) violations of land territory.
The mere fact that these duties are contained in the Hague con-
ventions, which are treaties and "the law of the land" would
furnish ground for the assertion of jurisdiction by judicial and
executive officers, but in some cases jurisdiction has been specifi-
cally conferred by statute, and in others it is necessary to con-
sider the view which the courts and executive authorities have
taken as cases have arisen. We will therefore consider the sup-
plementary laws enacted for carrying out these obligations, and
the rules laid down by the executive and judicial officers them-
selves in carrying them out.
ILLEGAL PBIZES.
The neutrality laws give the United States district courts
a jurisdiction over captures made in the territorial waters of
the country,
10 and imply that a jurisdiction exists over prizes
taken by privateers outfitted in the United States.11 This pro-
vision contained in the original neutrality act of 179412 was en-
acted as a result of Washington's address to congress of Dec. 31,
1793,
13 in which he urged upon congress the enactment of neu-
trality acts, and also provisions ensuring a sufficient jurisdiction
in the courts to carry out the duties of restoring illegal prizes.
It seems probable that United States courts can assume jurisdic-
tion over illegal prizes under their general admiralty and priz*;
jurisdiction even in the absence of statute, as was in fact done in
the cases of Glass vs. The Betsey14 and Talbot vs. Jansen, 15 both
of which came before the court before the passage of the first neu-
trality act. The view was emphatically stated in the case of the
Estrella10 that the jurisdiction existed independently of statute.
Furthermore, so far as the writer has been able to discover, there
has never been a case before the court in which the capture was
made in the territorial waters of the United States, and in which
10Rev. Stat. Sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14.
"Rev. Stat. Sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14, gives the President
power to utilize the military forces of the country to "detain such ship or
vessel (violating the neutrality of the United States) with her prize or
prizes in order to restore the prize or prizes in the cases to which resto-
ration shall be adjudged."
"Act. June 5, 1794, i stat. 381.
13See Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., 1531.
"Glass vs. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6, (1794).
15Talbot vs. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133.
"The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298, (1819).
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therefore the jurisdiction explicitly conferred by statute would
strictly apply. In all the cases the illegality of the prize has
been based on an outfitting of the privateer, or augmenting of
its forces, in the United States, prior to the capture. We may
therefore safely assert that the jurisdiction exercised by United
States courts while the country is neutral, over belligerent prizes,
is not dependent on statute.
The nature of the prize jurisdiction while the country is
neutral has been discussed at length in a number of cases and
with a remarkable concurrence of opinion. The court has always
insisted that its jurisdiction does not extend over the question of
prize or not prize.
17 This is a matter solely within the author-
ity of the prize courts of the belligerent country, and their de-
termination is conclusive. The neutral's jurisdiction over prizes
of war can only arise where (1) its own duty of vindicating its
neutrality is involved, (2) where the capture was entirely with-
out evidence of belligerent authorization or for other reason not
within the belligerent's prize jurisdiction,
18 or (3) where sal-
"L'lnvincible, I Wheat. 238, 261 ; McDonough vs. Dannery and the
Ship Mary Ford, 3 Ball. 188; The Alerta, 9 Cranch, 359, (1815) ; The Es-
trella, 4 Wheat. 298.
18This situation occurs where the capture was so clearly unwarranted
that the belligerent prize court can not legitimately assert a jurisdiction.
There is of course room for difference of opinion in any case as to
whether it could or could not, and the question virtually resolves itself
into this: Is the belligerent prize court's assertion of its own jurisdic-
tion to be considered conclusive? In Glass vs. The Sloop Betsey, (3 Dall.
6, 1794) the supreme court upheld jurisdiction over a capture by a French
privateer, apparently on the sole ground that being neutrally owned the
vessel was not liable to condemnation in a French Prize court. It is
doubtful whether such a jurisdiction would now be maintained. In Rose
vs. Himely, (4 Cranch 241, 1808) the prize, owned by an American, Rose,
was seized on the high seas near Cuba for breach of municipal regulations
and after sale to Himely brought to Charleston. Here it was libeled by
the original owner, Rose, and while in the custody of the United States
District court, a French Prize court in Santa Domingo issued a decree of
condemnation upon which Himely based his title. The majority of the
court though disagreeing in reasons agreed that the Santa Domingo court
lacked jurisdiction and consequently Himely had no title. Three justices
denied its jurisdiction on the ground that actual custody of the prize was
necessary. Two justices, including Chief Justice Marshall, held that cap-
tures on the high seas for breach of municipal regulations were contrary
to international law and so conferred no jurisdiction upon the prize court
of the capturing country. Justice Johnson dissented from the decision,
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vage or other maritime claims of neutral subjects are involved.
19
In all of these cases the prize must have been brought within the
neutral's jurisdiction voluntarily. A neutral state has no right
to make seizures outside of its own territory20 or to assume juris-
holding that the prize court's jurisdiction depended upon municipal and
not international law and that its own assertion of jurisdiction must be
regarded as conclusive by foreign courts; hence the Santa Domingo court
had jurisdiction and Himely's title was good. The case does not refer to
prize jurisdiction in pursuance of belligerent rights, but the principle that
there are limits, beyond which a foreign prize court's assertion of its own
jurisdiction will not be regarded as conclusive, although denied by Justice
Johnson, seems to have been settled. Consequently there are cases in
which the courts of a neutral state may exercise jurisdiction over a prize
which the belligerent claims the right to adjudicate, and thereby itself de-
termine upon the belligerent's rights.
19This situation occurs when the determination of belligerent prize
rights arises incidentally to some ordinary maritime claim of a neutral
subject. In McDonough vs. Dannery and the Ship Mary Ford, (3 Dall.
188,1795) a French squadron had captured the Mary Ford, a British vessel,
and after attempting to sink her, left her derelict. She was rescued by a
United States vessel which brought her to Boston and libeled her for sal-
vage. Both French and British claimants put in an appearance, the French
claiming the balance after deduction of salvage, as legal prize of war, and
the British claiming this balance as original owners of the vessel. The
supreme court decreed one-third salvage to the United States rescuers, and
:he balance to the French captors, holding that title to an enemy vessel
changed hands immediately on capture. Here the court really decided a
question of prize as between the two belligerents, but it was only done in-
cidentally to the adjudication of the neutral parties' claims to salvage, and
could be regarded, as was said in discussing the case by Justice Johnson
in LTnvincible, (i Wheat. 238, 261) to have been a recognition of the title
of the last possessor rather than a determination of belligerent rights. In
the Invincible the court again assumed jurisdiction, where neutral salvage
rights were involved, and in DelCol vs. Arnold, (3 Dall. 333), jurisdiction
over a prize sequestrated in Charleston was based on a maritime tort com-
mitted against a neutral owned vessel by the belligerent claimant of this
prize. The case was questioned in L'Invincible, but justified on the ground!
that consent had been given by the belligerent claimant to submit the pro-
ceeds of his prize to the neutral jurisdiction.
20This statement was denied by Chief Justice Marshall in Church vs.
Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, (1804), Scott, 343; He upheld a seizure by Brazil
outside of territorial waters in pursuance of a local law. The view stated
was however maintained by Marshall in Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 281,
(1808) ; See also Hudson vs. Guestier, 6 Cranch 281, (1810) ; The Appol-
lon, 9 Wheat. 362. In the case of the Itata submitted to arbitration, the
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diction over vessels which are not within the actual custody of
its court.21
The first situation mentioned is the one of immediate impor-
tance to the present subject. In the case of the Brig Alerta, 22
Justice Washington clearly defined the nature of this jurisdic-
tion. "The general rule is undeniable that the trial of captures
made on the high seas, jure belli, by a duly commissioned vessel
of war, whether from an enemy or a neutral, belongs exclusively
to the courts of that nation to which the captor belongs. To this
rule there are exceptions which are as firmly established as the
rule itself. If the capture be made within the territorial limits
of a neutral country into which the prize is brought or by a pri-
vateer which had been illegally equipped in such country, the
prize courts of such neutral country not only possess the pover,
but it is their duty to restore the property so illegally captured
to the owner. This is necessary to the vindication of their own
neutrality.
' '
The two cases are distinguished by Justice "Washington, (1)
where the capture is made in the territorial waters of the United
States, and (2) where the capture is made by a vessel which was
armed or had its forces augmented in the United States in viola-
tion of neutrality.
(1) In the first case jurisdiction is specifically granted by
statute23 but has never been exercised. In the case of the
Grange,
24
Attorney General Randolph gave an official opinion
that a vessel captured by a belligerent in Delaware bay, which
he regarded as territorial water, should be restored to the
United States, but as the vessel was no longer infra praesidia,
no question of a federal court's prize jurisdiction arose. In sev-
eral cases where the United States has been belligerent, the neu-
tral state's right to prizes captured in its territorial waters has
been upheld25 but apparently the courts have never had a direct
United States was held liable in damages for the seizure of a vessel in
Chilean territorial waters. See Moore, Digest of International Arbitra-
tions, 3J3067-307L
21Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, (1808).
"The Alerta, 9 Cranch, 359, 364, (1815).
"Revised Statutes, Sec. 5287. Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14.
2*The Grange, I op. 33, (1793). On request this vessel was returned
by the capturing belligerent power. Moore's Digest, 7; 1086.
25The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, (1818) ; The Florida, 101 U. S. 37, (1879) ;
The Sir Wm. Peel, 5 Wall. 517; The Adela, 6 Wall. 266. In Stewart vs.
United States, i Ct. Cl. 113, (1864), the court asserted that the United
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opportunity to assert jurisdiction over such a prize while the
country was neutral.
(2) In the case of prizes captured by vessels which pre-
viously had violated the United States neutrality laws, the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by courts is implied in the neutrality stat-
utes,
28 and has been frequently exercised. During the wars im-
mediately following the French revolution, American adventur-
ers, moved by republican sympathy for revolutionary France
and possibly fully as much by hopes of gain, frequently fitted
out privateers in American ports, obtained French Letters of
Marque and forthwith cruised against England, with whom
France was at war. It often happened that prizes made by these
vessels would be brought into American ports in accordance
with the right claimed by France under the treaty of 1778 ; 2T
in which case a representative of the original neutral or English
owner, generally the English consul, would file a libel for resti-
tution. The court from the first assumed prize jurisdiction in
such cases, 28 and in several cases restored the vessel.29 A similar
situation arose during the revolutionary struggles of the South
American republics against Spain and Portugal. Again
thoughts of pecuniary gain and republican sympathy combined
States had a just claim against Portugal for permitting a prize to be re-
captured by Great Britain in her territorial waters during the war of 1812,
and that Portugal had a just claim against Great Britain for performing
this act. Indemnity had been obtained from Portugal for some of these
seizures by the treaty of 1851. See Malloy treaties, p. 1458, and also Gen-
eral Armstrong Arbitration, Moore, Int. Arb., 2;iO7i. Commodore Stew-
art's claims having been ignored in this settlement, it was held he had no
claim against the United States. Supra, p. 107.
26Revised Statutes, sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14. Supra, p.
131, note ii.
27Treaty with France, 1778-1798, art. 17,22, Malloy treaties, p. 474.
28Talbot vs. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133, (1796) ; Moodie vs. The Alfred, 3
Dall. 307, (1796) ; Moodie vs. The Phoebe Ann, 3 Dall. 319, (1796) ; Geyer
vs. Michel and the Ship Den Onzekeron, 3 Dall. 285; Moodie vs. The
Betty Carthcart, Fed. Cas. 9, 742, 3 Dall. 288, note ; Wilkinson vs. The Bet-
sey, Fed. Cas. 17,750, (1799) ; Moodie vs. The Brothers, Fed. Cas. 9,743,
(1799) ; British Consul vs. The Nancy, Fed. Cas. 1898, (1799) ; Moodie vs.
The Amity, Fed. Cas. 9741.
29Restoration was decreed to a neutral Dutch claimant in Talbot vs.
Jansen, 3 Dall. 133, (1796), and to an English claimant in Moodie vs. The
Betty Carthcart, Fed. Cas. 9,742, 3 Dall. 288, note, and British Consul vs.
The Nancy, Fed. Cas. 1898, (1799).
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to lure American privateers into the fray, and frequent cases
appear in the reports with the Spanish or Portuguese consul
as libellant. Again the United States courts asserted ju-
risdiction and as before they generally decreed restitution to
the original owner.
80 The effrontery with which these priva-
teers sometimes put forth their claims was astonishing. On several
occasions the expeditions appear to have been nothing short of
piracy, as captures were made before any commission was
obtained from the South American insurgents. Under such
circumstances the owner of the privateer would put forth a
claim of expatriation
31 or of a sale of the privateer to a ficti-
tious South American party, 32 claims which were for the most
part ignored by the court.33
30Restitution was denied in La Amistad de Rues, 5 Wheat. 385, (1820) ;
the case was remanded for further evidence in The Divina Pastora, 4
Wheat. 52, (1814) and in the following cases restitution was decreed:
The Brig Alerta vs. Moran, 9 Cranch, 359, (1815) The Estrella, 4 Wheat.
298, (1819); La Conception, 6 Wheat. 235, (1821) The Bello Corrunes, 6
Wheat. 152, (1821) ; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 285, (1827) ; The
Gran Para, 7 Wheat. 471, (1822) ; The Arrogante Barcelones, 7 Wheat.
496, (1822) ; The Santa Maria, 7 Wheat. 490; The Monte Allegre, 7 Wheat.
520, (1822); The Nereyda, 8 Wheat. 108, (1823); The Fanny, 9 Wheat.
659, (1824).
31The Gran Para, 7 Wheat 471, (1822).
32LaNereyda, 8 Wheat. 108, (1823) ; The Monte Allegre, 7 Wheat. 520,
(1822).
33In some dicta in cases of this character the court expressed the
opinion that a bone fide transfer of the prize to an innocent third party
destroyed the taint of illegality, (The Arrogante Barcelona, 7 Wheat.
496, 1822) but where such a case arose restitution of the prize was decreed
(The Fanny, 9 Wheat. 658, 1824). A bona fide sale of the privateer after
the illegal outfit in the United States was held to remove the taint of ille-
gality from subsequent captures but such sale must be clearly proved (The
Monte Allegre, 7 Wheat. 520, 1822; Moodie vs. The Alfred, 3 Dall. 307,
1796). It was held that making of repairs with augmentation of force did
not amount to a breach of neutrality and consequently did not make prizes
illegal (Moodie vs. The Phoebe Ann, 3 Dall. 319, 1795; Geyer vs. Michel
and the Ship Den Onzekeran, 3 Dall. 285). A sale in the United States of
prizes captured under a French commission, being impliedly permitted by
the French treaty of 1778, (art. 17, 22, Malloy, p. 474) was held to be no
breach of neutrality and hence did not make the prize illegal, (Moodie vs.
The Amity, Fed. Cas., 9741). The United States never admitted that
France had an absolute right of sequestrating and selling prizes in the
United States under this treaty (Moore's Digest, 7:936). Such sales are
now forbidden by international law (Hague Conventions, 1907, XIII, art.
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It appears that the law of the United States permits of
courts exercising jurisdiction over illegal prizes and disposing
of them in a manner to fulfill the state's neutral obligation of
vindication. It must be noted that the exercise of this juris-
diction implies custody of the prize. If the prize is in a foreign
port the United States courts have no jurisdiction, although
the case may be such that the government of the United States
is under an obligation to demand its return.34
ILLEGAL ACTS BY BELLIGERENT WARSHIPS.
The duty of vindication following an illegal act by a bel-
ligerent warship may involve the exercise of jurisdiction, (1)
over the officers and crew of the vessel or (2) over the vessel
itself. Formerly a distinction was drawn between cases in-
volving public warships and those involving privateers. As
privateering is now technically abolished this distinction is no
longer important, and even before its abolition the courts de-
clared that for most legal purposes privateers, bearing a com-
mission of the sovereign, were in the same status as public
warships.
35
(1) It was held in an opinion of Attorney General Nelson
in 184436 that, although belligerent public vessels themselves
are not subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts, their
commander and officers are and can be criminally prosecuted
for breaches of the neutrality statutes. He said, "the very
purpose of the act would be defeated were it otherwise; and
there is no principle of which I am aware which exempts from
responsibility for criminal acts within our jurisdiction the
commander or officers of ships of war of other nations with
whom we are at peace." While there seem to be no cases in
which prosecution of the officers of men of war has been under-
21, Malloy, p. 2361; Moore's Digest, 7:935-938). In any case a bone fide
condemnation in a recognized court was held to transfer title conclusively,
in the prize, but the condemnation must be satisfactorily evidenced (La
Nereyda, 8 Wheat. 108, 1823). Where none of these circumstances inter-
vened, restitution to the original owner was decreed, but claims for further
damages by the injured owner of the prize were denied (LaAmistad de
Rues, 5 Wheat. 385). Supra p. 108, note 7.
S4See Hague Conventions, 1907, xiii, art. 3, Malloy, p. 2359 and United
States understanding of it, Senate Resolution of Apr. 17, 1908, Malloy,
p. 2366.
"L'Invincible, i Wheat. 238, (1816).
3
Nelson, Att. Gen., 4 op. 336, (1844).
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taken, the commanders of privateers holding commissions of
foreign belligerent states have been prosecuted when it could
be proved that they were still American citizens as is necessary
for prosecution under the first section of the neutrality act.37
If a privateer is to be regarded as subject to the same legal
exemption as a man of war it would seem that these cases are
in accord with Attorney General Nelson's opinion. Prosecu-
tion has never been attempted of commanders of privateers
under sections of the neutrality acts which are not directed
against citizens alone, as for instance section five, 38 which pro-
hibits the augmentation of force of warships or privateers in
the territory of the United States by any person. A very simi-
lar case arose in the criminal prosecution of Alexander McLeod
by the State of New York in 1841.39 He was a soldier acting
under authority of Great Britain, but nevertheless New York
maintained its jurisdiction to punish him criminally for a homi-
cide committed in that capacity, in the State.
At present international law seems to exempt the officers
and crew of public vessels from local jurisdiction so long as
their acts are in pursuance of official business or take place
entirely within the vessel.40 This exemption, however, does not
extend to acts done on land in violation of local laws, and if
the commander of a warship is engaged in augmenting the force
of his vessel by the purchase of military materials or the re-
cruitment of men in the territory of the United States and
outside of his vessel, it seems probable that he would be liable
to the criminal provisions of the neutrality act, although in
such a case undoubtedly diplomatic protest would be resorted
to rather than criminal prosecution.
The criminal prosecution of the officers of warships is not
itself a duty of vindication. Internment of such officers in
certain cases is the action required of neutral states. It would
seem that executive authorities can exercise jurisdiction over
foreign naval forces to perform the duties required by treaties.
The internment of land forces has been upheld in the courts41
and it is probable that the same action as to naval forces is
permitted by the law of the United States.
87U. S. vs. Isaac Williams, Fed. Cas. 17,708, 2 Cranch 82; note:
In re Henfield, Fed. Cas. 6360, (1793).
"Revised Statutes, 5285, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 12.
8 PeopIe vs. McLeod, (N. Y.) 25 Wend. 483, i Hill 375, (1841).
40See Moore's Digest, 2; sec. 256.
41Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913).
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(2) Whether United States courts can exercise jurisdic-
tion over foreign public vessels which have violated the neutral-
ity of the United States is a question of difficulty. It has been
noted that courts can exercise jurisdiction over the prizes
captured by belligerent privateers or cruisers in certain cases.
The exercise of jurisdiction over the privateer or warship itself
is an entirely different question. In the neutrality statutes
forfeiture of privateers fitted out in the United States for un-
neutral purposes is provided for,42 but this may be intended
to refer to cases where the vessel was apprehended before being
commissioned by the foreign power, and so does not necessarily
imply a grant of jurisdiction over foreign public vessels. It
has however been interpreted so to apply. In the case of the
Cassius,
43 which was a French public vessel originally fitted out
in the United States in violation of the neutrality laws, the
vessel was held for a long time pending litigation and ultimately
released on a technicality. France had protested at the exercise
of jurisdiction over this vessel and finally abandoned it with
the intention of protesting the matter diplomatically. Secre-
tary of War Pickering in referring to this case upheld the
court's jurisdiction,44 for he thought if forfeiture could not be
had in such cases the neutrality acts could be completely evaded
by transferring illegally fitted out vessels to the foreign gov-
ernment at their first port. The exemption of foreign war-
ships from local jurisdiction was denied by Attorney General
Bradford in an opinion of 179445 in which he supported the
execution of writs of habeas corpus on a British public vessel
in an American port, for the purpose of releasing American
citizens held on board. This action gave rise to a protest by the
British minister.
The better opinion however seems to be that expressed by
Chief Justice Marshall in the Schooner Exchange vs. Mc-Fad-
don,48 in which case the court refused juridiction of a French
public vessel which had entered port in stress of weather and
which was claimed by a United States citizen as having been
"Revised Statutes, sec. 5283, Penal Code of 1910, sec. II.
48Ketland vs. The Cassius, 2 Dall. 365. See also U. S. vs. Peters,
3 Dall. 121, which was an earlier case involving this vessel, in which the
court's jurisdiction was denied.
"Letter of Sec. of State Pinckney, Oct. i, 1795, Am. St. Pap., For.
Rel., 1:634.
"Bradford, Att. Gen., i op. 47, (1794).
48The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116, (1812).
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illegally made prize by the French. The court held that while
the principle of territorial sovereignty was absolute, comity and
custom demanded that public vessels be excepted from the
general rule, and the court would infer that the government
intended to observe the customary rule of comity unless it had
expressly declared the contrary. The exemption of foreign
public vessels from jurisdiction was emphatically maintained
by Attorney General Gushing in 185547 the theory of extra-
territoriality being asserted. As has been noted Attorney Gen-
eral Nelson, while maintaining that the officers of public vessels
were subject to the territorial jurisdiction, admitted that the
vessels themselves were exempt.
48 This appears to be the rule
and therefore, although United States courts can assume juris-
diction over illegal prizes, they cannot over foreign public vessels
even when they have violated a duty of international law.48
Although courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign
public vessels violating neutrality, it is clear that executive
officers must do so, if the duties of vindication are to be carried
out. If a court exercised jurisdiction it would have authority
to declare the vessel forfeited and thus change its ownership.
Executive officers can exercise no such authority as this, but
they can expel or detain a public vessel, render it incapable of
putting to sea and intern its crew when occasion demands. The
power to expel50 public vessels is specifically given in the neu-
trality laws to the president, and in the execution of this power
he may use the land and naval force and the militia of the
country, if necessary. The power to detain vessels violating
neutrality statutes is given to the president
51 and also to cus-
tom officers52 when circumstances render an unneutral use
probable. This does not apply to belligerent war vessels in
general. It has been held that the president's power can only
be used in aid of judicial process, and only military, not civil,
officers can be employed.58 A customs officer detaining a vessel
47The Sitka, 7 op. 123, (1855) Att. Gen. Gushing. See also 8 op. 73.
48Nelson, Att. Gen., 4 op. 336, (1844).
49For discussion of the exemption of public vessels from territorial
jurisdiction see Hall, International Law, p. 195.
60Rev. Stat 5288, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 15.
"Rev. Stat. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14.
B2Rev. Stat. 5290, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 17.
"Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; See also 4 op. 336, (1844), some-
what modified in 21 op. 273.
141] OBLIGATIONS OP NEUTRALS 141
under this provision does so at his own risk.54 On account of
these interpretations the statutory provisions seem insufficient
to carry out the country's duties of vindication. However, as
duties specified in treaties and conventions can probably be
exercised by the president in the absence of express statutory
authority,
55 the omission is not serious.
VIOLATIONS OF LAND TERRITORY.
The principal duty of vindication required under this head
is the internment of belligerent troops entering neutral
territory. Although not acted upon by New York in the case
of People vs. McLeod,58 the general principle that military
forces are exempt from territorial jurisdiction is recognized in
the United States. The doctrine was stated in reference to
troops passing through territory under a license, in dicta by
Chief Justice Marshall in The Exchange vs. McFaddon, 57 and
in reference to the rights of troops engaged in hostilities in
several cases arising out of the civil war.
58 This does not, how-
ever, prevent executive officers performing duties imposed upon
the country by treaty. In the case of Ex Parte Toscano,59
which came before a United States circuit court in 1913, the
facts were as follows: During the civil war in Mexico a band
of federalist troops defeated at Novco crossed the frontiers of
the United States and voluntarily surrendered to armed forces
of the United States. Under order of the president they were
disarmed, kept for a time at El Paso and then sent to Ft.
Rosecrans, California. Toscano, one of the interned soldiers,
sought release on habeas corpus, on the ground that he was
unconstitutionally deprived of liberty without "due process of
law". This the court denied, holding that the exercise of the
authority by the president was fully justified by the Hague
convention of 1907,60 which had been ratified by both the United
States and Mexico. "The treaty," it said, "is full and com-
plete and no legislation is necessary to its enforcement." If
congress has not provided special officers for carrying it out
"Hendricks vs. Gonzalez, 67 Fed. Rep. 351.
"Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913).
"People vs. McLeod, (N. Y.) 25 Wend. 483; i Hill 375, (1841).
"The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, (1812).
58Neal Dow vs. Johnson, 100 JJ. S. 158, 170, (1879) ; Coleman vs.
Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, (1878).
68Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913).
60Hague Conventions, 1907, v, art. n, Malloy, p. 2298.
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the duty devolves upon the president as chief executive. The
Hague treaty itself and the execution of its terms were held
to be sufficient to give the applicant his ''due process of law",
and the writ was denied. From this case it seems that United
States law adequately provides for performing this duty of
vindication.
The United States has provided for carrying out its duties
of vindication (1) by conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts of illegal prizes, with power to restore and liberate such
prizes according to international law, and (2) by conferring
authority on executive officers to expel, detain and intern war
vessels and their officers and crews and to intern belligerent
troops crossing the frontier. The degree to which the interna-
tional duties of vindication are performed depends upon the
rules of law acted upon by courts and executive officers in
exercising their jurisdiction in these matters. The rules fol-
lowed by courts are found in court decisions, and are based on
the principle that courts of the United States apply interna-
tional law as part of the law of the United States, while execu-
tive officers are bound by the principle that treaties are the
law of the land and so perform the duties of vindication as
therein specified. With these principles it seems that adequate
provision is made in the law of the United States for carrying
out the duties of vindication imposed by international law.
PART III. OBLIGATIONS AS A BELLIGERENT
TOWARD NEUTRALS
CHAPTER X. INTRODUCTORY.
The obligations of neutral to belligerent states have been
classified under the five heads, duties of (1) abstention, (2)
acquiescence, (3) prevention, (4) vindication, (5) reparation.
In order to show the relation of belligerent duties to neutral
duties we will consider belligerent duties under the same
classification.
It must, however, be constantly borne in mind that the
position of a belligerent is very different from that of a neutral.
A belligerent is always active, while a neutral is passive. Con-
sequently, while it is neutral duties that are prominent, it is
belligerent rights which are most noticed. Neutral duties are
restrictions upon the ordinary rights of an independent state,
while belligerent duties are simply limits set to extraordinary
rights.
(1) The belligerent's duties of abstention are largely
equivalent in substance to a neutral state's duties of prevention.
What the neutral is bound to prevent, the belligerent, in most
cases, though not always, is bound to abstain from. Thus a
belligerent state is bound to abstain from violations of neutral
territory and injury to neutral individuals. These duties so
far as encumbent upon the state as such are beyond the prov-
ince of municipal law to control and so beyond the scope of our
subject. When a belligerent neglects its duties of abstention,
as Germany did in the violation of Belgian neutrality, it is an
act of sovereignty for which the state is internationally respon-
sible but which can not be controlled by municipal law. Some
duties of this character have been given recognition in treaties
and international agreements, but such stipulations are for the
most part directed to the political organs of government and
constitute political questions which can not be enforced as mu-
nicipal law. An exception, however, may be made in one case.
The duty to abstain from interference with neutral commerce,,
i43
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except as permitted by international law, is enforced by munici-
pal law through the adjudication of all neutral seizures in prize
courts. This method of enforcing duties of abstention will
therefore be considered.
(2) The belligerent's duties of acquiescence relate largely
to the neutral's duties of vindication. In performing these
duties the neutral state subjects belligerent troops, public ves-
sels and prizes to its jurisdiction in a manner which would be
considered as an indignity under ordinary circumstances. These
conditions the belligerent must acquiesce in. It must not com-
plain when a neutral interns its troops or ships of war and
assumes prize jurisdiction over its captures, provided such acts
are required by international law. Acquiescence in such actions
or its reverse, however, are acts of sovereignty and beyond the
control of municipal law.
(3) The belligerent's duties of prevention bear a relation
to the neutral's duties of vindication. Acts which the neutral
is obliged to vindicate if committed, the belligerent is obliged
to prevent. As the belligerent in exercising rights peculiar to
that status comes in contact with neutrals through its army and
navy, its duties of prevention require it to exercise control over
those agencies of government. It is through this control that
municipal law can be most effective in enforcing international
obligations of belligerent to neutral states. The municipal means
for preventing infractions of international law by such agencies
of government will therefore concern us.
(4) A belligerent state has no duty of vindication. It is
itself the aggressive party in its relations with neutrals and
consequently no occasion is apt to arise for vindicating its
sovereign rights as against neutrals. Resembling the neutral's
duty of vindication is the belligerent's right of self-help, by
which it is permitted to requisition the property of neutrals
under certain circumstances, to draft resident aliens into its
armies and subject them to numerous inconveniences and losses
in case of military necessity, to visit and search neutral mer-
chant vessels, and confiscate them in well defined cases. These
acts resemble duties of vindication in that they are acts in-
volving foreign individuals and are specifically defined by inter-
national law, but they are in no sense duties. No one but the
belligerent is benefited by their performance and there will be
no violation of international law if they are not performed. It
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is a belligerent right which is here in question and the accom-
panying duty is that which is owed to the neutral state to
abstain from exceeding these privileges and to prevent an ille-
gal exercise of them by its land and naval forces. These sub-
jects are considered under obligations of abstention and
prevention.
(5) Reparation is a belligerent duty, but, as noted in the
case of a neutral, it is not a duty peculiar to the status of
belligerency. It is a duty universally required in cases of
breaches of international law. Because of the probability of
illegal acts in the heat of war, the question of reparation is
particularly prominent in relation to belligerent communities.
As examples of reparation by the United States as a belligerent
may be mentioned the case of the Florida, in which the United
States made public apology for a capture in the territorial
waters of Brazil,
1 and the Trent affair, in which the United
States restored two confederate officers taken from a British
vessel during the civil war.2 As the principles of municipal
law relating to the enforcement of this duty are applicable to
reparation in all cases, further discussion has been given under
that head, in the general division of the law of peace.
The obligations of belligerents to neutrals which may be
enforced by municipal law will therefore be considered under
the two heads, (1) obligations of abstention, and (2) obligations
of prevention. In the first case, international law itself defines
the obligations which are binding upon the government. Courts
in giving effect to such obligations therefore apply international
law. In the second case, international law defines the conduct
which land and naval forces must pursue in dealing with neu-
trals, but it does not prescribe the measures which the govern-
ment must take for enforcing this conduct. The means which
may be taken for preventing infractions of international law
by agencies of government, are left to the discretion of the
belligerent state. They are therefore rules supplementary to
international law.
iCase of the Florida; See Moore's Digest, 2:367: 7:1090.
'Case of the Trent, see Moore's Digest, 2;iooi: 7:626, 768.
CHAPTER XI. OBLIGATIONS OF ABSTENTION.
INTRODUCTORY.
A number of obligations of abstention have received
specific recognition in treaties and international agreements to
which the United States is a party, and are therefore according
to the constitution part of the law of the land. In the Hague
conventions the United States has bound itself to abstain from
exercising war rights against neutrals until it has notified them
of the outbreak of war,1 from committing hostilities in neutral
territory or in neutral waters,
2 and from using neutral harbors
or territory as bases of naval or military operations or for
the undue asylum of war vessels. 3 In special treaties as well
as the Hague conventions and the Declaration of London,
which, however, is unratified, it has agreed to abstain from
injuring neutral individuals in person or property except in
accordance with specified rules.* Although so far as these rules
bind the state they are sanctioned by considerations of policy
rather than by municipal law, yet a belligerent acts through
its agencies of government, largely its army and navy. The
duties of abstention imposed upon it may be to a considerable
extent guaranteed by the control of these bodies through munici-
pal law. Looked at from this standpoint the duties in question
become duties of prevention. What a belligerent community is
bound to abstain from doing, it is bound to prevent its army
and navy from doing. Such duties may be controlled by mu-
nicipal law and will be considered under obligations of
prevention.
Municipal law may also serve to make the obligations
effective through the action of constitutional checks between
1Hague Conventions, 1907, iii, art. 2, Malloy, p. 2266.
2
Ibid., 19x57, v, art. i ; xiii, art. I, Malloy, pp. 2297, 2358.
3
Ibid., 1907, xiii.
4See treaties guaranteeing "free ships, free goods", infra p. 164, note
106; specifying rules of blockade, infra, p. 149, note 12; freedom of ves-
sels under neutral convoy, infra, p. 182, note 49; freedom of neutral trade,
infra, p. 162, note 95, p. 182, note 50; specifications for the exercise of
the right of visit and search, infra, p. 182, note 51 ; and the immunity of
resident neutral persons from military service, infra, p. 174, note 9.
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departments of government. Thus the courts may be given
authority to control the action of the executive in seizing neu-
tral property. This situation actually exists in the provisions
of municipal law requiring the adjudication of all maritime
seizures by prize courts before their confiscation. The judiciary
here, by its power to liberate prizes, acts as a check upon the
abuse of authority by the executive, and in so far as it actually
applies rules of international law in determining prize cases,
enforces the belligerent government's duty to abstain from
illegally interfering with neutral commerce.
It must not, however, be forgotten that the prize court,
although it may apply international law, is a court of the bel-
ligerent state and is always bound by municipal law. It has
no authority as against the sovereign power in its state. It is
only over one branch of the government that its authority exists.
The fact that the belligerent state controls the prize court,
a condition which it was hoped would be remedied by the estab-
lishment of an international prize court, inevitably puts the
neutral claimant at a disadvantage in litigating, and were it
not for the pressure of his own government and the sanctions
of international opinion, he would not receive his rights, as is
indicated by the distinct difference in the enforcement of neu-
tral rights when most of the great powers are belligerent and
when most of them are neutral.
It is the belligerent state's duty to make its prize court,
in the words of Lord Stowell, "a, court of the law of nations".5
Yet as it is a court of the belligerent state the law which it
enforces is by definition municipal law. Here therefore we
have a case where we should expect to find international law
enforced directly as a part of municipal law. We should expect
to find the rules applied by prize courts, rules of both inter-
national law and municipal law. Both English and American
prize courts have on numerous occasions assured us that this is
the situation which actually exists,' yet with a few cases to the
8The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348, (1807). See T. E. Holland, Studies in
International Law, p. 196.
Cases asserting that prize courts apply international law. English
The Maria, i Rob. 350, (1799) ; The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348, (1807) ; The
Minerva, (1807); The Fox, Edw. Adm. 312, (1811) ; Le Louis, 2 Dods.
239, (1817) ; The Annapolis, 30 L. J. Pr. M. and Ad. 201. See also Phil-
limore, International Law, 3; sec. 436. For discussion of these cases see
Holland, op. cit. 196. The first three of these cases are authority for
the view that prize courts must apply international law even when con-
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contrary we have also been informed that even a prize court is
bound to obey a positive mandate of its government, even when
in conflict with the law of nations. Lord Stowell seized the
dilemma by the horns. "These two propositions," he said,
"that the court is bound to administer the law of nations and
that it is bound to enforce the king's orders in council are not
at all inconsistent with each other," because one could not
"without extreme indecency" presume that a conflict could
exist.7 In the United States Chief Justice Marshall solved the
dilemma by resort to the magic power of legal interpretation.
"It has also been observed that an act of congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi-
ble construction remains, and consequently can never be con-
strued to violate neutral rights or to affect neutral commerce
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood
in this country."
8
Neither Stowell's confidence in the impossibility of a con-
flict nor Marshall's reliance upon interpretation can obscure
the fact that conflicts between the law of nations and of the
nation have occurred and have been so direct that no interpre-
tation can avail.' In such circumstances prize courts, the same
as any other courts, must obey municipal law.
10 A failure to
trary to municipal law. United States cases Talbot vs. Seamans, I
Cranch i, 37, (1801) ; The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388; United States vs. The
Active, Fed Cas. 759; Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch
191; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677.
7The Fox, Edw. Adm. 312, (1811).
Murray vs. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 118, (1804).
8Strangely enough the very case in which Lord Stowell spoke in-
volved just such a conflict. The orders in council upon the basis of
which he decreed condemnation of the neutral vessel before him, have
been universally denounced as contrary to international law. See article
entitled Disputes with America in Edinburgh Rev., Feb. 1812, 195290,
severely censuring Lord Stowell's alteration of opinion from 1708 to
1811, quoted Moore's Digest, 7;648-65i. Phillimore in his international
law, 3; sec. 436, implies a similar censure. "If he (Lord Stowell) had
not so considered them (i.e. considered the orders in council to be con-
sistent with international law) and nevertheless executed them, he would
have incurred the same guilt and deserved the same reprehension as the
judge of a municipal court who executed by his sentence an edict of the
legislature which plainly violated the law written by the Creator upon
the conscience of his creature." See Holland, op. cit. p. 198.
10Regina vs. Keyn, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 160; The Schooner Exchange vs.
McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116; Murray vs. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch
64; Mortenson vs. Peters, 14 Scot. L. T. R. 227, (1906) Bentwich, p. 12.
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do so would be a dereliction of duty on the high way to re-
bellion. The duty therefore rests with the belligerent state to
see that the law applied by its prize courts is international law.
"We will examine the principles of law thus applied in the
United States, in cases involving the rights of neutral individ-
uals. They are to be found largely in prize court decisions,
but there have also been statutes, treaties, and executive orders
stating principles of this branch of law which the courts are
bound to observe.
NEUTRAL PROPERTY AT SEA.
The doctrine is maintained in the United States that title
to property seized at sea does not vest until after decision of
the court.11 The government, therefore, appears before the
prize court as an applicant for condemnation while the neutral
individual claims restitution, compensation, damages, or, if the
vessel is a recapture, restoration.
The bases upon which condemnation of neutral vessels and
property are justified under international law are (1) breach
of blockade, (2) carriage of contraband, (3) unneutral service,
(4) presumption of enemy character, (5) necessity or the right
of angary. The belligerent government will therefore claim
condemnation on one of these grounds. The neutral owner will
claim restitution if the belligerent does not make good his claim
for condemnation; he will claim compensation if in such a case
the vessel has been sold, destroyed or requisitioned; he will
claim damages if the vessel has been seized without probable
cause or has not been treated with proper care in bringing in;
or he will claim restoration if he is an original owner of al
recaptured prize.
GROUNDS FOR CONDEMNATION.
(1) Breach of Blockade. In a number of early treaties
the principles of blockade were laid down, requiring effective-
ness and sometimes individual notification of vessels.12 The
"The Adventure, 8 Cranch 221, (1814); The Nassau, 4 Wall. 634;
The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S. 92, 103, (1882); The Tom, 29
Ct. Cl. 68, 97, (1894) ; Grundy, Att. Gen., 3 op. 377, (1838). See letter of
Sir W. Scott, (Lord Stowell) and Sir J. Nicholl, to Mr. Jay, 1794, stat-
ing the general principles of prize law and the necessity of adjudication.
Am. St. Pap., i ;494, printed in Moore's Digest, 7 ;6o3-6o8.
"Effectiveness has been required in nineteen treaties with thirteen
countries, of which the following are in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 18,
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Declaration of London of 190913 lays down the rules of blockade
at length. This treaty, however, has not received general rati-
fication, although the United States senate has approved it.
The United States has instituted blockades during the
Mexican, Civil and Spanish wars. On these occasions the law
to be applied in dealing with neutrals was defined in proclama-
tions declaring the blockades and instructions to naval com-
manders. The prize courts in applying the law have relied on
these treaties, proclamations and instructions in addition to
judicial precedents and general principles of international law
on the subject. In proclamations and instructions the princi-
ples that the blockade must be effective and declared in order
to be binding have been generally specified. Individual warn-
ing, however, has usually not been required. The whole prac-
tice on the subject stating these points was embodied in Stock-
ton's Naval war code in force as a general order of the Navy
Department from 1900 to 1904.14
Malloy, p. 119; Colombia, 1846, art. 18, p. 308; Italy, 1871, art. 13, p. 973;
Sweden, 1783-1798, revived, 1816, 1827, art. 10, p. 1728.
Individual notification of vessels ignorant of blockade has been
required in twenty-one treaties with seventeen countries, of which the
following are in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 26, p. 120; Colombia, 1846,
art. 20, p. 308; Italy, 1871, art. 13, p. 973. Individual warning unless the
vessel could have heard of the blockade has been required in six treaties
with five countries, of which the following are in force : Sweden, 1827,
art. 18, p. 1754; Prussia, 1828, art. 13, p. 1500; Greece, 1837, art. 16, p. 853.
See also Moore's Digest, 7:827.
"Declaration of London, Charles, Treaties, 1913, pp. 269-272, signed
Feb. 26, 1909. Ratification advised by senate, Apr. 24, 1912.
"Proclamations of Blockade : Aug. 19, 1846, by Commodore Stock-
ton, (Moore's Digest, 7:790, Br. and For. St. Pap. 34:1139) ; Apr. 19, 27,
1861, by President Lincoln, (12 stat. 1259) ; Apr. 30, 1861, by Commander
Prendergast, (F. H. Upton, Law of Nations affecting commerce during
war, 3rd ed., N. Y. 1863, p. 487) ; Apr. 22, 1898, by President McKinley,
(30 stat. 1769). Naval Instructions relating to blockade, May 14, 1846,
(Moore's Digest, 7:828; Br. and For. St. Pap., 345U39) ; Dec. 24, 1846,
(Moore's Digest, 7:790) ; May 8, 1861, (Prize cases, 2 Black 676) ; Nov.
6, 1861, May 14, 1862, (Upton, op. cit, p. 490) ; Aug. 18, 1862, (Official
Records, Union and Confederate Navies, Ser. i, i ;4i7, Moore's Digest,
7;?oo) ; June 20, 1898, (Gen. Ord., Navy Dept, 1898, No. 492, For. Rel.,
1898, p. 780, Freeman Snow, International Law, and. ed., Washington,
1898, p. 174) ; June 27, 1900, Stockton's Naval War Code, (Gen. Ord.,
Navy Dept., 1900, No. 551, revoked Gen. Ord., Navy Dept., Feb. 4, 1904,
No. 150, Printed, Naval War College, International Law Discussions,
1903, p. 112).
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The courts have held that proof of three questions of fact
is necessary to justify condemnation, (1) existence of blockade,
(2) knowledge on the part of the violating vessel, (3) actual
or constructive violation. 15 To exist, a blockade must be ef-
fective,
16 but a single cruiser may be sufficient to make it so;17
it need not be declared, de facto blockades having been consid-
ered legitimate,
18
although they are denounced by the Declara-
tion of London,19 and it terminates only on notification or occu-
pation of the port.
20
Knowledge of the blockade will be presumed21 when the
vessel left port after notification to that government,
22 or had
an opportunity to learn of the blockade en route.23 An indi-
vidual warning is only necessary when required by treaty2* or
where the vessel sailed before notification and arrived in igno-
rance of the blockade. 25
In defining the acts constituting a violation of blockade
the courts in the civil war cases seem to have gone beyond the
bounds of international law. 26 Besides attempting to enter27
15The Nayade, Fed. Cas. 7,046; The Betsey, i Rob. 29; The Nancy,
1 Act. 59.
16The Andromeda, 2 Wall. 48; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474.
17The Olinde Rodriguez, 174 U. S. 510.
iThe Adula, 176 U. S. 361.
"Declaration of London, 1909, art. 8.
20The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Josephine, 3 Wall. 83; The Cir-
cassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Adula, 176 U. S. 361.
^Condemnations without special warning The Circassian, 2 Wall.
135; The Hallie Jackson, Blatch. 248; The Empress, Blatch. 175; The
Prize Cases, 2 Black 635; The Revenge, 2 Sprague 107; The Hiawatha,
2 Black 677; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603; The Cornelius, 3 Wall. 214; The
Herald, 3 Wall. 768; U. S. vs. Halleck, 154 U. S. 537; The Adula, 176
U. S. 361 ; The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231.
"The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135.
2SU. S. vs. Halleck, 154 U. S. 537, (1864).
24Fitzsimmons vs. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch 185, (1818).
25The Nayade, Fed. Cas. 7046; Yeaton vs. Frey, 5 Cranch 335, (1809).
26This is partly accounted for by the fact that the court considered
the civil war blockade a municipal rather than an international measure.
For an interesting statement of this view, written while the war was in
progress, see Upton, op. cit., pp. 298-307. He says, "No one surely whose
intelligence is not clouded by prejudice or obscured by selfish considera-
tions can fail to perceive the broad distinction between that blockade
which is proclaimed by a sovereign nation of a portion of its own ports,
for the purpose of quelling a domestic insurrection and compelling the
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or leave28 a blockaded port or hovering about in a suspicious
manner,
29 the court applied the doctrine of continuous voyage
to blockade, condemning cargoes bound for blockaded ports by
transhipment.
30 No limits to the zone of operations were re-
quired. Vessels with an "intent" to break blockade were held
liable from the beginning of the voyage to the end of the return
voyage
31 and even on a subsequent voyage.32 These rules were
misguided insurgents to 'unthread the rude eye of rebellion and welcome
home again discarded peace', and that which is ordered and enforced
by a sovereign government of the ports of its foreign enemy, for the
purpose of paralyzing his power and compelling him to repair his wrongs,
and submit to the terms of equitable pacification." p. 301. This view is
wholly indefensible by modern international law. The law of blockade
is for the benefit of neutrals and it makes no difference to them whether
the war is rebellion or international war they have a right to the same
law in either case.
27Fitzsimmons vs. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch 185, 200; McCall vs.
Marine Ins. Co., 8 Cranch 59; The Diana, 7 Wall. 354; The Nuestra
Senora de Regla, 17 Wall. 29.
28The Jeune Nelly, in U. S. vs. Guillam, 11 Wall. 47; The Tropic
Wind, Fed. Cas. 14,186, 16,5413; The Hiawatha, Fed. Cas. 6451, af-
firmed, 2 Black 677; The Lynchburg, Fed. Cas. 863/a, 8638, 8639; The
Crenshaw, Fed. Cas. 3384, affirmed, The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635. Days
of grace have generally been allowed in which vessels in port may leave.
In the civil war cases no cargo could be loaded in this time, The Hia-
watha, Fed. Cas. 6451, although a limited permission to do so was given
by the Navy Instructions of May 8, 1861, see Prize Cases, 2 Black, 6/6.
According to the instructions of 1898 and Stockton's Naval War Code
cargo may be loaded in this time.
29The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231; The Coosa, i Newb. Adm. 393; The
Hiawatha, Blatch. i, Fed. Cas. 6451; The Empress, Blatch. 175; The
Josephine, 3 Wall. 83; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170; The Teresita,
5 Wall. 180; The Newfoundland, 176 U. S. 97, (1900); The Cornelius,
3 Wall. 214.
The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Springbok, 5 Wall. I, (1866);
The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514; The Flying Scud, 6 Wall. 263; The Thomp-
son, 3 Wall. 155. In The Peterhoff, 5 Wall 28 it was held that a tranship-
ment by land could not be regarded as a breach of blockade.
^The Galen, 37 Ct. Cl. 89, (1901) ; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603; The
Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Cornelius, 3
Wall. 214; The Jenny, 5 Wall. 183; The Adela, 6 Wall. 266.
"The Mersey, Fed. Cas. 9,489, reversed Fed. Cas. 9,4Qo; The Major
Barbour, Fed. Cas. 8,983; The Joseph H. Toone, Fed. Cas. 7,541- The
principle of liability on a subsequent voyage was not relied upon ex-
clusively in these cases. For discussion see Upton, op. cit. p. 288. Contra,
see The Wren, 6 Wall. 155.
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quite generally denounced by European publicists, although in
a number of cases which were subsequently submitted to arbi-
tration the American position was sustained.33 They are how-
ever in conflict with the Declaration of London, which forbids
the application of "continuous voyage" to blockade and re-
quires that captures be limited to the zone of operation of the
blockading squadron.
34
Forfeiture of vessel and cargo has been the usual penalty
for breach of blockade, though in a few cases, where the owner
of part of the cargo was ignorant of the intent of the vessel,
the cargo was restored,
35
while in other cases, where, applying
the doctrine of continuous voyage, it was the cargo alone which
had a blockaded destination, the vessel was released.36
(2) Carriage of Contraband. Early treaties generally
contained lists of articles which could alone be declared contra-
band,37 and sometimes free lists were also included.38 One of
83The case of The Springbok, 5 Wall, i, (1866), in which a cargo
destined for transhipment to a blockade runner at Nassau, New Provi-
dence was condemned, aroused the severest criticism. It was denounced
as a retrogression to the practice of paper blockade so prominent in the
Napoleonic wars. See Moore's Digest 7:723-739, in which opinions of
Lord Russell, Twiss, Phillimore, Bluntschli, Fiore, and others are given.
For arbitral awards under Art. 13, treaty of Washington of 1871, Ibid.
75725, Moore Int. Arb., 453928-393S-
"Declaration of London, 1909, art. 17, 19.
35The Springbok, 5 Wall. I ; The Flying Scud, 6 Wall. 263.
36The Springbok, 5 Wall. I.
"Contraband lists generally consisting of four classes of articles,
(i) arms and ammuntion, (2) military clothes and accoutrements, (3)
horses and their furniture, (4) other instruments especially for use in war
have been included in twenty-six treaties, with twenty countries of which
the following are in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 17, Malloy, p. 119; Italy,
1871, art. 15, p. 974; Prussia, 1799-1810, revived 1828, art. 13, p. 1491;
Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 9, p. 1728. Most of these
treaties specify that no other articles shall be subject to confiscation as
contraband, although this is not true of those with Italy and Prussia.
In addition to these classes of articles, the treaty with Great Britain of
1794-1807, (art. 18, p. 601) included navy stores, and stated that "pro-
visions and other articles not generally contraband may be regarded as
such" and may be seized upon indemnifying the owner for their value
with an allowance for profit, and damages caused by the detention.
Treaties with Salvador, (1850-1870, art. 19, p. 1543; 1870-1893, art. 19,
P- !S57) add "provisions that are imported into a besieged or blockaded
place" to the contraband list, though it is difficult to see why such goods
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the most remarkable provisions is that in the Prussian treaties
of 1785 and 1799, the latter of which was renewed in 1828 and
is still in force,
39 in which contraband is declared abolished as
between the two countries with the proviso that goods formerly
deemed contraband might be detained and requisitioned on
payment of full compensation to the neutral owner. The Decla-
ration of London40 contains a codification of the law of contra-
band, embracing lists of absolute contraband, conditional con-
traband and free goods. These lists, however, have not been
adhered to in subsequent wars.
Naval instructions beginning with those of the continental
congress of 177641 have been issued at the beginning of wars
specifying contraband lists and enjoining naval officers to re-
spect neutral rights. Few cases involving contraband were
decided in the Revolutionary war, the War of 1812, the Mexican
or the Spanish wars. The Civil war cases alone are of impor-
tance. In these the courts appear to have been guided largely
would not be liable under the law of blockade, and a treaty with Two
Sicilies of 1855-1861, (art. 3, p. 1816) includes "troops whether infantry
or cavalry" under the name of contraband. The treaties with Prussia,
Italy and Venezuela, (1836-1851, art. 18, p. 1836; 1860-1870, art. 13, p.
1850) exclude horses from the contraband list.
88The treaties with France, 1778-1798, art. 24, p. 496; Spain, 1795-
1902, art. 16, p. 1646; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1826, art. 8, p.
1728, among other things put textiles, gold, iron, copper, coal, grain,
provisions, navy stores, and lumber on the free list. That with Nether-
lands, 1782-1795, art. 24, p. 1240, puts navy stores and machines for
manufacturing war material on the free list
39Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 13, p. 1481; 1799-1810, re-
vived 1828, art. 13, p. 1491. See U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 526 for
interpretation of this provision. It has also been made the basis of
compensation in the recent (1915) case of the United States vessel Wil-
liam P. Frye. ,
"Declaration of London, 1909, Charles, Treaties, 1913, p. 272.
41Naval instructions April 3, 1776, (Journal of the Continental Con-
gress, W. C. Ford, ed., 4 ; 253, Journal of Congress, I ; 244, G. W. Allen,
A Naval History of the American Revolution, N. Y., 1913, 2 vols., 2 ;695) ;
Apr. 7, 1781, (Jour. Cong, Ford, ed., 19; 361); 1812, (2 Wheat. App.,
80-81
; Moore's Digest, 7:516), May 14, 1846, (Br. and For. St. Pap.
3451139), May 14, 1862, (Upton, op. cit p. 490); Aug. 18, 1862, (Official
Rec. Union and Conf. Navies, Ser. i, 1 5417) ; June 20, 1898, (Navy
Dept., Gen. Ord., 1898, No. 492, For. Rel., 1898, p. 780) ; June 27, 1900,
Stockton's Naval War Code, (Naval War College, International Law
Discussions, 1903, p. 112).
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by British precedents, mostly those of Lord Stowell in the
Napoleonic era.42
All cases have held that the concurrence of (1) a hostile
character in the goods themselves and (2) a hostile destination
is necessary for condemnation. The courts have drawn the
distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, hold-
ing that the former may be condemned if destined to the enemy
country,
43 while the latter is only liable if bound for the use
of the enemy army.44 The doctrine of continuous voyage has
been applied to both absolute45 and conditional contraband.49
It was this question which occupied most attention in the Civil
war cases. British vessels were in the habit of landing cargoes
in the West Indies or in Mexico near the Texan frontier for
transhipment in blockade runners or by land to the Confederate
states.47 Such vessels, if captured on the first limb of the voy-
age, that is while sailing between two neutral ports, were usually
condemned.48 The grounds of condemnation were not always
clear. In most of these cases, carriage of contraband and breach
of blockade were both suggested.
The penalty imposed for carriage of contraband was ordi-
narily condemnation of the contraband cargo alone,49 though
free goods of the owner of contraband were generally declared
"infected" and condemned.50 Evidence of bad faith such as
42On force of British prize court precedents in United States courts
see Marshall in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191,
198, (1815), quoted Moore's Digest, 7:598, "The United States having
at one time formed a component part of the British Empire their prize
law was our prize law, so far as it was adapted to our circumstances,
and was not varied by the power which was capable of changing it."
The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28, 58, (1866).
"The Commercen, i Wheat. 382, (1816).
"The Dolphin, Fed. Cas. 868, (1863) ; The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514,
(1865).
"The Pearl, 5 Wall. 574, (1866) ; The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28, (1866).
47For complete statement of the conditions of contraband trade dur-
ing the Civil war see the Stephen Hart, Blatch. 387, (1863), Scott, 852,
affirmed in the Hart, 3 Wall. 559. See also Moore's Digest, 7:698-739.
"Instructions of the Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 18, 1862, author-
ized seizure of vessels carrying contraband for the insurgents "to their
ports directly or indirectly by transhipment". See Moore's Digest, 7 ;/oo.
"The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28, (1866); The Commercen, i Wheat. 382,
(1816).
BOThe Lucy, 37 Ct. Cl. 97, (1901) ; The Bird, 38 Ct. Cl. 228, (1903) ;
The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28.
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destruction of papers,
51
giving of false destination52 and being
involved in blockade running53 were held to condemn the vessel
also. Ordinarily liability was held to cease with the deposit of
contraband goods, but this was not true, the vessel being con-
demned on her return voyage if a false destination were given.54
(3) Unneutral Service. The transportation of troops and
the carriage of dispatches, which are the commonest offenses
included under the offense of unneutral service, are sometimes
spoken of as analogues of contraband. In reality the offense
is distinctly different from that of carrying contraband. The
idea of destination inseparable from contraband trade is not
necessarily included. It is the service, ordinarily coupled with
an unneutral intent, that creates the offense.55 The similarity
to contraband trade, however, is evident, and in a treaty of
1855 with Two Sicilies56 naval and military troops were in-
cluded in the contraband lists. A large number of treaties in
stipulating that free ships shall make free goods add that enemy
persons on neutral vessels shall "not be taken out of that ship
unless they are officers or soldiers and in the actual service of
the enemies",57 thus indicating that persons of the latter class
are liable and strongly implying that they may be taken out of
a vessel overtaken at sea, a position which was protested by
Great Britain in the Trent case.58 The Declaration of London
"The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514.
52The Lucy, 37 Ct Cl. 97, (1901); The Joseph, 8 Cranch 451; Car-
rington vs. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Pet. 494.
63The Dolphin, Fed. Cas. 868; The Pearl, 5 Wall. 574; The Hart, 3
Wall. 559; The Gertrude, Fed. Cas. 5,369, 5.37O.
"The Lucy, 37 Ct. Cl. 97, (1901); The Joseph, 8 Cranch 451; Car-
rington vs. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Pet. 494. In the Betsey and Polly,
38 Ct. Cl. 30, (1902), it was held that giving a false destination does
not condemn on return voyage when there is no contraband on board
and the real destination is unblockaded.
58On distinction of contraband trade and unneutral service see Mar-
quardson on the Trent case, quoted Moore's Digest, 75775.
"Treaty with Two Sicilies, 1855-1861, art. 3, Malloy, p. 1816.
"Seizure of military persons on neutral vessels has been provided
in twenty-seven treaties with nineteen countries, of which the following
are in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 16, Malloy, p. 119; Colombia, 1846, art.
IS, p. 306; Italy, 1871, art. 16, p. 974; Prussia, 1785-1796, revived 1828,
art. 12, p. 1481 ; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 7, p. 1727.
B8See Moore's Digest, 75775.
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distinguishes two classes of unneutral service.59 Lesser offenses
subject the vessels to the treatment of neutral contraband car-
riers, while graver offenses amounting to a direct participation
in naval movements subject them to the treatment of enemy
merchant vessels.
In the Chesapeake affair of 180780 and in other cases pre-
ceding and causing the War of 1812 the United States objected
to the taking of military persons from its vessels when neutral.
In these cases the illegal impressment of neutral persons was
also involved. The Trent affair81 during the Civil war, which
involved the seizure of Confederate emissaries from a British
vessel, was settled diplomatically and unfavorably to the right
of such seizure. Here the vessel was not brought in for prize
adjudication, seizure being made on the sea, but this practice
seems to have been contemplated in a large number of the
United States treaties of that time,62 although not by any treat-
ies with England. It also seems to be countenanced by the
Declaration of London.63 The seizure in the Trent case, how-
ever, was complicated by the fact that the persons seized were
diplomatic emissaries accredited to a neutral government,
rather than military persons, and consequently should have
enjoyed diplomatic immunities.
No cases involving unneutral service appear to have come
up in United States prize courts.84 English precedents, how-
ever, which are usually of weight in United States prize courts,
85
have held that vessels may be condemned not only on the basis
of employment by the enemy government but also for know-
ingly or fraudulently giving aid through carriage of troops,
military persons or dispatches.
86
"Where knowledge or fraud is
"Declaration of London, arts. 45, 46.
See Moore's Digest, 25991, 1001.
61See Moore's Digest, 75768-779.
82Supra, p. 156, note 57.
'Declaration of London, art. 47.
e
*Seizure of vessels engaged in unneutral service was authorized by
the Naval instructions of 1898, art. 16, For. Rel., 1898, p. 781, and Stock-
ton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904, arts. 16, 20.
68In regard to English prize court precedents in United States
courts see Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, 198,
(1815), Moore's Digest, 7;599, Supra, p. 155, note 42.
"Carriage of troops and military persons The Caroline, 4 Rob.
256, (1802) ; The Friendship, 6 Rob. 320, (1807); The Orozemba, 6 Rob.
430, (1807); Carriage of Dispatches The Atalanta, 6 Rob. 440, (1808);
The Constantia, The Susan, The Hope, see Moore's Digest, 7:759-762.
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not proved the vessel has usually been restored but on condition
that it pay the captors' expenses,
67 the ground being taken that
the belligerent has a right of seizing, bringing in and investigat-
ing neutral vessels suspected of unneutral service, even where
condemnation is not warranted.
(4) Presumption of Enemy Character. The general rule
applies that enemy property at sea is liable to confiscation. The
belligerent will therefore claim condemnation of vessels and
goods apparently neutral if their real ownership or the actual
right to their use is enemy. The enemy or neutral character of
property may be determined in a number of different ways, as
by the nationality of the owner, the domicile of the owner, the
location of the goods, or the flag of the vessel. Where the
character of the goods depends upon the character of the owner,
the question of who is the owner when goods are in transit
arises.
By the Declaration of London, 68 the neutral or enemy char-
acter of a vessel is determined by the
' '
flag which she is entitled
to fly" and of goods on board an enemy vessel by the "neutral
or enemy character of the owner,
' '
the title ordinarily remaining
with the seller until the destination is reached.
These principles have been generally adhered to by United
States courts, but the character of goods or of their owner has
been interpreted in accordance with the Anglo-American princi-
ple of territoriality as opposed to nationality. Thus goods owned
by an inhabitant of enemy territory, irrespective of his sympa-
thy
69 or nationality,
70 have been considered enemy goods. Goods
employed in the enemy service70 or the produce of enemy soil
72
67The Caroline, 6 Rob. 461, (1808) ; The Madison, Edw. Adm. 224,
(1810); The Rapid, Edw. Adm. 228, (1810) ; See Moore's Digest, 71/62-
763.
68Declaration of London, 1909, art. 58-60.
69Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419; The Benito Estenger,
176 U. S. 568. See Moore's Digest, 7J429-43O.
70Chester vs. The Experiment, Fed. Court of Appeals, 2 Dall. 41,
(1787); U. S. vs. Gillies, Pet. C. C. 159; Murray vs. The Charming
Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, (1804); The Venus, 8 Cranch 253, (1814); The
Frances, 8 Cranch 335, (1814) ; The Mary and Susan, i Wheat. 46. See
Moore's Digest, 7 1424-429.
"Darby vs. The Erstern, Fed. Court of Appeals, 2 Dall. 34, (1782) ;
The Hart, 3 Wall. 559; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474. See Moore's Digest,
754IO-4I5-
"Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, (1815) ; The
Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, (1862). See Moore's Digest, 7 -,406-410.
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are also regarded as enemy goods whatever the character of the
owner.
The courts have held that title to property in transit is
with the vendor. Thus goods enroute from an enemy seller to a
neutral buyer, even when sold, are condemned as enemy prop-
erty
73 and goods in transit from a neutral seller to a belligerent
buyer are released as neutral property.74 It has been hinted,
however, that if the contract of sale specified that the transfer
should take place on delivery to the master of the vessel, and
consideration had been given, a neutral buyer might make good
his claim.75
In addition to these general principles, international law rec-
ognizes certain circumstances which give a constructive enemy
character to goods which are really neutral, in which case con-
demnation is permitted. This constructive enemy character has
at different times and by different countries been asserted on
the following grounds: (a) transfers to neutral flag, (b) ac-
ceptance of enemy convoy, protection or license, (c) resistance to
visit and search or fraud, (d) engaging in closed trade, (e) car-
riage by neutral vessels of enemy goods, (f ) shipping of neutral
goods on enemy vessels.
(a) By the Declaration of London,78 transfers of enemy
vessels to a neutral flag are in general valid if made before the
outbreak of hostilities, void if made after. Certain provisions
and presumptions, however, are added. A more liberal rule has
heretofore been applied by United States courts. Thus bona fide
transfers of vessels and property, whether made before or after
the outbreak of the war, have been held valid.
77 This has also
been the British rule.78 The sale, however, is presumed not bona
73The Ship Frances and Cargo, i Gall. 445, affirmed 8 Cranch 350,
(1813) ; The Frances, 9 Cranch 183, (1815) ; The San Jose Indiano, 2
Gall. 268, affirmed i Wheat. 308, (1814).
74The Ship Ann Green, i Gall. 274, Scott, 620, (1812).
"The San Jose Indiano, 2 Gall. 268, affirmed i Wheat. 208. See
Moore's Digest, 75404-406.
"Declaration of London, 1909, art. 55-56.
"Gushing, Att. Gen., 6 op. 638, (1854); 7 op. 538, (1855). See
Moore's Digest, 7:715-724.
78The Baltica, n Moore P. C. 141, (1857) ; The Ariel, 11 Moore-
P. C. 119, (1857). France and Russia have generally applied the princi-
ple that sales made after the outbreak of war are void. See French
Regulations, July 26, 1778, noted Moore's Digest, 75417; Russian Prize
Regulations, March 27, 1895, quoted Moore's Digest, 7:424. Great Brit-
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fide if made in transit79 or under conditions such as the reten-
tion of enemy control or the reservation of a right to repur-
chase.80 The sale of enemy warships to a neutral has been re-
garded as void even if bona fide.81 .
(b) While the sailing under neutral convoy exempts mer-
chant vessels not only from capture but from visit and search,
the acceptance of enemy convoy, of enemy license, or the ship-
ping of goods in an enemy armed vessel has sometimes been held
in itself to render the neutral goods and vessels liable to condem-
nation as of constructive enemy character.82 In the leading
United States case, however, The Nereide,83 the majority of the
court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, held that neu-
tral goods laden on an armed enemy ship were exempt from cap-
ture, and this decision was followed in the Atalanta84 a few years
later. Justice Story dissented in The Nereide, holding that a
distinction existed between the loading of neutral goods in un-
armed and armed belligerent vessels, and the latter case, similar
to belligerent convoy, gave the neutral goods enemy character.
Story's opinion was followed by the court of claims in a number
of French spoliation claim cases. 85 The condemnation of neu-
ain adopted this rule as a measure of retaliation by order in council,
Nov. ii, 1807, Br. and For. St. Pap., 8:468; Am. St. Pap., For. Rel.,
3:270. By Naval Instructions of 1870, France somewhat relaxed her
practice, and admitted that the presumption of illegality in sales made
during war might be overthrown by sufficient evidence. See A. P. Rivier,
Principes du Droit des Gens, 2 vols., Paris, 1896, 2:414.
79The Ship Frances and Cargo, i Gall. 443, affirmed 8 Cranch 354,
(1813); The Sally, 3 Wall. 451, 460, (1865).
80The Island Belle, Fed. Cas. 168; The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S.
568, (1899), Scott, 621.
81The Georgia, 7 Wall. 32, (1868) ; The Sally, 3 Wall, 451, 460,
(1865). See also the Texan Star, Moore, Int. Arb., 3:2360 and an edi-
torial comment by J. B. Scott, Am. Jour. Int. Law, Jan. 1915.
82See Danish Instructions, Mch. 28, 1810, declaring all neutral ves-
sels good prize "which made use of British Convoy". Eighteen United
States vessels were seized under this clause and a diplomatic controversy
ensued which was settled by a convention of March 28, 1830, Malloy, p.
377, in which Denmark made compensation. See Moore's Digest, 7:496-
499.
83The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, (1815).
84The Atalanta, 3 Wheat. 409, (1818).
85 The Nancy, 27 Ct. Cl. 99, (1827) ; The Brig Sea Nymph, 36 Ct. Cl.
369, (1901). It was held in The Galen, 37 Ct. Cl. 89, (1901), that though
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tral and national vessels sailing under an enemy license or pass-
port has been decreed in a number of cases.86 .
(c) The Declaration of London87 provides that "forcible
resistance to the legitimate exercise of the right of stoppage,
search and capture" involves in all cases the condemnation of
the vessel and of goods belonging to the master or owner. Simi-
lar provision was made in the United States naval instructions
of 1898 and in Stockton's Naval war code.88 The courts have in-
variably held the captors exempt from liability for making seiz-
ures when any of these circumstances exist,89 and in a number
of cases have condemned the vessel.90 In most of the early trea-
ties of the United States, neutral vessels were required to carry
passports or sea letters and other papers. In some of them it
was also provided that a vessel not carrying such papers could
be detained and might be
' ' declared legal prize
"
by a competent
court unless the absence of the papers could be satisfactorily ex-
plained.
91 The courts, however, have held that in such cases neu-
tral vessels could not be condemned even in the absence of pass-
ports, if other evidence indicated a bona fide neutral character.92
(d) Belligerents have at times condemned neutral vessels
for engaging in a branch of enemy trade closed to them in time
of peace,
93 for trading between enemy ports or even for trading
acceptance of belligerent convoy rendered the vessel liable, the liability
did not inhere after voluntary separation from it.
"The Julia, 8 Cranch 181 ; The Aurora, 8 Cranch 203 ; The Hiram, 8
Cranch 444; The Hiram, i Wheat. 440; The Ariadne, 2 Wheat. 143; Pat-
ton vs. Nicholson, 3 Wheat. 204; The Langdon Cheves, 4 Wheat. 103. See
Moore's Digest, 7J395-398.
87The Declaration of London, 1909, art. 63.
*8Naval Instructions, June 20, 1898. For. Rel., 1898, p. 780; Stock-
ton's Naval War Code, art. 33.
89Del Col vs. Arnold, 3 Dall. 333; The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. I,
(1826).
9 The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514.
91 Non-carriage of passports was declared to subject the vessel to con-
demnation in sixteen treaties with eleven countries, of which those with
Bolivia (1858, art. 22, Malloy, p. 121) and Colombia (1846, art. 22, p. 309)
are still in force. In six treaties with five countries, of which that with
Prussia (1799-1810, revived 1828, art. 14, P- 149* ) is still in force, the car-
riage of passports was required but failure to do so was specifically de-
clared not to create a presumption against the vessel.
92The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227; The Venus, 27 Ct. Cl. 116. (1892).
93See British Rule of 1756, Moore's Digest, 7J383, also similar rule of
1793, Order in Council, Nov. 6, 1793, Lawrence, op, cit. p. 7*7- Historical
account of the growth of these rules, i Wheat. 530, App. ii.
162 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [162
with the enemy at all.94 In a large number of its treaties95 the
United States has agreed as a belligerent to recognize the right of
citizens of the other contracting party to free navigation between
neutral and enemy ports and between two enemy ports; and in
none of its wars has it condemned neutral vessels, even when not
protected by treaty, on the basis of engaging in closed trade.98
The condemnation of vessels of American citizens trading with
the enemy is based on an entirely different principle and is really
not governed by international law at all.97 In insurance cases98
94See Napoleon's Berlin, (Nov. 21, 1806) and Milan, (Nov. 23, 1807,
Dec. 17, 1807) decrees and British Orders in Council, (Jan. 7, 1807, Nov.
11, 1807, Mch. 15, 1915).. Texts of all but the last, Br. and For. St. Pap.
8
; 401-513 ; DeMarten's Nouveau Recueil, 1 5433-549 ; Am. St. Pap., For.
Rel. 35262.
95The freedom of neutral trade has been guaranteed in twenty-five
treaties with eighteen countries, of which the following are in force : Bo-
livia, 1858, art. 15, 18, Malloy, p. 119; Colombia, 1846, art. 15, 18, p. 206;
Italy, 1871, art. 16, p. 974; Prussia, 1785-1796, revived, 1828, art. 12, p. 1481 ;
Sweden, 1783-1798, revived, 1816, 1827, art. 7, p. 1727.
96Dicta in some civil war cases seems to indicate that such trade
creates an enemy character. See The Hart, 3 Wall. 560.
97The condemnation of property of citizens engaged in trade with
the enemy should be regarded as a matter of domestic policy, rather than
of international law. Such trade has always been branded as illegal and
creating a constructive enemy character by the United States, see The
Rapid, 8 Cranch 155, (1814) ; Rush, Att. Gen., i op. 175, (1814) ; The Al-
exander, 8 Cranch 169, (1814) ; The Sally, 8 Cranch 382, (1814) ; The St.
Lawrence, 8 Cranch 434, (1814) ; The Thomas Gibbons, 8 Cranch 421,
(1814); The Rugen, I Wheat. 63, (1816) ; Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13
How. 498, 18 How. no. See President Lincoln's proclamation Aug. 16,
1861, prohibiting all trade with the southern states, (12 stat. 1262). See
Moore's Digest, 7:391-395. The United States courts have applied the
doctrine of continuous voyage to such trade, The Joseph, 8 Cranch 451,
454, (1814) ; The Grotius, 8 Cranch 456, (1814). See Moore's Digest, 7;
388-391. In the Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 148, (1815), the doctrine of continu-
ous voyage acted to the advantage of a vessel which left England for the
United States after the repeal of the British Orders in Council and be-
fore the news of the outbreak of the war of 1812, and consequently would
have been exempt from capture under the president's instructions of Aug.
28, 1812, had she come home directly. Although she left an Irish port in
which she had been forced to take shelter long after she had knowledge
of the war, the court held her voyage was continuous from the innocent
start in England so she could not be condemned for trading with the
enemy. See Moore's Digest, 7J393-
8Vasse vs. Ball, 2 Dall. 270, (Pa.), See Moore's Digest, 75387.
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the United States courts have denied the legitimacy of condem-
nations of vessels for engaging in closed trade, or the Rule of
1756," as it was called. The greater extensions of the claims to
limit neutral trade put forth in the Napoleonic wars with in-
creasing severity against neutrals were scarcely admitted even
by the belligerent nations as warranted by international law, but
were justified if at all as measures of retaliation against enemies.
To these restrictions by means of paper blockades the United
States was an incessant protestant. The charge that its own
practice during the civil war was of similar character has al-
ready been mentioned in considering blockade.100 . However, the
usual practice of prize courts in the United States is to refuse to
condemn neutral vessels for engaging in any trade, unless prin-
ciples of blockade or contraband can be invoked, a practice which
naval forces were required to observe by Stockton's Naval War
Code.101
(e) When no question of blockade, contraband or unneu-
tral service is involved, the general principle has been recognized
from early times that neutral vessels carrying neutral cargo are
exempt from seizure and condemnation. When enemy goods are
loaded in a neutral vessel, three principles have at different times
been acted on : (1) both goods and neutral vessel are liable, (2)
the enemy goods alone are liable, (3) neither goods nor vessel
may be condemned. The first principle by which a constructive
enemy character is given to the neutral vessel carrying goods, is
known as the doctrine of infection. It was sometimes applied
in the early eighteenth century, but in recent times it has been
universally repudiated and has never been applied in the United
States. The second principle was the one generally applied by
the United States courts, except where treaties directed other-
wise, up to the time of the Spanish war. In spite of the renun-
ciation of the principle by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, and
"The Rule of 1756 was inaugurated by Great Britain during a time
when practically all colonial trade was closed in time of peace, and it was
to this practice that the doctrine of continuous voyage was first applied.
In the wars following the French Revolution, United States merchants
entered the French West Indian trade which was opened to them, and in
order to escape the operation of the rule of 1756, now known as the rule
of 1793, transshipped at a port of the United States before going to Eu-
rope. Lord Stowell held the voyage continuous and condemned vessels
bound for Europe whose cargo had originally come from the French
West Indies. See Moore's Digest, 7:383, r Wheat. 530, App. ii.
10 Supra, p. 153.
101Stockton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904. art. 19.
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the consistent stand of the political department of the govern-
ment in favor of "free ships, free goods" since the foundation
of the republic, the courts continued to announce the condemna-
tion of enemy property on neutral vessels as law during the civil
war,
102
although all condemnations were supported by resort to
principles of contraband or blockade as well. With this doctrine
neutral vessels carrying enemy goods were liable to the incon-
venience of seizure and detention until the enemy goods could be
removed. As a partial compensation the neutral was usually al-
lowed freight on the enemy goods condemned.103 The third prin-
ciple is known as the doctrine of "free ships, free goods." Al-
though it acts immediately for the benefit of enemy private per-
sons, its adoption has been brought about by the pressure of neu-
tral powers, and it is rather as a concession to the neutral 's inter-
est in not having his vessels detained, than for the benefit of bel-
ligerent powers, that the doctrine has at length become incorpo-
rated into international law.104 In naval instructions of the Rev-
olutionary War the principle was provided for, and the courts
at that time applied it in accord with these instructions.
105 In
early treaties beginning with the first treaty concluded by the
United States, that with France in 1778, "free ships, free goods"
found a place,108 sometimes though not always coupled with a
stipulation for "enemy ships, enemy goods."107 The political
102Early cases. The Julia, 8 Cranch 181 ; The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388;
The Antonia Johanna, i Wheat. 159, (1816) ; The Ariadne, 2. Wheat. 143;
The Caledonian, 4 Wheat. 100. For Judicial opinion during the Civil
War, see the Hiawatha, Fed. Cas., 6451 ; The Hart, 3 Wall. 559, affirming
the Stephen Hart, Blatch, 387.
108The Antonia Johanna, I Wheat. 159, Hoover vs. U. S., 2.2 Ct. Cl.
408, 460, (1887) ; The Ann Green, i Gall. 274.
104The doctrine was first authoritatively advocated by the Armed Neu-
trality of 1780, sponsored by Russia, see Moore's Digest, 7;558-56i.
105Naval Instructions, Apr. 3, 1776; Apr. 7, 1781, Jour. Cong., Ford,
ed., 45253, 19 5361, Allen, op. cit.., 25695. See also, Darby vs. the Brig
Erstern, 2 Dall. 34, ordinance Dec. 4, 1781, Jour. Cong., 7:185, Ford, ed.,
2151158.
106
"Free Ships, Free Goods" has been provided for in thirty treaties
with twenty-seven countries, of which the following are now in force:
Bolivia, 1858, art. 16, Malloy, p. 1195; Colombia, 1846, art. 15, p. 306;
Italy, 1871, art. 16, p. 974; Peru, 1856, art. I, p. 1402; Prussia, 1785-1796,
revived 1828, art. 12, p. 1481 ; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 7,
p. 1727; Russia, 1854, art. i, p. 1520.
107Of the above treaties in force those with Sweden and Colombia
contain the stipulation of "enemy ships, enemy goods." See infra, note in.
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department of the government has supported this principle as a
rule of international law since the establishment of the govern-
ment,
108 but it was not applied by the courts after the Revolu-
tionary War until the War of 1898. The principle was adopted
by most of the powers through the Declaration of Paris of 1856,
but this was never acceded to by the United States and during
the civil war the courts continued to voice the earlier princi-
ple.
109 In proclamations and naval instructions of the Spanish
war the principle was adopted, and it was also incorporated into
Stockton's Naval War Code.110 It is now undoubtedly law in
the United States as well as a principle of international law.
(f ) Neutral goods on enemy vessels have also been subjected
to varying treatment. The three possible principles are (1) both
enemy vessel and neutral goods are liable, (2) the vessel alone is
liable, (3) neither the vessel nor the goods may be condemned.
The first principle, known as "enemy ships, enemy goods," was
frequently applied in the early eighteenth century along with
the doctrine of infection at a time when neutrals were so few
and lacking in force that their voice commanded no attention,
but in recent times it has not been applied as a rule of interna-
tional law, and was repudiated by the Declaration of Paris of
1856. It has however been frequently stipulated in treaties, as
an offset to the concession of "free ships, free goods." The
United States has embodied this principle in a number of trea-
ties,
111 two of which are still in force but probably obsolete in
108See Moore's Digest, 7 ',434-453, especially letter of instructions by
Secretary of State Cass to United States Minister in France, June 27,
1859, which says, "with respect to the protection of the vessel and the
cargo by the flag which waves over them, the United States look upon
the principle as established and they maintain that belligerent property on
board neutral ships is not liable to capture," p. 450. In spite of this the
courts affirmed the opposite view a few years later during the civil war.
See The Hiawatha Fed. Cas., 6451, The Hart, 3 Wall. 559.
1W)The Hiawatha, Fed. Cas., 6451, The Hart, 3 Wall. 559.
110Telegraphic Instructions, Apr. 22, 1898, (Moore's Digest, 7:453);
Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, (30 stat. 1770) ; Stockton's Naval War Code,.
1900-1904, art. 19.
111
"Enemy ships, enemy goods" has been provided for in eighteen
treaties with thirteen powers, always in combination with the stipulation
of "free ships, free goods," and generally with the proviso that goods of
the neutral laden on an enemy vessel in a specified time, varying from
two to eight months after the outbreak of the war, shall be exempt. Only
two of these treaties, those with Peru, 1870-1886, (art. 19, p. 1420) and
Salvador, 1870-1893, (art. 16, p. 1556) were concluded after the Declara-
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this respect. The second principle, that which condemns the
enemy vessel and saves the neutral goods, coupled with the prin-
ciple that enemy goods in neutral vessels are liable, was laid down
in the Consolato del Mare, 112 a body of sea law of the thirteenth
century, and has formed the recognized rule of international law
since that time. The principle was adopted in the Declaration
of Paris in combination with the principle of "free ships, free
goods." Although the United States did not accede to this dec-
laration, in six individual treaties113 of about that time it was
agreed to recognize the two principles as "permanent and invio-
lable" rules of international law, applicable to all powers who so
conceived them. The courts have consistently applied this rule
in cases not covered by treaty provisions with a different re-
quirement, but with the presumption that goods in an enemy
vessel are enemy.
114 The final principle, that which contemplates
the exemption of both the enemy vessel and its neutral cargo,
when coupled with the existing principle of "free ships, free
goods,
' '
would logically lead to the total immunity of enemy pri-
vate property from seizure during war. This is a principle his-
torically advocated by the United States, but is not at present a
tion of Paris. In these two cases existing treaties were merely revised and
the clause was probably retained through lack of attention and an auto-
matic copying of old forms; in fact in the Peruvian treaty of 1856, the
principles of the Declaration of Paris had been adhered to as permanent
and inviolable. At the revision of the Peruvian treaty of 1870 in 1887
the clause was omitted. Two of these treaties, those with Sweden, (1783-
1798, revived 1827, art. 14, p. 1/30) ; and Colombia, then called New Gra-
nada, (1846, art. 16, p. 307) are still in force. A convention of 10x39, with
Colombia, (art. 7, Charles, treaties, p. 237), provided that negotiations for
the revision of the latter with a view to removing obsolete provisions
should be entered into.
112Text of the Prize Chapters of the Consolato del Mare may be
found in Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, N. Y., 1845, p. 63;
Travers Twiss, The Black Book of the Admiralty, Rolls Series, No. 55,
31539- In his introduction to this work, Twiss gives a very full account
of the origin and force of the Consolato.
"'Treaties with Bolivia, 1858, art. 16, Malloy, p. 119; Dominican Re-
public, 1867-1898, art. 15, p. 408; Hayti, 1864-1905, art. 19, p. 926; Peru,
1856, art. i, p. 1402; Russia, 1854, art. I, p. 1520; Two Sicilies, 1855-1861,
art. I, p. 1813. The two principles of the Declaration of Paris were in-
corporated in a treaty with Tripoli of 1805, art. 5, p. 1789.
114The London Packet, I Mason, 14, The Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague,
150; The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S. 655, (1809), Scott, 637; The Lynch-
burg, Blatch. 57. See also Declaration of London, 1909, art. 59.
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rule of international law. In its treaties with Prussia of 1785
and with Italy of 1871,115 the latter of which is still in force, the
principle was adopted as between the signatories. As the United
States has never been at war with a country with which such a
treaty existed, the principle has never been applied by the courts.
In the two Hague conferences, the United States delegation urged
the adoption of this principle. In the first conference a "voeu"
was formally expressed that the question be discussed at a suc-
ceeding conference.118 At the second conference in 1907, the
matter was discussed at length and a vote was taken117 in which
twenty-one powers including Germany, Austria, Italy and the
United States voted for
;
eleven including Great Britain, France,
Russia, and Japan voted against it, while one abstained from
voting.
(5) Necessity. The final rule under which condemnation
of neutral property has been claimed is by the rights of pre-
emption and angary.118 It is asserted that in case of necessity
the belligerent may seize and use any neutral property provided
it is paid for. In a number of treaties preemption rather than
confiscation has been provided as the treatment of contraband,119
but the present case relates to the seizure of goods not contra-
band or condemnable under any excuse other than necessity. Sev-
eral treaties, among them the Spanish treaty of 1902,120 provide
that vessels and property of subjects of the contracting parties
when neutral shall be exempt from seizure except in case of ne-
115Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 23, p. 1484; Italy, 1871, art.
12, p. 973. In a treaty with Bolivia of 1858 the contracting parties agreed
to give asylum to privateers until they should relinquish that practice, "in
consideration of the general relinquishment of the right to capture private
property on the high seas," (art. 9, p. 117).
116See Moore's Digest, 7:471.
117Deuxieme Conference internationale de la paix, Actes et Docu-
ments, 3 vols., The Hague, 1907, 3 5832.
118The term "angary" applied to forced service of neutral vessels and
is now obsolete. See G. G. Wilson, Handbook of International Law, St.
Paul, 1910, p. 416. Preemption refers to the forced sale of property. See
Wilson, op. cit, p. 437.
119Treaties with Great Britain 1794-1807, art. 18, p. 601 ; Prussia 1785-
1796, art. 13, p. 1481 ; 1799-1810, revived, 1828, art. 13, p. 1491. For inter-
pretation of the Prussian treaty see U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 526. It
has also been made the basis of compensation in the recent case (1915)
of the United States vessel William P. Frye.
120Treaty with Spain, 1902, art. 5, Malloy, p. 1703.
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cessity, and then compensation shall be given, to be arranged be-
forehand if possible.
Recognition of the right of requisitioning neutral property
in case of necessity is given in the Declaration of London, the
Hague Conventions, Lieber's instructions of 1863, the naval in-
structions of 1898 and Stockton's naval war code of 1900 to
1904.121 In all of these cases, however, full payment for such
requisitions is stated as an obligation.
CLAIMS OP THE NEUTRAL OWNER.
Having considered the claims which the captor state will
offer as a basis for the condemnation of neutral prizes, the claims
of the neutral owner involved may be considered. These claims
may be grouped under the heads, (1) restitution, (2) compensa-
tion, (3) damages, (4) restoration.
(1) Restitution of the actual property has been recognized
by the United States courts as the proper course in all cases
where the government does not make good its claim to condem-
nation. It is the logical corollary of the principle that title to
property does not change until after the decision rendered by
the prize court. If the court does not support the government's
claim for condemnation, the original owner's title has never
been lost and he can claim the goods.
(2) Restitution, however, may be impossible. The cargo
may have been requisitioned or destroyed. If enemy goods on
board are condemned, a practice now repudiated, the shipper can
not get freight from the consignee. In such cases the courts have
held compensation to be due the innocent neutral,122 but this is
subject to important limitations. The seizure may have been
justifiable because of suspicious circumstances, although there
is no condemnation. Here losses caused by delay must be borne
by the owner. Part of the cargo may have been destroyed
through accident or the lawful exercise of belligerent rights by
121Declaration of London, art. 29, 49-54; Hague Conventions, 1907,
iv, annex, art. 52, v, art. 19; Instructions for the government of the Ar-
mies of the United States in the Field, by Francis Lieber, Apr. 24, 1863,
Gen. Ord., War Dept, No. TOO, printed, Naval War College, International
Law Discussions, 1903, art. 14, 38; Naval Instructions, June 20, 1898, For.
Rel., 1898, p. 780; Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 3, 6, 14, 50.
122Declaration of London, 1909, art. 64; Hague Conventions, 1907,
v. art. 19; Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 6, 14. The Nuestra Senora
de Regla, 108, U. S. 92, (1882).
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the captor. Here again the neutral suffers the loss of freight and
goods.
123
(3) However, restitution and compensation for actual goods
seized may by no means cover the loss of the neutral. Even if the
ship and cargo are intact the delay may have caused serious loss
through fall of markets or breach of contract. The right of the
neutral to damages in such cases has been recognized in the
United States courts.124 Damages cannot lie against the govern-
ment for more than the value of the prize under adjudication,125
but they may be had from a naval officer if the seizure was made
without probable cause.126 The burden of proof, however, is al-
ways upon the neutral claimant.127 Except in a very clear case
recovery is impossible.
(4) The claim for restoration differs from those just con-
sidered in that it is not brought by the party from whom the ves-
sel was immediately seized, but from a former owner. It arises
in cases of recapture from the enemy of a vessel or goods origi-
nally belonging to a neutral or national individual.
128 The valid-
ity of the claim depends on whether or not title had passed to the
enemy captor before recapture. If it had, the vessel is enemy
property, if it had not it is neutral or national property, and
must be restored. The different views which have been held on
123The Antonia Johanna, i Wheat. 159, (1816).
12<The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, (1868) ; The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 108,
U. S. 92 ; Slocum vs. Mayberry, 2 Wheat, i ; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 377 ;
The Lively, i Gall. 315.
125In The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, (1868), a neutral vessel was run into
and sunk by a captured prize. The court held the owner of the sunken
vessel could recover to the value of the prize if subject to condemnation,
but no more.
126Del Col vs. Arnold, 3 Dall. 333, (1796) ; Little vs. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170, (1804) ; The Eleanor, 7 Wheat. 345; Jecker vs. Montgomery,
13 How. 498; The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall.
170; The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 327; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546.
See Moore's Digest, 7:583-597.
127The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. I, (1826) ; Murray vs. The Charm-
ing Betsey, 2 Cranch 64; The Buena Ventura vs. U. S. 175 U. S. 384; The
Thompson, 3 Wall. 185; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170. See Moore's
Digest, 7:598.
128The right of restoration has been derived from the Roman Jus
Postliminii, although that applied to the rule whereby slaves and property
on land returned to their former status after reconquest. See Hershey,
op. cit, p. 439-
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this subject assert that title to captured property vests, (1) imme-
diately on seizure, (2) after twenty-four hours quiet possession,
(3) after bringing "infra praesidia", (4) after condemnation
by a prize court. All of these rules have been at different times
acted on by courts and embodied in executive orders,129 but the
one at present established appears to be the last. The original
owner's claim is good until the vessel has been condemned in an
enemy prize court.130 A statute of 1800,131 continued by subse-
quent acts, required restoration to United States citizens where
the property had not been condemned by competent authority,
and to neutral subjects on a basis of reciprocity.132 The neutral
can make good his claim only where the law of his country would
allow restoration to a citizen of the United States. In any case
a deduction of military salvage for the recaptors is allowed be-
fore restoration.
The measures taken to enforce the duty of the United States
as a belligerent to abstain from illegally interfering with neu-
tral commerce are found in the rules laid down for the courts in
treaties, statutes, and executive orders and instructions, but pri-
129Vesting of title immediately on seizure was held to be the rule of
international law during the Revolutionary War, (see the Resolution,
Fed. Ct of App. 1781, 2. Dall. i, 4; McDonough vs. Dannery and the
Ship Mary Ford, 3 Dall. 188, 1/96) thus the right of restoration was de-
nied altogether except by way of comity or express ordinance. An ordi-
nance of congress, (Nov. 25, 1775, Journ. Cong., Ford, ed., 3:373) granted
restoration of recaptures made before twenty-four hours possession, but
the court held this could not apply where the enemy had sold the prize to
a neutral, and in any case it applied only to United States citizens (The
Resolution, Fed. Court, of Appeals, 1781, 2 Dall. i, 4). The twenty-four
hour rule was also recognized in several early treaties as to neutrals,
where the captor was a privateer, although restoration was permitted even
after twenty-four hours possession and before condemnation when the
captor was a public vessel. (See treaties with Netherlands, 1782-1795;
Malloy, p. 1243; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1827, p. 1730; Prussia, 1785-
1796; 1799-1810, arts. 17, 21, pp. 1482, 1492).
130Talbot vs. Seamans, I Cranch I, (1801) ; Murray vs. The Charm-
ing Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 121, (1804) ; The Star, 3 Wheat. 78, 86, (1818).
Restoration even after condemnation has been allowed where the con-
demnation by the enemy prize court was clearly illegal. See The Resolu-
tion, 2 Dall. i, (1781).
131 Act. Mch. 3, 1800, 2 stat. 16, June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760; June 27,
1813, 2 stat. 793; June 30, 1864, 13 stat. 306, 314; rev. stat. sec. 4652.
waThe Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, see Moore's Digest, 71521-
533-
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marily in the principles of law to which prize courts have habit-
ually adhered. These principles to which American prize courts
have professed obedience are (1) the principle that title does
not pass until decree of a prize court, (2) the law applied by prize
courts is the law of nations, (3) statutes and orders should be
interpreted if possible so as not to conflict with international law,
(4) treaties, including law making international conventions, are
to be applied as part of the law of the land. So long as these
principles are adhered to by discreet courts the national duties
of this character will undoubtedly be fulfilled. Yet on account
of the inevitable tendency of even the most conscientious judges
to be swayed by national partisanship the establishment of the
international prize court with a final jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing neutrals would be a most important addition to these sanc-
tions of neutral rights. The United States has signed the inter-
national prize court convention and the senate has recommended
ratification. The same is true of the Declaration of the London
naval conference designed to serve as a law to be applied by that
court. It has therefore done the most in its power to add this
sanction also for the enforcement of its duties as a belligerent.
CHAPTER XII. OBLIGATIONS OF PREVENTION.
INTRODUCTORY.
A belligerent state while acting in that capacity is for the
most part represented by its army and navy. The part of
international law defining the obligations of belligerents to
neutrals therefore consists to a considerable extent of rules of
conduct for such agencies of government. The land and naval
forces may be controlled by municipal law. The obligations of
prevention require a state to exercise this control and prevent
infractions of international law by its armed representatives.
With the theory of territorial state sovereignty, neutral
states have a right, in war as well as in peace, to exclusive
control of their territory.
1 As has been noted they are under
an obligation to vindicate this right by interning armed forces
of a belligerent violating their territory. The belligerent is
under an equal obligation to respect this right by preventing
such violations of neutral territory.
Although with a strict application of the theory of terri-
torial sovereignty the state's interest in its citizens would vanish
as soon as he leaves its frontiers, the actual law recognizes that
states have a limited right to protect their citizens on the high
seas and in foreign countries. Belligerents must respect this
right and prevent injury to such persons and illegal destruction
of their property. We may therefore classify the obligations
here considered into those of preventing (1) violations of neu-
tral territory, and (2) injury to neutral persons and property.
Reserving this as a secondary classification, we will divide the
obligations of prevention primarily into those relating to (1)
acts by the land forces and (2) acts by naval forces.
ACTS BY LAND FORCES
The probability of land forces violating neutral territory
or injuring neutral individuals is much less than in the case of
naval forces, yet the United States has recognized by treaty the
duty of preventing its land forces performing certain acts.
1For exceptions to this general statement see supra p. 45 et seq.
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(1) By the Hague conventions, 2 a belligerent is forbidden
to violate neutral territory by moving troops or convoys of mili-
tary material across it, erecting wireless stations or other means
of communication, or by recruiting corps of combatants thereon.
It would therefore appear to be incumbent upon the United
States to prevent its land forces performing any of these acts
on neutral territory in time of war.
There appear to have been no cases of prosecution of army
officers for violating neutral territory in time of war, but in an
opinion of the judge advocate general in 19083 it was stated
that the armed forces of the United States should not be per-
mitted to penetrate neutral territory in the process of enforcing
the neutrality laws. In the army regulations relating to garri-
son inspection the inspectors are required to see that the com-
manding officer is properly executing the laws relating to neu-
trality and the regulations concerning international courtesy,
so far as applicable to his post.
4
(2) The United States has recognized its duty to prevent
the injury of neutral persons through seizure of property on
land, in the Hague Conventions.5 The general prohibitions
relating to seizure of enemy property on land apply to neutrals
in enemy territory, and special provisions are included requir-
ing compensation in case railway material is requisitioned. By
the principles of Anglo-American law the status of property
depends upon its territorial location rather than the nationality
of the owner
; consequently neutral property on enemy territory
is subject to the same consideration as enemy property in that
situation.8 This question will be more fully considered in deal-
2Hague Conventions, 1907, Malloy, p. 2297, v, Art. 1-3.
8Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the Army, 1912,
C. R. Rowland, ed., p. 106.
4Army Regulations, 1913, sec. 889, p. 171-172.
5The Hague Conventions, v, Art. 19, Malloy, p. 2297.
6On the enemy character of the produce of enemy soil see, Thirty
Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635,
671. On the enemy character of property of citizens or neutrals domi-
ciled in enemy territory, see, Chester vs. The Experiment, Fed. Court of
Appeals, 2 Dall. 41, (1787) ; U. S. vs. Gillies, Pet. C. C. 159; The Venus,
8 Cranch 253, (1814) ; The Frances, 8 Cranch, 335, 363. (1814) ; The Mary
and Susan, i Wheat. 46; Rogers vs. Amado, I Newb. Adm. 400; The Wil-
liam Bagley, 5 Wall. 377 ; Gates vs. Goodloe, 101 U. S. 612 ; Mrs. Alexan-
der's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419. On the general subject see Moore's Digest,
7 J424-434-
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ing with the law of war. Suffice it to say here that the Instruc-
tions for the government of the armies7 state, and the courts
have reiterated8 that private property cannot be seized on land
except by requisition in case of necessity, unless an act of con-
gress especially permits.
In a number of treaties the United States has agreed not to
draft resident subjects of the other contracting power for mili-
tary service in case of war.
9 With the exception of treaties
relating to claims for injuries in specific cases,10 these treaties
appear to contain the only formal provisions imposing duties
upon the United States in reference to the injury of persons
of neutral states in land warfare. Whether or not a belligerent
state is responsible for injuries received by aliens resident in
its territory, due to the exercise of martial law, or the conduct
of actual hostilities, is not altogether clear in international law.
11
Undoubtedly a state is bound to prevent its armed forces un-
necessarily and wantonly injuring neutral residents,12 but it
seems clear that it is under no such duty when the actual prose-
cution of military movements creates a necessity.13 The neutral
alien assumes the risk of his residence. No statutes, regulations
or official opinions of the military law of the United States
appear to bear on this point, if we except the provisions relating
to the usual exemption of enemy private property contained in
'Instructions for the government of the armies of the United States
in the Feld, Art. 38; Printed in The Military Laws of the United States,
191 1, p. 1079; Naval War College, International Law Discussions 1903, p.
122.
8Brown vs. U. S., 8 Cranch no, (1814).
Treaties with Argentine Republic, 1843, art. 10, Malloy, p. 23; Congo,
1891, art. 3, p. 329; Costa Rica, 1851, art. 9, p. 344; Dominican Republic,
1867-1868, art. 2, p. 404; France, 1788-1798, art. 14, p. 495; Hayti, 1864-
1905, art. 8, p. 923; Honduras, 1864, art. 9, p. 955; Italy, 1871, art. 3, p. 970;
Japan, 1894, art. i, p. 1029; Mexico, 1831-1881, art. 9, p. 1088; Paraguay,
1859, art. n, p. 1367; Servia, 1881, art. 4, p. 1703; Tonga, art. 9, p. 783;
Two Sicilies, 1855-1861, art. 5, p. 1816; Venezuela, 1860-1870, art. 2, p.
1846.
"Treaty of Washington, with Great Britain, 1871, art. 12, Malloy, p.
705. The commission provided allowed Great Britain $1,929,819 for inju-
ries to British subjects during the Civil war. See note Malloy, p. 705.
Treaty with France, 1880, Malloy, p. 535. France was awarded $625,566.35
for injuries to her subjects during the Civil war. Malloy, p. 539.
"Moore's Digest, 65883-926
12Moore's Digest, 6:918-922.
"Moore's Digest, 65883-894.
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Lieber's instructions.14 Military commissions undoubtedly have
a jurisdiction to punish acts forbidden by the treaties men-
tioned, but the protection of resident neutrals during war is
largely left within the discretion of the president as commander
in chief of the army, and subordinate military authorities with
delegated powers.
(3) As the actual enforcement of the state's duties of
prevention in relation to the army depends upon the method of
control exercised, some attention may be given to this point.18
The discipline of the army is to a large extent governed by
formal rules, but these rules are to a considerable extent en-
forced by the discretionary authority of high military officers.
In the field covered by constitutionally enacted congressional
statutes, the army is bound beyond the authority of any execu-
tive or military officer to transcend, but in matters relating
purely to the conduct of war it is doubtful whether congress has
the power to control the army by statute.18
This does not, however, mean that the army is unregulated
by law. It has a system of law of its own, known as military
law, administered by its own officers and courts. The president
as commander in chief has complete discretion as to the move-
ments of the army except so far as limited by the constitution
and acts of congress within the competence of that body.17
While the president's authority is discretionary and may be
altered at will, as a matter of fact it is exercised by means of
more or less permanent regulations and instructions issued as
general orders. These regulations have the force of law while
operative,
18
and, together with statutes and constitutional pro-
visions, their interpretations found in judicial decisions and
"Lieber's Instructions, art. 38, Military Laws, 1911, p. 1079.
"The statutory laws relating to the control of the army, annotated
with references to court decisions and opinions of attorneys general and
judge advocates general, may be found in The Military Laws of the United
States, 1901, ed. by G. B. Davis, with a supplement to 1911, ed. by J. B.
Porter. The Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the
Army, published in 1912, also contains references to statutes, cases and
opinions of attorneys general bearing on the various points.
18On the independence of the president see Military Laws, 1911, p. 5
and notes. See Kendall vs. U. S. 12 Pet. 524, 610; Marbury vs. Madison,
i Cranch 137, 166.
"Military Laws, 1911, p. 5, note 2.
18U. S. vs. Barrows, Fed. Cas. 14,529; Dig. of Op. of Judge Ad. Gen.,
1912, p. 681.
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opinions of attorneys general and judge advocates general form
the body of military law.
Military law is enforced by executive action, 19 as in the
power of promotion, demotion and discharge exercisable by
superior military officers ; by courts martial, 20 whose jurisdiction
is defined by statute and extends only over statutory military
offences, most of which are included in the Articles of War;21
and by military commissions. 22 Military commissions adminis-
ter military law by a procedure similar to courts martial, but
they are not limited to the punishment of statutory offenses.
They may take cognizance of acts contrary to the unwritten
law of war or to military regulations.
The jurisdiction of both courts martial and military com-
missions is of an exclusively criminal character.
23
They decree
punishments but do not award damages or reparation of any
kind. Their jurisdiction, however, is not territorial.24 It ex-
tends over offenses committed in foreign countries.
The statutory provisions, known as the Articles of War, 25
largely prescribe duties of enlisted men and officers26 in relation
to their military superiors and the performance of their military
duties. Their aim is to enforce discipline in the army and they
contain little matter referring to the law of war. Courts mar-
tial, being limited in jurisdiction to these offenses, cannot take
cognizance of breaches of the unwritten law of war, including
breaches of the army's obligations to neutral states and persons.
The enforcement of these matters is in the hands of military
commissions and their jurisdiction in time of war extends to
"Military Laws, 1911, p. 5, note 2.
20Digest of Op. of Judge Ad. Gen., 1912, pp. 510-513.
21Rev. Stat., sec. 1342-1343; Military Laws, 1911, pp. 962-1026. For
historical account of development of articles of war; Military laws, 1911,
p. 962.
22For history of development of military commissions see Dig. of Op.
of Judge Ad. Gen. 1912, p. 1067. Use during Civil War, Ibid. p. 1071. Au-
thority of, see Rev. Stat. 1343. Military Laws, 1911, p. 744, note i. p. 745;
Lieber's Instructions, art. 13, Military Laws, 1911, p, 1076; Dig. Op. Judge
Ad. Gen., 1912, pp. 1067-1072.
23Dig. Op. Judge Ad. Gen., 1912, pp. 510, 1072.
24
Dig. Op. Judge Ad. Gen., 1912, pp. 511, 1071.
25Rev. stat. sec. 1342-1343, Military Laws, 1911, pp. 962-1026.
28An exception may be noted in the jurisdiction given to courts mar-
tial over enemy spies, Rev. Stat. sec. 1343, Military Laws, 1911, p. 1026.
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offenses committed by enlisted men or officers, civilians or ene-
mies, contrary to military law or the law of war.27
It is therefore by executive action and the adjudication of
military commissions that the duties of the army toward neu-
trals are enforced. The provisions of the treaties mentioned,
and the general requirements of international law, as well as the
rules specified in army regulations and instructions may be
enforced by these authorities.
ACTS BY NAVAL FORCES
The naval forces of a belligerent are much more likely to
infringe the rights of neutral states than land forces. With
them therefore the duty of preventing such infractions has
received more attention in the municipal law of the United
States.
(1) By the Hague conventions28 the United States has
recognized the obligation to prevent its naval forces violating
neutral territory by committing hostilities or setting up prize
courts in neutral waters, using neutral territory as a base of
operations or violating the usual rules of asylum.
As in the case of the army the action of naval commanders
is largely regulated by executive control. There are, however,
statutes dealing with the navy. The "Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy of the United States"29 specify certain acts
as crimes and subject to the jurisdiction of courts martial. The
only authority capable of inflicting punishment in the navy is
commanders,30 for minor offenses, and for more serious offenses,
summary and general courts martial.31 There are no courts in
the navy similar to military commissions.
27On the distinction between the jurisdiction of military commissions
and courts martial, see Lieber's Instructions, art. 13, Military Laws, 1911,
p. 1076.
28Hague Conventions, 1907, xiii, art. I, 4, 5, 12, 15-23. In thirty-
two treaties with twenty-five countries the United States has been given
the right of asylum for its war vessels in neutral ports, when necessary
through "stress of weather, pursuit of pirates or enemies." The follow-
ing are now in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 9, Malloy, p. 117; Prussia, 1799-
1810, revived 1828, art. 18, 19, p. 1492; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816,
1827, art. 21, p. 1732. Such action does not constitute a violation of neu-
tral territory even in the absence of treaty. Moore's Digest, 7:982-985.
29Rev. Stat. sec. 1624; Navy Regulations 1913, P- 15-
80Rev. Stat. sec. 1624, art. 24.
81Rev. Stat. sec. 1624, art. 22, 26, 38.
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In addition to statutory provisions, the navy is governed
by bodies of rules known as navy regulations and naval instruc-
tions which are promulgated by the president and have the
force of law until repealed.82
No statutory provisions deal with violations of neutral
territory, but regulations and instructions, 33 since the Revolu-
tionary war, have enjoined officers to respect neutral rights and
especially to refrain from hostilities in neutral territory. Thus
by the Navy Regulations of 1913 commanders in chief are to
"scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civil-
ized nations in amity with the United States."3*
(2) The duty of preventing its naval forces injuring neu-
tral individuals involves largely restraints which such forces
are bound to observe in exercising the belligerent right of seiz-
ing neutral prizes on the high seas. The law applied by courts
in enforcing the government's duty to abstain from illegally
confiscating neutral prizes has been considered. Here we will
consider the methods by which naval forces are prevented from
making such seizures, or otherwise injuring neutral persons.
It must be observed that the acts prohibited in performing
these duties of prevention and abstention are not exactly the
same. The belligerent must prevent a prima facie unjustifiable
seizure, but even when the seizure is justifiable the government
may be bound to abstain from confiscating the prize. Thus it
32Regulations for the government of the Navy of the United States,
Washington, 1913, under authority of Rev. Stat., sec. 1547.
88Naval Instructions, Apr. 3, 1776, Apr. 7, 1781, (Journ. Cong., Ford,
ed., 4:253, 19:361); Aug. 28, 1812, (2 Wheat. App. 80, Moore's Digest,
7J54S- Authority for the issuance of these orders was given in the prize
act of 1812, 2 stat. 760, sec. 8. They were upheld in the Thomas Gibbons,
8 Cranch 421, (1814), but in the Mary and Susan, i Wheat. 46, 57, (1816)
it was held that the captor must be notified of the order before his right
to prize money from vessels, captured contrary to them, would be af-
fected) ; May 14, 1846, (Br. and For. St. Pap., 34;ii39, Moore's Digest,
7:828); Dec. 24, 1846, (Moore's Digest, 7;79o); Nov. 6, 1861 ; May 14,
1862, (Upton, op. cit. p. 490) ; Aug. 18, 1862, (Official Records, Union
and Confederate Navies, Ser. i, 1:417, Moore's Digest, 75700); June 20,
1898, (Gen. Ord., Navy Dept., 1898, No. 492, For. Rel., 1898, p. 780) ;
Jan. 27, 1900, (Gen. Ord., Navy Dept., 1900, No. 551, revoked, Ibid., Feb.
4, 1904, No. 150) ; Navy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1645, 1647.
"Navy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1645. Naval commanders are allowed
some discretion under these rules. See note at head of chapter 15, Navy
Regulations, 1913, p. I59r.
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frequently happens that a naval officer will be held completely
justified in making a seizure even though the prize after adju-
dication is restored to the neutral owner.88
It might be supposed that the means adopted to prevent
illegal seizure of neutral property at sea would be a matter of
purely national concern and would not be specified by interna-
tional law. This is not the case. The exercise of belligerent
rights over neutral commerce is so important and so subject to
abuse that international law has to some extent specified the
exact means which a state must provide for carrying out this
obligation. Thus, it forbids captures by privateers, requires
certain specified formalities of visit and search, and demands
adjudication of the prize by a court acting in the usual form of
judicial bodies. The belligerent state is of course at liberty to
enact supplementary laws better to fulfill its duties under this
head. Among such acts in force in the United States may be
mentioned the statutes abolishing prize money, and those affix-
ing criminal penalties for the spoliation of prizes. Before the
abolition of privateering the requirement of bonds from priva-
teers and the enforcement of liability against the owners of pri-
vateers were rules of this character. The abolition of priva-
teering and the attempted abolition of prize money at the Sec-
ond Hague conference are illustrations of the tendency of inter-
national law to enter more and more this field, formerly left to
the discretion of states.
The United States has taken measures to prevent the illegal
seizure of prizes by restricting the classes of vessels which may
make seizures, by prescribing rules for visit and search of neu-
tral vessels, and by affixing penalties for making unjustifiable
seizures. An improper treatment of prizes and their crews is
also prevented by municipal law. Definite rules for the conduct
of prizes have been prescribed. Criminal penalties enforceable
by court martial proceedings against persons in the navy violat-
ing these rules, as well as liability to civil suit for damages, add
sanctions to their enforcement. Adjudication of prizes has also
been provided for by the establishment of courts of prize juris-
diction. These matters will be considered in greater detail in
the following sections dealing with the seizure of prizes, the
care and treatment of prizes and the adjudication of prizes.
"The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat, i, (1826).
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SEIZURE OP PRIZES
The United States has authorized seizures during war by
three varieties of vessels, (1) privateers, (2) converted mer-
chantment, (3) vessels of the navy.
(1) The use of privateers or private armed vessels in war was
prohibited by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. The United
States has not acceded to this declaration, 36 but refrained from
using privateers during the Civil war,37 and by proclamation at
the outbreak of the Spanish war of 1898 disclaimed intention
to use them during that war.38 Privateers have not been ex-
tensively used since 1856 and it may safely be said that their
use is now forbidden by international law.
The United States made free use of privateers in the Revo-
lutionary war and the War of 1812. On these occasions efforts
were made to prevent illegal seizures through rules of municipal
law expressed in treaties, statutes, naval instructions and court
decisions. Privateers were provided with commissions or letters
of marque accompanied by special instructions stating the scope
and limits of their right to seize property.30 These commissions
36The United States did not accede to the Declaration of Paris be-
cause not having a navy it considered this type of naval militia necessary
until the right to capture private property at sea should be abolished al-
together. This complete exemption has been a tradition of American
policy since earliest times. In a treaty with Bolivia, of 1858, it was recip-
rocally agreed to give asylum to privateers until the two parties should
relinquish their use, "in consideration of the general relinquishment of
the right of capture of private property upon the high seas," art. 9, Mai.
loy, p. 117.
87On proposals to issue letters of marque during the Civil War and
reasons for not doing so, see Moore's Digest, 7;556. An act of March 3,
1863, 12 stat. 758, gave the president authority to issue letters of marque.
"Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat. 1770; Moore's Digest, 75541.
39Privateers were authorized by a resolution of the Continental con-
gress, March 23, 1776. On April 2 and 3, forms of commission were
adopted to be sent in blank to the colonies. About i/oo letters of marque
were issued during the Revolutionary war. See Allen, Naval History of
the American Revolution, 15451; 25701. During the War of 1812, pri-
vateers were of great importance. In the Civil war the Confederate
states issued letters of marque and an act of Mch. 3, 1863, authorized
their issuance by the federal government. Regulations and instructions
were drawn up on Mch. 20, 1863, but as a matter of policy no commissions
were issued. See Moore's Digest, 75556. See Resolutions of Congress,
Mch. 23, 1776, Instructions Apr. 3, 1776, Apr. 17, 181, (Journ. Cong.,
Ford, ed., 45230, 253, 195361); Instructions, Aug. 28, 1812, (2 Wheat.
App. 80) (Moore's Digest, 75544). On necessity of carrying commissions
see Upton, op. cit. p. 177.
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could be declared forfeited at the discretion of the president.
40
By treaties41 and statutes42 privateers were required to furnish
bond or other security for good behavior. An act of 181243
required privateers to keep a journal which was to be inspected
by the commanders of naval vessels meeting the privateer at
sea, prohibited cruising without special instructions, and de-
clared prize money forfeited in case of illegal seizures. Courts
have held the owners of privateers responsible for the conduct
of the officers and crew of the vessel to the full value of property
injured or destroyed.44
It should be noted, however, that an illegal act done by a
privateer would not operate to invalidate the captures so far as
the United States government was concerned. The captor might
forfeit his prize money, bond and commission, but if the vessel
were declared good prize by the court, the neutral owner would
have no recourse. Thus a non-commissioned vessel,45 or a vessel
manned by a neutral or even an enemy crew46 might make a
capture, valid as against the belligerent or neutral owner, al-
though the officers, crew and owners themselves might be subject
to criminal punishment or civil liability.
(2) The use of converted merchant vessels in war was
provided for in the mail subsidy act of 1891,
47 and a number of
vessels of this character were used during the Spanish war.
40Act June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760. See Upton, Op. cit, p. 181, 185 ; The
Thomas Gibbons, 8 Cranch 421.
"Treaties with Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. 19, Malloy, p. 602;
France, 1800-1809, art. 23, p. 504; Netherlands, 1782-1795, art. 14, p. 1238;
Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 15, p. 1482; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived treaty of
1827, art. 1 6, p. 1730.
42Act July 9, 1798, I stat. 578 ; June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760.
"Act June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760; Instructions to privateers, Aug. 28,
1812, 2 Wheat. App. 80, Moore's Digest, 7 ',544.
44Del Col vs. Arnold, 3 Dall. 333, (1796). The liability of the owners
was held to extend only to acts committed by the officers and crew in
making captures in Davis vs. The Revenge, 3 Wash. 262. For acts done
not in pursuance of the commission the owner was held not liable, see
The Amiable Nancy, i Paine n.
48The Joseph, I Gall. 545, Upton, op. cit. 178.
48The Mary and Susan, i Wheat. 46.
47Act March 3, 1891, 26 stat. 830, sec. 9. See also act July 17, 1862,
12 stat. 600, sec. 8, for recognition of "armed vessels in the service of
the United States" distinct from either privateers or vessels of the navy,
and The Rita, 69 Fed. Rep. 763. Moore's Digest, 7;538-543.
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One of the Hague conventions of 1907 48 contains regulations
for the use of such vessels, but it was not signed or ratified by
the United States. The United States has always put converted
merchantmen under the command of regular naval officers and
subjected their crews to naval discipline. The measures taken
to prevent violation of the rights of neutral persons by regular
naval forces are therefore applicable to them.
(3) In a number of its early treaties the United States
put itself under the obligation to prevent warships exercising
the right of visit and search over vessels under neutral convoy,49
or the right of search over vessels bearing a passport or sea
letter of their country when neutral.50 Specific requirements
for conducting visit and search51 were often included in these
treaties and the right of action for damages received by the
neutral individual from a United States warship or privateer52
was frequently granted. The treaty requirement of bonds, en-
suring the good behavior of privateers, has already been
mentioned.53
According to the declaration of London vessels under neu-
tral convoy are exempt from visit and search.54 Illegal seizures
are guarded against by the provision entitling the owner to com-
pensation if his vessel was seized without sufficient reason and
was subsequently released.
48Hague Conventions, 1907, vii.
49Respect for neutral convoy has been required in twenty- four treat-
ies with nineteen countries, of which the following are in force : Bolivia,
1858, art. 23, p. 309 ; Colombia, 1846, art. 23, p. 309 ; Italy, 1871, art. 19,
p. 975; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 12, p. 1729.
50In most of the early treaties the carriage of sea letters was pro-
vided for in terms similar to that of the French treaty of 1778-1798,
art. 24, 27, Malloy, pp. 477, 478. In some of them the carriage of such a
passport was mandatory; a failure to produce it if not explained would
result in condemnation as constructive enemy property. Supra, p. 161.
B1As examples of treaty provisions prescribing method of conducting
visit and search see treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 15, p. 1482;
1799-1810, art. 15, p. 1491; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived treaties 1816, 1827,
art. 25, p. 1733.
82Treaties with France, 1778-1798, art 15, p. 474; 1800-1809, art. 19,
p. 504; Netherlands, 1782-1795, art. 13, p. 1237; Prussia, 1785-1796, art.
15, p. 1482; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 15, p. 1730.
58Supra, p. 181, note 41.
"Declaration of London, 1909, art. 61, 64. On the status of the
Declaration of London in 1914, see Am. Jour. Int. Law, 9'.i99i Jan- I9 I 5-
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In instructions issued to war vessels upon the outbreak of
wars,
55 and in general naval regulations58 and instructions,57
methods of conducting visit and search and other duties of naval
vessels toward neutral persons, required by treaty and interna-
tional law, have been specifically enjoined.
The courts have held that the making of seizures without
probable cause or proper authorization by law even when done
under specific order of the president, as commander in chief of
the navy, renders the captor liable to damages.58 A seizure in
violation of international law, however, when specifically author-
ized by municipal law, is permissible so far as the captor is con-
cerned.89 The only recourse in such cases is through diplomatic
protest.
CARE AND TREATMENT OP PRIZES
A prize having been seized, five courses are open to the
captor, (1) bringing in to home port for adjudication, (2) de-
struction, (3) ransom, (4) sequestration in a neutral port or sale
in neutral territory, (5) release. The treatment which a neu-
tral state has a right to expect under international law and the
measures which the United States has taken to prevent its naval
forces infringing those rights will now be considered.
(1) A number of early treaties60 required the preservation
of prizes intact until adjudication by a prize court, and the hos-
pitable treatment of the officers and crew.
The Declaration of London61 requires prizes to be brought to
port for adjudication and forbids the destruction of either vessel
"Naval Instructions, Apr. 3, 1776, (Jour. Cong., Ford, ed., 45253) ;
Apr. 7, 1781, (Jour. Cong., Ford, ed., 195361); Aug. 28, 1812, (2 Wheat.
App. 80, Moore's Digest, 7:544); 1813, Special Instructions, (Am. St.
Pap., Nav. Aff., 1 5373, Moore's Digest, 7;Si6); May 14, 1846, (Br. and
For. St. Pap., 3451139) ; Dec. 24, 1846, (Moore's Digest, 75790) ; May 14,
1862, (Upton, op. cit, p. 490) ; Aug. 18, 1862, (Rec. Union and Conf.
Navies, Ser. i, 15417, Moore's Digest, 75700); June 20, 1898, (For. Rel.,
1898, p. 780).
68Navy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1634.
"Stockton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904, art. 30, 32, 33.
"Little vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, (1804) ; The Thompson, 3 Wall.
155; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170; see also Moore's Digest, 7:593-598.
B9La Maissonaire vs. Keating, 2 Gall. 334. See Upton, op. cit, p. 189.
80As an example see treaty with France, 1800-1809, art. 20, 21, Malloy,
P- 503.
61 Declaration of London, 1909, art. 48-54.
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or cargo, unless the prize would be liable to condemnation and an
attempt to bring it in for adjudication "would involve danger
to the ship of war or to the success of the operation in which she
is at the time engaged." If the prize is destroyed, persons on
board and the ship's papers must be saved and the captor is de-
clared liable to pay compensation if he cannot prove the existence
of circumstances justifying destruction, irrespective of the valid-
ity of the capture. A decree of restitution of the vessel or part
of its cargo in such a case involves compensation.
By the articles for the government of the navy,62 punishment
by death or other sentence of court martial is authorized to any-
one destroying or injuring prizes or maltreating persons on board
of them, and in the instructions for the navy issued on the out-
break of war, as well as in permanent instructions, rules for the
care of prizes and their crew have generally been specified and
their prompt bringing in required.63
The courts have declared that it is the captor 's duty to bring
prizes in for adjudication as soon as possible64 and to deliver pa-
pers and necessary witnesses to the court.65 Failure to perform
these duties will result in damages to the neutral owner but it is
only for "gross misconduct without excuse or palliation" that
they may be had. "Much indulgence is extended to errors and
even improprieties of captors when no malignity or cruelty is
justly chargeable."66
(2) Special instructions to privateers and warships in the
war of 181267 particularly advised destruction of prizes and this
62
Resolution, Nov. 25, 1775, Journ. Cong., Ford, ed., 3:373; Act, Apr.
23, 1800, 2 stat. 52; July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 600; Rev. Stat. sec. 1624, art.
6, ii, 12. See other statutory provisions relating to the administration
of prizes, Act, March 3, 1800, i stat. 16; June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760; June
27, 1813, 2 stat. 793; March 25, 1862, 12 stat. 375; March 3, 1863, 12 stat.
759; June 30, 1864, 13 stat. 306; Rev. stat. sec. 4615-4617.
63Stockton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904, sec. 46, 47. Supra, note 57.
4The Lively, i Gall. 318; The Nassau, 4 Wall. 634; Moore's Digest,
7 ;630.
6BThe Diana, 2 Gall. 95 ; The Bothnea and the Jarnstoff, 2 Gall. 88.
See Upton, op. cit. p. 200, citing, The Lively and Cargo, i Gall. 29;
The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435 ; The George, i Mason, 24. On liability of cap-
tor for damages, see also, Slocum vs. Mayberry, 2 Wheat, i ; The Apollon,
9 Wheat. 362; The Neustra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S. 92, 103, (1882),
and Moore's Digest, 71630. Declaration of London, 1909, art. 52, 53.
"Special Instructions, 1813, Am. St. Pap., Navy Aff., 1:373; Moore's
Digest, 755I6.
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action was permitted by the instructions to blockading vessels in
1898,
68 and in Stockton's Naval War Code.69 But in the last two
cases bringing in was required unless there were "controlling
reasons" for not doing so, such as "unseaworthiness, the exist-
ence of infectious diseases, lack of a prize crew," or imminent
danger of recapture.
These provisions of statutes and executive orders indicate
that the destruction of prizes is permitted under certain circum-
stances, but the practice has been discouraged except during the
war of 1812. In discussions of the subject in the Naval War Col-
lege in 1905 and 1907 the release of neutral prizes which could
not be brought into port was recommended.70
(3) Ransom or the release of the prize by the captor on sig-
nature of a ransom bill generally accompanied by a hostage to
insure payment is permitted by law in the United States. The
88Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, June 20, 1898,
For. Rel. 1898, p. 780, Moore's Digest, 7:518.
"Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 50; Moore's Digest, 7:526.
70Naval War College, International Law Discussions, 1005, pp. 62-76;
I9O7, P- 75- In these discussions a distinction is drawn between the de-
struction of neutral and enemy prizes, the former being forbidden. See
also T. E. Holland, Neutral Duties in Maritime War, Proceedings British
Academy, 2512, quoted Moore's Digest, 7:521. International opinion gen-
erally condemns the destruction of neutral prizes and British courts have
upheld this view. See The Zee Star, 4 Rob. 71 ; The Felicity, 2 Dods.
283 ; The Leucade, Spinks 221 ; W. E. Hall, International Law, 4th ed.,
p. 763 ; T. J. Lawrence, International Law, p. 405 ; L. Oppenheim, Inter-
national Law, 2:469. Russian prize regulations of March 27, 1895, and
Sept. 20, 1900, (For. Rel., 1904, pp. 735, 747, 752, Moore's Digest, 7:519)
permitted destruction. A notable controversy arose from the destruction
of the British vessel Knight Commander under these regulations in the
Russo-Japanese War. The Russian prize court upheld this act. (Hurst
and Bray, Russian and Japanese Prize Cases, 2 vol., London, 1912, 1:54;
S. Takahashi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War,
N. Y. 1908, p. 310; Moore's Digest, 7:521). Destruction was permitted
in exceptional cases by the Japanese Prize Regulations of March 15, 1904,
art. 91 (Takahashi, op. cit. p. 788) and by the French Naval Instructions
of July 25, 1870, (Snow cases, p. 577), and in certain cases of pressing
necessity in the rules adopted by the Institute de Droit International.
(Annuair de 1'institut de droit international, 65213, 221, 1882-1883, Moore's
Digest, 7:526). The recent (1915) case of the William P. Frye, an
American vessel destroyed by a German cruiser, was settled under the
Prussian treaty of 1799, renewed in 1828, (art. 13, Malloy, p. 1490) which
requires compensation to be made for all contraband goods destroyed.
186 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [186
prize money act of 186271 provided for the division of ransom
money in the same manner as prize money, and in the case of
Goodrich vs. Gordon72 in the supreme court of New York, ran-
som bills were held to be good contracts enforceable in court.
(4) The sequestration and sale of prizes in neutral ports
are practices which the United States as a neutral permitted
France in the wars following the French Revolution.73 Since
that time the United States has opposed such practices, although
according to treaties7* and international law75 it has permitted
the temporary asylum of belligerent warships and their prizes.
In the Hague conventions of 1907 76 special provision was
made for the sequestration of prizes in neutral ports pending ad-
judication in the belligerent's prize court, apparently with the
hope of somewhat limiting the necessity of destroying prizes at
sea. The United States did not ratify this section, thus maintain-
ing its opposition to the principle of sequestration of prizes,
which the American delegation spoke of as an "ancient abuse."77
The Naval War College in a discussion of the subject in 1908 7 *
recommended against sequestration. Nevertheless the United
States has resorted to sequestration in wars in which she has been
a belligerent, and the courts have not hesitated to uphold their
jurisdiction over prizes in neutral ports, 79 as well as over prizes
71Act, July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 600.
"Goodrich vs. Gordon, 15 Johns, 6, (1818) N. Y.
73Moore's Digest, 71935-938.
7
*Treaties with France, 1778-1798, art. 17, Malloy, p. 474; 1800-1809,
art. 24, p. 504; Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. 25, p. 604; Prussia, 1785-
1796, art. 19, p. 1483; 1799-1810, revived 1828, p. 1493; Sweden, 1783-1799,
revived 1816, 1827, art. 17, 19, p. 1732; Tripoli, 1805, art. 17, p. 1792;
Algiers, 1795-1815, art. 10, p. 3; 1815-1830, art. 18, p. 8; Netherlands,
1782-1795, art. 5, p. 1245.
78Att Gen. Gushing, 7 op. 122, (1855), Moore's Digest, 7:982-985.
This applies at least to war vessels and their prizes. The privilege was
often denied to privateers. See Gushing, 7 op. 122, (1855), Moore's Di-
gest, 7:546. For opinion during the Revolutionary war see Allen, Naval
History of the American Revolution, 1:255-257, 274; 25537-538.
76Hague Conventions, 1907, xiii, art 23.
"Report of United States Delegation, see Naval War College, Inter-
national Law Situations, 1908, p. 76.
"Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1908, pp. 58-78.
79Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 512; The Arabella and The Ma-
deira, 2 Gall. 368 ; Hudson vs. Guestier, 4 Cranch 293 ; Naval War Col-
lege, International Law Situations. 1908, pp. 60-62.
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which had been sold80 or destroyed.81 The sequestration of prizes
in neutral ports seems to be permitted to naval vessels by law
of the United States, although not looked upon with favor.
(5) Release of neutral prizes in preference to destruction
was recommended by the naval war college in a discussion of
1907,
82 but this course would probably not be pursued except as
a last resort.
The permission to accept ransom and sequestrate vessels in
neutral ports, together with the strict injunction to bring prizes
in for adjudication if possible, tends to prevent injury to neutral
owners. The permission to destroy prizes, however, would have
an opposite effect. The criminal penalties provided for illegal
treatment of prizes as well as the rule giving action for damages
in such cases are also measures directed toward the duties of pre-
vention encumbent upon the country.
ADJUDICATION OF PRIZES
One of the most important measures taken by the United
States to prevent infractions of neutral rights by its naval forces,
is the establishment of prize courts with jurisdiction over all
seizures by naval vessels. This means of prevention is regarded
as so essential that it has become a rule of international law. The
establishment of prize courts and the adjudication of prizes are
duties which international law requires of belligerent states.
(1) In a large number of its treaties83 the United States has
reciprocally agreed as a belligerent to adjudicate prizes seized
from the other contracting party, when neutral, in its prize court,
80Williams vs. Amroyd, 7 Cranch 423.
81The Edward Barnard, Blatch. 122; The Schooner Zavalla, Blatch.
173. See Naval War Col., Int. Law Sit., 1008, p. 63.
82Naval War College, International Law Discussions, 1907, p. 75.
Release, where the prize can not be brought in for adjudication, is recom-
mended by Lawrence, op. cit, p. 405 ; Hall, op. cit., p. 763. British courts
have favored this rule in dicta, see The Zee Star, 4 Rob. 71 ; The Felicity,
2 Dods. 381 ; The Leucade, Spinks, 221, Bentwich 157, Moore's Digest, 7:522.
Release of neutral prizes in certain cases was prescribed in the Japanese
prize law of 1894, (art. 20, 22), but destruction was permitted in similar
cases by the law of 1904, art. 91. See S. Takahashi, International Law
applied to the Russo-Japanese War, New York, 1008, pp. 333-788, Moore's
Digest, 7 ;525.
Adjudication of prizes has been required in twenty treaties with
fourteen countries, of which those with Bolivia (1858, art. 24, Malloy, p.
121 ) and Colombia (1846, art. 24, p. 309) are in force.
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and to furnish a. written statement of the reason for condemna-
tion, on request. Statutes,
84 instructions to naval forces85 and
numerous decisions of prize courts
86 have also insisted on the
necessity of a legal adjudication of prizes before passage of title
or complete ousting of the right of the original neutral owner.
The United States has also recognized the duty of observing
certain limitations in the establishment of its prize courts. Al-
though France established prize courts in territory of the United
States in the wars following the French revolution, the United
States87 never acknowledged its right to do so, and in the Hague
conventions of 190788 it was provided that prize courts should not
be set up on neutral territory or on a vessel in neutral waters.
The courts have held that prize courts may be established in the
country's jurisdiction or in occupied enemy territory.89
(2) The power to establish a prize court of appeal was
given to congress in the Articles of Confederation and also the
power to
' '
establish rules for deciding in all cases what captures
on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken
by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall
be divided or appropriated.
' ' The court, consisting of a commit-
tee of congress established under this authority by the continen-
tal congress,
90 had simply appellate jurisdiction over state courts
84Rev. Stat. sec. 4615-4617.
85Instructions, June 20, 1898, art. 20-23, F r - Rel. 1898, p. 781 ; Moore's
Digest, 7:514; Stockton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904, art. 46-50.
86The Dos Hermanos, 2 Wheat. 76; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227; The
Adventure, 8 Cranch 221, (1814) ; Grundy Att. Gen., 3 op. 377, (1838), The
Nassau, 4 Wall, 634; Moore's Digest, 7:623-631.
87See Fenwick, The Neutrality Laws of the United States, p. 18. At
the time of the Revolutionary war it was common to take prizes into neu-
tral ports where they were adjudicated by the local courts of admiralty,
although it was even then regarded as an act approaching a breach of neu-
tral duty. The United States on several occasions took prizes into French
and Spanish ports. See G. W. Allen, A Naval History of the American
Revolution, N. Y., 1913, I -,255,274: 2:537,538.
88Hague Conventions, 1907, xiii, art. 4, Malloy, p. 2359.
89The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129. The authority of the president as com-
mander in chief to establish prize courts in conquered territory was up-
held in the Grapeshot but denied in Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 498,
which held that Congress alone could create courts with a prize jurisdic-
tion. See Moore's Digest, 7:585.
90Articles of Confederation, art.. 9; Resolution of Nov. 25, 1775. sec.
6, Jour. Cong. 1 :242, Ford. ed. 3 ;373. See note on these courts with refer-
ences, Scott 10..
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of admiralty, the establishment of which with a prize jurisdiction
was recommended to the colonial legislatures by a resolution of
congress.
91
By the constitution the judicial power of the United States is
declared to extend over ' ' all cases of admiralty and maritime ju-
risdiction." By the judiciary act of 1789 the jurisdiction of the
federal courts over prizes has been made exclusive, 92 thereby
barring any possible jurisdiction in state courts, and original
jurisdiction in prize causes has been given exclusively to federal
district courts,
93 thus limiting higher federal courts including the
supreme court to appellate jurisdiction in such cases. The prize
jurisdiction of district courts is complete, including all matters
relating to the disposition of vessels seized jure belli, or by au-
thority of statutes such as embargo, non-intercourse and revenue
acts. The admiralty jurisdiction, both instance and prize, exists
constantly, and no specific commission on the outbreak of war is
necessary for the exercise of prize jurisdiction ;94 thus when the
"Resolution of Nov. 25, 1775, sec. 4-6, Jour. Cong, i -242, Ford. ed.
3 ;373- See Moore's Digest, 7 ;s85. Before the passage of this resolution,
on Nov. i, 1775, the general court of Massachusetts had established prize
courts, the first ever erected by an independent state in the western hem-
isphere. See Acts and Resolutions of Province of Massachusetts Bay, 1886,
5 J436.
92Act. Sept. 24, 1789, i stat. 76,, sec. 9; rev. stat., sec. 711, cl. 3, 4;
Judicial code, 1911, act March 3, 1911, 36 stat. 1087, sec. 256, cl. 4. The ad-
miralty jurisdiction of which prize jurisdiction is a part was held to be
exclusive in federal courts in The Hine vs. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555 ; The Bel-
fast, 7 Wall. 625.
"Act Sept. 24, 1789, i stat. 76, sec. 9; rev. stat., sec. 563, cl. 8; Judi-
cial code of 1911, 36 stat. 1087, sec. 24, cl. 3. See Ketland vs. The Cassius,
2 Ball. 365, (1796).
94Prize jurisdiction may have been originally inherent in courts of ad-
miralty in England, but it was quite early recognized as distinct from the
instance jurisdiction and as exercisable only under special commission,
see Lindo vs. Rodney, 2 Doug. 614, (1781) W. S. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law, 3 Vol., London, 1907, i ;33O. By the naval prize act of
1864, (27-28 Viet, c 25, sec. 4) a permanent prize jurisdiction was given to
the High Court of admiralty, which was vested in the High Court by the
Judicature act of 1873, (36-37 Viet. c. 66, sec. 4-18). By the Prize courts
act of 1894, (57-58 Viet. c. 39), commissions giving a prize jurisdiction
to vice-admiralty courts might be issued in time of peace to become effect-
ive by the outbreak of war. See, The Earl of Halsbury, ed., The Laws of
England, 27 vol., London, 1912, 23:285, Pitt Cobbett, Cases and Opinions
on International Law, 3rd. ed., 2 vols., London, 1909, 25190.
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country is neutral the jurisdiction may be exercised over vessels
violating neutrality, and in times of peace over vessels of pirates
and unrecognized insurgents committing depradations against
commerce.95
(3) By the international prize court convention of the sec-
ond Hague conference, ratification of which with an amending
protocol was recommended by the senate on February 15, 1911,"
the United States has consented to submit to the decision of the
international prize court in certain prize cases arising in wars in
which all of the belligerents are parties to the convention. By
the protocol
97
proposed by the United States in 1910 on account
of the constitutional impossibility of an appellate authority
above the supreme court, it is provided that an original action
for damages against the captors may be brought in the interna-
tional prize court. Technically therefore in the case of the United
States the international prize court would not have jurisdiction
to determine the validity of the title to prizes, but the effect of
the decision would be the same. The international prize court
has not been established up to date.
The convention provides that in deciding cases the court is
to be governed by treaties if any bear on the controversy, by in-
ternational law if settled or in the absence of either by
' '
general
principles of justice and equity." On account of this somewhat
vague description of the law to be applied the London Naval
Conference of 1909 was called to draw up a code of prize law.
Owing to the failure of the Declaration of London, proposed by
this conference to secure general ratification, no immediate pros-
pect of the establishment of the court is in view.
98 The firm es-
tablishment of such an international court would undoubtedly be
a most potent agency for preventing injury to neutral persons
by belligerent naval forces.
(4) Prize jurisdiction is ordinarily exclusive in the courts
of the country of the capturing belligerent power.99 It is essen-
95Glass vs. The Betsey, 3 Dall. 6, (1/94). Supra p. 33 et seq., 131
et seq.
96Hague Conventions, 1907, xii, Charles, Treaties, 1913, p. 248.
97
Charles, Treaties, 1913, p. 262.
98On the status of the Declaration of London in 1914 see Editorial
comment, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 9; 199, Jan. 1915.
"L'Invincible, I Wheat. 238, 261 ; The Estrella, 4 Wheat 298 ; U. S.
vs. Peters, 3 Dall. 121, (i795)- In a number of treaties to which the
United States is a party, it is provided that prizes of either party when
belligerent shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of the other when tern-
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tially a jurisdiction in rem, extending over seizures jure belli
from neutrals or enemies upon the high seas or in territorial wa-
ters within the admiralty jurisdiction. 100 Actual possession of
the vessel in question, however, is not necessary. The jurisdic-
tion may be exercised over a vessel sequestrated in a neutral
port,
101
sold,
102
ransomed,103 or sunk, 104 and according to law a de-
cision must be given in all of these eases before the seizure and
disposition of the prize can be regarded as legitimate. The or-
dinary case is where the vessel has been brought into port and
has been put according to a provision of statute into the custody
of an officer of the court.
Seizures of foreign vessels made in pursuance of local regu-
lations such as the embargo and non-intercourse acts are legiti-
mate only when made in the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, but subject to this limitation are treated in the
same manner as prizes jure belli.105 The same is true of vessels
violating the neutrality of the United States. They also may only
be seized in territorial waters.106 The seizure of pirate ves-
sels,
107
vessels of unrecognized insurgents committing depreda-
tions on commerce108 and vessels engaged in acts internationally
condemned, as the slave trade,109 is permitted on the high seas
porarily taken into its ports. Supra, p. 186, note 74. For exceptions to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the captor power's courts over prizes see Moore's
Digest, 7:592. Supra, p. 134 et seq.
100Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, Speed, Att. Gen., 11 op. 445,
(1866) ; Note on prize law, i Wheat. App. II; 2 Wheat. App. I; 5 Wheat.
App. p. 52.
101Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Advocate, Blatch. 142;
The Arrabella and the Madiera, 2 Gall. 368.
io2\viHiams vs. Amroyd, 7 Cranch 423, (1819).
103Maissonaire vs. Keating, 2 Gall. 324, 337, (1815) ; Miller vs. The
Resolution, 2 Dall. i, 15, (1781). See Moore's Digest, 71533-
104The Edward Barnard, Blatch, 122; The Schooner Zavalla, Blatch,
173. See also Moore's Digest, 7 1590.
105Rose vs. Himeley, 4 Cranch, 241, (1808) ; Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat.
246.
10 The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298, (1819); The Alerta, 9 Cranch 359,
(1815).
107The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408, (1885).
' 8The Three Friends, 166 U. S. i, (1897) ; The Ambrose Light, 25
Fed. Rep. 408. (1885).
109General act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade, 1890,
Malloy, p. 1964. In the Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 122, (1825) Chief Justice
Marshall denied the legitimacy of seizures for slave trading beyond ter-
ritorial jurisdiction in the absence of treaty.
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by countries at peace and in such cases the United States courts
exercise a prize jurisdiction. It should be noted that statutes
may confer a jurisdiction over seizures on the high seas not
recognized or permitted by international law, and the prize
courts are bound to exercise it.110
In order to confer a prize jurisdiction the seizure must be
on the high seas or in territorial waters within the admiralty
jurisdiction. Seizures on land confer no prize jurisdiction in
the United States.111
Although prize jurisdiction is essentially a jurisdiction in
rem, the duty of the court being to settle the title to the vessel
itself and its cargo, yet it is not entirely so. Incidental to the
disposition of the prize, claims for damages may arise, and it
may be necessary to determine the rights of claimants for
freight, liens, insurance, etc. All of these matters come within
the jurisdiction of prize courts of the United States.112
(5) The functions of prize courts are (a) to determine
upon the legality of seizures, (b) to determine the title to prizes
and (c) to dispose of the proceeds in case of condemnation.
By their authority to decide whether the seizure was justi-
fiable, and in case it was without probable cause to decree dam-
ages against the naval officers making it, prize courts may aid
in the prevention of injury to neutral persons by such officers.
In determining the title to the prize, the court adjudicates
the respective claims of the belligerent government to condem-
nation and the neutral owner to restitution. It thus enforces
the duty of the government to abstain from illegal confiscation
of neutral property. In disposing of the proceeds of condemned
prizes the court may further prevent infractions of neutral
rights by naval forces.
The law applied by prize courts of the United States in
110The Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague 123; Murray vs. The Charming
Betsey, 2 Cranch 64 ; Talbot vs. Seaman, i Cranch i ; Moore's Digest,
2:914. In the absence of statute the jurisdiction of prize courts is deter-
mined by international law. The Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, Moore's
Digest, 7:599. In reference to British claims to prize jurisdiction over
extraterritorial seizures of foreign vessels in suppressing the slave trade
see supra p. 35.
111Brown. vs. U. S., 8 Cranch no, (1814). In England prize courts
were given jurisdiction over booty seized by land forces by statute in
1840, 3-4 Viet. c. 55, sec. 22; Banda and Kirwee Booty, L. R. I Adm. and
Ecc., 109, (1866).
ll2Moore's Digest, 75593-603, Infra p. 193, note 13.
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decreeing distribution of the proceeds of prizes will now be
considered.
(6) Claimants to proceeds of prizes may be of two kinds,
(1) persons with equitable claims upon the vessel by contract
or ordinary principles of the law of admiralty, such as claims
for freight, liens, insurance, etc. The prize courts of the United
States have in general recognized the validity of such claims
upon neutral prizes and their jurisdiction over them; conse-
quently in case of condemnation of the vessel, such claims have
been commonly allowed before any part of the proceeds is de-
creed to the government.113 (2) Persons with claims for meri-
torious service in capturing the vessel. These claims may be of
two kinds, (a) where the vessel is condemned to the capturing
state, and (b) where a recaptured vessel is restored to its
original neutral or citizen owner. In the first case the claim
is for prize bounty or prize money, in the second for military
salvage.
(a) It is a principle firmly established in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, if not universal, that prizes legally condemned
enure primarily to the government.114
113The Societe, 9 Cranch 209, 212, (1815); The Antonia Johanna, I
Wheat. 159, (1816) ; Schwartz vs. Insurance Co. of No. Am. 3 Wash. C. C.
117. In the case of enemy prizes the opposite rule appears to prevail,
that capture destroys all previous claims. See The Hampton, 5 Wall
372; The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S. 655; The Frances, 8 Cranch 418,
(1814) ; See Moore's Digest, 7:600-603.
114This principle which is signified by the phrase, "Bello parta cedunt
republicae," appears to have been recognized by the Greeks and Romans.
""Whatever is captured from the enemy, the law directs to be public prop-
erty, so that not only private persons are not the owners of it, but even
the general is not. The questor takes it, sells it and carries the money
to the public account." Cited from Dionysius of Halicarnassus by Gro-
tius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, (1625), Whewell, ed., 3 vols. Cambridge,
3:124. See also, A. S. Hershey, The History of International Relations
during Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 5:915, (1911) ;
Coleman Philipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece
and Rome, 2 vols., London, 1911, 2:237, 381. For opinion of Grotius on
this subject, see op. cit, 3:105. For recognition of this principle in Eng-
land in 1342 A. D., see Rymer, Foedera, 20 vol., London, 1704-1735, 1 1408;
Robert Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, 3rd ed., 4 vols.,
London, 1885, 3;6oi; T. E. Holland, Principles of Jurisprudence, nth
ed., N. Y., 1910, p. 212; Alexander vs. Duke of Wellington, 2 Russ. and
Mylne 54, (1831); The Elsebe, 5 Rob. 173, (1804); Banda and Kirwee
Booty, L. R. i Adm. and Ecc. 109, (1866). Recognition of this principle
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In the Revolutionary war, by resolution of congress, 115
prizes were given to the captors entirely if privateers, and one-
third to one-half if public vessels. By an act of 1800118 the
whole of the proceeds of prizes captured by public vessels was
decreed to the captor when of inferior force to the prize, and
one-half the proceeds when of superior force. The act also pro-
vided for distribution among the vessels within sight as joint
captors, and among the officers and men of the vessels. The
whole of prize proceeds was given to privateers and by an act
of 1812 117 distribution was decreed to be according to contract
between owners and crew or in the absence of contract one-half
to each. The provisions of the act of 1800 were practically
repeated in acts passed during the Civil war118 which applied
in the United States, U. S. vs. The Schooner Peggy, i Cranch 103; The
Siren, 13 Wall. 389; Porter vs. U. S. 106 U. S. 607; Commodore Stew-
art's case i, Ct. Cl. 113, Scott, 910; The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S.
92, 101, (1882) ; The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S. 254. In the Palmyra,
12 Wheat, i, the court held that all proceedings for condemnation upon
captures should be in the name of the United States. Before the aboli-
tion of prize money the courts frequently referred to the vesting of prize
in "captors" in an ambiguous manner which made it appear that title was
transferred immediately from the original owner to the naval force which
made the capture. (The Mary and Susan, i Wheat. 46). The difficulty
comes through the equivocal use of the word "captors" to mean either the
capturing state or the individuals of the capturing naval force. When
the question has come up directly the court has invariably held that con-
demnation is always to the government and the actual captors only have
rights by reason of explicit grant by the government. Thus an article in
the French treaty of 1800 (art. 4, Malloy, p. 497), providing for the resto-
ration of prizes not definitely condemned, but legally captured, was held
to violate no vested rights of the captors, (U. S. vs. the Schooner Peggy,
i Cranch 103, Lincoln Att. Gen. i op. HI), and during the Spanish war of
1898 the president released several captured vessels before adjudication
without compensation to the captors for their loss of prize money,
(Moore's Digest, 7:505; The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S. 254).
115Resolution of Congress, Nov. 25, 1775, Journal of Cong. 1 1242,
Ford. ed. 3 5373. See Moore's Digest, 7 5264. Henderson vs. Clarkson,
Supreme court of Pa., 2 Dall. 174. (1792) ; Keane vs. the Brig Glouces-
ter, 2 Dall. 36, (1782), Fed. Court of Appeals.
118Act. Apr. 23, 1800, 2 stat. 52, sec. 5-7, see Upton, op. cit. p. 484.
11TAct. June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760, sec. 4; June 27, 1813, 2 stat. 793, See
Upton, op. cit., p. 485.
118Act March 25, 1862, 12 stat. 375; July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 600; June
30, 1864, 13 stat. 306, 314, Rev. Stat., sec. 4630, 4632, 4635, 4642, 4652,
Upton, op. cit, p. 489.
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to both vessels of the navy and "not of the navy". Provision
was also made for the payment of prize bounty of $100 for each
man on board an enemy warship sunk or destroyed in battle
if of inferior force to the attacking United States vessel and
$200 if of superior force. Ransom money, salvage, and prize
bounty were all to be distributed in the same proportions as
prize money. There have been numerous special acts by con-
gress giving prize money in particular cases where the prize
was sunk or recaptured, and consequently no claim could be
prosecuted under the general law.119
The courts have held that as the statutes make no provi-
sion for prize money in case of capture by land forces or jointly
by land and naval forces, in such cases the entire proceeds enure
to the government.
120 While non-commissioned captors are
legally entitled to no prize money, "it has been the practice to
compensate gratuitous enterprise, courage and patriotism, by
assigning the captors a part and sometimes the whole of prize"
according to Attorney General Wirt.121 By an act of March 3,
1899122 all provisions granting prize money and prize bounty
were repealed; thus the entire proceeds of prize now enure to
the government, and are according to the act of 1862123 to be
used as a permanent naval pension fund.
(b) In early treaties with the Netherlands, Sweden and
Prussia124 it was reciprocally agreed that where either of the
contracting parties recaptured a vessel of the other before
twenty-four hours enemy possession, the vessel should be re-
stored with one-third salvage to privateers and one-thirtieth to
public vessels. If the enemy had had possession more than
twenty-four hours, privateers were permitted to retain the en-
119Special acts granting prize money, Victory on Lake Erie, 3 stat.
130; Case of Algerine vessels, 3 stat. 315; Crew of Brig Transfer, 3 stat.
480; Crew of the Black Snake, 4 stat. 23; Crew of the Bon Homme
Richard and the Alliance, 5 stat. 158; Crew of the Wasp, 3 stat. 295.
120The Siren, 13 Wall. 389; The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S.
92, 101, (1882).
121Wirt, Att. Gen., i op. 463, (1821). See The Dos Hermanos, 2
Wheat. 77. Decisions involving prize money distribution in the Spanish
War, Dewey vs. U. S., 178 U. S. 510; The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S.
254; The Mangrove Prize Money, 188 U. S. 720.
122Act March 3, 1899, 30 stat. 1004, 1007.
123Act July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 600, sec. n.
124Treaties with Netherlands, 1782-1795, Malloy, p. 1243; Sweden,
1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 17, 18, p. 1730; Prussia, 1785-1786, art.
17, 21 ; 1799-1810, art. 17, 21, pp. 1482, 1492.
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tire proceeds while with public vessels the prize should be
restored with one-tenth salvage. A statute of 1800,125 substan-
tially embodied in the revised statutes of 1878, decrees salvage
of one-eighth to the recaptors upon restoration of vessels to the
original owner. The principle upon which restoration or con-
demnation is decreed in cases of recaptured vessels has been
considered under obligations of abstention.128
The methods adopted for enforcing the obligations of naval
forces, have been (1) punishment by court martial for violation
of articles for the government of the navy, (2) assessment of
damages by prize courts, (3) forfeiture of prize money. In
addition to these legal methods of control the conduct of naval
forces can be and is ordinarily controlled by executive action
exercisable by the president as commander in chief and subor-
dinate naval officers with delegated authority. The abolition of
prize money has also been a measure tending toward the pro-
tection of neutral rights. The abolition of privateering with
the stimulus which it gave toward disregard for the rights of
merchantmen, by offering chances for personal gain, has called
attention to the fact that prize money created a similar situa-
tion in the navy itself. There can be no doubt but that the
quest of prize money acts as an incentive to the making of
unjustifiable seizures,127 and when it was allowed its forfeiture
in case of unwarranted seizures was used as a means of enforc-
ing observance of neutral rights among naval vessels. By the
abolition of prize money and prize bounty the incentive toward
illegal captures has been removed and the movement in the
direction started by the abolition of privateering continued.
In the second Hague Conference of 1907, a proposal was
made to abolish prize money,128 which was still given by all
nations except the United States and Japan. It was not ac-
cepted, even the United States voting against it on the ground
125Act March 3, 1800, 2 stat. 16. The Act June 30, 1864, 13 stat. 306,
314, Rev. Stat. sec. 4652, leaves the determination of the amount of sal-
vage to the court.
128Supra, pp. 169 et seq.
127See Article by C. C. Binney, The latest chapter of the American
Law of Prize and Capture, Am. Law Reg., Sept. 1906, and Editorial
Comment, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 1907, 1 1484.
128Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Actes et Docu-
ments, 3 vols., The Hague, 1907, 3 ',1148. English translation of this pro-
posal, J. Westlake, International Law, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1910, 2:313.
Discussion of the "voeu" which was proposed by the French delegation,
in the Acts and Documents, 3:792, 809, 842, 845, 906, 909.
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that the matter was a subject proper for local regulation and
that it was not desirable to take emphasis from the broader
question of abolishing the right to capture private property at
sea which the United States was advocating. In the present
war, Great Britain has by order in council abolished prize
money,
129 and it seems probable that in course of time it will
be acted on internationally as was done in the case of
privateering.
129Order in Council, Aug. 28, 1914, abolished prize money and estab-
lished a prize fund to be divided among the whole navy at the end of
the war. See Norman Bentwich, International Law as applied by Eng-
land in the War, Am. Jour. Int. Law, Jan. 1915.
PART IV. OBLIGATIONS AS A BELLIGERENT
TOWARD ENEMIES
CHAPTER XIII. INTRODUCTORY
In their dealings with neutral states, the rights of belligerent
states are much in excess of the ordinary rights of states at
peace. This is even more true in their dealings with enemies.
The recognized rights of a belligerent against its enemy are so
great that it sometimes seems impossible to define their limits at
all. Yet the establishment of these limits is the purpose of the
law of war. As soon as we recognize the existence of such limits
to legal rights, we recognize the legal obligations not to exceed
them. It is therefore possible to speak of the obligations of a bel-
ligerent to its enemy.
The obligations of states have been classified under the five
heads, (1) abstention, (2) acquiescence, (3) prevention, (4) vin-
dication, (5), reparation.
(1) Obligations of abstention can be made effective, for the
most part, only by act of the sovereign authority of the state. In
so far as this is true, municipal law can have no effect in their
enforcement. As in the case of obligations of belligerents toward
neutrals, the practice of prize courts does furnish a check upon
the infraction of some of these duties. By legally adjudicating
enemy property captured at sea according to the rules of inter-
national law, prize courts interpose between their own govern-
ment and the enemy owner of the prize, thus compelling obser-
vance of the belligerent duty to abstain from confiscation of ene-
my property declared immune by international law. In this case,
therefore, municipal law may aid in the enforcement of the bel-
ligerent's obligations of abstention.
(2) Acquiescence seems to be contradictory to the very na-
ture of war. Non-acquiescence, the effort to overcome, appears to
be the very essence of the relationship between belligerents. This is
true so far as the belligerent state itself is concerned, but the duty
of acquiescence is recognized as obligatory upon the non-combat-
ant inhabitants of occupied territory. This duty obviously can
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not be enforced by the belligerent state claiming de jure sover-
eignty of the territory, but by the occupying belligerent who has
de facto sovereignty. The law of the United States does, how-
ever, recognize the duty, in that it enforces ordinary commercial
acts of individuals, not of direct aid to the enemy, which were
performed in pursuance of this duty of acquiescence, even when
contrary to the law of the United States. 1 This duty, however,
relates to the general subject of the succession of states and the
rights of inhabitants of transferred territory which is considered
in the chapters dealing with obligations in time of peace.2
(3) The obligations of prevention require a state to prevent
certain acts by its officers of government and the inhabitants of
its territory which would amount to infractions of international
law. It is by enforcing these duties that municipal law can be
most effective in enforcing international obligations. The bellig-
erent state comes in contact with its enemy largely through its
army and navy. Through municipal regulations preventing in-
fractions of international law by such agencies, this obligation of
international law may be made effective.
(4) Vindication, however, is foreign to the law of war. In-
ternational law does not put a belligerent under an obligation to
vindicate illegal acts by its enemy. It does, however, give him a
right to retaliate to a limited extent. Retaliation is a right to
vindicate, not a duty. The belligerent is, however, under an obli-
gation not to carry retaliation beyond a certain limit.3 The limit
is not fixed or enforceable by any authority. The legitimacy of
any particular measure of retaliation is left to the discretion of
the sovereign. Municipal law can not control it.4
(5) Reparation should also theoretically be a duty of bellig-
erents. Individuals of either belligerent state ought to be able to
recover compensation for injuries due to illegal acts of the enemy
state. In practice such a condition is impossible. The victor will
'thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall, i, (1868).
-Supra, pp. 62-63.
3The right of retaliation is recognized in Lieber's Instructions, art.
27, 28.
4 It should be said, however, that there has been authority in British
prize court decisions for the view that courts may refuse to recognize
retaliatory measures of their own government so far as they injuriously
affect neutrals. See The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348, (1807); The Minerva,
(1807) Life of Sir J. Mackintosh, 1:317; Phillimore, Int. Law, 3; section
436; Holland, Studies in Int. Law, pp. 197-198.
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gain full reparation in the treaty of peace, but there is no legal
recourse for the loser. The treaty of peace definitively settles
the matter, and its terms are fixed according to policy and the
result of the conflict. There have, however, been treaties requir-
ing each party to indemnify the other for the care of its prison-
ers of war, specifically stating that this indemnity shall be con-
sidered entirely apart from general indemnities demanded by the
conqueror. The Hague conventions also require compensation
for breaches of the law of war. 5 So far as such treaties are en-
forceable by municipal law, and so far as enemy individuals are
assisted by municipal law in obtaining indemnity- for injuries,
the general rules of the subject of reparation considered under
the law of peace will apply.
We shall therefore consider the duties of belligerents toward
their enemies under the twro heads, ( 1 ) obligations of abstention,
and (2) obligations of prevention. In the enforcement of the
former class of duties, municipal law enforces international law
directly. The rules of municipal law bearing on this point are
therefore rules of international law at the same time. In the sec-
ond case, the means employed for controlling the conduct of per-
sons and officers are a matter left to the discretion of the govern-
ments. International law does not say how individuals shall be
controlled, only what they must be prevented from doing. The
municipal law in this class will therefore consist largely of rules
supplementary to international law.
BTreaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 24, Malloy, p. 1484; 1799-1810,
revived 1828, art. 24, p. 1494; Mexico, 1848, art. 22, p. 1118; Hague
Conventions, 1907, iv, art. 3.
CHAPTER XIV. OBLIGATONS OF ABSTENTION
INTRODUCTORY
A belligerent state is bound to abstain from certain acts
toward its enemy. Thus it must abstain from committing hostil-
ities until formal warning of war, from the confiscation of pub-
lic or private debts, from committing acts of hostility against
enemy persons domiciled in its territory, from resorting to for-
bidden methods of warfare, from the inhuman treatment of
prisoners of war, from the unnecessary injury of non-combat-
ants, from injuring the sick and wounded and those caring for
them, and from injuring scientific, religious and artistic institu-
tions. 1 These duties, however, are obligatory upon the sover-
eignty of the state. They are beyond the province of municipal
law to control, so far as they are duties of abstention. Thus
courts have held2 that the commencement of war is a political
act and they can not question the legitimacy of belligerent meas-
ures when the political department of government has recog-
nized the existence of the status. Thus the Hague convention re-
lating to the opening of hostilities must be regarded as directory
solely upon the political department of government.
The courts also have held3 that the sovereign may confiscate
debts and if it does so unequivocally the courts can offer no re-
course to the mulcted enemy person. This statement, however,
is subject to limitation. Unequivocal confiscations of the sover-
eign are undoubtedly valid in municipal law. Confiscations by
particular agencies of government may not be. Thus during the
Revolutionary war the confiscations by the individual common-
wealths were declared void where they conflicted with treaty pro-
visions.4 The enforcement of the duty as against inferior agen-
*Hague Conventions, 1907, iii, iv, vi, Malloy Treaties, pp. 2259, 2269,
2304.
2The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635.
8Brown vs. U. S., 8 Cranch no, (1814); Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Ball.
199, (1796).
4Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, (1796). See treaty with Great Brit-
ain, 1783, art. 4-6, Malloy, p. 588. The United States has concluded
twenty treaties with fifteen countries, six of which are now in force
(1915) forbidding confiscation of public or private debts due enemy
persons during war.
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cies of government, however, should be classified under duties of
prevention rather than of abstention.
By a large number of treaties5 the United States has recog-
nized its duty to protect enemy persons domiciled in its terri-
tory and to permit them a certain time to wind up their affairs
and leave. These treaties also are addressed primarily to the po-
litical department of the government. A sovereign act impris-
oning domiciled enemies could not be controlled by municipal
law. As in the case of confiscation, however, municipal law can
enforce such treaties by preventing their infraction by inferior
agencies of government.
By its adhesion to the Hague and Geneva conventions the
United States has recognized its duty to abstain from forbidden
methods of warfare, from the inhuman treatment of prisoners of
war, from unnecessary injury to non-combatants and from in-
jury to red cross agencies and to the sick and wounded in their
care. So far as they are duties of abstention, these matters are
addressed to the political department of government, but they
may be indirectly enforced by the control, through municipal
law, of the armed forces of the government, and will be consid-
ered under obligations of prevention.
In the enforcement of prize law, however, the obligation of
the belligerent state to observe certain restraints in the capture
of enemy property at sea is enforced through municipal law di-
rectly against the government. The principle observed by the
United States prize courts and other rules of municipal law bear-
ing on this point will therefore concern us at this point. In at
least one case, also, judicial methods have been provided for the
protection of enemy private property on land. This case merits
brief consideration.
ENEMY PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA
The general right of capturing enemy property at sea is rec-
ognized by international law but there are specified cases in which
the belligerent must abstain from such captures. The enforce-
5 Protection to resident enemy persons has been guaranteed in twenty-
seven treaties with twenty-three countries, of which the following are
now (1915) in force: Argentine Republic, 1853, art. 12, Malloy, p. 24; Bo-
livia, 1858, art. ii, p. 122; Columbia, 1846, art. 27, p. 310; Costa Rica, 1851,
art. ii, p. 345; Honduras, 1846, art. u, p. 956; Italy, 1871, art 21, p. 975;
Mexico, 1848, art. 22, p. 1117; Paraguay, 1859, art. 13, p. 368; Prussia,
1799-1810, revived 1828, art. 23, p. 1494; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816,
1827, art. 22, p. 1732.
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merit of this duty is provided for by the rule recognized in the
United States whereby all prizes, enemy as well as neutral, are
submitted to prize courts before final appropriation. The gen-
eral principles of prize court jurisdiction and procedure have
been discussed under the law of neutrality6 and it should again
be emphasized that the whole institution of prize courts is pri-
marily intended for the benefit of neutrals. Enemies benefit
from them only incidentally. The rules applied in distinguish-
ing enemy and neutral property and vessels has also been dis-
cussed as has the attitude of the United States on the question
of total immunity of enemy private property from seizure during
war.7
In the case of neutral vessels and goods, immunity from cap-
ture is the general rule. Capture can only be justified in certain
exceptional cases, as breach of blockade, carriage of contraband,
unneutral service, constructive enemy character, or necessity.
With enemy property and vessels the case is reversed. Here the
rule is liability to capture. Cases of immunity are exceptional.
Under the two treaties8 which the United States has concluded,
insuring the total immunity of enemy private property during
war, this would not be true, and if this principle were adopted
as a general rule, a condition which the United States has advo-
cated since the foundation of the Republic and notably at the
second Hague conference, enemy private property and merchant
vessels at sea would be in practically the same condition as neu-
tral vessels and property are today. This condition, however,
does not exist, and by international law cases in which enemy
property at sea is immune, are exceptions to the general rule
of liability.
The cases in which enemy property at sea is immune from
capture are defined in the Declaration of Paris and the Hague
conventions and may be classified as (1) vessels in port on the
outbreak of war, (2) vessels leaving their last port before the out-
break of war, (3) postal correspondence, (4) coast fishing ves-
sels, (5) enemy property under the neutral flag, (6) "vessels
charged with a religious, scientific or philanthropic mission," (7)
hospital ships bearing the red cross flag when they are commis-
sioned and authorized by the belligerent government. In the
Supra p. 187 et seq.
7Supra, pp. 158, 166.
*Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1799, art. 23, Malloy, p. 1484; Italy, 1871,
art. 12, p. 973.
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last two cases public as well as private owned vessels are immune
from capture. 9
The immunities granted in these cases were provided for in
Stockton's Naval War code of 1900 to 1904.10 In the proclama-
tion and instructions11 on the outbreak of the Spanish war, days
of grace on departure with immunity until they reached a home
port were granted to enemy vessels, and the immunity of vessels
bound for the United States which left their last port before the
outbreak of war was also prescribed, the rule being applied in
several cases.12 In the case of the Paquete Habana, 13 arising
during the Spanish war, the court held that coast fishing vessels
of the enemy were not liable to capture, before the enunciation of
this doctrine by any international convention.
The immunity of enemy property under the neutral flag is
a doctrine which has been supported by the political department
of the government since its foundation, but not given legal recog-
nition until the war of 1898, when the president's proclamation
required adhesion to the rules of the Declaration of Paris in this
respect.
14 In many of the early treaties the doctrine of "free
ships, free goods
' ' had been specified as binding between the con-
tracting parties.
15
Although there have not been a great many cases before the
prize courts in which these immunities have been applied, in the
few cases that have come up the court has followed the rules
laid down in treaties and executive orders. The general principle
requiring the adjudication of all prizes operates as a guarantee
to the enforcement of this duty of abstention.
See Hague Conventions, 1907, x, arts. 1-3, vi, xi.
"Stockton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904, arts. 13-15, 21-22.
"Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat. 1770; Instructions, June 20,
1898, art. 7, For. Rel. 1898, 780.
"The Buena Ventura, 175 U. S. 384, was released under the procla-
mation. The Panama, 176, U. S. 535, although in the terms of the ex-
emption, was condemned as an armed vessel forming part of the enemy
auxiliary navy, a case provided for in the proclamation. The Pedro, 175
U. S. 354, although her ultimate destination was the United States, was
condemned because her immediate voyage was to an enemy port. The
doctrine of continuous voyage was here denied, where it would have
operated to the advantage of an enemy vessel. Four justices dissented
from this opinion but it was followed by the court in the case of the Guido,
175 U. S. 382. See Moore's Digest, 7J453-9-
"The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, (1899).
"Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat 1770.
"This principle has been embodied in thirty-one treaties, with twenty-
one countries. Seven are now (1915) in force. Supra p. 164, note 106.
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Were the international prize court established as provided by
the Hague conventions of 1907, cases involving these immunities
would all be subject to its jurisdiction. 18 By its signature of this
convention and its consent to its ratification, the United States
signified its willingness to add this further sanction to the en-
forcement of these duties.
ENEMY PRIVATE PROPERTY ON LAND
According to international law, enemy private property on
land is exempt from capture. 17 Consequently, the government is
under an obligation to abstain from such captures. Exceptions
to this rule are recognized in the case of necessity, which justifies
military requisitions. The expense of adminstering territory
under military government may also be reimbursed by money
contributions of the inhabitants, which thus resemble taxes. In
both of these cases the enforcement of the rule is in the hands of
military authorities, and is discussed in considering the obliga-
tions of prevention in relation to the land forces. 18
Ordinarily the sanction of military law, controlling the
armed forces, alone guarantees this obligation of abstention.
There is no possibility of recourse to judicial authority as is pro-
vided in the case of naval captures. Prize courts have repeatedly
asserted that their jurisdiction does not extend to land captures.19
The reason for this difference is to be found in the fact that in
naval war, questions of neutral rights are apt to be involved;
whereas this is not so true in land captures. Property on enemy
territory is prima facie enemy property. The enemy's privilege
of a judicial adjudication of his property captured at sea arises
from the probabliity of its association with neutral property.
It is not, however, impossible that all property seized on
18The international prize court is given jurisdiction over enemy prop-
erty when the case involves enemy cargo in a neutral ship, and when a
claim is based on an allegation that the seizure has been effected in viola-
tion of the provisions of a convention or of an enactment of the belliger-
ent captor. Hague conventions, 1907, xii, art. 3. See Charles, Treaties,
1913, p. 250.
"United States courts have stated this principle, see Brown vs. U. S.,
8-Cranch- no, (1814) ; U. S. vs. 1756 shares of capital stock, 5 Blatch. 231 ;
U. S. vs. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 137 ; Lamar vs. Brown, 92 U. S. 194, Moore's
Digest, 7 ;288-289.
18Infra. p. 210.
"Brown, vs. U. S., 8 Cranch. no, (1814) ; Kirk vs. Lynde, 106 U. S.
315, 317; Oakes vs. U. S., 174 U. S. 7?8, 786, (1899).
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land should be subject to legal adjudication before confiscation.
The British prize courts have in fact been given jurisdiction of
such seizures.20 In the United States the abandoned and cap-
tured property act of 1863
21 furnished a somewhat similar rem-
edy during the Civil war. By this act, a sum equal to the value
of captured property was to be deposited in the treasury, and
persons claiming ownership were permitted to prosecute claims
for such property in the court of claims. Property intended for
use in waging war such as arms, ordinance ships, steamboats, for-
age, military supplies, etc., were excluded, and persons who had
given "aid or comfort" to the rebellion were denied this priv-
ilege.
Such privileges as this have not been granted in other wars.
This act probably was due to the fact that being a civil war,
many inhabitants of the seat of war were loyal to the union
cause. The act was to reimburse such persons, rather than ene-
mies. As a matter of fact, by an act of 186422 it was specifically
declared that the jurisdiction of the court of claims should not
extend to general claims
' '
against the United States growing out
of the destruction or appropriation of or damage to property by
the army or navy
' '
during the Civil war.
In general therefore the United States does not provide for
the enforcement by means of judicial adjudication of its duty to
abstain from capturing enemy private property on land. The
duty is enforced indirectly by measures for preventing illegal
seizures by armed forces.
20Statute 1840, 3-4 Viet. c. 65, sec. 22, The Banda and Kirwee Booty
L. R. I Adm. and Ecc. 109 (1866) Pitt Cobbett cases and opinions, on in-
ternational law, 2. vols., London, 1913, 25201.
21Act March 12, 1863, 12 stat. 820; Moore's Digest, 7:295-300. Cases
under this act, see Young vs. U. S. 97 U. S. 39, (1877) ; Briggs vs. U. S.,
143 U. S. 346, (1892) ; Vance vs. U. S., 30 Ct. Cl., 252. British subjects
enjoy the benefits of this act, U. S. vs. O'Keefe, u Wall. 178; Carlisle vs.
U. S. 16 Wall 147.
"Act, July 4, 1864, 13 stat. 381.
CHAPTER XV. OBLIGATIONS OF PREVENTION
INTRODUCTORY
It is for the most part through the enforcement of the duty
of prevention, as against its armed representatives, that the state
fulfills its duties of abstention
;
and it is largely through the mu-
nicipal sanctions thus enforced that the law of war is observed at
all. The belligerent's duties toward neutrals tend to be observed
because of the sanctions of international law. Neutrals can bring
threats of force and demands for reparation which the belligerent
usually finds it convenient to heed. But in the law of war the
enemy is already using all the force he can. The treaty of peace
definitely concludes any further demand for reparation. What
therefore is the force which causes obedience to the law of war?
There is none, except that of self-interest. Reciprocity benefits
both belligerents. Each knows that a breach of law on its part
will bring about a retaliatory breach by the other. If this pro-
cess were continued, war rights would soon pass all limits, the
law of war would disappear and savagery would prevail. It is
only in so far as the principle of reciprocal benefit acts that the
law is obeyed.
The state must therefore take extreme care that its armed
representatives do not unwittingly break the law of war, for the
minute the breach is made, a progressive march of retaliation and
counter-retaliation will have begun which, although contrary to
the self-interest of both, neither can stop. We will therefore dis-
cuss the laws of the United States designed to prevent infractions
of the law of war by its (1) land forces and (2) naval forces. As
a third division we will consider the laws of like effect in refer-
ence to (3) the civil population.
ACTS BY LAND FORCES
Military law, military government, and martial law are
three terms relating to the legal position of land forces in time
of war which should be distinguished.
1 Martial law is the law
in force in portions of the home territory of a belligerent near
JOn these distinctions see Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; W. E. Birk-
heimer, Military Government and Martial Law, 2nd. ed. London, 1904; p.
21, 372, G. B. Davis, Treatise on Military Law, p. 6.
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the seat of war or in a state of insurrection. It is a matter regu-
lated entirely by constitutional law and as its effect is primarily
domestic it has no connection with international law, except in
case neutrals are injured by the suspension of constitutional
guarantees, in which case international questions would arise,
but extraneous to the present topic.
Military government exists when an army is in secure occu-
pation of a portion of enemy territory. The law applied under
military government, (to which the term martial law is also
sometimes applied), 2 bears a relation to martial law, but in real-
ity the condition is somewhat different. In the latter case the
persons affected are for the most part citizens ; in the former they
are foreigners. The law of military government, therefore, is a
matter governed by international law. The occupying belliger-
ent owes obligations to the inhabitants and they owe obligations
to it, both of which are determined by international law. We are
therefore concerned here with the law of military government
which the United States requires of its armies.
Military law is the law regulating the conduct of the army.
It consists of the rules defining the powers and liabilities of mili-
tary officers and enlisted men and the means of enforcing them.
It defines the constitution of military tribunals, such as courts
martial, military commissions and commissions of inquiry, their
jurisdiction and their procedure, as well as the rules of executive
subordination and enforcement of discipline. In the United
States, military law is found in statutes, army regulations, and
instructions and opinions of courts, attorneys general and judge
advocates general.
3
Military law is not a part of international
2See Lieber's Instructions, art. i-io. By applying the theory of de
facto governments, that sovereignty passes immediately upon effectual oc-
cupation of the territory, the law of military governments fulfills our defi-
nition of marital law, for the occupied territory has become home terri-
tory. With this conception the law of military government would be a
subject of constitutional rather than of international law. Because of the
practical difference and because of the fact that military government is re-
garded as a temporary and not permanent transfer of sovereignty, it
seems well to preserve the distinction.
8The statutory laws relating to the control of the army, annotated
with references to court decisions, and official opinions, may be found in
"The Military laws of the United States", 1901, ed. G. B. Davis, with sup-
plement to 191 1, ed. J. B. Porter. The "Digest of Opinions of the Judge
Advocates General of the Army" published in 1912, C. R. Rowland, ed.,
also contains references to statutes, cases and opinions of attorneys gen-
eral bearing on the various points. See also annual publication of Army
Regulations and General Orders of the War Department.
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law. The relationships it defines are entirely domestic. Yet it is
of great importance for our present subject, for it is through the
sanctions of military law that the army is compelled to obey the
law of war. Much of it consists of laws supplementary to inter-
national law.
There has long been a discussion whether war is a relation
between states or between armies. The latter view was eloquently
espoused by Rousseau* and apparently influenced the early
statesmen of the United States. At any rate the policy they es-
tablished, now a national tradition, that private property ought
to be immune from capture in war, is in harmony with it. The
present regime of universal conscription armies seems to nullify
the theory, in Europe at least. In our view Rousseau's dicta is
untenable. The relationship is one between two communities or
states, not between two armies or two navies. Facts are sufficient
justification for the assertion. It is, however, clear that though
both are enemies a distinction exists between combatants and non-
combatants. We may therefore consider successively the duties
of the army to (1) combatants and (2) non-combatants.
(1) The duties of armed forces toward enemy combatants
include such matters as the employment of only legitimate means
of warfare, care of sick and wounded, treatment of prisoners of
war and spies, observance of flags of truce, armistices, etc.
A number of early treaties prescribed humane treatment for
prisoners of war.
5 All of the subjects mentioned are regulated
in detail in the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 relating to
the laws of war on land and in the Geneva conventions of 1864
establishing the red cross flag and prescribing rules for the care
of the sick and wounded. By its ratification of these treaties the
United States has made them law for its armies. The same mat-
ters are covered by Francis Lieber's celebrated instructions for
the government of the armies of the United States in the field,
written during the Civil war. On April 24, 1863, these instruc-
tions were officially promulgated as a general order of the war de-
partment and are therefore binding law for the army. The in-
4
J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Translation by Tozer, London,
1909, p. 106. See discussion on this question, J. Westlake, Principles of
International Law, Cambridge, 1894, P- 258 ; G. M. Ferrante, Private Prop-
erty in Maritime War, Pol. Sci. Quar., 20; 706, (1895).
8
Treaties, Algiers, 1816-1830, art. 17, p. 15; Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 24,
p. 1484; 1799-1810, revived 1828, art. 24, p. 1494; Mexico, 1848, art. 22, p.
II 18; Morocco, 1787-1836, art. 16, p. 1209, Tripoli, 1805-1911, art. 16, p. 1791.
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structions give detailed regulations defining the limits permitted
by necessity and by retaliation, the treatment of prisoners of
war and spies, use of flags of truce, exchange of prisoners, and
prohibited measures such as assassination.
The enforcement of these laws is largely in the hands of
military commissions. Courts martial, being of statutory juris-
diction, can not take cognizance of many of these cases, as
violations of the laws of war are not listed in the offenses speci-
fied in the articles of war.6 By statute courts martial are,
however, given jurisdiction over the trial of spies, 7 and over
officers or soldiers injuring persons bringing provisions or other
necessaries to the army while in "foreign parts". This juris-
diction extends to camp followers, retainers and militia in the
service of the government, as well as the regular army and
volunteers violating the articles of war.
8 The imposition of crim-
inal penalties upon violators is the means employed by both
courts martial and military commissions for enforcing the law.9 It
must not be lost sight of, however, that the control of the army
is largely executive rather than legal. It is to the discretion
of commanding officers that enforcement of the laws of war,
whether unwritten, in treaties, or in orders, is left.10
(2) Non-combatants vary in legal rights somewhat accord-
ing to circumstances. Thus non-combatants domiciled in the
belligerent's own state, in territory under military government
and in the actual zone of hostilities enjoy different immunities.
The army does not affect the first class. Their treatment will
be considered under the duties of the civil population.
6On authority and jurisdiction of courts martial and military com-
missions see Rev. Stat. sec. 1342-1343; Military Laws, 1911, p. 744, note i,
p. 745; Dig. Op. Judge. Ad. Gen., 1912, p. 1067; Lieber's Instructions,
art. 13.
7Rev. Stat. sec. 1343.
8Articles of War, Rev. Stat, sec. 1342, art. 56, 63, 64. Courts martial
may punish members of these classes for felonies in time of war, (art.
58) and soldiers for being found over a mile from camp without leave,
(art. 34).
9
Dig. Op. Judge Ad. Gen., 1912, pp. 510-511, 1071-1072.
10By the Articles of War an officer must keep good order and "to
the utmost of his power, redress all abuses and disorders which may be
committed by an officer or soldier under his command, (art. 54) and offi-
cers guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman may be dis-
missed." (art. 61).
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In the second case the United States has recognized the
principles that such persons are immune from injury and their
property from confiscation so long as they observe their duty
of acquiescence to the occupying government. The duties of
the army in this connection are prescribed in the Hague con-
ventions and in Lieber's instructions. Special instructions to
army officers are also usually issued providing rules for military
government. It is a remarkable fact that during General
Scott's occupation of parts of Mexico in 1846, he enforced the
general rule of paying for requisitions and levying only contri-
butions in lieu of taxes to pay for the civil administration of
the territory, until he had received special instructions from
Washington to adopt a harsher practice. It was thought that
Mexico was continuing the war because the civil population was
not feeling its hardship, consequently the instructions ordered
him to support his army by uncompensated seizures. Very re-
luctantly he undertook this policy, which is contrary to modern
international law and in his opinion at that time was inexpedi-
ent. Here was a case where the discretion of the general on
the field was more efficient in enforcing the law of war than
that of authorities higher up. 11
The conduct toward non-combatants in the actual zone of
hostilities is also provided for in the Hague conventions. A
number of early treaties provided for the immunity of non-
combatants in person and the payment for all requisitions.12
The Hague conventions besides covering these points forbid
unnecessary injuries to non-combatants, the bombardment of
undefended towns, and pillage. Similar matters are covered in
Lieber's instructions. Special statutes and instructions, how-
ever, especially during the Civil war, have required a far harsher
treatment.13 The treaties and instructions covering these points
are law and enforceable through the exercise of penal jurisdic-
tion by military commissions and through executive coercion.
The preservation of the rights of non-combatants may also be
enforced through laws providing for their indemnification for
requisitions, after the war. This is provided for in the provi-
"Moore's Digest, 7:282-285.
"Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1/96, art. 23, p. 1414; 1799-1810, revived
1828, art. 23, p. 1444; Mexico, 1848, art. 22, p. 1117; Italy, 1871, art. 21, p.
975-
"Confiscation act, July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 589. On confiscation of cot-
ton and slaves during the Civil war see Moore's Digest 7;3OO-366. For or-
ders during Mexican war see Moore's Digest 7 ;282-28s.
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sions of the Hague conventions and Lieber's instructions which
require the giving of cash or receipts, good after the war for all
requisitions.
14 In the Civil war by the captured and abandoned
property act
15 the United States provided for the indemnifica-
tion of non-combatants. A sum equal in value to all requisitions
was to be deposited in the treasury and all persons were com-
pensated from this fund if they could prove that they had taken
no active part in the rebellion.
ACTS BY NAVAL FORCES.
The law governing the conduct of the naval authorities is
contained in statutes, regulations, instructions, and the opinions
of courts. 18 Naval courts martial with jurisdiction over offenses
against the statutory articles for the government of the navy
are provided, but the enforcement of the law of naval warfare
is largely intrusted to the discretion of commanding officers.
(1) The duties of the navy toward enemy combatants are
specified in the Hague convention of 1907 and the Geneva con-
ventions as applied to naval warfare adopted at the same time.
In 1868 a treaty was signed extending the provisions of the
Geneva convention to naval war. It was not generally ratified,
although the United States did so in 1882. In 1898 the United
States issued a circular stating that these additional articles
would serve as a modus vivendi during the war with Spain,
and in consequence the Navy Department issued a General Or-
der requiring the observance of these regulations in the treat-
ment of "The Solace", which had been fitted out as an ambu-
lance ship.
17 Besides incorporating the principles of the Geneva
convention, the Hague convention of 1907 limits the use of
submarine contact mines, and the bombardment of undefended
coast towns. In Stockton 's Naval War Code, in force from 1900
to 1904, and in instructions issued at the beginning of wars18
the limits of hostile acts against enemy public forces have been
14Hague Conventions, 1907, v, art. 52; Lieber's Instructions, art. 38.
"Act March 12, 1863, 12 stat. 820. See Moore's Digest, 7:295-300.
"Articles for the government of the Navy, Rev. Stat. sec. 1624; Reg-
ulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1913, con-
taining also permanent instructions.
"Additional articles to Geneva Convention, 1868, Modus Vivendi,
1898, General Order of Navy Dept., and Correspondence, Malloy, Treaties,
p. 1907-1924.
"Instructions to Blockading vessels and Cruisers, June 20, 1898, Gen.
Ord. 492, For. Rel. 1898, p. 780.
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prescribed. In the navy regulations of 1913 it is provided that
"when the United States is at war, the commander in chief shall
require all under his command to observe the rules of humane
warfare and the principles of international law."19 It will
thus be seen that, as in the case of the army, the enforcement
of the duties of naval war is largely left to the executive control
of naval officers.
(2) The duties of the navy toward enemy non-combatants
relate largely to the exercise of the right of capturing private
property at sea, but certain restrictions upon possible injury
to persons are also required. Naval forces are forbidden bom-
barding undefended coast towns, indiscriminately laying sub-
marine contact mines or unnecessarily cutting cables between
belligerent and neutral territory, by the Hague conventions of
1907. 20 These provisions are designed for the protection both
of enemy non-combatants and of neutrals. The same obligations
with the exception of that relating to mines were prescribed in
Stockton's Naval war code and it was especially stated that
"non-combatants are to be spared in person and property dur-
ing hostilities as much as the necessities of war and the conduct
of non-combatants will permit. 21
The enforcement of these duties, like those required in
dealing with enemy armed forces, is left to the authority of
naval officers, subject to the control of the navy department
through instructions and executive action.
In general the duty in reference to the seizure of enemy
property at sea is enforced by the same measures as those relat-
ing to the seizure of neutral prizes. The law of prize grew up
for the benefit of neutrals but because of the frequent difficulty
of determining between neutral and enemy property at sea,
enemy individuals are benefited by the same rules.
As pointed out in considering the law of neutrality, the
seizure of prizes by public naval forces alone, their care, treat-
ment, bringing in and adjudication are provided for in treaties,
and instructions of the navy department. These provisions are
made effective by such measures as the abolition of privateering,
the abolition of prize money, the holding of vessels liable in
damages for seizures without probable cause, and by the estab-
lishment of prize courts with adequate jurisdiction. Although
iNavy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1635.
20Hague Conventions, 1907, iv, art. 54, viii, ix.
21 Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 3, 4, 5.
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enemy prizes benefit in the main by provisions applicable to
neutrals, this is not always true. Enemy property is prima facie
condemnable ; therefore it is seldom that damages can be ob-
tained for a seizure even where the vessel proves to be immune.22
Also, because of this prima facie liability, the destruction of
enemy prizes is not, by the Declaration of London, made subject
to such grave presumptions of illegality, and the treatment to
be accorded the officers and crew of enemy vessels is different
from that in the case of neutrals. 23
The general principle that prizes must be brought in and
that title does not pass until legal adjudication applies to enemy
private vessels as well as neutral. The law applied by prize
courts in adjudicating enemy prizes has been considered in
treating the belligerent's obligations of abstention toward neu-
trals and enemies.
ACTS BY THE CIVIL POPULATION.
International law requires a belligerent state to prevent its
citizens from performing certain acts against the person and
property of enemy individuals. In a large number of treaties
the United States has recognized the principle that enemy indi-
viduals in its territory are immune from injury or confiscation
of property.
24
During both the Mexican and Spanish wars
special instructions specifically called attention to such treaties.
25
The usual criminal laws of the states serve to prevent the spo-
-The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, (1899); and 189 U. S. 453,
(1903).
23The Declaration of London, 1909, art. 48-54, on destruction of neu-
tral prizes.
24The United States has concluded twenty-seven treaties with twenty-
three countries on this subject. Ten are now in force. As examples see
treaty with Mexico, 1831-1881, art. 26, p. 1903; 1848, art. 22, p. 1117, Spain,
1795-1902. art. 13, p. 1645. Generally a time is specified, varying from six
months to a year, in which merchants may wind up their affairs and leave
the country unmolested. Supra, p. 202, note 5.
"Circular of Treasury Department to customs collectors, June n,
1846, Br. and For. St. Pap., 34:1138, calling attention to the treaty of 1831,
giving Mexican merchants the right to leave the country, and letter of
Asst. Sec. of State, J. B. Moore, Moore's Digest, 7:255, calling attention
to the provisions of the Spanish treaty of 1795. Spain claimed that the
treaty was abrogated by the war, a claim which the United States denied.
Such provisions as this would obviously be meaningless if the treaty were
abrogated by war. Several of these provisions are followed by the state-
ment that they shall not be abrogated by war; See Treaty with Prussia
mentioned, supra p. 202, note 5.
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liation of such aliens the same as in time of peace. The treaties
would also avail to gain freedom for the alien in case of deten-
tion by executive authority unless such detention were specifi-
cally authorized by act of congress or unless martial law had
been declared in the territory in question. Where such cases
exist, undoubtedly the courts could not intervene to release
detained enemy persons. In the alien enemies act of 1798 the
detention or removal of such persons is provided for but express
provision is made for the observance of treaty exemptions. 28
During the Civil war numerous detentions of this kind were
made, and although the courts held after the war that they
were not in all cases justifiable according to the constitution,
as a matter of fact while war was in progress judicial process
was of no benefit to the prisoners.-
7 In this case there were, of
course, no treaties providing immunity.
United States law recognizes the principle that all commer-
cial intercourse between enemies stops at the outbreak of war
and the courts will not enforce obligations due to enemies on
contracts or commercial transactions made after the outbreak
of war.28 The principle is, however, by no means of universal
application. Private contracts valid before the war are valid
after it, unless, as in the case of insurance contracts, time is an
element. 29 In such cases war suspends but does not abrogate
contracts. Furthermore contracts made in good faith, which
have no relation to the war, may be enforceable even when made
during war. Such a contract has been upheld where both par-
ties were domiciled in the same territory,
30 and a devise by a
United States citizen to an alien enemy, resident in the enemy
country, was upheld.
31
The confiscation of debts or other enemy property on land
in the absence of express act of the sovereign has also been
forbidden32 by the courts. After the Revolutionary war the
"Act July 6, 1798 i Stat. 577. Rev. Stat. sec. 4067-4070.
27Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
28Scholefield vs. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586; The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155,
(1814) ; President's proclamation Aug. 16, 1861, 12 stat. 1262.
29N. Y. Life Ins. Co. vs. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, (1875).
30Kershaw vs. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561. (1868).
"Fairfax' Devisee vs. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, (1813). On this
general subject see Moore's Digest, 7 ;237-2S4.
"Georgia vs. Brailsford, 3 Dall. i ; Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 ;
Stanbery, Att. Gen., 12 op. 72, (1866) ; Planters Bank vs. Union Bank, 16
Wall. 483; Williams vs. Bruffy. 96 U. S. 176, (1877) ; Brown vs. U. S. 8
Cranch no, (1814).
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courts held state confiscation acts invalid, as conflicting with the
British treaty of peace. The fact that a citizen had paid his
debt to the state treasury was held to be no bar to the British
creditor's right of action.
83 Confiscation acts by congress would
undoubtedly be regarded as valid even when opposed by treat-
ies, as acts of congress are ordinarily held to supersede earlier
treaties. Whether the passage of such an act at all is within
the constitutional competence of congress is a question not con-
sidered here. If the guarantee of enemies against confiscation
of debts were included in the constitution, undoubtedly the
privilege could be enforced even against congress by the power
of the courts to declare laws unconstitutional. In the absence
of a treaty, constitutional provision or federal statute, it is
questionable whether state statutes confiscating enemy debts
could be prevented by the courts.
The confiscation of enemy private property on land when
in the zone of hostilities or in territory under military govern-
ment is justified on principles of necessity under the restric-
tions required in levying requisitions and contributions by the
army. Where the property is in the belligerent state's own
territory, not under martial law, the plea of necessity can not
be offered. In such cases the courts have held that the property
may not be confiscated unless an act of the sovereign specifically
requires. The outbreak of war does not itself confiscate enemy
property, although the court held that confiscation by the sov-
ereign was compatible with international law, a view no longer
held.34
Enemy merchant vessels in the belligerent's jurisdiction on
the outbreak of war are subject to the same rule. By the Hague
convention they may not be confiscated unless by their build
they show that they "are intended for conversion into war
ships." The same convention, however, permits such vessels to
be detained or requisitioned with compensation where they can
not leave in a short time because of "force majeure," but per-
mission to leave in a specified time is declared "desirable".
8*
The United States followed this rule in its naval instructions
8SWare vs. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, (1796).
S4Brown vs. U. S. 8 Cranch 1 10, ( 1814) ; Cargo of Ship Emulous, I
Gall. 562; U. S. vs. 1756 shares of Capital Stock, 5 Blatch. 231.
85Hague Conventions, 1907, vi. This convention has not been signed
or ratified by the United States.
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of the Spanish war.38 The subject has been discussed at greater
length in considering duties of abstention. Suffice it to say here
that the law of the United States attempts to prevent the con-
fiscation of such vessels as well as other enemy private property
in its jurisdiction on the outbreak of war.
"Instructions, June 20, 1898, art. 7, For. Rel. 1898, p. 780; Proclama-
tion, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat. 1770.
CHAPTER XVI. CONCLUSION.
The views enunciated in the foregoing pages are based on
the theory that all rules of conduct, for a breach of which states
as such are held liable, are rules of international law. Viewed
from this standpoint, the rules of international law can be di-
vided into two general classes : ( 1 ) those prescribing conduct for
the sovereign power in states, (2) those prescribing conduct for
persons and governmental agencies subject to the control of the
sovereign power.
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESCRIBING CONDUCT FOR
SOVEREIGN POWERS
In a sense all rules of international law fall in the first
class. The responsibility for the observance of international
law and consequently the duty of enforcing it, rests with sover-
eigns. Yet if we consider the rules themselves, and regard the
conduct prescribed rather than the responsibility imposed, a
large part of them belong in the second class and are capable
of enforcement by municipal law.1
It is hoped that the foregoing pages have indicated what
these rules are and the manner in which they are enforced by
the municipal law of the United States.
The rules of international law which prescribe conduct for
the sovereign alone are known as "political questions", and
embrace such matters as the recognition of new states, and
newly acquired territory, intervention, termination of treaties
and declarations of war. In respect to these matters, interna-
tional law has laid down rules of varying definiteness. It at-
tempts to determine when new states, new governments, and
belligerent and insurgent communities must be recognized, when
intervention is proper, under what conditions treaties may be
terminated, etc. According to the older writers, it detailed the
circumstances under which a just war might be waged. Ob-
servance of these rules, if indeed they are rules of international
1
"This usage thus becomes not merely a rule for the guidance of the
state, but for the guidance, enjoyment and observance of the individual
member of the body politic, and the very claim of the rule in question
makes it of necessity a measure of municipal right and duty." J. B. Scott,
The Legal Nature of International Law, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 1 5857, (1907).
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law at all, is, however, left to the discretion of the political
departments of the government. In the United States the
president and congress act in such circumstances according to
their views of national policy. They may ordinarily follow the
practice of nations in making these decisions, but it is certain
that municipal law can not compel them to do so. The ques-
tions are political in character. Municipal law adjusts itself in
accordance with such political acts, but does not control them.
The judicial and administrative organs of government in these
matters will look to the political organs for guidance, exclu-
sively. They will not look beyond them, to international law.
However, even in rules of this character, where international
law itself does not look down to the officer or individual upon
whose activity the effectiveness of the rule must ultimately
depend, municipal law may perform this step. It may specify
and enforce obligations upon the public officers and subjects of
the state by permanent rule, the performance of which will
insure the observance by the state of those prescriptions of
international law directed to it. Municipal law of such char-
acter, filling in the necessary details of. international law in
reference to the duties of officers and private persons, is of the
greatest importance in considering the legal sanctions for the
enforcement of international law, and has here been referred
to as municipal law, supplementary to international law.
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESCRIBING CONDUCT FOR PERSONS
AND OFFICERS
The second group of rules of international law prescribes
conduct for private persons and public officers. Such rules
may be effectively enforced, may be rules of law in the Aus-
tinian sense, through concurrent enforcement by the municipal
law of all civilized countries. Yet they continue to deserve the
name international because it is on account of the pressure of
international public opinion that they are thus concurrently
enforced by states. 2 States are held internationally responsible
2Fitzjames Stephen remarks that international law is not law so far
as it is international and is not international so far as it is law. (His-
tory of the Criminal Law of England, 2:35). With the Austinian concep-
tion of the law this dilemma is inevitable if we accept the literal meaning
of the term international law, as a law between states. However, by ad-
mitting as rules of international law those in which a vicarious liability
is imposed upon states for acts of individuals, we believe it is possible to
vindicate the term. With such rules the incidence of the liability and of
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for their observance. Many rules of this character as well as
rules supplementary to international law are enforced through
the law of the United States. The obligation to enforce them
has been recognized in treaties, statutes, executive orders and
judicial decisions.
(1) Treaties.
Much of international law has been included in treaties to
which the United States is a party. Especially is this true in
reference to the laws of war and neutrality which have been
to a considerable extent codified in the Hague and other inter-
national conventions. It must, however, be emphasized that
although declared law by the constitution, treaties may embrace
political questions incapable of enforcement through municipal
law. The constitutional provision and the practice of courts
and executive officers in giving direct effect to treaties, so far
as they apply to individuals, impart a municipal sanction to the
rules of international law thus defined.
the sanction are distinct. The rules are international because by general
international practice, states are held liable. Yet the rules may relate to
the conduct of individuals and be capable of sanction by state authority.
In so far as they are thus sanctioned by concurrent adoption into the mu-
nicipal law of states they would conform to Austin's definition of law.
It seems to the author that different writers on the legal nature of inter-
national law have written to cross purposes from failure to reach an agree-
ment as to whether the character of the rule, especially the responsibility
it implies, or the character of the sanction is the criterion of international
law. It is too clear to demand refutation that if no rules are international
law except those enforceable against states, international law can not be
a part of municipal law. We agree that "while the principles which inter-
national law embodies are the product of international usage and agree-
ment, their legal force as rules controlling the administration of justice
between litigants is derived from the sanction of the state whose justice
the courts administer and by whose laws the courts themselves are
created." (Willoughby, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 2:357). This, however,
simply states that effective sanction can be given to rules only through
state authorities, and if this sanction is given the rules are municipal law.
If we take the character of the rule rather than of its sanction as our cri-
terion of international law, Willoughby's statement does not prevent the
rule being at the same time a rule of international law. See J. B. Scott
and W. W. Willoughby, The Legal Nature of International Law, Am.
Jour. Int. Law, i ;83i, 2 1357, and an effort to reconcile these two articles.
Note, Harvard Law Review, 22;66. See also John Westlake, Is Interna-
tional Law it part of the law of England? Law Quar. Rev. 22114.
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(2) Statutes.
Holland calls attention to the fact that in England an
"express recognition of international law in an act of parlia-
ment is extremely rare," 3 and he notes only five cases4 in which
the term is used expressly. In the United States statutes, the
use of the term appears to have been more frequent. "The
law of nations," which is generally used in preference to the
more recent term "international law," is of frequent occur-
rence.
5 The most important statutes bearing on our subject
ST. E. Holland, Studies in International Law, Oxford, 1898, p. 193.
4The term "law of nations" is used in the act relating to the privi-
leges of ambassadors, 1709, (7 Anne c. 12), the prize jurisdiction of the
court of admiralty, 1815 (55 Geo. III. c. 160, sec. 58), The Naval Prize
Act, 1864 (27-28 Viet. c. 25), and "International Law" in the Territorial
Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, (41-42 Viet. c. 73, sec. 7) and the Sea Fish-
eries act, 1883, (46-47 Viet. c. 22, sec. 7). Holland also notes the use of
certain terms peculiar to international law as "neutral ship," "proclama-
tion of neutrality," "belligerent" in a few statutes. Holland, op. cit., p.
194.
5The term "law of nations" has been used in the following cases, pos-
sibly others : A Resolution of Congress, May 22, 1779, states that the United
States will cause the "law of nations to be most strictly observed," (Journ.
Cong. 5;i6i, Ford, ed. I4;635) ; Aug. 2, 1779, the United States will pay
expenses for all prosecutions in states for such "transactions as may be
against the law of nations", (Journ. Cong. 5:232, Ford, ed., 14:914) ; Nov.
23, 1781, recommends that state legislatures provide for the punishment
of offenses relating to violation of safe conducts, breaches of neutrality,
assaults upon public ministers, infractions of treaties, and "the preceding
being only those offenses against the law of nations which are most ob-
vious, and public faith and safety requiring that punishment should be
coextensive with all crimes, Resolved, that it be further recommended
to the several states to erect tribunals in each state, or to vest ones already
existing with power to decide on offenses against the law of nations not
contained in the foregoing enumeration," (Journ. Cong. 7;i8i, Ford, ed.,
21:1137) ; Dec. 4, 1781, Courts to determine prize cases by "the law of na-
tions, according to the general usages of Europe," (Journ. Cong. 7:189,
Ford, ed., 21 11158) ; Constitution, 1789, Congress given power "to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses
against the law of nations," (Art. i, sec. 8, cl. 10) ; Act, Sept. 24, 1789,
District courts given jurisdiction of suits brought by aliens for torts in
violation of "the law of nations or of treaty," and the supreme court
given exclusive jurisdiction of suits against public ministers "as a court of
law can have consistently with the law of nations," (i stat. 76, sec. 9,13;
rev. stat. sec. 563, cl. 16, 687; Judicial code of 1911, act March 3, 1911, 36
stat. 1087, sec. 24, cl. 17, 233) ; Act, Apr. 30, 1790, prescribes criminal pen-
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may be roughly divided into (1) those defining the jurisdiction
of courts, (2) those creating and defining the functions of
public officers, (3) those designed to prevent infractions of
duty by public officers, and (4) those of like effect in reference
to private persons.
(1) The jurisdiction of courts in relation to ambassadors,
consuls, and aliens; over offenses against foreign states; and
over prizes of war have been prescribed both by the constitu-
tion and statutes, often in terms making specific reference to
international law.
(2) Statutes prescribing the functions of such officers as
ambassadors, ministers and consuls, are of distinct importance
in the observance of international law, as also are those giving
executive, naval and military officers authority to perform du-
ties required by international law, such as expelling foreign
vessels of war which have violated neutral rights, and extradit-
ing criminals when required by treaty.
In these two cases, statutes frequently contain rules of
international law itself. When a statute requires a court to
refuse jurisdiction of suits against foreign ministers, the rule
is one both of municipal and international law.
(3) Statutes frequently provide for enforcing the duties
of officers. Naval and military officers and enlisted men are
made subject to military law and to civil liability for damages
in certain cases. Requirements of bond and amenability to
criminal penalties for specified breaches of duty are specified
in the case of diplomatic officers and consuls.
allies for assaulting or serving out process against public ministers, in
"violation of the law of nations," (i stat. 117, sec. 25, 28; rev. stat. sec.
4062, 4064) ; Act, June 5, 1794, authorizes the president to expel foreign
vessels in cases in which "by the law of nations" they ought not to re-
main, (i stat. 384, sec. 8, Act, Apr. 20, 1818, 3 stat. 447, sec. 9; rev. stat.
sec. 5288; Penal Code of 1910, Act, March 4, 1909, 35 stat. 1088, sec. 15) ;
Act March 3, 1819, prescribes punishment for committing piracy "as de-
fined by the law of nations," (3 stat. 513, sec. 5; rev. stat, sec. 5368; Penal
Code of 1910, sec. 290) ; Act, Aug. 29, 1842, permits federal courts to re-
lease on habeas corpus, from state courts, persons claiming any right "the
validity and effect of which depends upon the law of nations," (5 stat.
539; rev. stat 703) ; Joint Resolution, March 4, 1915, authorizes the presi-
dent to prevent the territory of the United States being used as a base of
military operations "contrary to the obligations imposed by the law of na-
tions," (38 stat. 1226).
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(4) In the same manner private persons are made subject
to criminal prosecution for violating neutrality, for assaulting
foreign ministers, for committing offenses against foreign states
such as counterfeiting foreign securities, or for committing
piracy.
Rules in these two classes are not, for the most part, rules
of international law, but rules supplementary to international
law. International law does not prescribe the means to be em-
ployed by the state in compelling persons under its jurisdiction
to observe the rules it lays down, but if they are not properly
observed it holds the state responsible. The enactment and
enforcement of such rules are therefore of great importance in
giving legal sanction to international law. Especially are such
statutes necessary in the United States in view of the fact that
federal courts have no criminal jurisdiction except in so far as
has been conferred by statute.
Statutes defining boundaries, recognizing states, declaring
war, making appropriations to pay indemnities, etc., although
of great international importance are to be regarded as deter-
minations by congress of political questions. They do not fur-
nish permanent rules for the enforcement of international obli-
gations, although they may recognize specific international
duties.
(3) Executive Orders.
Executive orders have been, for the most part, similar in
character to statutes of the third class. They are supplementary
to statutes, generally giving administrative rules in greater
detail for the guidance of public officers. Instructions and reg-
ulations for diplomatic, consular, naval and army officers are
illustrations of rules of this character.
(4) Judicial Decisions.
In practice the courts of the United States have given
most marked recognition and sanction to the rules of interna-
tional law. American courts from the earliest time have given
voice to the doctrine that international law is law in the United
States and must be applied by the courts in appropriate cases.
The philosophy basing law on natural rights, so prominent
among the founders of the Republic, found expression through-
out its constitutional system. There was, it is true, confusion
of thought as to the sources of natural law. The voice of the
people, as expressed in written constitutions limiting the powers
of government, was considered the final criterion by many. The
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courts, however, have tended to recognize natural rights, based
on precepts of morality or reason, to have legal force, even when
not so expressed. Thus while enforcing the authority of constitu-
tions as against legislatures by declaring statutes contrary to
them void, they have sometimes expressed the opinion that cer-
tain fields of legislation are barred by a higher law, not ex-
pressly stated in the constitution.
9
The theory by which international law, is applied by the courts
bears a very close relation to this philosophy. In the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, international law was often
considered a branch of natural law.7 If natural law was a
6Goshen vs. Stonington, 4 Conn. Rep. 209, 225 ; Wilkinson vs. Leland,
2 Pet. 627 ; Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 ; Ham vs. McClaws, i Bay 98
(S. Car. 1789) Bowman vs. Middleton, i Bay 254 (S. Car. 1792) ; Regents
of University vs. Williams, 9 Gill, and J. 365 ; Mayor of Baltimore vs.
State, 15 Md. 376; Benson vs. Mayor of New York, 10 Barb. 244; Robin
vs. Hardaway, Jeff. Rep. 109, 113, (Va.) ; Page vs. Pendleton, Wythe, Rep.,
211, (Va. 1793) ; Quincy, Rep. 200, 474, App. 520, (Mass. 1761-1772) ; Scott
vs. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 556; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 282. The
superior authority of natural law was denied in Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall.
386. English authority for a similar doctrine see, Day vs. Savadge, Ho-
bart, 85, 87 ; Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. i ; City of London vs. Wood, 12 Mod.
669, 687; Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 114 a, 4 Rep. 234; Rawles vs. Mason, Rich.
Brownlow, Rep. 187, 652. See Doctor and Student, written about 1540,
London, 1746, p. 14; Blackstone upholds the superior authority of natural
law, (Commentaries, 1541) but admits later that such laws can not render
an act of parliament void so far as municipal law is concerned. (Ibid.
1591). James Wilson, Works, J. D. Andrews, ed., 2 vols., Chicago, 1896,
p. 415 ; T. M. Cooley, a Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,
Boston, 1903, p. 164; J. B. Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, 2 vol.,
Cambridge, 1895, r Ji J A. L. Lowell, Essays on Government, Boston, 1889,
p. 169; A. C. McLaughlin, The Courts, the Constitution, and Parties, Chi-
cago, 1912, pp. 63-99; Brinton Coxe, An Essay on Judicial Power and Un-
constitutional Legislation, Philadelphia, 1893, pp. 172, 189, 227, 234. C. G.
'
Haines, The Conflict over Judicial Power in the United States to 1870,
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law,
(1909), 35:16-36; C. G. Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Su-
premacy, New York, 1914, pp. 18-24, C. H. Mclllwain, The High Court
of Parliament, N. Y., 1910, pp. 97-108.
'Pufendorf, (1632-1694), Burlamaqui, (1694-1748), and the modern
writer Lorimer derived international law exclusively from natural law.
Blackstone takes a similar view, Commentaries, 1 543, 4 536. For other
writers in the "natural law school" of international law see Bonfils, op.
cit, p. 64; A. S. Hershey, History of International law since the Peace
of Westphalia, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 6530, (1912). For American writers
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higher law to which courts must give effect, so was international
law, although, in the United States, judicial opinion seems
never to have gone the length of holding that it must be applied
even when in derogation of express statute.8
Chief Justice Marshall always maintained that the courts
apply national law alone, but by the regard which he showed
for international comity,
9 and by the stand he took that inter-
national law is incorporated into the law of the United States
and must be applied unless expressly changed by legislation,
he showed the influence of the theory of a higher law.10
asserting this view, see James Wilson, Works, 1528,34; W. J. Duane, The
Law of Nations investigated in a popular manner addressed to the farm-
ers of the United States," Philadelphia, 1809, P- 7-8. Discussion of "The
Influence of the law of nature upon international law in the United States,"
Jesse Reeves, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 3:547, (1909).
8The obligation of courts to apply international law was derived from
the theory of natural law in a number of cases of the latter eighteenth
century. See Rutgers vs. Waddington, Mayor's court of N. Y., 1784, Thay-
ers, cases, 1:63; Res Publica vs. DeLongchamps, i Dall. in, (Pa. 1784) ;
In re Henfield, Fed. Cas. 6360; Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199. British Prize
courts sometimes asserted that they must apply international law even
-when conflicting with executive orders. The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348; The
Maria, i Rob. 350 ; Le Louis, 2 Dods. 239 ; The 'Annapolis, 30 L. J. Pr. M.
and Ad. 201 ; Phillimore, International Law, 3 ; sec. 436. "In the Minerva
(circa 1807) Sir J. Mackintosh, then Recorder of Bombay, and acting un-
der a Commission of Prize, spoke of its being the duty of the judge to
disregard the instructions, supposing them illegal, and to consult only that
universal law to which all -civilized Princes and States acknowledge them-
selves to be subject." Holland, Studies, p. 197, citing Life of Sir. J. Mackin-
tosh, i ;3i7. See also supra p. 147.
9Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116.
10Talbot vs. Seaman, i Cranch i, 37; Murray vs. The Charming
Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 118; The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423; The Antelope,
10 Wheat. 66, 120. The reception of international law into the law of the
United States has been based on three theories, or four if we include the
one just mentioned which really asserts the authority of a "higher law"
superior to international law. These are : (i) International law was part
of the common law and was accepted with it. "The first craft that car-
ried an English settler to the new world was freighted with the common
law, of which the law of nation was and is a part." J. B. Scott, Am. Jour.
Int Law, i ;857, (1907); "It is indubitable that the customary law of
European nations is a part of the common law, and by adoption, that of
the United States," A. Hamilton, Letters of Camillus, No. 20, Works,
Lodge, ed., 9 vols., N. Y. 5 189. (2) International law was impliedly re-
ceived by the terms of the constitution. "The Federal constitution pro-
vides that congress shall have power to define and punish offenses against
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Throughout the history of the United States, the courts have
in theory maintained this view, which was never more emphati-
cally pronounced than in 1900 by the supreme court in the case
of the Paquete Habana.11 And that the courts have in practice
made serious efforts to discover the rule of international law
applicable to the case in hand, is indicated by the character of
the formal sources of law to which they have habitually turned
in rendering opinions upon facts appearing to involve interna-
tional law. Thus the works of publicists, of which those of Vat-
tel, Bynkershoek, Grotius, Wheaton and Kent are probably the
most frequent, have been freely cited.12 Treaties have been
frequently adverted to, as well as statutes and court decisions
of foreign countries, of which those of Great Britain are by
far the most numerous.13 Historical accounts of international
the law of nations and to make rules concerning captures on land and
water. Furthermore it is declared that treaties made under the author-
ity of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land. The effect
of these clauses which recognize the existence of a body of international
laws and the grant to congress of the power to punish offenses against
them, the courts have repeatedly held is to adopt these laws into our
municipal law en bloc, except where congress or the treaty making power
has expressly changed them." W. W. Willoughby, Am. Jour. Int Law,
25365. (3) International* law itself and the privilege of membership in
the family of nations, put the courts of the United States under an obliga-
tion to apply international law in appropriate cases. "The statesmen and
jurists of the United States do not regard international law as having be-
come binding on their country through the intervention of any legislature.
They do not believe it to be of the nature of immemorial usage, 'of which
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.' They look upon its
rules as a main part of the conditions on which a state is originally re-
ceived into the family of civilized nations. If they put it in another
way it would probably be that the state which disclaims the authority of
international law places herself outside the circle of civilized nations."
Sir H. S. Maine, International Law, N. Y., 1887, p. 37. To similar ef-
fect, Phillimore, op. cit. I ;/8 ; Secretary of State Jefferson to Genet,
French Minister, 1793, Am. St. Pap. For. Rel. i;iso; Assist. Secretary of
State Rives to Mr. McGarr, For. Rel. 1888, pt. I, pp. 490, 492; Moore's Di-
gest, i;i-n; See also cases cited, supra p. 16, note 10 and statutes cited
p. 221, note 5.
"The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 604, (1899).
12Other publicists frequently quoted have been Pufendorf, Ruther-
ford, Wicquefort. Wolf, Halleck, Calvo, Perels, Hall.
18On the authority of British prize precedents in United States courts
see Chief Justice Marshall in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, g
Cranch 191, (1815). During the Civil war Lord Stowell's prize decisions
were relied on almost entirely.
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practice have also sometimes been cited as evidence of the rule
of international law on the subject in question.14
The general principles which the courts of the United States
have applied in cases involving international law may be sum-
marized as follows: (1) international law should furnish the
rule of decision in all appropriate cases where there is no con-
stitutional provision, statute, or executive order, authorized by
statute, in direct conflict; (2) treaties are an immediate source
of law on a par with statutes, a later treaty overruling an earlier
statute and vice versa
; ( 3 ) statutes and executive orders when
appearing to conflict with international law should be inter-
preted, if possible, in harmony with the rule of international
law.
It must always be borne in mind that these rules can only
apply to that portion of customary and conventional interna-
tional law which, by its nature, is applicable immediately to
controversies between parties, subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is therefore of the highest importance to consider
what fields of international law the courts consider in this class.
Clearly if the court conceived of the bulk of international law
as rules prescribing conduct for the sovereign power alone, that
is as
"political questions", these liberal principles would be of
little practical effect.
The view of the courts in this respect can only be inferred
from their practice. We have, therefore, given much considera-
tion in this thesis to the question, "From what fields of inter-
national law have the courts actually drawn rules for the deci-
sion of cases?"
These fields in which international law has been actually
applied by the courts may be classified as (1) cases relating to
jurisdiction, (2) cases relating to the rights of the inhabitants
of newly acquired territory, and (3) prize and maritime cases.
By defining the limits of national jurisdiction, according to in-
ternational law, by refusing jurisdiction of extraterritorial of-
fenses, and suits against foreign sovereigns; by refusing to give
extraterritorial effect to laws and by assuming jurisdiction over
prizes of war, courts have enforced duties of international law.
The same is true where courts have supported vested rights and
applied the existing law for the benefit of the inhabitants of
acquired territory. In determining prize cases, the courts have
in general made a faithful effort to apply international law as
14In the Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 694, Justice Gray makes exten-
sive citations from all of the kinds of sources mentioned.
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their theory demanded, although exception should be made in
some of the Civil war cases. So long as international law has
to be applied by national tribunals it can not but be warped
by its proximity to considerations of policy and the inevitable
partisanship of officers, who owe a primary duty to one of the
litigant states.
DIVISION OF POWER BETWEEN STATE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
The division of power between the state and national gov-
ernments has at times resulted in an inability to perform obli-
gations required by international law. The state governments,
not having international relations, and not feeling the pressure
of international public opinion, cannot be relied on to enforce
duties of international law. It would seem, however, that under
the constitution the national government may exercise all pow-
ers necessary to make treaties and obligations of international
law effective. The difficulty lies in the failure of congress to act,
rather than in a constitutional impossibility.
The United States has provided in its municipal law for
the enforcement of numerous rules of international law. How
completely the field is covered we will not venture to assert.
To define exactly what obligations are actually imposed by
international law at any particular time is almost im-
possible. The field of international law is constantly
growing. Matters yesterday considered entirely internal to-
day entail international responsibility and are regulated
by international law. Judicial and administrative officers
must therefore take continuous cognizance of the devel-
opment of international law to insure that they apply it
in appropriate cases, so far as compatible with their duties as
national officers
;
and congress must be constantly on the lookout
for new international duties which require supplementary leg-
islation to be made effective. The failure to provide such
necessary municipal measures does not relieve the state from
international responsibility if a breach of international law
should occur.
IMPORTANCE OP MUNICIPAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The municipal enforcement of international law is a matter
of great importance from the standpoint both of international
law and of national policy. There are no administrative or
judicial authorities with coercive power except those of terri-
torial states. The growth of international unions and admin-
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istrative organs has been rapid in the last few years, but such
bodies still rely on states for effectiveness. Power is essential
to effective sanction15 and power is still controlled by states
exclusively. Eules of international law can not, therefore, be
effective unless enforced by state authorities as municipal law.18
National policy likewise dictates the provision of municipal
measures for enforcing international obligations. Since the
Alabama claims arbitration it has been clear that lack of such
laws will not relieve the state from responsibility. Liability to
indemnity, reprisal or war can only be avoided by a strict ob-
servance of international duty, and this observance can in many
cases be assured only by adequate provisions of municipal law.
"Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, Am. Jour. Int.
Law, i ;io5-i28, 297-320, emphasizes the importance of physical power in
the sanction of law.
"Though not incorporated into municipal law, rules of international
law may be law in the sense of being rules of great authority generally
observed. They would occupy the position which Maine assigns to the
Brehon laws of ancient Ireland. "The Law of Distress was clearly
enough conceived by the B'rehon lawyers, but it depended for the practi-
cal obedience which it obtained on the aid of public opinion and of popu-
lar respect for a professional caste. Its object was to force disputants to
submit to what was rather an arbitration than an action, before a Brehon
selected by themselves, or at most before some recognized tribunal ad-
vised by a Brehon." Sir H. S. Maine, Early History of Institutions,
p. 286. See also ibid. pp. 52, 252.
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Abandoned and Captured Property act, 206.
Abrogation of treaties, 83, 112.
Abstention, belligerent duties of, toward enemies, 198, 201 ; belligerent du-
ties of, toward neutrals, 143, 146; duties of, in time of peace, 23; neu-
tral duties of, 106.
Accepting commissions, 117.
Accretion, acquisition of territory by, 24.
Acquiescence, belligerent duties of, toward enemies, 198; belligerent du-
ties of, toward neutrals, 144; duties of, in time of peace, 45; neutral
duties of, 107.
Acquired territory, liabilities attached to, 56.
Acquisition of territory, 23.
Acts of Congress. See Statutes.
Adjudication of prizes, 187.
Administrative law, international, 88.
Admiralty jurisdiction, extent of, 37.
Alien enemies, protection of, 202, 214; rights of, 214. See also, Enemy
persons.
Aliens, protection of, 78, 81, 97.
Ambassadors. See Diplomatic officers.
Amelia Island affair, 27.
Analogues of contraband, 156.
Anarchists, 75.
Angary, 167.
Anti-Chinese outrages, 96, 97.
Anti-Italian outrages, 80, 96.
Apology, reparation by, 95.
Arbitral Court, permanent, 102.
Arbitral decisions, effect of, on private rights, 102.
Arbitration, permanent court of, 102; submission to, a political question,
101 ; treaties of, 26.
Armed belligerent vessels, neutral goods on, 160.
Army, control of, 175, 207, 210; violations of neutrality by, 172.
Army Instructions, 175.
Army Instructions concerning: rights of non-combatants, 211; requisition,
212; requisition of neutral property, 168; war, law of, 209.
Army Regulations, 68, 175.
Army Regulations concerning: neutrality, preservation of, 173; respect for
foreign territory, 27.
Articles for government of the navy, 177.
Articles of War, 176.
Assistance of foreign justice, 73.
Asylum, right of, 54; for vessels in distress, 65, 177.
Austin, John, 14, 15.
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Base of operations, 112, 113, 119.
Bays, territorial, 32.
Behring Sea seal fisheries, arbitration of, 32; litigation over, 30, 32.
Belligerent duties, toward neutrals, 143; toward enemies, 198.
Bello parta cedunt reipublicae, 193.
Bentham, Jeremy, on international law, n.
Blockade, 149.
Bonfils, H., definition of international law, 13.
Boundaries, 31.
Boundary rivers, See international rivers.
Boxer rebellion, 27.
Breach of municipal law, extraterritorial seizures for, 29.
Canals, interoceanic, 124.
Canning, George, on contributions of the United States to the law of
neutrality, 127.
Care of prizes, 183.
Caroline affair, 27.
Cession, acquisition of territory by, 25 ; of territory, as reparation, 95.
Chesapeake affair, 157.
Citizens, immunity of, from foreign military service, 50; jurisdiction over,
when abroad, 39; responsibility of government for acts of, 71, 72.
Civil population, acts of in time of war, 214.
Claims, prosecution of, 100; of neutral owner of prize, 168. See also
Court of Claims.
Classification of subject matter of international law, 17.
Closed trade, 161.
Combatants, rights of in land war, 209; rights of in naval war, 213.
Commercial embargoes, 123.
Commercial policy, 47.
Common law, theory of territorial jurisdiction, 45.
Compensation for prizes, 168.
Condemnation of prizes, grounds of, 149.
Confiscation of enemy debts, 201, 215; of enemy private property on land,
216; of enemy private property at sea, 202; of neutral property, 169.
Conflict of laws, 46.
Conquest, acquisition of territory by, 24.
Consolato del Mare, 166.
Constitution, power of national government to protect aliens under, 80, 81 ;
power of national government to perform international duties under,
99-
Constitutional guarantees, effect of, on extradition, 91 ; application in ac-
quired territory, 59; application to consular jurisdiction, 60; applica-
tion to military government, 59; protection of aliens, 79, 80.
Constructive enemy character, 159.
Consular conventions, 40.
Consular jurisdiction, 37, 40, 41, 53, 60, 74.
Consular Regulations, 70.
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Consular Regulations concerning: asylum, 55; consuls subject to jurisdic-
tion when abroad, 38.
Consuls, duties under international law, 70; immunities, 52; subject to
jurisdiction when abroad, 39; treaty privileges, 49.
Continuous voyage, application to blockade, 152; application to contraband
trade, 155; application to enemy trade, 162; application to rule of 1756,
163.
Contraband, 153; judicial decisions on, 155.
Contributions, 205.
Converted merchantmen, 181.
Convoy, enemy, 160; neutral, 182.
Cooperation, international, 87.
Corporations, difficulty of controlling by law, 18.
Court of claims, 100; jurisdiction of, 100, 206; in states of the United
States, 103.
Courts martial, 176, 177, 210.
Counterfeit of foreign securities, 73.
Crime, prevention of, 88.
Crimes against international law, 72-78; against diplomatic officers, 75-77;
against neutrality, 117, 118.
Cuba, succession to, 58.
Customs collectors, instructions to, 121, 214.
Customs collectors, instructions to, concerning: alien enemies, protection
of, 214; neutrality, preservation of, 121, 122.
Cutting case, 41.
Damages for prize seizures, 169.
Declaration of London, status of 190.
Declaration of London on: blockade, 150; contraband, 154; destruction of
prizes, 183, 184; neutral and enemy character, 158; neutral convoy, 182;
requisitions, 168 ; resistance to visit and search, 161 ; transfers to neu-
tral flag, 159; treatment of prizes, 183; unneutral service, 157.
Declaration of Paris, 163, 165, 166, 180; on privateers, 180.
De facto government, succession to, 63.
Definitions of international law, 13; of municipal law, 14.
Destruction of enemy prizes, 214; of neutral prizes, 184.
Diplomatic Instructions, 69.
Diplomatic Instructions concerning : conduct of diplomatic officers in bel-
ligerent countries, 126; diplomatic officers subject to jurisdiction when
abroad, 38, 39.
Diplomatic officers, duties in belligerent countries, 126; immunities, 51;
jurisdiction over, when abroad, 38; obligations under international
law, 69; offenses against, 75-77; treaty privileges, 49.
Diplomacy, prosecution of claims by, 100.
Discovery and occupation, acquisition of territory by, 23.
Division of power between state and national governments, 228.
Due diligence, 72, 112.
Duties and rights, 18, 19.
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Embargo, commercial, 123; hostile, 216.
Emigration, 47.
Enemy character of neutral goods, 158.
Enemy goods in neutral vessel, 163.
Enemy license, 161.
Enemy persons, 202, 214.
Enemy private property, on land, 205, 216; at sea, 166, 202, 203.
Enemy ships, enemy goods, 165.
Enemy trade, 162, 215.
Enemy vessel with neutral goods, 165.
Enforcement of international law, II.
Enlisting in foreign service, 117.
Executive Orders, 223.
Executive Orders concerning: alien enemies, protection of, 214; asylum in
public vessels and consulates, 55; consuls, functions of, 38, 55, 70; dip-
lomatic officers, functions of, 38, 69, 126; respect for foreign territory,
27; neutrality, preservation of, 122, 126; neutrality proclamations, 115;
neutrality of Panama Canal, 125; requisition of enemy property, 212;
requisition of neutral property, 168. See also, Army instructions;
Army regulations ; Consular regulations ; Customs officers, instructions
to; Diplomatic instructions; Naval instructions; Navy regulations.
Executive authority, under constitution, 122; under Hague Conventions,
141; under treaties, 85; to preserve neutrality, 120, 122; over army,
68, 175. !76, 210; over consuls, 70, 71 ; over diplomatic officers, 69, 126;
over navy, 68, 126, 177, 212, 213. See also, Political questions; Execu-
tive orders.
Exemptions from territorial jurisdiction, 38, 45, 49, 50.
Exemptions from neutral territorial jurisdiction, 138-141.
Expatriation, 48.
Exterritoriality, 140.
Extradition, 89-92.
Extraterritorial application of law, 42, 43.
Extraterritorial crime, 40.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction, 31, 33, 38, 40, 176-177. See also, Consular ju-
risdiction.
Extraterritorial seizures, in time of peace, 29; by neutrals, 133.
Fishing vessels, enemy, 204.
Florida, invasion of, 27.
Force, use of against foreign states, 26.
Foreign governments, offenses against, 72, 73, 74.
Free ships, free goods, 164.
Fundamental norms of international law, 21.
Geneva Conventions, 202, 209.
Geneva Convention on Naval War, 212.
Gray, J. C, 14, IS-
Greytown affair, 27.
Guano islands, 23.
258 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [258
Hague Conferences, on abolition of prize money, 196; on private enemy
property at sea, 167.
Hague Conventions concerning : belligerent duties of abstention, 146 ; con-
verted merchantmen, 182 ; declaration of war, 201 ; hostile embargo,
216; international prize court, 190; intervention, 26; naval war, law
of, 212 ; neutral duties of abstention, 106 ; neutral duties of prevention,
113; neutral duties of vindication, 129, 130; neutral property on land,
173; neutrality, violations of by navy, 177; non-combatants, rights of,
21 1 ; prohibition of interventions, 26; requisition, 168, 212; requisition
of prizes, 186; reparation for violation of enemy rights, 199; viola-
tions of neutral territory, 173 ; war, declaration of, 201 ; war, law of,
202, 209, 212.
Hague Conventions, judicial application of, 141.
Hague court of arbitration, 102.
Hall, W. E., definition of international law, 13; on American contribu-
tions to law of neutrality, 127.
Halleck, H. W., definition of international law, 13.
Hamilton, A., on relation of international law to municipal law, 225.
Hawaii, succession to, 57.
Hershey, A, S., definition of international law, 13.
Holland, T. E., definition of international law, 13.
Holmes, Justice O. W., on sovereignty, 12.
Hovering laws, 29, 32.
Illegal prizes, restoration of, 135, 136.
Immigration, 47.
Immunity of enemy private property at sea, 167 ; of aliens from military
service, 50, 174; of consuls, 52; of diplomatic officers, 51. See also,
Exemptions from jurisdiction.
Indemnity, reparation by, 95, 96.
Independence of states, 21.
Indian land titles, 23.
Infection, doctrine of, 163.
Insurgent government, succession to, 63.
Insurgents, as pirates, 34; seizure of vessels of, 191.
Insurrection, prevention of by consuls, 74.
International administrative law, 88.
International cooperation, 87.
International law, application of, by courts, 227 ; constitutional recogni-
tion of, 225, 226; crimes against, 72-78; definition of, 12; definitions
of by leading publicists, 13; executive enforcement of, 223; fundamen-
tal norms of, 21 ; importance of municipal law enforcement of, 229 ;
incorporation of, into law of United States, 225; judicial application
of, 227; legislation supplementary to, 223; nature of, n; objects of,
17, 18; relation of, to municipal law, 12, 13, 219, 220, 225; relation of,
to natural law, 224; rules of, prescribing conduct for persons and
officers, 219; rules of, prescribing conduct for sovereign powers, 218;
sources of, 226; statutory recognition of, 221; subjects of, 17, 18.
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International prize court, jurisdiction of, 205.
International rivers, 31 ; right of free navigation of, 64.
Internment of naval forces by neutral, 138.
Interoceanic canals, 124.
Intervention, 26.
Judicial decisions, 223.
Jurisdiction, admiralty, 37; citizens abroad, subject to, 39; consular, 37, 53;
consuls abroad, subject to, 39; diplomatic officers abroad, subject to,
38; exemptions from, 50, 51; exemptions from by statute, 51; exemp-
tions from by treaty, 49; extraterritorial, 31, 38; merchant vessels on
high seas, subject to, 37; military forces abroad, subject to, 38, 141;
naval forces abroad, subject to, 38; pirates subject to, 34; belligerent
warships violating neutrality, subject to, 137 ; prize, 190, 191 ; prizes
seized in violation of neutrality, subject to, 131 ; prizes seized by ves-
sels violating neutrality, subject to, 135; public vessels, exempt from,
77; states, foreign, exempt from, 43. See also, Exemptions from
jurisdiction; Extraterritorial jurisdiction; Consular jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of courts, statutory definition, 222.
Jurisdiction of Court of Claims, 100.
Jurisdiction of courts martial, 176.
Jurisdiction of federal courts, 96, 114, 116; over prizes, 189; over suits in-
volving international law, 104.
Jurisdiction of international prize court, 205.
Jurisdiction of military commissions, 176.
Lawrence, T. J., definition of international law, 13.
Laws of extraterritorial effect, 42, 43; of non-territorial character, 43.
Legislative action, abrogation of treaties by, 83; performance of treaties
by> 85; political determinations by, 223. See also, Political questions;
Statutes ; Supplementary Laws.
Letters of Marque, forbidden by treaty, in.
Letters rogatory, 73.
Liberty of states, 22.
Lieber, Francis, Instructions for the government of the armies in the field,
1 68, 209. See also, Army instructions.
Local responsibility for outrages, 103.
Maine, Sir Henry S., 15, 226, 229.
Marauding Indians, suppression of, 28.
Marshall, Chief Justice John, on law applied by courts, 225; on prize
courts, 148.
Martial law, 207.
Merchant vessels, jurisdiction over, 37.
Military commissions, 176, 210.
Military expeditions, 117.
260 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW [260
Military forces, exemptions from jurisdiction, 50; subject to jurisdiction
when abroad, 38. See also, Army.
Military government, 208; application of constitutional guarantees to, 68;
succession to, 63.
Military law, 175, 208.
Ministers, public. See Diplomatic officers.
Monroe doctrine, 88.
Municipal law, definition of, 15; nature of, II.
National government, power to enforce international obligations, 228;
reparation by, 94.
Natural law, 223, 224.
Natural rights, guaranteed to inhabitants of acquired territory, 60.
Naturalization, 47.
Naval forces, control of, 212, 213, 214; illegal acts by, 137; neutral juris-
diction over belligerent, 137 ; obligations under international law,
68; subject to jurisdiction when abroad, 38; violations of neutrality
by, 177.
Naval Instructions, 178.
Naval Instructions concerning: adjudication of prizes, 188; blockade, 150;
combatants, rights of, 212, 213; contraband, 154; destruction of prizes,
185; exemption of enemy vessels from capture, 204; free ships, free
goods, 164, 165 ; hospital ships, 212 ; hostile embargo, 216 ; non-combat-
ants, rights of, 213; privateers, 180; requisition of neutral property,
168; resistance to visit and search, 161 ; restoration of prizes, 170;
treatment of prizes, 184; visit and search, 183.
Naval officers, duty to preserve neutrality, 126; exemption from neutral
jurisdiction, 138.
Navy, articles for government of, 177; control of, 177.
Navy Regulations, 68, 126, 178, 213.
Navy Regulations concerning: asylum in naval vessels, 55; naval forces
subject to jurisdiction when abroad, 38; neutrality, preservation of,
126; respect for foreign territory, 27.
Necessity, grounds for prize condemnation, 167.
Neutral, belligerent duties toward, 143.
Neutral duties toward belligerent, 106.
Neutral and enemy, character of property, 173.
Neutral flag, transfers to, 159.
Neutral goods in armed enemy vessel, 160; in enemy vessel, 165,
Neutral prize jurisdiction, 132.
Neutral property at sea, 149.
Neutral trade, freedom of, 162.
Neutral vessel with enemy goods, 163.
Neutrality, contributions of United States to law of, 127; obligations of,
administrative enforcement, 120, 122; obligations of, judicial enforce-
ment, 117-120; offenses against, 117-120; violations of, by army, 173;
violations of, forbidden by treaty, no, 114; violations of, means of
preventing, 127.
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Neutrality proclamations, 115.
Neutrality statutes, history of, 114-116.
Non-combatants, rights of, in land war, 210; rights of, in naval war, 213.
Objects of international law, 17, 18.
Obligations of states, 22; to enforce international law, 16.
Offenses against diplomatic officers, 75-77; against international law, 72-
78; against neutrality, 117-120.
Ordinances, See Executive orders.
Panama Canal, 124 ; neutrality of, 125.
Paper blockade, 153, 163.
Passports, carriage of, 161 ; issue of false, 73.
Peace and amity treaties, no.
Philippines, succession to, 58.
Phillimore, Sir Robt., on prize courts, 148.
Piracy, 34-35; privateering designated as, in treaties, in; seizure of ves-
sels for, 191.
Political questions, 17, 19, 25, 106, 143, 201, 218; abrogation of treaties as,
84; commencement of wars as, 201; extent of maritime jurisdiction
as, 33; interventions as, 27; reparations as, 94; reprisals as, 29; sub-
mision to arbitration as, 101.
Porto Rico, succession to, 50.
Preemption, 167.
Prescription, acquisition of territory by, 24.
Presumption of enemy character, 158.
Prevention, belligerent duties of, toward enemies, 199, 207 ; belligerent
duties of, toward neutral, 144, 172; duties of in time of peace, 67;
neutral duties of, 107, no.
Prisoners of war, treatment of, 209.
Private international law, 46.
Private law, effect of succession on, 61.
Private rights, effect of succession on, 52; effect of war on, 215.
Privateering, treaty provisions, in.
Privateers, 137, 180.
Prize bounty, 193.
Prize courts, 147; distribution of prize proceeds by, 193; enemy rights in,
203; establishment of, 188; functions of 192; history of, in United
States, 188, 189; location of, 188.
Prize court, international, 190; jurisdiction of, 205.
Prize jurisdiction, 189; belligerent, 100; neutral, 134.
Prize law, general principles of, 171.
Prize money, 193; abolition of, 195, 196.
Prizes, adjudication of, 187; claim of neutral owner to, 168; condemnation,
grounds of, 149; destruction of enemy, 214; destruction of neutral,
185; enemy, 202; exemptions from capture of enemy, 203, 204; illegal,
131; neutral, 149; ransom of, 185; recaptured, restoration of, 169; re-
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lease of, 187; restoration of illegal, by neutral, 135, 136; restoration
of recaptured, 169; sequestration of, 129, 170, 186; treatment of
enemy, 213, 214; treatment of neutral, 183; vesting of title in, 149.
See also, Blockade ; Contraband ; Unneutral service ; Presumption of
emeny character; Necessity.
Proclamation of blockade, 150; of neutrality, 115; to privateers, 180.
Property on land, enemy, 205; neutral, 174.
Property at sea, enemy, 212; neutral, 149.
Property in transitu, 159.
Public law, effect of succession on, 60.
Public ministers, See Diplomatic officers.
Public officers, responsibility of, 104.
Public vessels, belligerent, neutral jurisdiction over, 159; foreign, exemp-
tion from local jurisdiction, 49, 50, 139 ; foreign, exemption from serv-
ice of legal process, 55; national, subject to jurisdiction when
abroad, 37.
Publicists, frequently cited by courts, 226.
Punishment of offenders as reparation, 97.
Ransom, 185.
Recaptured prizes, restoration of, 169.
Recognition, 19.
Relation of international to municipal law, 12, 13, 218-220, 225-226.
Relation of international law to natural law, 224.
Release of neutral prizes, 187.
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Roman law. theory of territorial jurisdiction, 45.
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Rule of 1756, 161, 162, 163.
263] INDEX 263
Salmond, J. W., definition of municipal law, 15.
Salvage, military, 193, 195.
Sanctions of international law, 14.
Scott, J, B., on relation of international to municipal law, 218.
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probable cause, 183.
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Sequestration of prizes, 129, 130, 186.
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report on, 55, 56.
Slave Trade, 35 ; seizure of vessels for, 141.
Sovereigns, exemption from jurisdiction of, 43, 50; right of legal
recourse by, 144.
Sovereignty, n, 21.
States, foreign, right of legal recourse by, 104.
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effect of, on treaties, 57.
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Territorial sovereignty, 21.
Territorial waters, prize seizures in) 134.
Territory, extent of, 31 ; violations of, 141.
Texan debt, case of the, 57.
Texas, succession to, 57.
Three mile limit, 31.
Trade with the enemy, 162, 215.
Transfer to neutral flag, 159. , j
Transit, title to property in, 159; transfers in, 159,
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Visit and search of slave traders, 35.
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effect of, on treaties, 84; law of, 204; nature of, 209.
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